

POLICY BRIEFING: NOVEMBER 2026

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CONFRONTS ISLAMIST ENTRYISM

From Recognition to Action: A Roadmap for Implementation

Why the October 8, 2026 European Parliamentary resolution matters for the defense of liberal secular democracy, and a roadmap for turning recognition into coordinated, intelligence-led, evidence-based action against Islamist entryism, its funding, and its role in normalizing antisemitism.

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Published in New York

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ISBN 978-1-940186-47-4 (print)
978-1-940186-48-1 (pdf)

CONTENTS

Key findings 4
Executive summary 6
1. Introduction: why this resolution matters 7
2. What did the European Parliament vote on? 9
3. Genealogy: a French template, amplified at the European level 11
4. What the resolution says 14
5. Entryism: a powerful analytic concept, a fragile evidentiary category 15
6. Money: following funds to the end of the chain 20
7. Institutional access and legitimacy 23
8. The terrorist list: what the E.U. can and cannot do 25
9. Fault lines and unintended effects 28
10. Islamist entryism and Jews 30
11. An implementation roadmap 33
12. Conclusion 37
Annex 38
Selected Bibliography 41

DETAILED CONTENTS

Key findings 4

Executive summary 6

1. Introduction: why this resolution matters 7

A contest over ideas, influence, and institutional power 7

Islamism is not Islam 7

Islamism beyond Islamists 7

2. What did the European Parliament vote on? 9

The nature of the resolution 9

A broad but heterogeneous majority 9

The European Commission is the remaining variable 10

3. Genealogy: a French template, amplified at the European level 11

The Chronology of the Resolution 11

What the chronology reveals 12

4. What the resolution says 14

5. Entryism: a powerful analytic concept, a fragile evidentiary category 15

The origin of the term 15

Entryism in the Muslim Brotherhood's own words 15

A milieu rather than a single organization 16

The challenge of establishing proof 17

6. Money: following funds to the end of the chain 20

Fighting entryism through funding 20

Legal constraints 20

Foreign funding 21

7. Institutional access and legitimacy 23

8. The terrorist list: what the E.U. can and cannot do 25

The Muslim Brotherhood and the E.U. terrorist list 25

Terrorist designation: two realistic routes 26

The transatlantic comparison 26

9. Fault lines and unintended effects 28

10. Islamist entryism and Jews 30

Antisemitism and hatred of Israel as indicators of Islamism 30

From theology to the language of antiracism 31

11. An implementation roadmap 33
European Commission formal response (by early January) 33
Pillar one: network mapping 33
Pillar two: tracing of funds and foreign influence 34
Pillar three: preventing institutional capture 34
Pillar four: strengthen democratic resilience 35
Cooperation and enforcement 35
Collective action 36
Proposed timetable 36
12. Conclusion 37
Annex 38
Table 1. Vote of October 8, 2026, by political group 38
Table 2. Timeline, May 2025 to October 2026 38
Table 3. The resolution's four policy levers in light of existing law 39
Table 4. Grading links according to evidentiary value 39
Table 5. Four registers that must never be conflated 40
Table 6. Indicators to monitor through spring 2027 40
Selected Bibliography 41
Institutional documents 41
Press, statements, and analysis 41
Bibliographic references 41

KEY FINDINGS

1. **Recognizing a threat beyond terrorism.** By 381 votes to 167, the European Parliament has recognized Islamist entryism as more than a counterterrorism issue. Nonviolent Islamist influence becomes a distinct object of European public policy, framed as a question of democratic resilience.
2. **One front in a global Islamist insurgency.** Entryism must be understood within a wider contest over ideas, influence, and institutional power that challenges liberal secular democracy. The Brotherhood's own texts, from the works of Hassan al-Banna to the 1991 *Explanatory Memorandum*, describe a phased project whose logic is not sudden takeover but settling in and taking root.
3. **Islam is not Islamism.** The resolution distinguishes Islam as a religion from Islamism as a political ideology, stating that Islam "is not intrinsically political or hostile." The target is a political project, not a faith or its believers. That distinction protects Muslim citizens and supports the Muslim reformers whom the resolution asks Europe to back.
4. **Islamism beyond Islamists.** A central entryist tactic is to advance and normalize Islamist narratives and objectives through the witting or unwitting agency of people and institutions from outside Islamist movements. A very successful example of this tactic was seen in the 2021 Council of Europe "freedom is in hijab" campaign, in which a major European institution was co-opted into lending its name and funding to precisely such a narrative.
5. **Antisemitism, hatred of Israel, and conspiracism are central indicators.** The resolution names antisemitism, "hatred of Israel," and conspiracy narratives among the indicators of Islamist influence, linking the fight against Islamist entryism to the E.U. Strategy on Combating Antisemitism.
6. **Money, foreign influence, and access are the levers.** The resolution calls for E.U. funds to be traced to their final beneficiaries, scrutinizing foreign funding linked to Qatar or Turkey, and conditioning access to E.U. institutions. These are the resources through which entryism acquires reach and legitimacy.
7. **Recognition must now become action.** The Commission must respond in writing by early January 2027. It should use that formal response to set a timetable for a coordinated, intelligence-led, evidence-based E.U. strategy to map networks, trace funding and foreign influence, prevent institutional capture, and strengthen democratic resilience.
8. **Cooperation and listings, where the law allows.** Member States, Europol, and Eurojust must cooperate on analysis and cases. The Council should assess terrorist listings wherever legal thresholds are

met, beginning with Brotherhood branches designated by Washington and Hamas financiers under the E.U.'s 2024 sanctions regime.

9. **The rule of law is a condition of success.** E.U. financial law and the terrorist list both require established facts. Mere labeling will fail in court, handing Islamist networks a narrative of persecution, while documented evidence will hold. Defending liberal secular democracy demands collective action by governments and civil society, with political will and respect for the rule of law.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 8, 2026, the European Parliament adopted, by 381 votes to 167 with 15 abstentions, a resolution calling for an E.U. strategy to counter "Islamist entryism" and the influence of Muslim Brotherhood networks.[1] The resolution recognizes Islamist entryism as more than a counterterrorism issue, to be understood in context of a wider global Islamist insurgency that challenges the very foundations of liberal secular democracy. It distinguishes Islam as a religion from Islamism as a political ideology, and it names both antisemitism and hatred of Israel among the indicators of radicalisation. The Introduction sets out this framing, including the central role of what ISGAP terms "Islamism beyond Islamists."

The resolution bans no organization and has no binding force. Its immediate consequence is that the Commission must respond in writing by early January 2027. Recognition must now become action. This briefing sets out a roadmap:

- **The Commission** should use its formal response to set a timetable, a mandate, and a public evidentiary standard for a coordinated, intelligence-led, evidence-based E.U. strategy, with the recognition that both antisemitism and hatred of Israel are indicators of Islamist radicalization or influence.
- **The strategy** should rest on four pillars: mapping of networks; tracing of funding and foreign influence, including foreign funding of universities; prevention of institutional capture; and strengthening of democratic resilience.
- **Member States, Europol, and Eurojust** must cooperate on intelligence, analysis, and cross-border cases, including terrorism finance and the reconstitution of dissolved organizations.
- **The Council** should assess terrorist listings wherever legal thresholds are met, beginning with Brotherhood branches designated by Washington and Hamas financiers under the E.U.'s 2024 sanctions regime.
- **Governments must act together with civil society institutions**, including universities, media, and Jewish and Muslim community organizations.

Implementation can succeed only within the rule of law. E.U. financial law and the terrorist list both require established facts, so every measure must rest on documented evidence, not mere labeling. Defending liberal secular democracy demands collective action by governments and civil society, with political will and respect for the rule of law.

[1] European Parliament resolution 20206/2868 (RSP), 'The need for an EU strategy to counter Islamist entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood network', 8 Oct 2026, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0342_EN.html

1. INTRODUCTION: WHY THIS RESOLUTION MATTERS

A contest over ideas, influence, and institutional power

For two decades, European policy toward Islamism was organized around the idea of violence. Jihadist attacks were the threat, and counterterrorism was the response. The October 8 resolution marks a change of focus. It recognizes that Islamist movements also pursue their objectives through non-violent means: via associations and foundations, public subsidies and consultations, educational networks, and the language of fundamental rights. Violence and entryism are different methods within the same wider global Islamist insurgency: a contest over ideas, influence, and institutional power that challenges the foundations of liberal secular democracy.

The Brotherhood's own literature describes this strategy. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, set out a staged progression from the reform of the individual to the reform of government and, finally, "mastery of the world."[2] Youssef al-Qaradawi, for decades the Brotherhood's spiritual leader, advised Muslims in the West to build "their small society within the larger society."[3] The logic is gradual consolidation, not sudden takeover. Sections 2 and 4 of this briefing trace that genealogy and the evidence for it.

Islamism is not Islam

The resolution draws the distinction on which any credible policy depends. According to its recitals, "Islam, as a religion, is not inherently political or hostile", while entryism is a strategy that "relies ... on the organized confusion between Islam as a religion ... and political Islam as a societal project."[4] Céline Imart, who introduced the text, further stressed the need to distinguish Islam as a faith from political Islam as an ideology.[5] This distinction is not a concession. It is the precondition for effective action. It ensures that policy targets a political ideology and its organizations, not Muslim citizens or their faith, and it strengthens those Muslim intellectuals and activists who defend democracy and freedom of conscience, whom the resolution explicitly calls on European institutions to support.

