

# **ASSAULT ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PRINCIPLES**

**HOW ISLAMIST ENTRYISM  
WEAKENS CIVIL SOCIETY AND  
HIGHER EDUCATION IN CANADA**



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*Assault on Democratic Values and Principles: How Islamist Entryism  
Weakens Civil Society and Higher Education in Canada*

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ISLAMISM BEYOND ISLAMISTS

**ASSAULT ON DEMOCRATIC  
VALUES AND PRINCIPLES:**

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HIGHER EDUCATION IN CANADA**

August 2026



# Executive Summary

Using the framework developed in ISGAP's groundbreaking study *The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into the United States: A Systemic Analysis*,<sup>1</sup> the present report demonstrates that Muslim Brotherhood-aligned networks in Canada should be understood not as isolated organizations or disparate episodes but as part of a structured transnational strategy of ideological entrenchment, institutional embedding, narrative control, and political and legal protection. The Canadian case is examined as a domestic expression of a wider transnational model.

## Four key findings emerge:

- **The first concerns the ideological and strategic foundations of the model.**
- **The second concerns entryism within federal government institutions and the electoral mobilization of Muslim voters as a coordinated political bloc.**
- **The third concerns Canadian civil society and the operating environment.**
- **The fourth concerns higher education as a central operational domain.**

## 1. Ideological and Strategic Foundations

The analysis identifies coherent doctrinal progression rather than ad hoc adaptation. Hassan al-Banna (the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood) established the premise that Islam constitutes a comprehensive system governing law, politics, and society. Sayyid Qutb advanced that premise into a civilizational framework in which secular systems are treated as illegitimate and opposition to them is framed in theological terms. Yusuf al-Qaradawi subsequently articulated an operational doctrine for Western environments in which participation in democratic, legal, and civic institutions functions as a mechanism for long-term positioning.

This progression is further reflected in the concept of *tamkeen*, the Muslim Brotherhood's term for the gradual establishment of influence and authority through institutional entrenchment. Within the framework articulated in the "Explanatory Memorandum" (1991), this process is situated within a broader civilizational effort described in doctrinal terms as a form of "jihad" conducted through social, political, and institutional means rather than through direct confrontation. Institutional

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<sup>1</sup> ISGAP, *The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into Western Society: A Systemic Analysis* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf>.

embedding within Western environments is therefore aligned with a defined strategic objective rather than representing adaptation or moderation.

This strategic approach is documented in foundational planning texts. “The Project” (1982) outlines a long-term program for expansion across social, political, educational, and financial domains. The “Explanatory Memorandum” (1991) applies that framework to North America, explicitly including Canada and defining the process as one conducted from within existing societal structures. The institutional patterns identified in Canada correspond closely to the methods described in these documents. However, unlike the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Austria, each of which has undertaken a formal government investigation into Muslim Brotherhood-aligned networks, Canada has conducted no equivalent inquiry at any level, despite being identified as a target jurisdiction in both founding documents.

A core finding of this report is that this strategy operates through four mutually reinforcing domains. The first is narrative development, through which the framing of Islam, Islamism, the Palestinian cause, and Islamophobia shapes public discourse, especially in relation to Israel and its very legitimacy, and constrains scrutiny. The second is institutional embedding, including interconnected infrastructures across mosques, charities, schools, universities, advocacy organizations, student groups, and professional networks. The third is policy impact and political mobilization, through which institutional presence and narrative influence are translated into coalition-building, advisory roles, and policy outcomes. The fourth is legal framework manipulation, including litigation, procedural challenges, and reputational pressure, which increase the cost of oversight and create protective barriers. These domains operate as a single system, each reinforcing the others and collectively advancing long-term entrenchment.

This coordination is not only ideological but is operationalized through state and quasi-state actors, most notably Qatar, which functions as a central hub for financing, institutional support, and narrative amplification across Western environments.

## **2. Federal Entryism and Electoral Mobilization**

The second principal finding concerns entryism within federal government institutions and the electoral mobilization of Muslim voters as a coordinated political bloc.

Within the federal public service, the Muslim Federal Employees Network (MFEN)—an internal advocacy group founded in 2021 within the RCMP’s federal policing branch

and comprising approximately seventy members across departments—has circulated workplace guidance materials and lobbied for formal recognition of Muslims as a protected group under the Employment Equity Act, a request rejected by a government task force. Internal records indicate MFEN objected to parliamentary testimony from a Jewish advocacy organization and characterized routine workplace conduct in terms consistent with the broader Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism frameworks examined elsewhere in this report.

This advocacy was substantively amplified at the ministerial level. During her tenure as Canada's Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia (2023–2026), Amira Elghawaby's office lobbied federal deputy ministers, the Canada Revenue Agency, the Public Safety Minister, and the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on MFEN's behalf, and proposed extending taxpayer funding to the organization.

These institutional dynamics are mirrored in electoral politics. For example, TCMV and the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) have developed as principal vehicles for mobilizing Muslim voters as a coordinated bloc, employing a targeted riding strategy across sixty to eighty federal constituencies where the Muslim population approaches or exceeds the margin of victory. Both organizations maintain documented leadership ties to Brotherhood-aligned networks: TCMV's board includes Mustafa Farooq, former CEO of NCCM, while CMPAC's executive director, Khaled al-Qazzaz, previously served as foreign affairs secretary to former Egyptian president and long-time Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. In addition, multiple CMPAC board members hold concurrent leadership roles within the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC).

In the 2025 federal election, CMPAC, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), and Greater Toronto for Palestine registered as third parties with Elections Canada. A coordinated "Vote Palestine" campaign secured endorsements from 344 candidates across four federal parties, while a joint statement of Muslim organizations—including CMPAC, TCMV, the NCCM, the Islamic Circle of North America, and the Islamic Society of North America—backed dozens of candidates specifically on the basis of their positions on Gaza and Islamophobia policy. Survey data commissioned by both CMPAC and TCMV identified Palestine as the dominant issue shaping Muslim electoral behavior, indicating that the transnational cause functions, consistent with the ideological framework documented above, as a primary mechanism through which political allegiance is tested and secured.

### 3. Canadian Civil Society and the Operating Environment

The third principal finding is that formal mechanisms of oversight exist but that they are applied inconsistently, at limited scale, and without sustained continuity. Where regulatory scrutiny does occur, it is episodic rather than systemic and is followed by coordinated responses that constrain its practical effect.

The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) provides a key example of this dynamic. The audit identified concerns relating to foreign political activity, organizational alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood's global network, support for entities connected to terrorism, and financial irregularities.

Instances of scrutiny are consistently accompanied by coordinated legal, narrative, and political responses. Litigation, public advocacy, and communications campaigns operate in parallel to frame regulatory action as discriminatory, most prominently through the language of Islamophobia. These responses are reinforced through academic outputs, advocacy reports, and coordinated engagement with political actors, including Members of Parliament, repositioning regulatory concerns within a civil liberties and civil rights-based framework. These dynamics are reinforced through the parallel deployment of the Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism (APR) frameworks, which function to reframe regulatory scrutiny as discrimination while embedding narrative protections within institutional and policy environments.

Legal mechanisms form a central component of this response environment. Charter challenges, appeals, procedural applications, and attempts to restrict disclosure are used not only to contest findings, but to delay proceedings and increase the cost of enforcement. In the MAC case, attempts to halt the audit, challenge judicial decisions, and prevent disclosure through sealing orders extended the process over multiple years, with key findings entering the public domain only after unsuccessful legal challenges.

These dynamics contribute to a divergence between regulatory findings and enforcement outcomes. In cases involving MAC and the Islamic Society of North America Canada (ISNA Canada), findings relating to financial irregularities and links to extremist or Islamist networks did not result in the revocation of charitable status but in compliance agreements or financial penalties.

At the same time, organizations subject to such findings continued to receive public funding, including federal grants, introducing inconsistency between regulatory assessment and state support and reducing deterrence.

Legal and reputational risk further shape the operating environment. Litigation and public disputes impose financial, administrative, and reputational costs on regulators and policymakers, contributing to an environment in which scrutiny is constrained by anticipated consequences.

A further structural dimension is the interaction between advocacy, academic, and policy domains. Advocacy organizations produce or support research through academic partnerships. These outputs are subsequently used in public and parliamentary discourse to frame regulatory scrutiny as discriminatory, creating a reinforcing interaction between narrative development, legal positioning, and policy engagement.

Taken together, these findings establish that the Canadian civil society environment is characterized not by the absence of oversight but by limited, inconsistent, and episodic scrutiny, followed by coordinated responses that constrain its effectiveness.

#### **4. Higher Education as a Central Operational Domain**

The fourth principal finding is that universities function as institutional environments in which funding, legitimacy, knowledge production, and mobilization intersect, providing a critical platform for institutional entrenchment consistent with the broader framework of *tamkeen*.

Across the Canadian cases examined, including the University of Toronto, York University, Toronto Metropolitan University, and the University of Waterloo, consistent concerns are identified: limited transparency in foreign funding; absence of disclosure regarding contractual terms governing intellectual property, research access, and student data; engagement in research domains with potential dual-use implications; and the use of campus environments as platforms for sustained mobilization, coalition-building, and narrative development.

The absence of a comprehensive national transparency framework is also identified. In contrast to the United States, where Section 117 of the Higher Education Act mandates disclosure of foreign gifts and contracts above defined thresholds, Canada does not maintain an equivalent reporting regime. Foreign funding flows, contractual provisions, and institutional obligations therefore remain largely unreported at a system-wide level.

Efforts to address this transparency gap have been limited in scope and, where proposed, have encountered institutional resistance. The Countering Foreign

Interference Act (Bill C-70), which received Royal Assent in June 2024, introduced provisions for a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, which takes effect on August 4, 2026. Its disclosure obligations, however, remain tied to arrangements intended to influence government or political processes, not to foreign funding of universities or research institutions generally, and do not constitute a dedicated disclosure regime comparable to Section 117. During parliamentary and regulatory consideration, proposals that would have expanded disclosure requirements in the higher education sector were opposed by U15 Canada, the association representing Canada's leading research universities, on the basis that such measures could constrain international research collaboration. This position reflects a broader dynamic in which institutions with significant exposure to foreign funding may also resist the introduction of enhanced transparency mechanisms.

At the University of Toronto, a complex institutional ecosystem is identified. The university functions as a central node in the development and dissemination of anti-Israel and related narratives. Israeli Apartheid Week originated at the institution, and the university hosted one of the largest encampments in North America following October 7.

The institutional environment includes interconnected student organizations such as the Muslim Students' Association (MSA), Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), and the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), operating within broader coalition structures that sustain continuity of mobilization.

A faculty legitimization layer reinforces these dynamics. Faculty groups publicly supported encampments and endorsed divestment from Israel. Statements included commitments to physically protect student protesters. Academic outputs characterized Canadian counterterrorism frameworks as discriminatory, contributing to legitimization of these narratives within academic and public discourse.

The institutional response reflects these dynamics. The University of Toronto Faculty Association (UTFA) voted in favor of divestment from Israel. The institution faced criticism for failure to advance an antisemitism motion and withdrew draft guidance on antisemitism following activist pressure. These developments indicate governance-level influence and institutional hesitation.

The university is also identified as a significant site of Qatari-linked academic engagement. Research funded by the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) includes projects in the fields of solar energy, corrosion modelling, carbon systems, and secure

communications. These research domains are directly relevant to infrastructure resilience and communications security and potentially fall within categories associated with potential dual-use considerations. The scale and diversity of these engagements indicate sustained institutional-level integration rather than isolated collaboration.

At Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU), the research reveals similar dynamics within an institutional environment shaped by sustained mobilization, organizational linkages, and governance-level pressures. The university has been the focus of sustained activist engagement, including encampments, coalition activity, and coordinated campaigns aligned with broader network structures identified in this report. These developments illustrate how campus-based mobilization interacts with institutional decision-making processes and governance responses.