Islamism beyond Islamists

Islamist entryism involves the advancement and normalization of Islamist narratives and objectives through the witting or unwitting agency of people and institutions outside Islamist movements. Public bodies provide funding through intermediaries without adequately scrutinizing how those funds are ultimately used. Institutions engage with and consult organizations without fully examining their broader

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2 Ḥasan al-Bannā, 'Risālat al-Taʿālīm' [Message of the Teachings], in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Cairo: Dār al-Daʿwa, n.d.); Limor Lavie, 'The Ambiguity of the Quest for Mastership of the World: The Concept of *Ustāḍiyyat al-ʿĀlam* in the Doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood', *Religions*, 14/9 (2023), 1144, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091144, accessed 20 October 2026.

3 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase* (Swansea: Awakening Publications, 2000); quoted in Lorenzo Vidino, 'Aims and Methods of Europe's Muslim Brotherhood', *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 4 (2006), Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/aims-and-methods-of-europe-s-muslim-brotherhood, accessed 20 October 2026.

4 EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), recitals C and D

5 European Jewish Congress, "European Parliament adopts resolution on Islamist entryism and Muslim Brotherhood networks," October 2026.

ideological objectives, affiliations or agendas. Coalitions formed around antiracism or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often frame issues in an Islamist – and even overtly antisemitic – narrative for audiences that would never knowingly join an Islamist group. The Council of Europe's 2021 campaign promoting the message that "freedom is in hijab", co-funded by the E.U. but subsequently withdrawn following public criticism, provides one of the clearest European examples of an institution lending its legitimacy and financial support to a superficially "anti-racist" narrative without adequately examining the broader ideological implications.

When we consider the above, it becomes clear that the good intentions expressed in the resolution must be realised not only through criminal law, but also through the application of policy levers relating to money and access. Such policy implementation must be very precise. As the above discussion shows, contact with an Islamist organization does not make a person or institution part of that organization. The key question is of how to interrupt the knowing or unknowing adoption, legitimization, and financing of Islamist narratives and objectives.

2. WHAT DID THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT VOTE ON?

The nature of the resolution

The debate took place on Wednesday, October 7, 2026, in the presence of Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner.[6] The roll-call vote on the text as a whole took place the following day. Tabled by the European People's Party, motion B10-0424/2026, entitled "The need for an E.U. strategy to counter Islamist entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood network," was adopted by 381 votes to 167, with 15 abstentions, among 563 members voting.[7]

The legal position is straightforward: a resolution of this kind is neither a regulation nor a directive. It creates no binding obligation for Member States and establishes no criminal offense. It states the Parliament's position and addresses requests from other institutions. It also creates a follow-up mechanism: under the 2010 Framework Agreement governing relations between Parliament and the Commission, the Commission must set out in writing, within three months, the manner in which it intends to respond to the specific requests made by Parliament. It is therefore inaccurate to describe the vote, as some activist networks did on the evening of October 8, as a "ban on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe." It would be equally mistaken to dismiss it as merely symbolic.[8]

A broad but heterogeneous majority

The voting pattern reflected a clear political divide, primarily along left and right ideological lines. The European People's Party (143 in favor, with only one vote against, from Finland's Sirpa Pietikäinen), the European Conservatives and Reformists (72), Patriots for Europe (67), and Europe of Sovereign Nations (25) voted almost unanimously in favor. Renew Europe followed by a clear majority (62 in favor, 3 against, 2 abstentions). The Socialists and Democrats (84 against), the Greens/European Free Alliance (40 against), and The Left (35 against) opposed the text with near-total cohesion. This is to say that the coalition that ordinarily supports the Commission split over the issue (see Annex, Table 1).

A counterfactual calculation clarifies the role of each bloc:

- Remove the 164 votes cast by the three groups to the right of the European People's Party, and the resolution still passes, 217 to 167.
- Remove Renew Europe's votes, and it still passes, 319 to 164.

Although neither bloc was arithmetically necessary to secure the resolution's adoption, Renew's contribution was politically significant. By lending its support as a liberal, centrist party, it made it harder to characterize the resolution as a radical-right initiative, and gave the text, in Brussels terms, a degree of mainstream legitimacy that

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[6] Magnus BRUNNER is an Austrian politician and a member of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). In 2024, after serving as Federal Minister of Finance, he became European Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration.

[7] European Parliament, motion for resolution B10-0424/2026 tabled by the EPP Group, procedure 2026/2868(RSP); plenary debate on October 7, 2026; vote on October 8, 2026.

[8] Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ L 304, November 20, 2010, p. 47. The three-month period applies to specific requests contained in Parliament resolutions.

the support of right-wing groups alone would not have conferred. Nathalie Loiseau, who negotiated on Renew's behalf and also chairs the European Parliament's special committee on the European Democracy Shield, described the outcome as a "well-deserved victory" for her group, while emphasizing that Renew had resisted far-right attempts to conflate Islamism with Islam.[9]

The voting pattern among French MEPs broadly reflected the divisions of domestic politics. Les Républicains, Rassemblement National, Reconquête and Identité-Libertés voted in favor of the resolution, alongside members of Renaissance, MoDem and Horizons. The only exceptions among the latter groups were Pascal Canfin and Bernard Guetta, who abstained. In contrast, the Socialists, the Greens and La France Insoumise voted against.

Céline Imart, a French Member of the European Parliament from the center-right Les Républicains, played a prominent role in advancing the resolution, describing the vote as "historic" and declaring: "I broke a taboo that Europe had been dragging like a chain."[10] She went further, asserting: "From now on, not a single euro of public money will go to Islamists." François-Xavier Bellamy, head of the Republican delegation, was more measured: "This vote is not an end in itself."[11] With the French presidential election only six months away, it would be naive not to interpret the vote, at least in part, as an exercise in pre-election political positioning.

The European Commission is the remaining variable

Commissioner Brunner said that the Commission was taking these concerns "very seriously," while noting that Member States differ in their assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood's precise role. That qualification is important. It points to a Commission that is unlikely to move faster than a Council consensus that has yet to be built.

[9] Renew Europe, "Islamist entryism: no EU money for those who undermine European values," statement of October 8, 2026.

[10] Céline Imart, a French Member of the European Parliament from the center-right Les Républicains,

[11] Frères musulmans : le Parlement européen adopte une résolution contre l'entrisme islamiste', *Le Journal du Dimanche*, 8 October 2026, https://www.lejdd.fr/politique/freres-musulmans-le-parlement-europeen-adopte-une-resolution-contre-lentrisme-islamiste-185556, accessed 20 October 2026 (author's translation from the French).

3. GENEALOGY: A FRENCH TEMPLATE, AMPLIFIED AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

The Chronology of the Resolution

The Strasbourg vote marked the culmination of a seventeen-month sequence of developments rather than an isolated political initiative (see Annex, Table 2).

In France, this process began with the publication in May 2025 of the report *Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islam in France,* authored by diplomat François Gouyette and prefect Pascal Courtade and released at the initiative of Bruno Retailleau, then Minister of the Interior. The report identified 139 places of worship affiliated with Musulmans de France, described as the Brotherhood's "national branch," and 68 others considered close to it, roughly 7 percent of France's approximately 2,800 Muslim places of worship, as well as 21 schools enrolling about 4,200 students. It characterized Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations as the youth branch of the Council of European Muslims and as a structure for training promising cadres within the movement.[12] Its central interpretation was one of "bottom-up" entryism, operating primarily through municipal and associational channels rather than through sudden and overt takeover of institutions.[13]

Two parliamentary initiatives emerged from this French template. On January 22, 2026, the National Assembly adopted, by 157 votes to 101, a proposed European resolution initiated by Republican deputies calling on the Commission to ask the Council to place "the Muslim Brotherhood movement" and its leaders on "the European list of terrorist organizations."[14] On May 5, the Senate adopted at first reading, by 208 votes to 124, Bruno Retailleau's bill "to combat Islamist entryism in France." Among other provisions, the text would create an offense targeting coordinated efforts to induce an organization to adopt unlawful practices with the aim of seriously undermining constitutional principles and would require the prefect's binding approval for the construction of any place of worship.

The French government, under the current Minister of the Interior Laurent Nuñez, is separately preparing legislation on separatism and entryism that would add entryism as a ground for administrative dissolution, also authorizing asset freezes, and prohibiting dissolved organizations from engaging in any activity in France after reconstituting themselves abroad. The intended target of this last provision is hardly obscure: the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, dissolved in December 2020, reconstituted itself in Belgium as the Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe.[15]

The issue subsequently gained traction beyond France, with the Dutch House of Representatives adopting a motion in March 2026 calling on the government to ban

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[12] Musulmans de France is the current name of the UOIF (Union des organisations islamiques de France), created in 1983 by a grouping of associations described as ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood milieu.

[13] F. GOUYETTE and P. COURTADE, Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France [Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islam in France], report to the Minister of the Interior, made public on May 21, 2025. The data were also reported by Il Sole 24 Ore, "The European debate on the Muslim Brotherhood: a strategy of influence takes centre stage," September 30, 2026.