TMU's Qatari-linked exposure extends beyond campus activism to formal institutional relationships. The university has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Qatar-owned University of Doha for Science and Technology encompassing joint academic programming, research collaboration, and a business incubator operated jointly with TMU's Digital Media Zone. This institutional engagement occurred within a university that has structured its finances around international student tuition revenue, which reached approximately C\$122 million by 2023–2024, representing 28 percent of total student fee revenue. According to the university's own president, this dependency places international academic partnerships outside the scope of the enrollment-driven oversight documented elsewhere in this report.

Related dynamics are observable within a broader networked context, including at York University, where event programming and academic engagement have contributed to an environment characterized by strong political bias and documented incidents of intimidation. For example, a 2009 conference on the subject of Israel and Palestine at York University included speakers aligned with anti-Israel advocacy and resulted in findings of intimidation directed at dissenting participants, including rhetoric advocating violence against pro-Israel scholars.

York University is also identified as a site of sustained mobilization linked to broader activist networks. Student organizations and external actors operate together to reproduce narrative frameworks and maintain continuity of mobilization activity. The significance lies in persistence and institutionalization of these dynamics.

At the University of Waterloo (UW), multiple dimensions of exposure converge. Qatari state-linked research funding exceeds C\$3.8 million across projects in smart grid

systems, energy infrastructure, high-voltage insulation, and hydrocarbon-related environmental systems aligned with Qatar's national priorities. These domains are directly relevant to national infrastructure and energy optimization and also fall within areas with potential dual-use implications.

This funding is complemented by structured educational and sponsorship pathways. At least thirty-five Qatari government-sponsored students have been enrolled or have graduated in the fields of engineering, computer science, and applied scientific disciplines. When combined with research funding and scholarship support, total Qatari state-linked investment connected to the institution is estimated to exceed C\$10.5 million, indicating sustained integration into a state-aligned academic and research ecosystem.

Campus mobilization is similarly extensive. Groups including Students for Palestinian Rights, Voices for Palestine, and Occupy UW operate alongside external networks such as Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME) and the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM). Documented incidents include antisemitic harassment and controversies over speakers with known antisemitic positions.

The Occupy UW encampment escalated beyond protest activity into direct confrontation with governance: after participants disrupted a Board of Governors meeting and physically prevented attendees from entering the building, the university issued trespass notices and initiated legal proceedings, seeking C\$1.5 million in damages for trespass, intimidation, and property damage, before withdrawing the suit following the encampment's dismantlement. Protest activity resumed the following semester under UW Voices for Palestine, whose media liaison described the movement as part of coordinated "international actions" connected to "liberation groups for Palestine across the world," and stated that the university was "not fighting one dedicated group of students."

A further finding concerns the University of Waterloo's engagement with Sofyan Taya, a visiting professor in 2021–2022, who was killed in a 2023 Israeli airstrike and subsequently memorialized by the university through a dedicated fund. Taya served as president of the Islamic University of Gaza, an institution established by the founder of Hamas whose alumni include Hamas's former political bureau chief and the principal architect of the October 7 attacks, and which independent reporting and Israeli military assessments identify as having provided facilities used in weapons development and militant operations. A separate case, involving the role of a UW professor emeritus as the founder and president of a now-defunct organization whose

leadership publicly endorsed violence against Israeli civilians, reflects a similar pattern of unaddressed institutional affiliation at the faculty level.

Specific institutional examples reinforce these findings. Fundraising activity for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) occurred during a period of international scrutiny. The university published and subsequently removed a bereavement notice lacking evidentiary confirmation. Governance concerns include overlapping affiliations between a member of the Board of Governors and external advocacy organizations.

The most consequential outcome is the termination of the university's academic partnership with the Israel Institute of Technology, also known as the Technion, following sustained mobilization. This is a case in which campus activity translated directly into institutional decision making. An asymmetry is identified: Israeli partnerships were terminated under pressure, while Qatari-linked research and funding relationships continued without comparable examination.

These university-level findings are complemented by broader institutional relationships involving Canadian institutions such as the College of the North Atlantic, Dalhousie University, and the University of Calgary.

A central concern across these relationships is the opacity of contractual arrangements. The Texas A&M case demonstrates that foreign state-linked agreements may extend beyond funding to include intellectual property, research outputs, institutional data, curriculum, and sensitive student information, illustrating the scale at which such exposure can operate. In the Canadian context, the absence of disclosure frameworks prevents assessment of whether comparable provisions exist. Brown University's disengagement from the "Choices Program," which was funded by Qatar Foundation International, illustrates how sustained scrutiny can result in institutional withdrawal from foreign-funded educational programs.

A convergence of risks is identified, including dual-facing organizational positioning, foreign funding exposure linked to Qatar-based entities, alignment with established ideological frameworks, and the presence of individuals and intellectual influences associated with antisemitic incitement.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the Canadian case reflects interaction between a transnational strategic model and a domestic environment characterized by limited transparency, variability in enforcement, and elevated costs associated with scrutiny.

## Policy Recommendations

These dynamics require a coordinated structural response across the regulatory, educational, and national security domains.

- Align Canadian government policy with US policy, which has designated elements of the global Muslim Brotherhood as terror organizations, direct Public Safety Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to investigate Muslim Brotherhood chapters—and related entities and individuals—connected to Canada and within Canada, beginning with those already designated by the United States under Executive Order 14362, and establish intelligence-sharing channels with relevant US departments.
- Implement a comprehensive national foreign funding disclosure regime for universities, affiliated institutes, and foundations, covering financial flows above a defined threshold, contractual terms, intellectual property, research access, and student data, with public access and enforceable compliance provisions.
- Expand foreign influence transparency requirements beyond universities to charities and civil society organizations, requiring registration for individuals and entities acting on behalf of foreign state-linked actors across the academic, research, and advocacy environments.
- Establish a federal and provincial mechanism to review international academic partnerships against a risk-based compliance framework, with periodic reassessment of governance, funding sources, research sensitivity, intellectual property arrangements, and legal compliance.
- Introduce formal national security due diligence procedures for research collaborations, including federal guidance on partner vetting, funding transparency, intellectual property protection, and data governance, particularly in domains associated with potential dual-use applications.
- Strengthen the oversight of charities and non-profit organizations by equipping the Canada Revenue Agency to assess organizational networks, ideological alignment, and foreign linkages alongside financial compliance, with defined timelines and enforcement thresholds.

- Enhance accreditation and oversight standards for post-secondary institutions, including the systematic review of governance structures, funding sources, and curricula, in cases where institutions are linked to organizations that are subject to regulatory scrutiny.
- Clarify legal frameworks to ensure that anti-discrimination protections do not inhibit legitimate scrutiny and introduce safeguards to address the use of litigation and reputational pressure as mechanisms that constrain oversight. Strengthen coordination between federal, provincial, regulatory, and law enforcement bodies to ensure consistency between findings and enforcement outcomes.
- Improve campus transparency by requiring universities to disclose external partnerships, funding relationships, and formally supported student organizations and establish mechanisms to identify coordinated activity across campus networks.
- Support independent research and community voices by directing public funding toward pluralistic research not linked to transnational ideological networks, prioritizing work on foreign influence, antisemitism, extremism, and institutional resilience.

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## Introduction

At a time when the Government of Canada's own evidence describes antisemitism on Canadian campuses as systemic rather than episodic, the question of what has produced that environment has become unavoidable. *Campus Antisemitism and Student Experiences (CASE)*,<sup>2</sup> a report published by Canadian Heritage in August 2026, found that almost 96 percent of the Jewish postsecondary students surveyed had experienced or witnessed at least one antisemitic incident in the preceding twelve months, and that a quarter of the incidents they described occurred in classrooms or lecture halls, with 18 percent implicating faculty members. Its authors conclude that campus antisemitism in Canada is not a series of discrete acts but a failure of campus climate and campus governance. That conclusion identifies a serious problem but does not fully account for it.

The present report examines what lies behind this problem: the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned networks driving the doctrine, the organizational infrastructure, and the foreign state funding that shape the institutional environment in which the aforementioned conditions have taken hold not only on Canadian campuses but in the country's charitable sector, its civil service, and its political life. The report situates the Canadian environment within a broader transnational framework, drawing on primary source material, judicially authenticated evidence, state investigations, and comparative Western case studies to assess how these networks operate across multiple domains.

The analytical framework underpinning this report is grounded in prior work by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), in particular its report *The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into the United States: A Systemic Analysis*, which provides a detailed examination of entryism as a method of long-term ideological and institutional embedding.<sup>3</sup> That report establishes entryism as a structured and sequential process through which ideologically driven movements operate within existing institutional environments to influence, reshape, and over time redirect them from within. Its central contribution is to move analysis beyond

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<sup>2</sup> Jack Jedwab and Paul Holley, *Campus Antisemitism and Student Experiences (CASE)* (Association for Canadian Studies and Metropolis Institute for the Department of Canadian Heritage, August 2026), <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/canada-holocaust/antisemitism/campus-antisemitism-student-experiences.html>.

<sup>3</sup> ISGAP, *The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into Western Society: A Systemic Analysis* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf>.

individual actors and organizations toward the identification of systemic patterns across networks, sectors, and jurisdictions.

Within this framework, institutions are treated as sites of cumulative influence. Educational systems, civil society organizations, policy environments, and legal frameworks are understood as interconnected domains through which influence is established, normalized, and protected. This report applies that framework to the Canadian context.

The internal strategic documents of the Muslim Brotherhood, including “The Project” from 1982 and the “Explanatory Memorandum” from 1991, are examined as corroborative evidence of this model. These documents identify North America, including Canada, as a target environment and describe a phased process of long-term institutional entrenchment defined as a civilizational struggle (jihadist) effort. Their relevance lies in their alignment with the patterns identified in the strategic entryism analysis rather than as standalone explanatory tools.

This report does not examine Islam as a religion. It examines Islamism as a political ideology, and specifically the organizational and strategic architecture developed by the Muslim Brotherhood to operate within non-Islamic governance systems. The distinction is central. The subject of this report is not belief but the instrumentalization of religious language, identity, and institutions in pursuit of political and structural objectives.

The report proceeds on the basis that the Canadian case cannot be understood in isolation. The same doctrinal frameworks, institutional models, and funding mechanisms identified in the United States, France, Austria, and the United Kingdom are transnational in design and execution. Where Canada differs is not in exposure but in the absence of equivalent disclosure frameworks, investigative mechanisms, and policy responses.

A central focus is the role of higher education as a domain through which entryism operates with particular effectiveness. The strategic entryism report identifies universities as key sites where funding, narrative production, legitimacy, and policy influence converge. Evidence from the United States demonstrates that Qatari state-linked funding has shaped academic ecosystems at Georgetown University, Northwestern University, Columbia University, and Brown University, influencing curriculum development, faculty environments, research priorities, and downstream educational outputs, including K-12 materials and teacher training programs.

The report identifies parallel areas of exposure within Canada. Canadian institutional engagement with Qatar includes the College of the North Atlantic, Dalhousie University, the University of Calgary, and institutional collaborations involving SickKids Toronto. These relationships demonstrate the extent to which Canadian academic and professional institutions have participated in educational ecosystems shaped by Qatari state policy.

In addition to these formal partnerships, the report examines major Canadian university environments as operational sites in which narrative frameworks, student mobilization, coalition building, and advocacy structures converge. These include the University of Toronto and York University, alongside other large urban campus environments. These settings are not treated as isolated instances of campus activity, but as institutional spaces in which transnational narratives and organizational linkages are reproduced, normalized, and embedded.