[14] French National Assembly, European resolution calling for the Muslim Brotherhood movement to be added to the EU list of terrorist organizations, adopted text no. 215, January 22, 2026.

[15] French Senate, bill to combat Islamist entryism in France, adopted at first reading on May 5, 2026; see Public Sénat, "Entrisme islamiste: que contient le texte de Bruno Retailleau qui arrive en séance?" and Il Sole 24 Ore, cited above, for the vote count.

the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations. That same month, at the European Parliament, Dutch MEP Bert-Jan Ruissen (European Conservatives and Reformists) and Czech MEP Tomáš Zdechovský (European People's Party) organized a conference entitled *Safeguarding Europe: Exposing the Growing Threat of the Muslim Brotherhood*. At a late June meeting in Vienna, the European People's Party Political Assembly adopted a resolution on interference by political Islam in European democratic processes. It called for an end to E.U. support for the movements concerned, as well as the exclusion of actors linked to them, closer scrutiny of undesirable foreign funding, and a common framework of indicators, potentially supported by Europol.[16]

Developments across Europe unfolded alongside a significant shift in U.S. policy towards specific branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, beginning with Executive Order 14362 of 24 November 2025, which initiated a process to consider the designation of those branches as terrorist organizations. On 13 January 2026, the U.S. State Department designated the Lebanese branch (*al-Jamâ'a al-islâmiyya*) both as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, while the Treasury Department designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches as Specially Designated Global Terrorists for providing material support to Hamas. Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized these measures as the opening steps of an "ongoing, sustained effort" to counter the activities of Muslim Brotherhood branches. The policy was subsequently extended to Sudan on 9 March 2026, when Washington announced the designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.[17]

What the chronology reveals

First, the developments illustrate a process familiar to scholars of European integration: bottom-up Europeanisation, through which a Member State shapes E.U. policy by promoting its domestic approaches, terminology and policy instruments at the European level. France has played a leading role in this process, providing the analytical framework, introducing concepts such as "separatism" and "entryism", advancing policy instruments, including administrative dissolution, the Republican Commitment Contract, and financial oversight, and supplying some of the principal political figures behind the initiative.

More significant, however, is the Vienna resolution's framing of politico-religious interference alongside Russian and Chinese state interference. The importance of this comparison should not be underestimated, as it brings Islamism within the E.U.'s established policy framework for countering foreign interference and strengthening democratic resilience. This framework, developed in response to threats from Moscow and Beijing, was further institutionalized in November 2025 through the European Democracy Shield. The E.U. already has mechanisms, policy instruments and funding arrangements designed to address such threats. The strategic

[16] European People's Party, Interference of Political Islam in European Democratic Processes, resolution adopted by the EPP Political Assembly, Vienna, June 29-30, 2026.

[17] Executive Order 14362 of November 24, 2025; State Department and Treasury Department designations of January 13, 2026; State Department designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, March 9, 2026.

significance of the resolution lies in its potential to extend these existing tools to Islamist interference, rather than requiring an entirely new policy framework.

A further conclusion concerns the importance of sustained research and engagement in shaping public policy. Despite the continuing political sensitivities surrounding Islamism, years of analysis and explanatory work by specialists in political Islam have helped to inform the debate and deepen institutional understanding of the issues involved. This demonstrates how sustained research, evidence and engagement can gradually influence perceptions, shape policy priorities and create the political and institutional conditions necessary for action at both national and European levels.

4. WHAT THE RESOLUTION SAYS

The proposed version of the resolution initially tabled by Céline Imart on behalf of the European People's Party establishes its analytical framework by defining "entryism" as "a political strategy of influence, progressive structuring, institutional penetration, and ideological legitimization ." [18] It describes Islamist entryism in Europe as operating through "a broad and fragmented ecosystem of associations, foundations and cultural, educational, religious, charitable, university, youth, anti-discrimination or social action structures"[19] capable of adopting "the vocabulary of fundamental rights, inclusion, diversity, intercultural dialogue, anti-racism and the fight against discrimination" whilst simultaneously pursuing a divisive and anti-democratic agenda.[20] The text also identifies several indicators of concern, including "separatist narratives, systematic victimhood, antisemitism, hatred of Israel, conspiracy narratives, challenges to secularism, the use of religion as a tool or social control [and] the contestation of equality between women and men."[21]

An important aspect of the resolution that has received relatively little attention is its explicit identification of specific organizations. The text recommends excluding the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations from E.U. institutions,[22] recognizing the former and the European Network Against Racism as two among several organizations which have either received or been associated with projects receiving European Union funding despite having "raised serious questions regarding their ideological, institutional or financial links with networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or political Islam".[23] Naming organizations in a non-legislative resolution carries political and reputational consequences, even where the resolution itself has no binding legal effect. Such references can influence institutional relationships, public perceptions and future funding decisions without necessarily being subject to a formal process in which the organizations concerned can challenge the allegations. The significance of these implications was not lost on the organizations involved, which mobilized their responses within hours of the vote.

Equally significant, although largely overlooked, is the resolution's call for greater support for Muslim intellectuals and activists who "defend democratic values, freedom of conscience [and] equality between women and men," and who "fight against antisemitism" and resist "Islamist pressure".[24]

The resolution otherwise calls for the use of four policy levers: network identification, control over funding, denial of institutional access, and cooperation leading to targeted sanctions. Table 3 in the Annex compares each lever with instruments already available under E.U. law and identifies the points at which implementation is likely to encounter legal obstacles.

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18 Céline Imart, 'MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the need for an EU strategy to counter Islamist entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood network' (2026/2868(RSP)), 30 Sep 2026, recital C. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-10-2026-0424_EN.html

19 Imart, recital F

20 Imart, recital J

21 Imart, recital E

22 EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), operative clause 12

23 EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), recital J

24 EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), operative clause 8.

5. ENTRYISM: A POWERFUL ANALYTIC CONCEPT, A FRAGILE EVIDENTIARY CATEGORY

The origin of the term

The term was not initially coined in relation to Islamism. It comes from Trotskyism, and its so-called "French turn". In 1934, Leon Trotsky (at one time a senior member of the Soviet leadership, but by that point living in exile) urged his French supporters to join the precursor of today's Socialist Party in order to win over its left wing without abandoning their own organization or program. Since then, the word "entryism" has referred to the tactic of entering a host organization in order to reshape it from within in the service of primary loyalties which lie elsewhere.

The Muslim Brotherhood also has much else in common with revolutionary communist movements such as Trotskyism. It borrowed from the secular revolutionary parties of its era a strong organizational culture: basic cells (*usar*, literally "families"), an oath of allegiance (*bay'a*), a hierarchy, and a degree of secrecy, all described in the late 1960s by the scholar Richard P. Mitchell.[25] However, the entryism that it practices does not necessarily follow the original Trotskyist model, with orders issued to disciplined operatives from a central command structure. Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Islamism in Europe rarely functions so neatly.

Entryism in the Muslim Brotherhood's own words

Concerns over entryism are rooted, at least in part, in the Muslim Brotherhood's own ideological and doctrinal writings. In *Risalat al-Ta'alim* (the "Epistle of Teachings"), Hasan al-Banna outlines a progressive sequence through which the Brotherhood seeks to achieve its objectives, beginning with the reform of the individual, followed by the establishment of the Muslim household, the transformation of society, the "liberation" of the homeland, the reform of government, the restoration of the international unity of the *umma* (i.e. the worldwide community of Muslims), and ultimately the attainment of "mastery of the world" (*ustadhiyyat al-'alam*)[26]. This gradualist approach, subsequently developed in Brotherhood literature through the concept of *tamkîn* (consolidation or entrenchment), provides an important framework for understanding the movement's long-term strategy and its engagement with the societies and institutions in which it operates. Rather than relying on direct confrontation or the immediate seizure of institutional power, this approach emphasizes the gradual establishment of influence, the cultivation of relationships and the progressive entrenchment of the movement's ideas, networks and objectives within society.[27]

Al-Banna's focus was the Muslim world, his immediate ambition being the overthrow of the secular Muslim rulers of majority-Muslim states. Islamists in the west were in a very different situation. Founded in 1997 by Youssef al-Qaradawi, the European

[25]Richard P. MITCHELL, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

[26] Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi, '*Risālat al-taʿālīm*: A Translation and Historical Contextualization of Ḥasan al-Bannā's "Letter of the Teachings"', *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, n.s., 94/2–4 (2021), 47–70, https://doi.org/10.19272/202103804003, accessed 20 October 2026; see also Lavie, 'The Ambiguity of the Quest for Mastership of the World'.

[27]Hassan al-Banna, *Risâlat al-ta'âlîm* [The Epistle of the Teachings], in *Majmû'at rasâ'il al-imâm al-shahîd Hasan al-Bannâ* [The Collected Letters of the Martyred Imam, Hassan al-Banna]. For discussion, see G. Krämer, *Hasan al-Banna*, Oxford: Oneworld, 2010.

Council for Fatwa and Research developed a "jurisprudence of minorities" (*fiqh al-aqalliyyât*) intended to keep Muslims in the West within an Islamist normative framework while permitting full participation in civic life. In a 1990 text on the priorities of the Islamist movement, al-Qaradawi advised Muslims living in the West to build "their small society within the larger one," lest they dissolve into it "like salt in water."[28] The logic is clear: remain distinct enough not to disappear, while integrating just so far as is necessary in order to exert influence.[29]

Two documents recovered during law enforcement investigations offer important insights into the strategic thinking associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The first, *Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy*, dated 1 December 1982 and commonly referred to as "The Project", was reportedly discovered during a November 2001 police search of material associated with Youssef Nada[30] in Campione d'Italia. The second, *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America*, written in May 1991 by Mohamed Akram, a senior Brotherhood figure in the United States, was recovered by the FBI in 2004 and subsequently admitted into evidence during the Holy Land Foundation proceedings, which resulted in convictions in 2008. The memorandum characterized the Brotherhood's activities in North America as a form of "grand jihad" aimed at "eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within." Although these documents provide evidence of long-term strategic thinking, they should not be treated as definitive blueprints uniformly adopted or implemented across the movement. Questions concerning their formal status, particularly the authorship and organizational authority of the 1982 document, require careful distinction. Nevertheless, their contents offer valuable insights into a revolutionary strategy characterized by gradual institutional influence, organizational consolidation and long-term ideological objectives.[31]

A milieu rather than a single organization

Scholarly research on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe increasingly describes a movement organized through overlapping circles of affiliation and influence, rather than a single, centrally directed organization. Brigitte Maréchal has demonstrated how Brotherhood affiliation in Europe extends beyond formal membership to encompass varying degrees of ideological affinity, organizational association, and occasional loyalty.[32] Lorenzo Vidino distinguishes among organizations founded by Brotherhood members and linked to the movement, organizations that originated in that milieu but no longer have an organic tie, and organizations subject to its influence; drawing on former members' testimony, he has also reconstructed the

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28 Youssef al-Qaradâwî, *Awlawiyyât al-haraka al-islâmiyya fî al-marhala al-qâdima* [Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase], 1990.

29 For detailed analysis, especially in relation to Islamist entryism in France, see Mohamed SIFAOUI, *Taqiyya: Comment les Frères musulmans veulent infiltrer la France* [Taqiyya: How the Muslim Brotherhood Seeks to Infiltrate France], Éditions de l'Observatoire, 2019.

30 Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Paris: Seuil, 2005); see also Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), https://www.fpri.org/books/the-new-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-west/.

31 *An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America*, May 22, 1991, entered into evidence in United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.

32 Brigitte MARÉCHAL, *Les Frères musulmans en Europe. Racines et discours* [The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe: Roots and Discourses], Paris: PUF, 2009.

"closed circle" that forms the movement's core.[33] Bernard Rougier and his team have described local "ecosystems" in which mosques, associations, bookstores, and businesses overlap.[34] Since 2019, one author has used the term *frérisme* ('Brotherhoodism') to describe both an ideology and a diffuse network whose coherence rests more on a shared project than on anything that could be represented by a formal organizational chart.[35]

The October 8, 2026 resolution broadly reflects the understanding outlined above by adopting the conceptual vocabulary of networks and ecosystems, whether explicitly or otherwise. While this approach provides a useful framework for understanding how Islamist influence can extend beyond formal organizational structures, it also presents a fundamental legal challenge. A network or ecosystem may be a valid subject of political and security analysis, but it is not, in itself, a legal entity that can be sanctioned. Legal action must instead be directed at identifiable individuals or organizations, supported by evidence of specific conduct and assessed against the applicable legal standards.

The challenge of establishing proof

One of the most significant challenges in addressing Islamist entryism lies in establishing the evidence necessary to justify legal and administrative action. For example, the resolution identifies "institutional doublespeak" as a warning sign of entryism.[36] Treating such "doublespeak" as indicative of a need for special caution presupposes the possibility of drawing a distinction between publicly stated positions and underlying intentions or objectives. Yet public authorities cannot rely on suspected intentions alone. Whether an administration is withdrawing public funding, a court is reviewing an order to dissolve an organization, or the Council of the European Union is considering the inclusion of an entity on a sanctions list, decisions must be grounded in demonstrable facts and satisfy applicable legal standards. This presents a fundamental challenge for constitutional democracies, in which the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law require allegations to be supported by evidence. In France, administrative measures against Islamist organizations have sometimes been overturned by the courts because the evidence or legal justification was insufficient. The organizations concerned can subsequently portray these decisions as judicial victories, suggesting that the courts have vindicated not only their legal position but also their wider activities and objectives.

Rigorous research can, however, provide a means of identifying and documenting the characteristic forms of "doublespeak" employed by Islamists engaged in entryism. The most effective approach is comparative, examining how the same organization presents its beliefs, objectives, and activities to different audiences and in different contexts. This may involve comparing statements made before parliamentary committees with messages delivered in sermons, comparing public communications in English or French with those issued in Arabic or Turkish, or comparing official

[33] Lorenzo VIDINO, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West; The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West, New York: Columbia University Press, 2020.
[34] Bernard ROUGIER (ed.), Les Territoires conquis de l'islamisme [Territories Conquered by Islamism], Paris: PUF, 2020.
[35] SIFAOUI, *Taqiyya*.
[36] EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), operative clause 6.

press releases with materials used in internal training programs. Such analysis becomes particularly valuable when combined with research into organizational leadership, examining the professional backgrounds of key individuals, the positions they have occupied, and their connections and movement across organizations and institutions. When supported by the reconstruction of financial flows and institutional relationships, this comparative analysis can help establish patterns of behavior, inconsistencies in public and internal messaging, and connections between individuals and entities. In doing so, it provides a basis for moving beyond mere suspicions about concealed intentions toward a documented and verifiable body of evidence.

Germany provides an instructive example of how this challenge has been approached. For years, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has monitored organizations and individuals associated with what it terms "legalistic Islamism" (*legalistischer Islamismus*), a category describing actors who pursue Islamist political objectives through ostensibly lawful means rather than through violence. Austria, by contrast, illustrates the legal and institutional risks of pursuing investigations that are not sufficiently supported by individualized evidence. Operation Luxor, launched in November 2020, targeted more than sixty individuals suspected of involvement in Islamist networks, but the investigations subsequently encountered significant legal setbacks. The Graz Higher Regional Court later ruled that nine searches had been unjustified because the authorities had failed to establish sufficient grounds for suspicion. The broader lesson is that an investigation constructed primarily around an alleged network, without adequately establishing the conduct and responsibility of identifiable individuals or organizations, risks being undermined by judicial scrutiny. Such outcomes can also allow those targeted to claim a broader judicial vindication, even where the courts have ruled only on the legality of specific investigative measures rather than on the underlying ideological or organizational allegations. This distinction is essential for any democracy seeking to address Islamist influence while maintaining the credibility and integrity of its legal institutions.[37]

For researchers and policymakers, the challenge is to avoid two equally damaging analytical errors. The first is to dismiss the existence of a coordinated strategy simply because it does not operate through a clandestine, centralized organization with a clearly defined hierarchy. The impossibility of constructing a formal organizational chart does not necessarily establish the absence of a shared political project, strategic coordination, or sustained networks of influence. The second is to assume that ideological affinity, personal relationships, institutional cooperation, or participation in a common political campaign automatically constitute evidence of organizational membership or direction. Such an approach risks creating a presumption of guilt by association, weakening the credibility of research and potentially undermining legitimate legal or policy responses. A more rigorous approach lies between these two extremes, requiring relationships to be identified, documented, and assessed according to their nature, strength, and evidentiary significance. This makes it

[37] On the decision of the Graz Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht Graz), see Eurotopics, "Operation Luxor: unlawful police raids in Austria."

possible to distinguish formal membership and organizational control from ideological alignment, strategic cooperation, and more indirect forms of influence, without either overlooking genuine connections or attributing responsibilities that the evidence cannot sustain (see Annex, Table 4).

6. MONEY: FOLLOWING FUNDS TO THE END OF THE CHAIN

Fighting entryism through funding

Rather than relying primarily on criminal prosecution or punitive measures, the resolution focuses on two critical sources of influence: public funding and institutional legitimacy. Its underlying principle is straightforward: democratic institutions should not provide financial support or institutional recognition, directly or indirectly, to organizations that use such resources or legitimacy to advance objectives that undermine the democratic values those institutions are responsible for upholding.

E.U. funding for civil society is distributed through programs such as Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV), Erasmus+, and various youth initiatives, as well as through consortia, operating grants, and arrangements that allow intermediary organizations to redistribute funds to third parties. Oversight that extends only to the initial recipient risks overlooking how public funds are subsequently distributed and ultimately used. In asking the European Commission "to ensure ... full traceability throughout funding chains, including sub-grants, financial intermediaries, implementing partners, beneficial owners, contractors, subcontractors, and final recipients and beneficiaries",[38] such that E.U. funding cannot benefit "persons and entities promote Islamist entryism, radicalisation, antisemitism, terrorism, incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence or other activities incompatible with the values of the EU,"[39] the 8 October 2026 resolution inaugurates a new standard for financial transparency and accountability. This standard will require the identification of final beneficiaries, the application of stronger mechanisms for assessing risks, and the implementation of more effective procedures for excluding organizations that fail to meet established eligibility and compliance requirements.