Detailed analysis of these university environments, together with examination of foreign linked academic partnerships and institutional exposure, is presented in Section III of this report. These cases are assessed alongside the accreditation of the Canadian Islamic College under the auspices of the Muslim Association of Canada, which is examined as a parallel institutional development within the same entryism framework.

The report therefore integrates external evidentiary records as directly instructive for understanding Canadian dynamics. It examines how ideological doctrine, foreign state support, educational partnerships, and domestic institutional activity intersect to produce an operational environment in which influence can be established, expanded, and protected over time. Alongside its analytical findings, the report sets out targeted policy measures to address structural deficiencies in Canada's legal, regulatory, and institutional framework.

Section I sets out the ideological foundations, strategic doctrine, and operational domains of the Muslim Brotherhood's Western model, including the role of Yusuf al-Qaradawi in systematizing institutional entrenchment and the function of narrative frameworks such as the Palestinianization of Islam. It also examines the role of Qatar as an ideological hub, financier, and media amplifier.

Section II examines the Canadian environment, including political mobilization, advocacy structures, legal strategies, and the development of institutional networks across civil society and public life.

Section III presents detailed Canadian case studies, including foreign influence and funding dynamics in higher education and an analysis of the campus ecosystem at major Canadian universities, including the University of Toronto, the University of Waterloo, and Toronto Metropolitan University.

The research shows that Canada represents a permissive environment in which a documented transnational strategy is able to operate with reduced scrutiny. The absence of a comprehensive foreign funding disclosure regime for universities, the limited scope of existing foreign influence legislation, and the political and legal costs associated with scrutiny have collectively constrained the institutional response.

The findings presented in this report are intended to provide a structured evidentiary basis for understanding the scale, mechanisms, and implications of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned influence in Canada.

# SECTION I: THE STRATEGY

## Chapter 1: The Muslim Brotherhood's Western Playbook

### 1.1 Islamism, Islam, and the Origins of the Muslim Brotherhood

“Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

—Muslim Brotherhood motto<sup>4</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen*) was founded in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a schoolteacher who had absorbed both traditional Islamic learning and modern European methods of political organization. Al-Banna’s central conviction was that Islam is not merely a religion of personal devotion but an all-encompassing system governing politics, law, economics, and society. From that premise, he envisioned a movement unlike anything previously seen in the modern Muslim world—one that would ultimately take shape through tiered membership, specialized departments, financial self-sufficiency, and paramilitary capacity layered beneath a public infrastructure of schools, clinics, and mosques. However, it was his successors who fully constructed and then weaponized this architecture. Sayyid Qutb supplied the ideological framework that delegitimized secular governance entirely, and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi formulated a patient, institutionally sophisticated strategy for embedding this framework within Western liberal democracies.<sup>5</sup>

This analysis does not examine Islam as a faith. Rather, it examines Islamism—a twentieth-century political ideology that instrumentalizes Islamic tradition in service of a program of institutional and ultimately governmental transformation. This distinction matters analytically and politically, as several Muslim majority countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Several of the movement’s most consistent critics are Muslim scholars, community leaders, and politicians, who view it as a corruption of their religion rather than a defense of it.

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<sup>4</sup> US Senate, *Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015*, S. 2230, 114th Congress, 1st session, November 3, 2015, accessed June 18, 2026, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2230/text>.

<sup>5</sup> Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1993), available online at: <https://archive.org/details/societyofmuslimb0000mitc>.

Al-Banna's original model was explicitly gradualist. He redefined *tamkeen*—a Qur'anic term meaning empowerment or entrenchment—as a structured, sequential program comprising seven stages, beginning with individual spiritual reform and progressing through family, community, and government to an end state culminating in a revived Islamic world order and a restored caliphate. The operative doctrine was patience: building cadres, establishing institutions, and consolidating a base before seeking the exercise of overt power. Al-Banna's writings were explicit that premature confrontation would destroy the movement before it was strong enough to prevail.<sup>6</sup>

What began as a reformist movement hardened rapidly into something more militant. By the 1930s, the Brotherhood had embraced armed jihad, targeting colonial powers, Western modernity, and the Jewish presence in Palestine. Al-Banna's worldview was conspiratorial and explicitly antisemitic—he admired Nazi Germany, oversaw the Arabic translation of *Mein Kampf* under the title “My Jihad,” and aligned the Brotherhood with fascist currents at a moment when European racial ideology and Islamic revivalism found common cause in their shared hostility toward Jews and Western liberalism.<sup>7</sup>

It was from within this ideological framework that al-Banna elevated the Palestinian cause from a regional political matter to a pan-Islamic religious obligation binding on every Muslim—a framing that would prove to be one of the Muslim Brotherhood's most durable and consequential strategic contributions. His 1936 declaration that “those stopping short of helping Palestine are actually stopping short of defending Allah and His messenger”<sup>8</sup> transformed a territorial dispute into a religious cause and laid the ideological foundation for the Palestinianization strategy that Muslim Brotherhood-aligned organizations deploy in the West to this day in narrative construction and inculcation, educational entryism, political mobilization, and the building of alliances.

In contrast, Sayyid Qutb, radicalized during imprisonment under President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and by an alienating visit to the United States in 1948–1950, rejected gradualism entirely, infusing the Muslim Brotherhood with revolutionary rhetoric, a complete rejection of secular governance, and a distinct focus on instrumentalizing violent jihad.

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<sup>6</sup> Hassan al-Banna, *Risalat Al-Ta'alim* [The message of teaching] (1938), available online at: [https://thequranblog.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/\\_3\\_-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf](https://thequranblog.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/_3_-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2013), ch. 4.

<sup>7</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>8</sup> “Hassan al-Banna's Centenary ... Attitude Towards Palestinian Cause,” Ikhwanweb, n.d., <https://ikhwanweb.com/hassan-al-bannas-centenary/>.

He expanded the Qur’anic concept of *jahiliyyah*—a condition of ignorance and corruption that defined the pre-Islamic age—to encompass all contemporary secular societies, Muslim and Western alike, thereby delegitimizing any government not founded on his reading of divine sovereignty. Qutb’s 1964 revolutionary manifesto, *Milestones*, provided the ideological foundation for the conclusion that existing institutions required replacement rather than reform and that a committed vanguard—not a mass movement—was the instrument of transformation.<sup>9</sup>

Qutb also systematically expanded the antisemitic architecture al-Banna had introduced, drawing on the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Nazi-era materials and recasting them in Islamic theological language, constructing Jews as the architects of Western corruption and framing opposition to Israel as a religious obligation.<sup>10</sup> In doing so, Qutb transformed al-Banna’s Palestinian framework from a religious duty into a civilizational struggle—the point at which antisemitism, anti-Westernism, and pan-Islamic mobilization fused into a single, self-reinforcing ideological instrument that his successors would carry into the West.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi inherited al-Banna’s and Qutb’s frameworks and resolved their central tension. Where al-Banna had built a mass gradualist movement and Qutb radicalized its ideology, al-Qaradawi provided the strategic doctrine that made both operational in Western liberal democracies: patient institutional entrenchment (*tamkeen*) through democratic participation, legal infrastructure, and narrative control, pursued behind a public façade of moderation that his concept of *wasatiyyah*—the “middle way”—made credible to Western authorities.<sup>11</sup> A recent French government report examining Muslim Brotherhood infiltration refers to this highly successful strategy as a “double discourse.”<sup>12</sup>

Al-Qaradawi’s enormous contribution to the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West is examined in detail in section 1.3.

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<sup>9</sup> Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* [first published in Arabic in 1964] (Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), available online at: <https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Milestones%20Special%20Edition.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (Columbia University Press, 2010); Qutb, *Milestones*; Sayyid Qutb, *Fi Zilal al-Qur’an* [In the shade of the Qur’an] (Dar al-Shuruq, 1964).

<sup>11</sup> Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Al-Wasatiyya al-Islamiyya wa al-Tasamuh* [Islamic moderation and tolerance] (Dar al-Shuruq, 2000), cited in ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>12</sup> French Ministry of the Interior, *Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France* [The Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in France] (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2025), <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sites/minint/files/medias/documents/2025-05/2025-05-02-rapport-freres-musulmans.pdf>. Quotations from this report were translated independently and do not originate from the issuing body.

The most recent synthesis, associated with Ali al-Sallabi—Secretary General of the Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) since al-Qaradawi’s death—integrates Salafist literalism with Muslim Brotherhood methodology and more explicitly endorses various forms of jihad as components of the *tamkeen* process. In April 2025, under al-Sallabi’s leadership, IUMS issued a fatwa declaring armed jihad against Israel “incumbent upon every able Muslim in the Islamic world,” a significant escalation beyond al-Qaradawi’s qualified endorsements of resistance.<sup>13</sup>

The institutional scale at which this strategy has operated in the West would not have been possible without significant financial and diplomatic patronage. Qatar, a small but immensely wealthy Gulf emirate with significant geopolitical influence, provided precisely that. From the 1960s onward, Qatar provided al-Qaradawi with citizenship, a permanent base, a global media platform in the form of Al Jazeera, and access to sovereign wealth fund resources that no non-state movement could independently command.<sup>14</sup>

When Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa seized power in Doha in 1995 and made Muslim Brotherhood patronage a cornerstone of Qatari foreign policy, the Brotherhood’s North American settlement framework was already in place. What Qatar provided from that point onward was the infrastructure that the Brotherhood had always foreseen in its planning documents but could not itself supply.<sup>15</sup> The result was a strategic convergence between ideology, strategy, economic might, state-level protection, narrative incubation and dominance, and statecraft.<sup>16</sup> This convergence is examined in detail in Chapter 2.

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<sup>13</sup> Ali Muhammad al-Sallabi, *Fiqh al-Nasr wa al-Tamkin fi al-Qur’an al-Karim* [The jurisprudence of victory and empowerment in the noble Qur’an] (Dar al-Ma’rifa, 2005); Fatwa issued by IUMS in April 2025, as cited in ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>14</sup> Alberto M. Fernandez, “Al-Qaradawi: Qatar’s Islamist Empire Builder,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series no. 1652, Middle East Media Research Institute, October 3, 2022, <https://www.memri.org/reports/al-qaradawi-qatars-islamist-empire-builder>; David B. Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,” *Middle East Policy* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2014).

<sup>15</sup> Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood”; ISGAP, *Foreign Infiltration: Georgetown University, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FTM-GEORGETOWN-REPORT-2025-05-23-1.pdf>; Mohamed Akram, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” May 22, 1991, Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex.) [hereinafter, “Explanatory Memorandum”], available at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Fernandez, “Al-Qaradawi: Qatar’s Islamist Empire Builder”; Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood”; Alberto M. Fernandez and Yotam Feldner, “Al-Jazeera Unmasked: Political Islam as a Media Arm of the Qatari State,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series no. 1527, Middle East Media Research Institute, August 12, 2020, <https://www.memri.org/reports/al-jazeera-unmasked-political-islam-media-arm-qatari-state>; Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout, “Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington,” Quincy

## 1.2 Strategic Blueprints: “The Project” (1982) and the “Explanatory Memorandum” (1991)

Two internal Muslim Brotherhood documents, recovered by Swiss police in 2001 and FBI agents in 2004 respectively, provide authenticated blueprints for the movement’s Western strategy. Both were introduced as evidence in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing trial in Dallas in 2008, the largest such prosecution in American history, and were authenticated through expert testimony and organizational network analysis.<sup>17</sup>

The trial was itself a landmark event in the evidentiary history of this issue. For the first time, authenticated internal Brotherhood strategy documents entered the public record, providing a foundation for understanding how the movement’s North American network—which explicitly named Canada as a target alongside the United States—was structured and resourced. The Brotherhood’s own planning documents coined the term “civilizational jihad” to describe this strategy: a nonviolent campaign to erode Western society from within by exploiting democratic systems, with the long-term objective of diluting and displacing Western cultural and political influence and replacing it with an organizational network operating across social, religious, and professional sectors.<sup>18</sup>

“The Project” (1982) is a 100-year strategic framework for expanding Islamist influence in Western societies. Its core directives are not limited to creating Islamic financial networks and organizations but extend to infiltrating political and social institutions, gaining control of education and media, and manipulating legal and political systems through coalition-building with ideologically disparate groups, explicitly including socialist and left-wing movements where tactical convergence exists. The document is notable for its candor on the instrumental nature of these alliances: partners need not share Muslim Brotherhood ideology as long as they agree on specific immediate objectives.<sup>19</sup>

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Brief no. 83 (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, September 8, 2025), <https://quincyinst.org/research/soft-power-hard-influence-how-qatar-became-a-giant-in-washington/#>; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate: Qatari Paymasters, Soft Power and the Manipulation of Democracy* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Networks-of-Hate.pdf>; ISGAP, *Foreign Infiltration*.