Legal constraints

The existing legal framework, however, imposes important constraints that have been overlooked by many of those declaring political victory on the basis of a single parliamentary vote. The E.U. Financial Regulation, recast in September 2024, provides grounds for excluding individuals and organizations from E.U. funding where their conduct involves incitement to discrimination, hatred, or violence against a group or its members. Such conduct falls within the category of grave professional misconduct, provided that it undermines the integrity of the individual or organization concerned and adversely affects, or creates a concrete risk to, the performance of its obligations under E.U. funding arrangements. Exclusion must be supported by legally established grounds, ordinarily through a final judicial judgment or administrative decision, although the Regulation also permits decisions based on a preliminary legal assessment of documented facts, subject to prescribed procedures and safeguards.

[38] EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), operative clause 21
[39] EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), operative clause 23

In practical terms, the European Commission cannot exclude an organization from E.U. funding solely because a parliamentary resolution, research report, or academic study characterizes it as engaging in entryism or double discourse. Such allegations must be supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the applicable legal criteria. National judicial and administrative decisions, particularly those concerning the dissolution of organizations, may therefore become increasingly significant in informing E.U. exclusion procedures. They are not, however, the only possible basis for action. The central challenge is to translate documented patterns of conduct into legally defensible decisions that can withstand judicial scrutiny.[40]

The legal challenges emerging from these developments will provide an important test of the E.U.'s approach to funding conditionality. In September 2026, following the withdrawal of an E.U. structural grant, the innocuously-named European Network Against Racism (mentioned, as noted above, in the 8 October 2026 resolution) announced its intention to challenge the decision by the E.U. agency responsible for the funding. Regardless of the outcome, any resulting judicial proceedings could help clarify the extent to which E.U. institutions may make funding decisions conditional on compliance with the fundamental values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, as well as the evidentiary standards and legal safeguards required to justify such decisions.[41]

Foreign funding

The resolution further calls for greater scrutiny of foreign funding, specifically identifying concerns about financial support from actors linked to Qatar and Türkiye.[42] These concerns have been the subject of extensive investigation and public debate, notably through Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot's 2019 investigation into Qatar Charity's financing of organizations and institutions across Europe, and the Dutch House of Representatives' 2020 parliamentary inquiry into undesirable foreign influence originating from what it described as "unfree countries." Both investigations have contributed significantly to the debate over foreign funding, institutional influence, and the implications for the independence and integrity of European civil society.[43]

Establishing an effective legal framework for scrutinizing foreign funding presents significant challenges under E.U. law. In June 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union struck down Hungarian legislation requiring associations receiving foreign funding to register and publicly disclose their foreign-funded status, finding that the measures imposed disproportionate restrictions on the free movement of capital and infringed fundamental rights protected by the E.U. Charter. Any future framework for monitoring foreign funding must therefore comply with the principles of proportionality and nondiscrimination, making measures directed exclusively at Muslim organizations particularly vulnerable to legal challenge. The European

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40 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of September 23, 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), Article 138(1)(c)(vi).

41 Civic Space Watch, alert of September 11, 2026; joint statement of October 8, 2026.

42 EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), operative clause 24

43 Christian CHESNOT and Georges MALBRUNOT, Qatar Papers. Comment l'émirat finance l'islam de France et d'Europe [Qatar Papers: How the Emirate Finances Islam in France and Europe], Michel Lafon, 2019; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Parlementaire ondervragingscommissie naar ongewenste beïnvloeding uit onvrije landen, final report, June 2020.

Commission appears to have taken these constraints into account. In December 2023, it proposed a directive regulating interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries, adopting an approach based on transparency, disclosure, and accountability rather than outright prohibition.[44]

[44] Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber, June 18, 2020, Commission v. Hungary (Transparency of Associations), C-78/18.

7. INSTITUTIONAL ACCESS AND LEGITIMACY

Access to European institutions can confer considerable political and institutional legitimacy on organizations, which creates considerable risks in cases where those organizations' representative status or broader objectives have not been adequately assessed. An invitation to address the European Parliament, participation in an advisory group, or recognition as a stakeholder by a European Commission directorate-general does not, in itself, establish that an organization genuinely represents the constituency on whose behalf it claims to speak. Nevertheless, such engagement can strengthen its public standing, enhance its credibility, and provide a form of institutional recognition that can subsequently be used to advance its wider objectives. A notable example occurred in the fall of 2021, when the Council of Europe launched an anti-discrimination campaign, co-funded by the EU, featuring the message "beauty is in diversity as freedom is in hijab." The initiative followed collaboration with the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, which is identified by the October 8, 2026 resolution as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood via the Council of European Muslims.[45] Following strong criticism, particularly from the French government, the campaign materials were withdrawn on November 2, 2021. The episode illustrates the broader concern addressed by the resolution: European institutions can inadvertently lend their authority, credibility, and financial support to narratives whose wider ideological and political implications have not been sufficiently examined.

Existing mechanisms already provide a basis for regulating institutional access, although their scope and application remain subject to legal constraints. The joint E.U. Transparency Register, established under the interinstitutional agreement of May 20, 2021, between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission, requires organizations engaged in certain forms of interest representation to register and comply with an established code of conduct. Registration is also a prerequisite for obtaining long-term access badges to the European Parliament, while breaches of the applicable rules can result in suspension, removal from the register, or the withdrawal of access privileges. These mechanisms, however, are primarily designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct, rather than to sanction organizations on the basis of their ideological orientation alone.

This distinction is particularly important in relation to proposals to exclude the European Network Against Racism from the Transparency Register. Such proposals featured in the parliamentary debate, although the final resolution directed its explicit exclusion request at organizations linked to the Council of European Muslims. The European Network Against Racism's public support for the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, which was subsequently dissolved by the French authorities, does not automatically establish a breach of the Transparency Register's code of conduct. Nor was the Collective Against Islamophobia in France designated as a terrorist organization. The legal challenge therefore lies in distinguishing legitimate concerns about institutional influence from conduct that provides sufficient grounds

[45] EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), recital I

for exclusion under existing rules. If the E.U. intends to introduce more rigorous procedures for determining which organizations may participate in consultations, advisory bodies, or other institutional activities, those procedures must be based on clear, publicly available, and objectively justified due diligence criteria. Moreover, decisions taken in context of such procedures must in turn be consistent, supported by verifiable evidence, and accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards, including meaningful opportunities for affected organizations to challenge them. Without such safeguards, measures intended to protect the integrity of European institutions risk becoming the subject of legal disputes over discrimination, proportionality, and freedom of association.[46]

[46] Interinstitutional Agreement of May 20, 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission on a mandatory Transparency Register, OJ L 207, June 11, 2021, p. 1.

8. THE TERRORIST LIST: WHAT THE E.U. CAN AND CANNOT DO

The Muslim Brotherhood and the E.U. terrorist list

The European Parliament has no authority to place anyone or anything on the E.U. terrorist list. That power belongs to the Council, acting unanimously under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. Listing requires a competent authority, normally a judicial authority, to have taken a decision to open an investigation or prosecution, or to convict, in relation to a terrorist act, an attempted terrorist act, participation in such an act, or facilitation of one, on the basis of serious and credible evidence or indications.[47] The consequences are substantial: freezing of funds and economic resources, and a prohibition on making funds available. Listed persons and entities must be reviewed at least every six months. Since its 2017 judgments concerning Hamas and the Tamil Tigers, the Court of Justice has accepted that a listing may rely on a decision by an authority of a third country, provided that the Council verifies that the decision was adopted in accordance with the rights of defense and the right to effective judicial protection.[48]

Hamas, described in its 1988 founding charter as "one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine",[49] has been on the E.U. terrorist list for a long time: its military wing was added in December 2001, and in September 2003 it was listed as an organization in its entirety. In 2017, the Hamas *Document of General Principles and Policies* removed the explicit reference to the Brotherhood without repudiating the ideological lineage.[50] The issuing of this later document created an ambiguity: without rescinding the 1988 Charter (*mithaq*), Hamas issued a 2017 policy document (*wathiqa*) that did not, in any legal or textual sense, abrogate the founding Charter, yet which made it possible to cultivate the false impression of distance between Hamas and the Brotherhood.

European organizations operating within the wider Muslim Brotherhood milieu have not yet met the legal requirements for E.U. terrorist designation. As explained above, a court or other authority legally empowered to investigate or prosecute terrorism would need to make a decision that directly links these organizations to terrorist acts, but no such decision has been identified. While one such organization has been dissolved for incitement to hatred (as discussed above), such dissolution does not, in itself, satisfy this legal criterion. The French National Assembly's January call to designate the movement as a whole therefore lacks a sufficient legal foundation in its present form.

Pursuing such a designation without the necessary evidence would be legally vulnerable and strategically counterproductive. Should the designation be annulled by the General Court of the European Union, the organizations concerned could claim judicial vindication and acquire a degree of legitimacy they had previously been

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47 Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of December 27, 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, Article 1(4) and (6); Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of December 27, 2001.