<sup>17</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum”; Department of Justice, “Federal Judge Hands Down Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case,” press release, US Department of Justice, May 27, 2009, <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences-holy-land-foundation-case>.

<sup>18</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum,” 7; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>19</sup> “The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy” (1982), translated by Scott Burgess in December 2005 based on French version published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l’Occident* (Seuil, 2005) [hereinafter, “The Project”], available at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf>.

The “Explanatory Memorandum” (1991), written by senior Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammed Akram and ratified by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council, translates the Project’s global framework into a specific North American plan. Its central formulation describes the Muslim Brotherhood’s work in America and Canada as a “Civilization-Jihadist Process,” which entails “eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers.”<sup>20</sup> The document identifies twenty-nine affiliated civil-society organizations and individuals operating across the religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media sectors, including Dr. Jamal Badawi, an Egyptian-Canadian educator and academic who held leadership roles in several Brotherhood-aligned organizations.<sup>21</sup> The Memorandum emphasizes the need for the movement to master the “art of coalitions” and the “principles of cooperation.” It further urges the movement to “absorb Muslims and win them with all of their factions and colors in America and Canada for the settlement project” while building alliances with “those who agree from our belief in work.”<sup>22</sup>

The complementary logic of these two documents is significant. “The Project” establishes doctrine, while the “Explanatory Memorandum” operationalizes it for North America. The Memorandum’s seven stages of *tamkeen* for North America begin with ideological clarity, ensuring members understand their community-building and advocacy work as part of a civilizational confrontation, and progress through organization building, base expansion, coalition coordination, and the adoption of causes (with Palestine as the primary unifying cause).<sup>23</sup> The long-term objective is to present Islam as a “civilization alternative” and support “‘the global Islamic State wherever it is,’ with Islamic centers in every city serving as institutional foundations where ‘Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland’ through the ‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ of settlement.”<sup>24</sup>

### 1.3 The Grand Architect: Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Western Institutional Strategy

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi—spiritual leader, chief ideologue, and principal architect of the modern Muslim Brotherhood’s Western strategy—based in Qatar from the 1960s until his death in 2022, developed the third and decisive phase of Brotherhood strategy:

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<sup>20</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>21</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum.”

<sup>22</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

institutional *tamkeen*. Where Qutb had rejected democratic participation as theological compromise, al-Qaradawi reframed it as a tactical instrument. His jurisprudence of priorities (*fiqh al-awlawiyyat*) provided a framework for phasing Islamic objectives, while his jurisprudence of minorities (*fiqh al-aqalliyyat*) provided specific guidance for Muslim communities operating inside Western liberal systems. Both endorsed participation in Western political and civic life *not* as an expression of commitment to liberal democracy but as a means of embedding influence within it.<sup>25</sup>

Al-Qaradawi was not merely a jurisprudential innovator but an institution-builder of extraordinary reach. He served as chairman of the European Council on Fatwa and Research (ECFR), as the spiritual and ideological leader of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE)—now the Council of European Muslims (CEM)—and as the ideological figurehead of France’s Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (IESH).<sup>26</sup> The aforementioned French government report on Muslim Brotherhood infiltration identifies al-Qaradawi as an essential architect of the Brotherhood’s organizational and educational framework in Europe, finding that the CEM, established in 1989 as the “umbrella organization for the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe,” steered the Brotherhood toward a more strategic gradualist approach under his ideological leadership.<sup>27</sup> The report further found that al-Qaradawi’s strategy of combining concealment with the pursuit of legitimacy and victimization defined the movement’s transactional strategy, with the CEM maintaining ties to Hamas and Hamas-linked fundraising networks and some affiliated organizations having links to al-Qaeda. His Al Jazeera program “Sharia and Life” reached an estimated sixty million viewers weekly from his base in Doha, making Qatar’s state media the primary distribution platform for Brotherhood jurisprudence in the television era.<sup>28</sup>

What distinguished al-Qaradawi from his predecessors was not merely ideological leadership or clerical jurisprudence but the construction of an entire operational architecture for the West: a web of interconnected institutions—mosques, schools, charities, student organizations, professional associations, legal bodies, media platforms, and research centers—each reinforcing the others, each publicly defensible on liberal grounds, and each serving the long-term transformative objective that al-Banna had identified and Qutb had radicalized. His concept of *wasatiyyah*—the “middle

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> French Ministry of the Interior, *Frères musulmans et islamisme politique*.

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Smoltczyk, “Islam’s Spiritual ‘Dear Abby’: The Voice of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” *Der Spiegel*, February 15, 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islam-s-spiritual-dear-abby-the-voice-of-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-a-745526.html>.

way”<sup>29</sup>—gave this architecture its public face: a presentation of Brotherhood objectives in the idiom of moderation, pluralism, and civic engagement that made the network comprehensible and acceptable to Western authorities while internal doctrine remained intact.

Al-Qaradawi systematized what the French government, in its report on political Islam, referred to as “double discourse”: a deliberate bifurcation between what Brotherhood-aligned organizations say to Western authorities and what they communicate internally. The French experience illustrates the mechanism. The interfaith dialogue and civic engagement promoted by the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, the Muslim Brotherhood’s French affiliate, were not expressions of genuine pluralism but instruments of legitimation. According to French authorities, this was “a tactical choice in [the organization’s] quest for legitimacy in the eyes of public authorities.”<sup>30</sup> The logic is al-Qaradawi’s: present moderation outwardly, while preserving doctrine internally. Legitimacy at state level is a tactical asset, not a reflection of shared values.

This strategy of combining concealment with victimization narratives is laid out in al-Qaradawi’s seminal *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, which set out his goal to “restore Islam to the leadership of society” and reinstate “the Islamic caliphate system to the leadership anew as required by sharia.”<sup>31</sup> French investigations uncovered “strategies of concealment particularly concerning the receipt of foreign funding through endowment funds and real estate holding companies (notably from Qatar),”<sup>32</sup> and the CEM and its French affiliate have been designated as terrorist entities by the UAE for their ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>33</sup> Despite public efforts by affected organizations to deny formal links to the Brotherhood, such denials have been rejected by several European courts.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> al-Qaradawi, *Al-Wasatiyya al-Islamiyya*.

<sup>30</sup> French Ministry of the Interior, *Frères musulmans et islamisme politique*.

<sup>31</sup> Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, trans. S.M. Hasan al-Banna (Awakening Publications, 2000), quoted in Lorenzo Vidino, “Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Hudson Institute, November 1, 2006, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/aims-and-methods-of-europe-s-muslim-brotherhood>.

<sup>32</sup> French Ministry of the Interior, *Frères musulmans et islamisme politique*, 64.

<sup>33</sup> “UAE Cabinet Approves List of Designated Terrorist Organizations,” *Emirates News Agency (WAM)*, November 15, 2014, <https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395272478814>; “UAE Lists Scores of Groups As ‘Terrorists,’” *Al Jazeera*, November 16, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/11/16/uae-lists-scores-of-groups-as-terrorists>.

<sup>34</sup> Lorenzo Vidino and Sergio Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood’s Pan European Structure* (Austrian Fund for the Documentation of Religiously Motivated Extremism, February 2022), [https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/fileadmin/dpi/publikationen/Report\\_EU\\_Strukturen\\_final.pdf](https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/fileadmin/dpi/publikationen/Report_EU_Strukturen_final.pdf).

### 1.3.1 The Weaponization of Islamophobia

Al-Qaradawi's jurisprudence of minorities provided the theoretical foundation for one of the Muslim Brotherhood's most consequential Western tactical innovations, namely the weaponization of Islamophobia as a shield against scrutiny. The conceptual architecture was developed through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), a Brotherhood-aligned think tank founded in the United States in 1981, which reframed Muslim identity in Western contexts as a protected minority category requiring dedicated legal infrastructure.<sup>35</sup> The term "Islamophobia," which originally described genuine anti-Muslim prejudice, was systematically stretched to encompass any critical examination of Islamist ideology, organizations, or funding networks, thus constraining academic inquiry, shaping journalism guidelines, and generating sustained pressure on security agencies to remove Islamist-specific terminology from training materials. Operationalized through North American advocacy groups and a network of allied organizations and sympathetic academic institutions,<sup>36</sup> it became one of the Muslim Brotherhood's most effective instruments for insulating the institutional web al-Qaradawi and fellow Muslim Brotherhood leaders had built from the scrutiny it was designed to evade. Its consequences are documented across Western democracies and are examined in the Canadian context throughout this report.

### 1.3.2 The Palestinianization of Islam and the Islamization of Antisemitism

Rooted in al-Banna's 1936 framing of Palestine as a religious obligation<sup>37</sup> and hardened by Qutb into a revolutionary and civilizational struggle, the Palestinianization of Islam transforms a territorial conflict into a theological imperative—one that normalizes antisemitism, frames anti-Zionism as a non-negotiable religious duty, and systematically minimizes or inverts the Holocaust.<sup>38</sup>

Al-Qaradawi completed this construction. From his base in Qatar, he elevated it into the primary pan-Islamic mobilizing issue for Muslim communities in the West—the entry point through which Muslims with no personal connection to the conflict are drawn into adopting the Brotherhood's broader ideology, the loyalty test by which allegiance is measured, and the hinge on which the Muslim Brotherhood's coalition-building strategy turns.

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<sup>35</sup> "About Us," International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), n.d., <https://iiit.org/en/about-us/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>36</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*; Department of Justice, "Federal Judge Hands Down Sentences."

<sup>37</sup> "Hassan al-Banna's Centenary ... Attitude Towards Palestinian Cause," Ikhwanweb, n.d., <https://ikhwanweb.com/hassan-al-bannas-centenary/>.

<sup>38</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

At the 2002 Al-Quds Conference, al-Qaradawi declared: “What unites Muslims today is not race, nor culture, but causes, chief among them is Palestine. It should remain the first cause.”<sup>39</sup> No statement more precisely captures the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic entryism into Western institutions. The Palestinian cause was not merely a political position—it was a carefully engineered mobilizing instrument, one that grafts onto anti-colonial discourse, capitalizes on Western liberal guilt, and converts a geopolitical conflict into an Islamic religious obligation accessible to every Muslim regardless of nationality or personal connection to the land.

The antisemitism embedded in this framework is structural, not incidental. As Matthias Küntzel has documented, under al-Banna and his successors “the Muslim Brotherhood became a mass organization not as an anti-colonial but as an anti-Jewish movement. Jihadism did not merely spur this antisemitism; it was constituted by it.”<sup>40</sup> The French government report states that “antisemitic and Brotherhood-inspired conspiracy theories, along with hatred of Jews, have been a significant component of the Brotherhood’s ideology since its inception.”<sup>41</sup> Al-Qaradawi inherited and amplified this tradition. His fatwas and broadcasts, including ones that explicitly target Jews, were not an aberration but the public expression of a theological framework that runs from Hamas’s founding charter to Qatar’s domestic educational infrastructure and its documented correlation with campus antisemitism across Western universities.

Al-Qaradawi’s fatwas were not merely rhetorical. In 2001, he issued a fatwa legitimizing suicide bombings, which was posted on Hamas’s website to justify its terrorist attacks, and in 2003 he authorized the use of women in suicide attacks.<sup>42</sup> He expressed public astonishment that “some sheikhs deliver fatwas that betray the mujahedin, instead of supporting them and urging them to sacrifice and martyrdom,” and reiterated his support for suicide bombing and terrorist groups at a 2007 conference held in his honor in Doha.<sup>43</sup> In a January 2009 broadcast, he expressed the hope that Allah would grant him “the opportunity to go to the land of Jihad and resistance, even if in a wheelchair. I will shoot Allah’s enemies, the Jews, and they will throw a bomb at me, and thus, I will seal my life with martyrdom.”<sup>44</sup> In the same broadcast, in a statement

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<sup>39</sup> “Al-Quds Conference—Min Ajl al-Haqq (In Support of the Truth),” conference proceedings, 2002, accessed November 7, 2025, available online at: <https://aja.me/7fhyr>.

<sup>40</sup> Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (Telos Press, 2007).

<sup>41</sup> French Ministry of the Interior, *Frères musulmans et islamisme politique*, 16.

<sup>42</sup> “Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Theologian of Terror,” Anti-Defamation League, May 13, 2013, <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/Sheik-Yusuf-al-Qaradawi-2013-5-3-v1.pdf>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> “Sheikh Yousuf Al-Qaradawi: Allah Imposed Hitler on the Jews to Punish Them – ‘Allah Willing, the Next Time Will Be at the Hands of the Believers,’” MEMRI Special Dispatch no. 2224, Middle East Media Research Institute,

exemplifying his fusion of Nazi ideology with a theology of divine retribution, al-Qaradawi noted that Allah had historically imposed successive punishments on the Jews for their “corruption,” that “the last punishment was carried out by Hitler,” and that the next would come “at the hands of the believers.”<sup>45</sup> Al-Qaradawi framed support for Hamas not as a political position but as a religious obligation,<sup>46</sup> ensuring the cause would function as a non-negotiable commitment rather than a debatable stance.

Al-Qaradawi was banned from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States for inciting violence and formally designated a terrorist by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—and yet his institutional framework persisted and spread, including into Canada. The Muslim Association of Canada, one of the most important Muslim organizations in Canada—and discussed in detail in Section II of this report—published an extensive eulogy upon his death in 2022 describing him as “our beloved teacher” who “pioneered intellectual Islamic renewal in the West.”<sup>47</sup> When considered alongside the incorporation of al-Qaradawi’s textbooks into MAC’s K-12 curricula,<sup>48</sup> the eulogy might suggest the direct transmission of his framework into Canada. The doctrinal phases, antisemitic architecture, Qatari underwriting, and Canadian manifestations of that transmission are examined throughout this report.

#### 1.4 Four Domains of Operational Implementation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s *Tamkeen* (Entrenchment) Strategy

The four domains examined below are the operational expression of the strategic architecture constructed by al-Qaradawi and mandated by the Brotherhood’s blueprints. They are introduced here in their American context—where the evidentiary record is most complete—and are examined in their Canadian manifestations in Sections II and III of this report

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February 4, 2009, <https://www.memri.org/reports/sheikh-yousuf-al-qaradhawi-allah-imposed-hitler-jews-punish-them-%E2%80%93-allah-willing-next-time>.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds., *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (Columbia University Press, 2009), introduction and ch. 1; Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat al-Muslima* [Jurisprudence of Muslim minorities] (Dar al-Shuruq, 2001), 34–38; Fernandez, “Al-Qaradawi: Qatar’s Islamist Empire Builder.”

<sup>47</sup> Muslim Association of Canada (@MACNational), “Among the believers there are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah,” Facebook, September 26, 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/share/1AkFRLz5Kf/?mibextid=WC7FNe>.

<sup>48</sup> “Islamic Knowledge Contest (Grade 8),” Muslim Association of Canada, April 8, 2023, <https://schools.macnet.ca/alhudaschools/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2023/03/KCEQG08.pdf>.

### 1.4.1 Domain 1: Narrative Control and the Red-Green Alliance

Narrative control is the most consequential domain of the Muslim Brotherhood's *tamkeen* strategy, and the one on which all others hinge. Without narrative dominance, which involves the capacity to determine how Islam, Islamism, Islamophobia, and the Palestinian cause are framed in Western public discourse, the Muslim Brotherhood's political, legal, and institutional gains would be contestable. Narrative infrastructure is what makes the other three domains durable.

The Qatari media infrastructure through which Brotherhood-aligned narratives are amplified globally—Al Jazeera's dual-track strategy, AJ+'s social justice repackaging, and Qatar's penetration of Western entertainment markets through collaborations with the BBC,<sup>49</sup> CNN, and others—is examined in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Within this broad narrative space—which touches upon everything from journalism and media to education and political mobilization, economic partnerships, and foreign policy—actors from the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological and organizational sphere have positioned themselves as the main authority on Islam and religious accommodation in Western institutional settings, marginalizing alternative Muslim voices that might be critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and its tactics.<sup>50</sup> Al-Qaradawi's systematization of *tamkeen* and his incorporation of social justice frameworks into the Brotherhood's overarching strategy—as discussed in section 1.3—forms the operational logic behind this positioning.

The doctrinal authorization for coalition building as a narrative instrument was codified in “The Project” (1982) decades before the term “Red-Green alliance” gained traction in Western security analysis. The Project's Seventh Point of Departure instructs Brotherhood members “to accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances.”<sup>51</sup> The governing logic is explicit: coalition partners are not to be given allegiance or taken into confidence, the Islamic movement “must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken,” and collaboration is to be “limited to the leadership or to a limited number of individuals in order to maximize the benefit and

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<sup>49</sup> “BBC Studios Extends Partnership with beIN Media Group across Qatar, MENA & Turkey,” press release, beIN Media Group, August 1, 2018, <https://www.beinmediagroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/BBC-Studios-beIN-Release-August-2018-Eng.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>51</sup> “The Project.”

minimize the possible drawbacks.”<sup>52</sup> The document instructs adherents to study “the possibility of strengthening internal collaboration” with local movements.

This has produced what analysts describe as the Red-Green alliance: a sustained convergence between Islamist movements and progressive left-wing actors centered on opposition to Israel, anti-colonial discourse, and the instrumentalization of social justice and anti-racism frameworks. The mechanism is not ideological agreement—as Muslim Brotherhood orthodoxy is irreconcilable with secular leftism on gender, sexuality, or pluralism—but operational convenience. Muslim Brotherhood actors and organizations repackage Islamist objectives in the language of decolonization, indigenous solidarity, and social justice, which affords them access to progressive communities that would reject more explicit Islamist framing.

The ideological and tactical centerpiece of the narrative strategy is the Palestinianization of Islam: the elevation of the Palestinian cause as the primary pan-Islamic mobilizing issue for Muslim communities in the West. Its doctrinal construction—from al-Banna’s 1936 framing through Qutb’s civilizational architecture to al-Qaradawi’s mobilizational synthesis examined—transforms a territorial conflict into a theological imperative, frames anti-Zionism as a non-negotiable religious duty, and provides the foundation on which the Red-Green alliance rests.

Hamas—the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, established in 1987 and identified as such in its own 1988 founding charter—is the most complete institutional expression of the Palestinianization strategy. Its founding charter is unambiguous: drawing explicitly on the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, it attributes the French Revolution, both World Wars, and Freemasonry to Jewish conspiracy, calls for the killing of Jews until Judgment Day, and describes the elimination of Israel as a religious obligation incumbent on every Muslim.<sup>53</sup>

That an organization founded on a charter of explicit genocide against Jews became, within three decades, the subject of normalization campaigns across Western university campuses and progressive political coalitions is among the most consequential achievements of this strategy—and the most direct measure of the Red-Green alliance’s effectiveness. The Brotherhood did not need to persuade Western audiences to endorse Hamas’s charter. It needed only to install, through decades of

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, August 18, 1988,” Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, n.d., [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/hamas.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp) [hereinafter, “Hamas Covenant 1988”].

narrative investment, an interpretive framework in which Hamas—a designated terrorist organization in Canada, the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom<sup>54</sup>—could come to be perceived as a resistance movement rather than as a genocidal one and in which any accusation of antisemitism could be recast as Islamophobia, anti-Palestinian racism (APR), or anti-Arab bigotry. That this reframing took hold as thoroughly as it did is the logical endpoint of the narrative infrastructure examined in this chapter. This helps explain how Western publics have been so conditioned by the Palestinianization doctrine and Red-Green alliance coalition building that they are willing to defend and celebrate under the banner of anti-racism an organization whose founding document calls for the extermination of the Jews.

The post-October 7, 2023, cultural, educational and institutional milieu demonstrates that the strategy has matured. Nearly all major Muslim organizations in North America, including in Canada, not only declined to condemn Hamas by name but actively normalized its narratives and methods, branding opposition to it as Islamophobic.<sup>55</sup> Campus protests reproduced Brotherhood-aligned messaging and visuals within hours of the massacre because decades of educational and media investment had successfully installed those frameworks as the default categories through which the conflict is understood.<sup>56</sup>

In Canada, that maturity was visible in protest coalitions that united organizations with no shared ideological foundation beyond opposition to Israel: in direct action campaigns bringing together pro-Palestinian activist groups with campus environmental and social justice organizations;<sup>57</sup> in the rapid institutional adoption of

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<sup>54</sup> “Currently Listed Entities,” Public Safety Canada, last updated September 29, 2025, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrtr/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx>; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” US Department of State, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>; Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 of 26 February 2026 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 2026/455 of February 26, 2026; “Proscribed Terrorist Groups or Organisations,” policy paper, UK Home Office, last updated January 28, 2026, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations-2>.

<sup>55</sup> Cosmin Dzsurdza, “One Out of Six Muslim Organizations Responded When Asked to Denounce Hamas,” *True North*, November 30, 2023, <https://tnc.news/2023/11/30/muslim-organizations-denounce-hamas/>; Gabby Deutch, “CAIR Executive Director ‘Happy to See’ Oct. 7 Hamas Terror Attack,” *Jewish Insider*, December 7, 2023, <https://jewishinsider.com/2023/12/nihad-awad-council-american-islamic-relations-israel-gaza-terror-attacks/>.

<sup>56</sup> Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar, “Resistance to Repression and Back Again: The Movement for Palestinian Liberation in US Academia,” *Middle East Critique* 33, no. 2 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2024.2375669>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>57</sup> Aloysius Wong, Ben Makuch, and Roxanna Woloshyn, “Some Blame Outsiders for Spread of Pro-Palestinian Encampments,” *CBC News*, May 14, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/campus-protests-outside-influence-theories-1.7200820>; “Palestinian Youth Movement,” profile, NGO Monitor, last updated August 11, 2025, <https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/palestinian-youth-movement/>; National Center for Combating

the anti-Palestinian racism definition;<sup>58</sup> and in the deployment of indigenous rights and land sovereignty discourse to import a foreign geopolitical conflict into Canadian classrooms and domestic policy debates.<sup>59</sup> Each is a direct expression of the coalition-building doctrine “The Project” had outlined more than forty years earlier.

## 1.4.2 Domain 2: Institutional Embedding

The Muslim Brotherhood’s institutional strategy spans the religious, educational, charitable, financial, media, political, social services, legal, and research domains. These are built and operationalized to achieve the Project’s directive to “create Islamic centers in every city” and the Memorandum’s vision for an expansive, interconnected network of institutions.<sup>60</sup> The operational architecture al-Qaradawi constructed forms the blueprint that is implemented in this domain.