48 Court of Justice of the European Union, July 26, 2017, Council v. LTTE, C-599/14 P, and Council v. Hamas, C-79/15 P.

49 Hamas, *Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement*, August 18, 1988, Article 2.

50 Hamas, *Document of General Principles and Policies*, May 1, 2017.

unable to secure. The consequences of such a legal defeat would extend beyond the annulment, potentially undermining the credibility of future efforts to address Islamist influence. Countering the Muslim Brotherhood and its wider networks requires rigorous evidence, clearly identified legal targets, and measures capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny. Political grandstanding, inflammatory statements, and unsubstantiated claims amplified by sympathetic media or academic commentators cannot substitute for a credible, intelligence-led strategy grounded in evidence and the rule of law.

Terrorist designation: two realistic routes

There are two realistic routes to listing by the EU. The first concerns the foreign branches designated by the U.S. in January and March 2026. In principle, those third-country decisions could support an E.U. listing, subject both to the safeguards required by the Court and, crucially, to unanimity in the Council, which gives every Member State a veto.

The second, and more operational, route is the sanctions regime created on January 19, 2024, for persons and entities supporting, facilitating, or enabling violent actions by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[51] That regime targets financiers. Its first listings included six individuals accused of financing Hamas, among them Aiman Ahmad Al-Duwaik (also spelled Ayman Al-Duwaik), a Jordanian businessman based in Algeria who has been identified by several international authorities as a financier and fund manager linked to Hamas and described as one of the managers of Hamas's international investment portfolio.[52] The movement of money to Hamas is the primary terrain on which connections between Brotherhood-linked networks and terrorism can be established with the evidentiary rigor required in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

The transatlantic comparison

The transatlantic comparison highlights the different approaches adopted by Washington and Brussels in addressing the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated networks. The U.S. has relied primarily on foreign-policy and counterterrorism sanctions, designating individual Brotherhood branches on the basis of their alleged involvement in terrorist activities, including rocket attacks carried out by Lebanon's al-Fajr Forces following October 7, 2023, executions of civilians attributed to Sudan's al-Bara' ibn Malik Brigade, and material support for Hamas. By contrast, European institutions have, in this context, focused more heavily on measures relating to internal governance, particularly public funding and institutional access (even though the E.U. has its own legal framework for terrorist designations).

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[51] Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/385 and Regulation (EU) 2024/386 of January 19, 2024 concerning restrictive measures against persons and entities supporting, facilitating, or enabling violent actions by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

[52] Aiman Ahmad Al-Duwaik managed holdings and investments in several companies across the region, including as CEO and shareholder of the Sidar construction/real-estate company in Algeria and through links to network businesses in Turkey, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. He was placed on U.S. (OFAC) and U.K. sanctions lists in late 2023 for providing financial support to terrorist organizations. In January 2024 he was added to the EU targeted sanctions list under Decision (CFSP) 2024/385 and Regulation (EU) 2024/386.

These approaches are not mutually exclusive, but address different dimensions of the same transnational phenomenon. They also have important practical implications for Europe, particularly in the financial sector. U.S. terrorist designations can have significant consequences for banking compliance across Europe, as financial institutions with exposure to the U.S. dollar may restrict transactions, terminate banking relationships, or impose additional due diligence requirements even in the absence of a corresponding designation by the Council of the European Union. European policymakers must therefore recognize that American sanctions decisions can have consequences within Europe independently of any action taken by E.U. institutions.

9. FAULT LINES AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS

Opposition to the resolution centered on concerns about its legal clarity, the distinction between Islam and Islamism, and the potential consequences for civil society and fundamental rights. These objections deserve to be examined on their merits rather than dismissed or mischaracterized. Socialist MEP Chloé Ridel criticized what she described as "vague arguments," while Manon Aubry of La France Insoumise characterized the text as "confused" and argued that it "conflates Islam and terrorism." Green MEP Mélissa Camara accused the right and far right of using the issue to legitimize Islamophobia and xenophobia. Similar concerns were expressed in a joint statement issued by nine civil society organizations, including the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, the European Network Against Racism, and the Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe (all of which have been discussed above), as well as the European Civic Forum. The signatories condemned the resolution as a "new high" in "Islamophobic" attacks against civil society organizations. In support of their position, they cited the E.U. Anti-Racism Strategy for 2026–2030, which recognizes anti-Muslim hatred as a form of racism, alongside the principles and protections established under Articles 2 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union.[53]

Such objections do not have to be taken at face value. Research has documented the ways in which accusations of "Islamophobia" have been strategically deployed in order to deflect scrutiny and challenge legitimate criticism. For example, Andrew Gilligan and Damon Perry use key activists' own statements to demonstrate that the purpose of the campaign to enshrine the concept of "Islamophobia" in law is "to control and prevent conduct 'far beyond' anti-Muslim hatred or discrimination … [and] impose [what the activists describe as] 'appropriate limits to free speech' when talking about Muslims".[54] Moreover, campaigns organized around the idea of "Islamophobia" have served both as a means of political mobilization and, in some instances, as a mechanism for shielding organizations, their activities, and their wider ideological objectives from examination – as in the U.K.'s "Trojan Horse" affair, in which accusations of "Islamophobia" were systematically deployed in order to discredit investigations into the takeover of several state-run schools by a network of Islamist and Islamist-aligned activists.[55] Acknowledgement of the weaponization of the term "Islamophobia" does not diminish the reality of anti-Muslim discrimination, but it highlights the need for a clear distinction between genuine concerns about prejudice and the strategic use of such allegations to discourage legitimate scrutiny.

Two distinct but equally serious risks must therefore be addressed. The first is that the concept of "entryism" could be applied so broadly as to encompass individuals and organizations with no demonstrable connection to the Muslim Brotherhood or its objectives. This could potentially include religiously conservative Muslims, pro-

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[53“] Joint press statement: NGOs condemn European Parliament resolution on countering 'Islamist entryism,'" October 8, 2026, signed, among others, by the Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe, the European Network Against Racism, the European Civic Forum, and the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations.

[54] Gilligan, Andrew and Perry, Damon, *Bad Faith Actor: A Study of the Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM)*, Policy Exchange (July 7, 2025), p. 8. https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/bad-faith-actor/

[55] Perry, Damon L. and Stott, Paul, The Trojan Horse Affair: A Documentary Record, Policy Exchange (December 11, 2022), https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/the-trojan-horse-affair/

Palestinian activists without Islamist affiliations, and legitimate anti-racism organizations. The second is that organizations and networks subjected to legitimate scrutiny could exploit allegations in order to build a narrative of persecution that could in turn be employed in order to discredit oversight, mobilize political support, and transform legal proceedings into opportunities for public advocacy.

Attempts to legislate against Islamist entryism must be founded in principles that leave no room for such risks. If they are not, they will have the potential, not only to undermine fundamental rights, but also to weaken the credibility of efforts to identify and counter genuine Islamist influence. Effective counter-entryist policy must avoid both errors by distinguishing ideological affinity from organizational affiliation, political advocacy from coordinated institutional influence, and legitimate dissent from demonstrable misconduct. Credible accusations of entryism rest on verifiable conduct, documented relationships, and consistent evidentiary standards – and not on assumptions about motives or imputations of guilt by association.

10. ISLAMIST ENTRYISM AND JEWS

Antisemitism and hatred of Israel as indicators of Islamism

Although the resolution is not primarily concerned with antisemitism, it recognizes antisemitism and "hatred of Israel" as potential indicators of Islamist radicalization or influence. This represents an important and largely overlooked dimension of the text. By explicitly identifying these concerns, the resolution establishes a connection between efforts to counter nonviolent Islamism and the E.U. Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life, adopted in October 2021.[56]

The historical and ideological foundations of this connection deserve closer examination. The Muslim Brotherhood was antisemitic from its outset, and this antisemitism served to provide ideological common ground for three-way alliances between the Brotherhood, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Axis powers in Europe – as well as with those Middle Eastern leaders who sided with the latter – well before the founding of the State of Israel.[57] In the early 1950s, leading Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb devoted an essay to the subject of Jews, portraying them as enduring enemies of Islam and tracing their alleged hostility back to the Prophet Muhammad's time in Medina.[58] The ideological continuity between early Islamist antisemitism and the Islamist antisemitism of the present day is particularly evident in Hamas's 1988 Charter (which, as noted above, explicitly identified the organization as a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood). Article 7 invokes an eschatological hadith concerning the killing of Jews by Muslims, while Article 22 promotes antisemitic conspiracy theories that attribute the French and Russian revolutions, as well as both world wars, to Jewish influence and manipulation. Article 32 further reinforces these narratives by citing *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the notorious antisemitic forgery, as evidence of an alleged Jewish conspiracy.

These ideas were not confined to the movement's earlier history. In January 2009, during an appearance on the Qatari news network, Al Jazeera, spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Yusuf al-Qaradawi characterized Hitler's persecution of the Jews as a form of divine punishment and expressed the hope that a future punishment would come "at the hands of the believers."[59] His remarks illustrate the persistence of explicitly antisemitic narratives within influential currents of contemporary Islamist thought. Historians continue to debate the extent to which Nazi propaganda disseminated in Arabic during the 1930s and 1940s contributed to the development and dissemination of these ideas. The existence of that propaganda, however, is well documented.[60] A recent analysis of survey data collected in the U.K. finds that, among Muslims, antisemitic attitudes are strongly predictive of radical Islamist sympathies – up to and including support for the genocidal terror group, Islamic State.[61]

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56 European Commission, EU Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life (2021-2030), COM(2021) 615 final, October 5, 2021.