Key Brotherhood-linked figures—including Hisham al-Talib, Jamal Barzinji, and Ahmed Totanji—established foundational institutions beginning in the 1960s, including the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), building networks that now include approximately 270 full-time Islamic schools. The network’s mosque infrastructure grew from 2,106 to 2,769 institutions between 2010 and 2020—a 31 percent increase that significantly exceeds Muslim population growth over the same period.<sup>61</sup>

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Antisemitism, “Canada – Pro-Palestinian Groups to Hold Demonstration in front of the Israeli Consulate in Montreal – July 12, 2025,” Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, n.d., [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/canada\\_propalestinian\\_demonstration\\_israeli\\_consulate\\_montreal\\_2025-07-12/en/mashlat\\_canada\\_propalestinian\\_demonstration\\_israeli\\_consulate\\_montreal\\_2025-07-12.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/canada_propalestinian_demonstration_israeli_consulate_montreal_2025-07-12/en/mashlat_canada_propalestinian_demonstration_israeli_consulate_montreal_2025-07-12.pdf).

<sup>58</sup> Dania Majid, *Anti-Palestinian Racism: Naming, Framing and Manifestations* (Arab Canadian Lawyers Association, April 25, 2022), <https://www.canarablaw.org/s/Anti-Palestinian-Racism-Naming-Framing-and-Manifestations.pdf>; Kathryn Blaze Baum and Dakshana Bascaramurthy, “TDSB Trustees Vote to Adopt ‘Anti-Palestinian Racism’ Term,” *CBC News*, June 20, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/tdsb-anti-palestinian-racism-board-vote-1.7240178>; Adam Hummel, “Anti-Israel Curriculum Is Becoming Mandatory in Canadian Schools,” *Future of Jewish*, February 28, 2026, <https://www.futureofjewish.com/p/anti-israel-curriculum-is-becoming>; C.S. Kogan et al., “The Legal and Societal Perils of Introducing the Concept of Anti-Palestinian Racism in Canada,” *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10228>.

<sup>59</sup> Lila Sarick, “TDSB, Ontario Education Ministry to Investigate How Students Ended Up at a Political Rally Featuring Pro-Palestine Slogans,” *Canadian Jewish News*, September 24, 2024, <https://thecjn.ca/news/tdsb-grassy-narrows/>; Mitchell Consky, “Toronto School Board Passes Motion to Assist Provincial Investigation of Divisive Protest Scene,” *Canadian Jewish News*, September 26, 2024, <https://thecjn.ca/news/grassy-narrows-tdsb/>.

<sup>60</sup> “The Project”; “Explanatory Memorandum.”

<sup>61</sup> Ihsan Bagby, *The American Mosque 2020: Growing and Evolving – Report 1 of the US Mosque Survey 2020: Basic Characteristics* (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2021), <https://ispu.org/public-policy/mosque-survey/>; “Study Finds 31% Increase in U.S. Mosques from 2010 to 2020,” Hartford International University for Religion and Peace, June 9, 2021, <https://www.hartfordinternational.edu/news-events/news/study-finds-31-increase-us-mosques-2010-2020>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

The “Explanatory Memorandum” names twenty-nine affiliated North American organizations, and the Holy Land Foundation trial revealed the financial and operational connections between them.<sup>62</sup> Central to this infrastructure is NAIT, identified in the Memorandum as a Brotherhood financial hub that holds titles to over 300 Islamic centers across forty-two states, providing centralized asset control while maintaining the appearance of decentralized operations.<sup>63</sup> A parallel financial infrastructure of Islamic banking, property trusts, zakat collection systems, and Gulf funding networks sustains an institutional ecosystem without external accountability, while accusations of Islamophobia serve to shield it from scrutiny.<sup>64</sup>

The educational infrastructure created by the Muslim Brotherhood is narrative driven. For example, the Islamic Schools League of America’s 2024 Teaching Palestine Toolkit—funded through a Ramadan webinar and fundraiser and explicitly framed as empowering students through “the lens of Palestine’s history” and “rooted in Islamic values”—illustrates how the Palestinian cause is embedded within formal curricula as a vehicle for instilling loyalty to the global Muslim ummah, a direct expression of the Memorandum’s directive to adopt the Palestinian cause as a core component of its mission.<sup>65</sup>

On university campuses, MSA—established in part by Muslim Brotherhood members in 1963 and explicitly named in the Memorandum’s list of Brotherhood organizations<sup>66</sup>—operates chapters on over 600 college and university campuses across North America, including Canada, functioning as a pipeline for ideological formation, leadership identification, and recruitment into the broader organizational network.<sup>67</sup> Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), and other collaborators cooperate with MSA chapters at many colleges and universities<sup>68</sup> and

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<sup>62</sup> “The Project”; “Explanatory Memorandum”; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>63</sup> “North American Islamic Trust (NAIT),” profile, InfluenceWatch, <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/north-american-islamic-trust-nait/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>64</sup> Noura AlHabsi, “Unveiling the Muslim Brotherhood’s Business and Funding Networks,” TRENDS Research and Advisory, July 5, 2021, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/unveiling-the-muslim-brotherhoods-business-and-funding-networks/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>65</sup> “Teaching Palestine Toolkit,” Islamic Schools League of America, n.d., <https://theisla.org/teaching-palestine-toolkit/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>66</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum”; ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee? The Growing Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Politics, Academia, and Civil Society in Canada* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada\\_Report\\_Final\\_250622\\_EN\\_Final.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada_Report_Final_250622_EN_Final.pdf); ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>67</sup> “Muslim Students’ Association (MSA),” profile, Investigative Project on Terrorism, n.d., <https://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/166/muslim-students-association-msa>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>68</sup> Swarthmore MSA Board, “MSA Board Letter of Solidarity with SJP,” Swarthmore Voices, April 4, 2018, <https://swarthmorevoices.com/content-1/2018/4/4/msa-board-letter-of-solidarity-with-sjp>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

receive organizational support, training, and resources from American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), whose leadership includes figures from organizations identified during the Holy Land Foundation trial as part of the US-based Hamas support network.<sup>69</sup> SJP's post-October 7 response—near-identical statements across dozens of universities within hours and coordinated encampments across multiple campuses—demonstrated the maturity of the underlying infrastructure.<sup>70</sup>

The Canadian university record, examined in Section III of this report, reveals that the Brotherhood's infrastructure operates with even greater institutional penetration and less scrutiny in Canada than it does in the American case. The organizational ecosystem at the University of Toronto—the originating institution of Israeli Apartheid Week in 2004 and the site of one of the largest campus encampments in North American history—includes not only MSA, SJP, and PYM chapters but pro-Palestinian faculty networks that have publicly pledged to physically protect activist encampments, that have voted for institutional divestment from Israel, and that have produced university-funded academic papers characterizing Canada's terrorist designation framework as systemically Islamophobic.<sup>71</sup> At the University of Waterloo, a decade-long campaign by the same organizational coalition terminated a research partnership with the Israel Institute of Technology, also known as the Technion, that had produced advances in quantum computing and drug delivery.<sup>72</sup> At Toronto Metropolitan University, student organizations operating with university funding and student union approval physically attacked Jewish

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<sup>69</sup> *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-P (N.D. Tex. 2008); ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*; "Investigation Exposes AMP Leaders' Ties to Former U.S.-Based Hamas-Support Network," Investigative Project on Terrorism, June 24, 2015, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/4891/investigation-exposes-amp-leaders-ties-to-former>.

<sup>70</sup> ISGAP, *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP\\_Report.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf); ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>71</sup> Omar Taleb, "Our University is Complicit," *The Media Co-op*, May 3, 2024, <https://mediacoop.ca/node/119224>; "Not a 'Student Encampment': U of T Professor Visits anti-Israel Protest," *National Post*, May 4, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/news/toronto/university-of-toronto-anti-israel-protest-encampment>; Mathilda Heller, "University of Toronto Faculty Association Votes for Divestment from Israel," *Jerusalem Post*, May 2025, <https://www.jpost.com/bds-threat/article-853577>; Casey Babb and Joe Adam George, "Canadian Universities Have an Islamist Problem," *National Post*, May 6, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadian-universities-have-an-islamist-problem>; "Silenced Voices: The Impact of Terrorism Designations on Palestinian Advocacy in Canada," event announcement, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, February 2025, <https://www.crimsl.utoronto.ca/events/silenced-voices-impact-terrorism-designations-palestinian-advocacy-canada-basema-al-alamy>.

<sup>72</sup> "Waterloo-Technion Research Cooperation Program," press release, University of Waterloo, June 2014, <https://uwaterloo.ca/news/media/waterloo-technion-research-cooperation-program>; Alicia Wang, "UW Will Not Renew Partnership with Technion," *Imprint*, September 22, 2025, <https://uwimprint.ca/article/uw-will-not-renew-partnership-with-technion/>.

students at on-campus events and deployed Hamas targeting imagery against Israeli speakers, while the faculty association has formally adopted the anti-Palestinian racism framework as an institutional governance instrument.<sup>73</sup> At each institution, the Qatari funding relationships documented in Chapter 2 operate in the same institutional environment as the Brotherhood-aligned activism—creating a convergence of foreign state financial influence and ideological pressure that the analysis of the American record identifies as the defining feature of Qatari university strategy.<sup>74</sup>

Beyond the campus, the institutional embedding domain in Canada encompasses a national charitable network whose public funding profile is examined in Chapter 5. The Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM, formerly CAIR-Canada), the Islamic Society of North America Canada (ISNA Canada), and Islamic Relief Canada (IRC) have collectively received tens of millions of dollars in public funds: MAC alone received nearly C\$31 million between 2018 and 2022,<sup>75</sup> the IRC received C\$9.2 million,<sup>76</sup> ISNA Canada received C\$1.2 million,<sup>77</sup> and the NCCM received C\$394,508 in 2022 based on federal lobbying disclosures.<sup>78</sup> The CRA’s 2021 audit letter separately

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<sup>73</sup> Ari David Blaff, “‘You Can’t Be Openly Jewish at TMU’: Jewish Students at Toronto Metropolitan University Say They’re Now Isolated, Harassed,” *National Post*, May 6, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/you-cant-be-openly-jewish-at-tmu-jewish-students-at-toronto-metropolitan-university-say-theyre-now-isolated-harassed>; “Toronto Metropolitan University Faculty Union Takes Historic Stand Against Anti-Palestinian Racism,” press release, Jewish Faculty Network, May 15, 2025, <https://www.jewishfaculty.ca/static/pdfs/toronto-metropolitan-university-faculty-union-takes-historic-stand-against-anti-palestinian-racism.pdf>.

<sup>74</sup> ISGAP, *The Corruption of the American Mind* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/The-Corruption-of-the-American-Mind\\_DKFormat2.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/The-Corruption-of-the-American-Mind_DKFormat2.pdf); “University of Doha for Science and Technology Concludes the Third Day of Research and Innovation Week with ITAS Arab Youth Competition and Many MoU’s,” University of Doha for Science and Technology, February 28, 2023, archived on March 18, 2023, at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20230318114941/https://www.udst.edu.qa/about-udst/media/news/university-doha-science-and-technology-concludes-third-day-research-and>.

<sup>75</sup> Michael Lewis, “Islamist Groups in Canada Receive Public Funds—Thanks to a Culture of Complacency,” Middle East Forum, March 28, 2024, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-groups-in-canada-receive-public-funds> (citing CRA figures). See also Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Charity Information Returns (T3010) for the Muslim Association of Canada, 2021–2025, Government of Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, available at: <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/dsplyRprtngPrd/880495163RR0001>.

<sup>76</sup> Lewis, “Islamist Groups in Canada” (citing CRA figures). See also Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Charity Information Returns (T3010) for Islamic Relief Canada, 2021–2025, Government of Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, available at: <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/dsplyRprtngPrd/821896875RR0001>.