57 Allington, *Islamist Antisemitism,* pp. 35-37.

58 Allington, *Islamist Antisemitism,* pp. 38-39.

59 Quoted in Spoerl, Joseph S., "Islamic Antisemitism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 4 (2012), p. 611.

60 For the classic study, see Herf, Jeffrey, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (Yale University Press, 2009).

61 Allington, *Islamist Antisemitism,* pp. 65-79.

From theology to the language of antiracism

Although theological antisemitism remains a core feature of Islamist and Islamist-adjacent discourse intended for Muslim audiences, as in British mosque sermons after 7 October 2023 in which imams prayed for the "purif[ication of] the Al-Aqsa mosque from the filth of the Jews" or described Jews as "brothers of monkeys and apes",[62] public advocacy in the west tends to employ a different register. As Lorenzo Vidino observes, Hamas-affiliated speakers "frame the conflict in religious terms to local Muslim communities, labeling Israelis as 'infidels' and evoking hadiths about the killing of Jews", but, when addressing secular audiences, switch to "the language of postcolonial theory to tar the Israelis as 'European settlers'": a clear example of the "doublespeak" referred to in the European Parliament resolution.[63]

Examples of Islamist messaging on Israel and Jews tailored to secular western audiences include (but are not limited to) the following:

- Delegitimization of Jewish institutions as "lobbies" serving a foreign state;
- Reversal of victimhood in which efforts to combat antisemitism are cast as instruments of "Islamophobia" or so-called "Zionist" censorship;
- Minimization or even justification of the October 7, 2023 massacres; and
- Conspiracy narratives purporting to explain aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (but often bearing a close resemblance to traditional European antisemitic tropes).

As a recent report explains, narratives about the war between Israel and Hamas are a favorite Islamist recruiting tool, facilitating the open expression of radical ideology and serving to reinforce the idea of Muslims everywhere as part of an international community trapped in a state of perpetual crisis to which Islamists alone can provide resolution.[64] Such narratives have long been near-ubiquitous within coalitions bringing together Islamist networks, identity-based and religious nationalist movements, and elements of the far left, but have gained a new prominence since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023. The presence or circulation of antisemitic and anti-Israeli narratives within such coalitions does not, in itself, establish that every participating individual or organization shares those views or maintains formal links to Islamist movements. Indeed, such narratives have spilled over into popular culture.[65]

This represents a major success for Islamist propaganda in the west. However, it also represents a challenge, in that, faced with countless propagators of hateful anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli tropes, one must employ a degree of methodological discipline in identifying which are potential Islamist entryists and which are merely bigots. Of course, the same is true of other potential markers identified in the resolution, such as anti-Christian hatred, antisecularism, and opposition to gender equality:[66] it should

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62 Allington, *Islamist Antisemitism*, pp. 12, 54-56.

63 Vidino, Lorenzo, "How Hamas Won Hearts and Minds on the American Left: For 30 Years, the Terror Organization Has Made a Concerted Efort to Appeal to Western Intellectuals", *Wall Street Journal* (November 2, 2023), n.p. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-hamas-won-hearts-and-minds-on-the-american-left-1abafc2f

64 Allington, *Islamist Antisemitism*, pp. 50-54.

65 Daniel Rickenbacher, 'Pop Islam: How Germany Is Tackling the New Islamic Antisemitism', Fathom December, (2018), https://fathomjournal.org/pop-islam-how-germany-is-tackling-the-new-islamic-antisemitism/

66 EU Parliament resolution 2026/2868(RSP), recital E.

go without saying that not everyone who rejects feminism is an Islamist, for example. The most productive approach is not therefore to criminalize all organizations or individuals promulgating certain narratives, however unsavory, but to ask whether a given organization or individual has employed such narratives in the service of Islamist political goals. Where an entity is found to have done so, this could support an argument for withholding both of funds and of institutional access: not merely because it has expressed antisemitic or otherwise hateful views, but because the way in which it has done so constitutes evidence of Islamist radicalization (such that its acquisition of access or funds would involve the risk of entryism). Loss of such discipline would likely to lead into unresolvable arguments over definitions, as well as into allegations of attempted censorship.

11. AN IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

The Commission's written response, due by early January 2027, is the moment at which recognition must become action. The roadmap below sets out what that response should contain, four pillars of an E.U. strategy, the cooperation needed to deliver it, and a proposed timetable. Every measure is designed to be intelligence-led, evidence-based, and consistent with the rule of law, and every measure targets Islamism as a political ideology, never Islam as a religion. The recommendations draw on the analysis above and on ISGAP's research on Muslim Brotherhood entryism in Western democracies, foreign state funding of universities and civil society, and the transnational infrastructure of contemporary antisemitism.

European Commission formal response (by early January)

1 Set a timetable and a mandate

The response should commit the Commission to a coordinated E.U. strategy against Islamist entryism, with a published timetable, a designated lead Commissioner and directorate-general, and an annual report to the Parliament and the Council.

2 Establish the strategy's founding principles

The strategy should state, as the resolution does, that it targets Islamism as a political ideology and not Islam as a religion. It should adopt a public and challengeable evidentiary standard that grades relationships by evidentiary value (Annex, Table 4), keeps established fact, official finding, political allegation, and research hypothesis separate (Annex, Table 5), and gives organizations notice and a right of reply before they are named.

Pillar one: network mapping

3 Build intelligence-led mapping

Member States' security services, coordinated through Europol, should strengthen the analysis and exchange of information on Islamist networks, as the resolution requests. Germany's long-standing monitoring of "legalistic Islamism" by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution offers a tested model for following nonviolent Islamist actors over time.

4 Build individualized, conduct-based case files

Every action against a person or entity should rest on individualized facts about governance, funding, institutional access, and attributable content. Austria's Operation Luxor shows the cost of cases built on allegations of network membership: while the idea of a network may help to guide investigators in their researches, it is insufficient to support a court conviction, and may hand those targeted a form of judicial vindication when cases collapse.

5 Invest in independent research capacity

Governments and E.U. institutions should support an independent, multidisciplinary observatory on Islamist influence networks and antisemitism, bringing together researchers, practitioners, and officials across Member States

and allied democracies, maintaining shared open-source datasets, and applying a common evidentiary standard. Durable policy depends on a continuous loop between research, policy, and security practice.

Pillar two: tracing of funds and foreign influence

6 Trace E.U. funds to final beneficiaries

Reporting in the Financial Transparency System should extend to sub-grantees and third-party redistribution under CERV, Erasmus+, and youth programs. Consortium leads should disclose downstream recipients, and final national judicial and administrative decisions, including dissolution orders, should be systematically notified to the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES).

7 Create a foreign-funding transparency regime that extends to universities

Following *Commission v. Hungary*, disclosure obligations should apply to all third-country funding of civil-society, religious, and educational bodies above a set threshold, regardless of the faith or origin of funder or recipient, and should rely on transparency rather than prohibition. ISGAP's research on Qatari funding of Western universities shows that higher education is a principal and under-examined channel of influence. The regime should cover foreign gifts and contracts to universities and research institutions, drawing on experience with foreign-gift reporting under Section 117 of the U.S. Higher Education Act.

8 Target the financiers

The 2024 sanctions regime against supporters of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the most operational instrument for establishing connections between Brotherhood-linked networks and terrorism finance. Member States should share financial intelligence to extend listings to fund managers, front companies, and charitable intermediaries, in coordination with the U.S. Treasury and the United Kingdom.

Pillar three: preventing institutional capture

9 Apply due diligence before every invitation, consultation, partnership, or grant

As the resolution asks, E.U. institutions should redouble their vigilance before engaging any organization, on the basis of public, reasoned, and challengeable criteria. The Parliament's Bureau and the Transparency Register secretariat should adopt such criteria for access to premises, events, and advisory roles, so that decisions rest on documented conduct capable of withstanding a challenge of discrimination.

10 Address Islamism beyond Islamists

Officials, grant managers, universities, and partner organizations should be equipped to recognize when they are being used to advance or legitimize Islamist narratives and objectives. Grant agreements should contain enforceable values and conduct clauses, and institutions should review their partnerships, accreditations, and consultation lists against the strategy's evidentiary standard.

11 Close the reconstitution loophole

Member States should notify one another of dissolution decisions and their grounds, and should examine a mechanism that prevents an organization dissolved in one Member State from simply reconstituting in another, as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France did in Belgium to become the Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe.

Pillar four: strengthen democratic resilience

12 Bring Islamist influence within the European Democracy Shield

The tools that the E.U. has built for Russian and Chinese interference (threat assessment, transparency of foreign sponsorship, and resilience funding) should be applied to Islamist influence operations, with funding linked to third states assessed on the same footing as any other third-country influence.

13 Support Muslim reformers and democratic civil society

European institutions should create a transparent framework of consultation and support for Muslim intellectuals, religious leaders, and civil-society actors who defend democracy and freedom of conscience, with published selection criteria, so that institutional recognition no longer flows by default to the best-organized networks.