<sup>77</sup> Lewis, “Islamist Groups in Canada” (citing CRA figures). Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Charity Information Returns (T3010) for the Islamic Society of North America Canada, 2021–2025, Government of Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, available at: <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/dsplyRprtngPrd/118971886RR0001>.

<sup>78</sup> “National Council of Canadian Muslims,” profile, Registry of Lobbyists, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg?regId=937741&cno=358918#regStart>.

raised concerns about MAC's alignment with the global Muslim Brotherhood network and its relationship with entities linked to Hamas, including a "working relationship" with IRFAN-Canada after its 2014 designation as a terrorist entity.<sup>79</sup>

That audit took over eight years, was delayed by sustained legal counter-campaigns characterizing regulatory scrutiny as Islamophobia, and ended not in revocation but a compliance agreement—an outcome that is itself a measure of how effectively the institutional embedding and legal manipulation domains reinforce each other in the Canadian context.<sup>80</sup>

### 1.4.3 Domain 3: Policy Impact and Political Mobilization

Narrative dominance and institutional presence feed into policy capture. Brotherhood-aligned organizations have secured advisory and consultative positions within government agencies across multiple Western countries, shaping counter-extremism policy language, training materials, and diplomatic frameworks. This implements the Memorandum's directive to obtain "the keys and the tools" necessary to carry out the "grand mission as a Civilization Jihadist responsibility" and its goal of "adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally."<sup>81</sup>

During the Obama and Biden administrations, individuals with documented ties to ISNA, MSA, and IIIT—all named in the "Explanatory Memorandum" as Brotherhood-affiliated organizations—held advisory positions across multiple federal agencies,<sup>82</sup> including at the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships, at the Department of Homeland Security's Advisory Council, as a US Special Envoy to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and at the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, among others.<sup>83</sup> Individuals with ties to the US Muslim Brotherhood

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<sup>79</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, Letter concerning the audit of the Muslim Association of Canada, March 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CRA-Audit-letters-of-Muslim-Association-of-Canada-MAC-dated-March-17-2021.pdf>.

<sup>80</sup> Jim Bronskill, "Changes Needed at Canada Revenue Agency after Audit of Muslim Charity: Report," *CBC News*, April 1, 2026, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/canada-revenue-agency-muslim-association-audit-report-9.7149904>; *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2024 ONCA 541 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/k5nlp>; Canada Revenue Agency, Letter concerning the audit of the Muslim Association of Canada.

<sup>81</sup> "Explanatory Memorandum."

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>83</sup> Ryan Mauro, "A Window on the Muslim Brotherhood in America: An Annotated Interview with DHS Advisor Mohamed Elibiary," Occasional Paper Series no. 1001 (Center for Security Policy, October 2013), <https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Elibiary-Occasional-Paper-1001.pdf>; Josh Gerstein, "Islam Envoy Retreats on Terror Talk," *Politico*, February 19, 2010, <https://www.politico.com/story/2010/02/islam-envoy-retreats-on-terror-talk-033210>.

milieu have also held positions at the US Commission on International Religious Freedom<sup>84</sup> and as a US Special Envoy to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.<sup>85</sup>

This policy has borne concrete results in the United States. In 2012, fifty-seven Muslim organizations with documented Brotherhood connections sent a letter to White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan demanding a “purge [from] all federal government training materials of biased materials.” The administration subsequently initiated a comprehensive review that led to the systematic removal of references to Islamic terminology from counterterrorism training across multiple agencies.<sup>86</sup> The organizations also successfully advocated for the Department of Justice to halt a countering violent extremism (CVE) initiative to establish Shared Responsibility Committees.<sup>87</sup>

On the electoral front, Muslim voter registration rose from approximately 60 percent in 2016 to 78 percent in 2020, with Emgage’s Million Muslim Votes campaign reporting a 71 percent turnout among registered Muslim voters in the 2020 election.<sup>88</sup> Emgage—founded in 2006 in Florida as the Center for Voter Advocacy, subsequently renamed Emerge USA before rebranding again in 2017, and operating in close coordination with CAIR and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) through the Muslim Civic Engagement Table—hosted then-presidential candidate Joe Biden at its Million Muslim Votes summit in July 2020, securing a public pledge of Muslim representation in his administration and action

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<sup>84</sup> “USCMO Commends Biden Administration for Historic Nominations of Rashad Hussain, Khizr Khan to Religious Freedom Posts,” US Council of Muslim Organizations, July 30, 2021, <https://uscmo.org/uscmo-comends-biden-administration-for-historic-nominations-of-rashad-hussain-khizr-khan-to-religious-freedom-posts/>; “USCIRF Welcomes President Joe Biden’s Appointment of Mohamed Elsanousi to US Commission on International Religious Freedom,” USCIRF, July 3, 2024, <https://www.uscifr.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscifr-welcomes-president-joe-bidens-appointment-mohamed-elsanousi-us>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>85</sup> Mauro, “Window on the Muslim Brotherhood”; Gerstein, “Islam Envoy Retreats”; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>86</sup> Debi Kar, “Letter to DHS & John Brennan on FBI’s Use of Biased Experts and Training Materials,” Muslim Advocates, October 27, 2011, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2011/10/letter-to-dhs-john-brennan-on-fbis-use-of-biased-experts-and-training-materials/>; Adam Kredo, “Obama Admin Refuses to Inform Congress on Islamic Terrorism in the U.S.,” *Washington Free Beacon*, June 28, 2016, <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-admin-refuses-inform-congress-islamic-terrorism-u-s/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>87</sup> “Muslim Advocates Commends Justice Department Decision to Stop Plans for Dangerous CVE Program,” press release, Muslim Advocates, October 4, 2016, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2016/10/dojendsplansforsrc/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>88</sup> “American Muslim Poll 2020: Amid Pandemic and Protest,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, October 1, 2020, <https://ispu.org/american-muslim-poll-2020-amid-pandemic-and-protest/>; “Impact 2020: The Million Muslim Votes Campaign Voter Turnout Report,” Emgage, April 28, 2022, <https://emgageusa.org/impact2020/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

on Islamophobia.<sup>89</sup> Organizations including CAIR and American Muslims for Palestine drove this mobilization explicitly on transactional terms, publicly conditioning bloc voting in swing states on policy positions regarding Gaza and Islamophobia, with direct threats of electoral consequences if US weapons support for Israel continued<sup>90</sup> and encouraging deeper diplomatic engagement with Qatar.<sup>91</sup>

In Canada, analogous electoral and advocacy strategies are being pursued by the National Council of Canadian Muslims and the Canadian-Muslim Vote, which have explicitly modelled their mobilization approach on the US organizations examined here, conditioning electoral support on recognition of Palestinian statehood, the mainstreaming of the anti-Palestinian racism framework, and policy positions on Islamophobia. These developments are examined in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

#### 1.4.4 Domain 4: Legal Framework Manipulation

As examined in later chapters, Muslim Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed sophisticated legal capacity in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, using civil rights, anti-discrimination frameworks, and lawfare to insulate their activities and policy positions from scrutiny and impose costs on critics. This implements the Memorandum's directive to establish a "Central Jurisprudence Council," a "Central Islamic Court," a "Muslim Attorneys Society," and an "Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims' Rights."<sup>92</sup>

The Islamophobia shield, developed through al-Qaradawi's jurisprudence of minorities and institutionalized through IIIT,<sup>93</sup> as discussed above, is the legal domain's primary

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<sup>89</sup> "Reports," Emgage, <https://emgageusa.org/reports/>; Azad Essa, "Joe Biden, Emgage and the Muzzling of Muslim America," *Middle East Eye*, October 9, 2020, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/joe-biden-emgage-muslim-america-us-elections>; Mariam Fam and Elana Schor, "Biden Urges Muslim Americans to Help Him Defeat Trump," *Associated Press*, July 20, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-religion-election-2020-5b3852d8ec16a95c8fbf127639c74fa4>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>90</sup> Andrea Shalal and Andrew Hay, "No Ceasefire in Gaza, No Votes, Muslim Americans Tell Biden," *Reuters*, October 31, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/no-ceasefire-gaza-no-votes-muslim-americans-tell-biden-2023-10-31/>; "Breaking: CAIR Calls Biden Admin's New \$8 Billion Arms Sale for Israeli Genocide 'Racist, Sociopathic,'" press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations, January 4, 2025, [https://www.cair.com/press\\_releases/breaking-cair-calls-biden-admins-new-8-billion-arms-sale-for-israeli-genocide-racist-sociopathic/](https://www.cair.com/press_releases/breaking-cair-calls-biden-admins-new-8-billion-arms-sale-for-israeli-genocide-racist-sociopathic/).

<sup>91</sup> Humeyra Pamuk and Phil Stewart, "US Paused Israel Weapons Shipment Due to Rafah," *Reuters*, May 8, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-paused-israel-weapons-shipment-due-rafah-us-defense-secretary-2024-05-08/>; Humeyra Pamuk and Parisa Hafezi, "US, Qatar to Work with Israel and Egypt on Gaza Ceasefire," *Reuters*, February 26, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-delegation-heads-qatar-ceasefire-deal-push-2024-02-26/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>92</sup> "Explanatory Memorandum."

<sup>93</sup> "About Us," International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), n.d., <https://iiit.org/en/about-us/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

instrument. Its primary organizational vehicle in the United States has been the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a designated terrorist entity in the UAE.<sup>94</sup> All three of CAIR's co-founders were officials in the Islamic Association for Palestine at the time of the organization's founding in 1994. Court documents from the Holy Land Foundation trial subsequently identified CAIR as part of the Palestine Committee, the Hamas-support network.<sup>95</sup> Through sustained litigation and lobbying, CAIR operationalized the Islamophobia concept as a legal shield, deliberately expanding the term from describing genuine anti-Muslim prejudice to encompassing any critical examination of Islamist ideology, organizations, or funding networks.

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have used anti-discrimination frameworks selectively—to shield their activities and leadership from accountability while simultaneously deploying lawfare, professional licensing complaints, and human rights commission filings to target critics, including reformist Muslim voices, to suppress intra-Muslim dissent.<sup>96</sup> A key instrument under this approach has been litigation filed not to win but to exhaust opponents financially and deter criticism—defamation actions threatened or filed against journalists, academics, and reformist Muslims whose work discusses Brotherhood-aligned organizations or their funding networks.

The long-term structural objective has been to embed Islamic legal norms within Western frameworks through procedural compatibility rather than direct confrontation. For example, formally recognized religious arbitration services operate under general arbitration laws handling family and commercial matters in accordance with Islamic principles, with judgments given the force of law by state and federal courts.<sup>97</sup> In addition, sharia-compliant financial contracts have been approved by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as “functionally equivalent” to conventional financing, with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae purchasing Islamic mortgage products to provide liquidity.<sup>98</sup> Finally, Islamic marriage contracts, divorce procedures, and

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<sup>94</sup> “UAE Cabinet Approves List of Designated Terrorist Organizations, Groups,” WAM Emirates News Agency, November 15, 2014, <https://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates-international/1395272478814.html>.

<sup>95</sup> Attachment A: List of Unindicted Co-conspirators, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), [https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case\\_docs/423.pdf](https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/423.pdf); Congressional Record, 111th Congress, 1st session, vol. 155, pt. 11, July 14, 2009, 14950–52; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>96</sup> Jake Crowe, “SPLC Apologizes, Pays Settlement to Islamic Reformer It Wrongly Labeled ‘Anti-Muslim Extremist,’” *National Review*, June 18, 2018, <https://www.nationalreview.com/news/maajid-nawaz-splc-apologizes-settles-extremist-label/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>97</sup> Barbara Atwood, “Religious Arbitration of Family Disputes,” *Family Advocate* 42, no. 2 (2019), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27006939>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>98</sup> “Islamic Banking, American Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, January 17, 2025, [https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ\\_focus/2014/q2/feature1](https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2014/q2/feature1); ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

inheritance provisions are increasingly recognized and enforced by US courts under neutral principles of contract law.<sup>99</sup>

The Canadian legal domain—including the CRA’s audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), the NCCM defamation lawsuit against the Harper government, and the broader pattern of lawfare against institutional scrutiny—is examined in section 5.1. The use of the APR framework as a legal instrument is examined in section 4.3. Two cases illustrate its contours.