14 Protect Jewish life as part of the same strategy

Monitoring of entryism should include systematic analysis of how antisemitic and antizionist narratives are produced, relayed, legitimized, and financed, with the findings serving to inform both the new entryism strategy and the existing E.U. Strategy on Combating Antisemitism.

Cooperation and enforcement

15 Make Europol and Eurojust central to delivery

Europol should support joint analysis of Islamist networks and their financing across Member States. Eurojust should coordinate cross-border cases involving terrorism finance, dissolution, and the reconstitution of dissolved organizations, including through joint investigation teams where criminal offenses are suspected.

16 Assess terrorist listings wherever legal thresholds are met

The Council should assess listings under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the basis of complete evidentiary files, beginning with Brotherhood branches designated by U.S. authorities for documented violence, such as Lebanon's al-Jamâ'a al-islâmiyya and its armed wing, the al-Fajr Forces, subject to the Court's safeguards. A blanket listing of "the movement" would not meet current legal thresholds and would risk annulment.

17 Coordinate with the United States and allied democracies

The European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia confront the same transnational networks with different instruments. A standing working group of officials and independent researchers should

exchange designation files, compliance guidance for banks exposed to U.S. designations, and evidence on cross-border funding, including the transnational hubs linking European networks to the Middle East, among them the London, Turkey, and Jordan triangle that ISGAP research identifies as a key node of the Brotherhood's international infrastructure.

Collective action

18 Engage civil society as a partner in implementation

Governments cannot defend liberal secular democracy alone. Universities, media, Jewish and Muslim community organizations, independent researchers, and civil-society groups each hold part of the evidence and part of the response. Implementation should draw them in on the basis of shared democratic values and a common evidentiary standard, and should resist capture by any party seeking partisan advantage, including in the French presidential campaign of 2027.

Proposed timetable

By early January 2027	The Commission's written response sets a timetable, a mandate, founding principles, and an evidentiary standard for an E.U. strategy.
First half of 2027	Indicator methodology published; Europol and Eurojust coordination established; audit of final beneficiaries under CERV and Erasmus+ launched; due-diligence criteria for access adopted by the Parliament's Bureau.
Second half of 2027	Proposals on foreign-funding transparency, including higher education, advanced; Council assessment of listing files for U.S.-designated branches and Hamas financiers; support framework for Muslim reformers in place.
2028 onwards	Annual E.U. report to the Parliament and the Council on Islamist entryism and democratic resilience, reviewing progress against the timetable.

12. CONCLUSION

The October 8, 2026, vote recognizes Islamist entryism as more than a counterterrorism issue and places it where it belongs, i.e. within a wider global Islamist insurgency: a contest over ideas, influence, and institutional power that challenges liberal secular democracy. It does so while distinguishing Islam as a religion from Islamism as a political ideology, and it identifies antisemitism as one of the narratives through which that ideology advances, often through the knowing or unknowing agency of people and institutions outside Islamist movements themselves.

Recognition is not yet policy. If the Commission's formal response does not set a timetable, and if Member States, Europol, Eurojust, and the Council do not act on it, "entryism" will remain a political slogan, useful in electoral campaigns but unusable before a court, and the networks concerned may emerge stronger, wrapped in a narrative of persecution they never had to prove. If recognition becomes action, the E.U. will have a framework for addressing forms of influence that fall outside criminal law without necessarily being harmless.

The path forward is clear: map networks, trace funding and foreign influence, prevent institutional capture, and strengthen democratic resilience, on the basis of intelligence and evidence and within the rule of law. To accomplish this will require double discipline, requiring that investigators never minimize a documented influence strategy, and never substitute a label for evidence. Defending liberal secular democracy demands collective action by governments and civil society, with political will and respect for the rule of law.

ANNEX

Table 1. Vote of October 8, 2026, by political group

Political group	For	Against	Abstentions	Total
European People's Party (EPP)	143	1	0	144
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)	72	0	0	72
Patriots for Europe (PfE)	67	0	0	67
Renew Europe	62	3	2	67
Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN)	25	0	1	26
Non-attached members	8	4	10	22
Socialists and Democrats (S&D)	2	84	1	87
Greens/European Free Alliance	1	40	1	42
The Left	1	35	0	36
Total	**381**	**167**	**15**	**563**

Source: roll-call lists appended to the minutes of the October 8, 2026 sitting, analyzed by CERIF. Secondary count, subject to any subsequent corrections of votes.

Table 2. Timeline, May 2025 to October 2026

Date	Milestone
May 21, 2025	Publication of the Gouyette-Courtade report, *Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islam in France*.
November 24, 2025	U.S. Executive Order 14362 initiates the designation of Muslim Brotherhood branches.
January 13, 2026	Washington designates the Lebanese, Egyptian, and Jordanian branches under U.S. terrorism authorities.
January 22, 2026	The French National Assembly calls for the movement to be added to the E.U. terrorist list.
March 9, 2026	U.S. designation of the Sudanese branch.
March 2026	Motion in the Dutch House of Representatives calling for a ban on the Brotherhood.
May 5, 2026	The French Senate adopts the Retailleau bill against Islamist entryism, 208 votes to 124.
June 29-30, 2026	In Vienna, the European People's Party adopts a resolution on Islamist interference in democratic processes.
October 7-8, 2026	Debate followed by plenary adoption of Resolution B10-0424/2026.

Table 3. The resolution's four policy levers in light of existing law

Policy lever	What the resolution calls for	Existing instruments	Legal or operational constraint
Network identification	A common European approach for identifying indicators of entryism and "double discourse"; information-sharing between intelligence services and judicial authorities.	National reports (France, 2025); monitoring of "legalistic Islamism" by Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution; Europol and Eurojust.	Moving from a political characterization to verifiable, challengeable criteria.
Funding	Traceability through to final beneficiaries; stronger exclusion and risk-assessment tools; scrutiny of foreign funding linked to Qatar or Turkey.	Financial Regulation 2024/2509 (Art. 138) and the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES); values clauses in grant agreements.	Exclusion requires a final judicial judgment or administrative decision; *Commission v. Hungary* (2020) case law on foreign funding.
Institutional access	Exclusion from E.U. events and meetings of organizations linked to the networks concerned; removal of the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations; deletion of European Network Against Racism from the Transparency Register.	Transparency Register (2021 interinstitutional agreement); powers of the Parliament's Bureau.	Procedures designed to sanction misconduct, not ideological orientation; absence of an adversarial procedure.
Cooperation and targeted sanctions	Transmission to the Council of information allowing it to assess whether persons or entities linked to the Brotherhood meet the criteria for the terrorist list; national dissolution of associations that violate domestic law.	Common Position 2001/931/CFSP; 2024 sanctions regime targeting supporters of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; national dissolution procedures.	Requirement of a terrorism-related decision by a competent authority; unanimity in the Council; review by the General Court of the European Union.

Table 4. Grading links according to evidentiary value

Level of connection	Typical indicators	Evidentiary value
Formal affiliation	Bylaws, oaths, leadership roles in an identified structure, or mentions in official decisions.	Strong
Structural and sustained cooperation	Joint programs, recurring co-organization, shared leaders over several years.	High, if documented over time
Financial or governance link	Funding, transfers, shared board members, cross-contracting.	High, subject to traceability
Ideological proximity	Doctrinal references, invited trainers and preachers, training programs.	Moderate; requires corroboration
Occasional participation	Attendance at an event, signature of a petition, participation in a coalition.	Low; insufficient on its own

Table 5. Four registers that must never be conflated

Register	Definition	Example wording
Established fact	Verifiable through a primary source or multiple independent sources.	“X has served on Y’s board of directors since 2019.”
Administrative or judicial finding	A dated decision by a competent authority, including the status of any appeal.	“Y was dissolved by decree; the appeal was rejected.”
Political allegation	An allegation made by a political official, report, or resolution.	“The 2025 report links Y to the movement.”
Working hypothesis	An analyst’s inference, clearly identified as such and with clear conditions of falsifiability.	“The convergence of discourse suggests coordination, which remains to be established.”

Table 6. Indicators to monitor through spring 2027

Timeframe	Indicator	What to watch
Early January 2027	Commission’s written response	Possible announcement of a common methodology, a funding audit (C.E.R.V., Erasmus+), or increased reliance on E.D.E.S.
Winter 2026-2027	Council of the European Union	Possible referral by a Member State under the Common Position; debate over branches designated by Washington.
Ongoing	Parliament’s Bureau and Transparency Register	Access decisions concerning the Federation of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations; follow-up to the request concerning the European Network Against Racism.
2026-2027	Litigation	European Network Against Racism litigation; possible challenges to exclusions or removals.
2026-2027 session	National legislation	Nuñez bill and further consideration of the Retailleau proposal in France; developments in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Austria.
Ongoing	Washington	New designations; possible conversion of designations into Foreign Terrorist Organization listings; banking-compliance effects in Europe.
Ongoing	Organizations concerned	Renaming, relocation following the Collective Against Islamophobia in France / Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe model, litigation strategies, and media strategies.
April-May 2027	French presidential election	Prominence of the issue in the campaign and the risk of rhetorical escalation, especially among candidates aligned with populist or extremist currents on the left or right.

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