The CRA’s audit of MAC<sup>100</sup>—initiated in 2015 by the agency’s Review and Analysis Division in response to concerns including involvement in foreign political activity tied to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological and organizational network, support for a listed terrorist entity, and improper charitable receipting—was met with a sustained legal counter-campaign framing the regulatory scrutiny as Islamophobia. MAC filed a Charter challenge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking to halt the audit and appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal when the challenge was dismissed as premature.<sup>101</sup> It also pursued sealing orders to prevent public access to the audit record.<sup>102</sup> The audit decision, delivered in 2023, found MAC’s responses insufficient to address CRA concerns about its alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood’s global ideology and organizational network. The CRA has stated explicitly that

“the Organization [MAC] has not fully alleviated concerns that it may have continued relationships with groups, or allowed groups that have ‘real or possible links to Terrorist Activities or Terrorist Groups’ to use the Organization’s vast network and membership, electronic resources, and physical locations for the purpose of fundraising to advance the cause of a third party.”<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Julie MacFarlane, “Family Dispute Processes Among North American Muslims,” American Bar Association, September 30, 2018, [https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute\\_resolution/resources/magazine/archive/family-dispute-processes-among-north-american-muslims/](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/magazine/archive/family-dispute-processes-among-north-american-muslims/); ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>100</sup> For the full text of the CRA’s final audit decision, as well as the related compliance agreement and notice of penalty, see Court of Appeal for Ontario, *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, Affidavit of Sophie Amberg, affirmed on November 28, 2023, Court File no. 23-CV-1096, filed October 10, 2024 [hereinafter, Affidavit of Sophie Amberg], available at: [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada\\_report\\_MACvAG\\_23-CV-1096.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada_report_MACvAG_23-CV-1096.pdf).

<sup>101</sup> *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2023 ONSC 1923 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/jwcz5>; *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2023 ONSC 5171 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/k07t8>; *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2024 ONCA 541 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/k5nlp>.

<sup>102</sup> *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2023 ONSC 1923.

<sup>103</sup> Affidavit of Sophie Amberg, 48.

The CRA audit took over eight years to conclude, delayed in part by MAC's own litigation,<sup>104</sup> and ended not with a revocation of its charitable status—which the CRA's administrative fairness letter had in fact recommended<sup>105</sup>—but with a compliance agreement and modest financial penalties. It is reasonable to infer that MAC's legal campaign may have materially shaped this outcome. MAC continues to contest the findings under accusations of Islamophobia.<sup>106</sup>

In parallel, the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) sued Prime Minister Harper's Director of Communications, Jason MacDonald, and the Crown for defamation after MacDonald publicly alleged the NCCM had "documented ties to a terrorist organization such as Hamas."<sup>107</sup> The lawsuit was settled in 2017 with MacDonald and the federal government publicly retracting the statement and affirming it did not reflect the official view of the Canadian government.<sup>108</sup> Taken together, these two cases are illustrative of the Canadian manifestation of the same legal strategy documented in the American context, namely using the courts and anti-discrimination frameworks not merely to defend against specific allegations but to impose reputational and financial costs on any institutional actor that scrutinizes Brotherhood-aligned organizations and to establish a precedent under which such scrutiny is itself characterized as discriminatory. These strategic dimensions are examined in Section II of this report.

## 1.5 An Understudied Threat: The Muslim Brotherhood in Canada

Wherever the Muslim Brotherhood has established itself across the Middle East, North Africa, or the West, it has been assessed to have weakened social cohesion and

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<sup>104</sup> Mark Blumberg, "Ontario Court of Appeal Dismisses Muslim Association of Canada Appeal from Ontario Superior Court Decision," *Canadian Charity Law*, July 15, 2024, <https://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/blog/ontario-court-of-appeal-dismisses-muslim-association-of-canada-appeal-from-ontario-superior-court-decision/>.

<sup>105</sup> Affidavit of Sophie Amberg, 2.

<sup>106</sup> Bronskill, "Changes Needed at Canada Revenue Agency"; Jim Bronskill, "Expert's Report Criticizes CRA over Audit of Muslim Charity and Calls for Improvements," *Canada's National Observer*, April 1, 2026, <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2026/04/01/news/experts-report-criticizes-cra-over-audit-muslim-charity-calls-improvements>.

<sup>107</sup> "NCCM Commences Defamation Lawsuit against PMO," National Council of Canadian Muslims, May 26, 2014, <https://nccm.ca/nccm-commences-defamation-lawsuit-against-pmo/>; "Harper, Spokesman Must Apologize for Hamas Comment, Muslim Group Demands," *CBC News*, January 28, 2014, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/muslim-group-demands-apology-from-harper-chief-spokesman-1.2514099>.

<sup>108</sup> "NCCM Announces Settlement of Defamation Lawsuit against Former Spokesman for Stephen Harper," National Council of Canadian Muslims, March 20, 2017, <https://nccm.ca/nccm-announces-settlement-defamation-lawsuit-against-former-spokesman-stephen-harper/>; "Stephen Harper's Ex-Spokesman Admits He Wrongly Suggested Muslim Group Had Terrorist Ties," *CBC News*, March 20, 2017, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper-settlement-macdonald-muslim-1.4033585>.

threatened national security. This has prompted several governments to proscribe either the Brotherhood as a whole or key branches of the movement. For example, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have all designated or outlawed the Brotherhood,<sup>109</sup> Austria listed it as a terrorist entity in 2021,<sup>110</sup> and in March 2026 a majority of the Dutch House of Representatives supported a motion calling for a ban, which is yet to be enacted.<sup>111</sup>

In 2025, a comprehensive report commissioned by the French government described Muslim Brotherhood networks as pursuing “a subtle and providentialist approach, yet one that is no less subversive to institutions,” posing risks to “civil society organizations and to Republican institutions, particularly local authorities, and more broadly to national cohesion.”<sup>112</sup> The report resulted in the closure of the Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines based on its ideological orientation, foreign funding, and extremist affiliations.

The United States has also moved to proscribe the Muslim Brotherhood. Texas designated both the Brotherhood and CAIR as foreign terrorist organizations in November 2025.<sup>113</sup> Two months later, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, while the State Department simultaneously designated the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.<sup>114</sup> The accompanying press release captured the core pattern this report documents, stating that Brotherhood chapters “purport to be

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<sup>109</sup> “Egypt Designates Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” *Reuters*, December 25, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-explosion-brotherhood/egypt-designates-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSBRE9BO08H20131225>; “UAE Lists Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” *Reuters*, November 15, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uae-lists-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZOOM>; “Saudi Arabia Designates Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Group,” *Reuters*, March 7, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security/saudi-arabia-designates-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group-idUSBREA260SM20140307>; “Jordan Outlaws Muslim Brotherhood, Confiscates Assets and Offices,” *Reuters*, April 23, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-outlaws-muslim-brotherhood-group-confiscates-its-assets-offices-2025-04-23>.

<sup>110</sup> Directorate for State Security and Intelligence (DSN), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021* [Report on the protection of the Constitution 2021] (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2021), [https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/vsb/vsb\\_2021\\_bf\\_012023.pdf](https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/vsb/vsb_2021_bf_012023.pdf).

<sup>111</sup> Mathilda Heller, “Dutch House of Representatives Adopts Motion to Ban Muslim Brotherhood in the Netherlands,” *Jerusalem Post*, March 17, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-890299>.

<sup>112</sup> French Ministry of the Interior, *Frères musulmans et islamisme politique*.

<sup>113</sup> “Governor Abbott Designates Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR as Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Office of the Texas Governor, November 18, 2025, <https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-designates-muslim-brotherhood-cair-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations>.

<sup>114</sup> “Treasury and State Departments Designate Muslim Brotherhood Branches as Terrorist Organizations,” US Department of the Treasury, January 13, 2026, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0357>.

legitimate civic organizations while, behind the scenes, they explicitly and enthusiastically support terrorist groups like Hamas.” This is what Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley described as a “peaceful public façade” concealing active conspiracy to “support Hamas’s terrorism” and “undermine the sovereignty of their own national governments.”<sup>115</sup>

In the United Kingdom, a comprehensive government review in 2014–2015 documented the Brotherhood’s systematic cultivation of political relationships and its use of charitable and educational organizations as vectors of influence. It stopped short of formal designation but identified patterns of access and funding opacity that constrain effective policy responses.<sup>116</sup>

Canada, by contrast, has undertaken no equivalent investigation at any level—national or local—despite being named specifically in the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” as a target jurisdiction alongside the United States.<sup>117</sup> Muslim Brotherhood-linked entities continue to operate as registered charities and receive public funding in Canada without adequate scrutiny of their ideological and organizational ties.

This regulatory and investigative gap is not incidental. It is the product of the strategies examined in the preceding sections—the Islamophobia shield, the victimhood narrative, the lawfare counter-campaign, the anti-discrimination reframing of national security concerns—each of which has imposed political and institutional costs on anyone prepared to scrutinize Brotherhood-aligned organizations in Canada. The cumulative effect has been to deter precisely the kind of sustained government examination undertaken elsewhere in the West. The evidence base for this report therefore draws substantially on the American, French, British, and Austrian investigative records, treating them as directly instructive for dynamics that are present in Canada, as documented in subsequent chapters.

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> UK Government, *Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings* (HM Stationery Office, 2015), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/muslim-brotherhood-review-main-findings>.

<sup>117</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum,” 4; “The Project.”

## Chapter 2: Qatar as Ideological Hub, Financier, and Amplifier

### 2.1 Qatar's Dual Strategy

Qatar occupies a structurally anomalous position in the international system. A small Gulf emirate with a citizen population of under 350,000 (and a total population of only 3.2 million), it nonetheless has a GDP per capita exceeding US\$80,000,<sup>118</sup> controls a sovereign wealth fund managing an estimated US\$526 billion in assets,<sup>119</sup> hosts a strategically important US military base, and has long served as a principal patron and safe haven for the Muslim Brotherhood's global network. This dual position is not an accident or a failure of policy coordination; it is a deliberate strategy for maximizing leverage, maintaining Western security partnerships while projecting ideological influence through Muslim Brotherhood proxies and media infrastructure.<sup>120</sup>

One of the clearest expressions of this strategy was Qatar's harboring of Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Banned from entering the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and multiple Middle Eastern states,<sup>121</sup> al-Qaradawi lived and worked in Doha with full state support from the 1960s until his death in 2022, shaping Muslim Brotherhood strategy globally, issuing fatwas legitimizing suicide bombings, and providing the theological framework that guides Brotherhood-aligned organizations in Western democracies today.<sup>122</sup> His "Sharia and Life" program on Al Jazeera reached millions of viewers worldwide, making Qatar's state media the primary distribution platform for Brotherhood jurisprudence in the television era.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> "Qatar Datasets," World Economic Outlook (April 2026), International Monetary Fund, n.d., <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/QAT>; "GDP per Capita (Current US\$)—Qatar (2024)," World Bank Group, n.d., <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=QA>. For context on Qatar's per-capita wealth relative to global rankings, see Chloe Domat, "Qatar: A New World Capital for Wealth?," *Global Finance*, December 10, 2024, <https://gfmag.com/features/qatar-new-world-capital-wealth>.

<sup>119</sup> Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, *2025 Qatar Investment Climate Statement* (US Department of State, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/qatar>; Tiziana Barghini, "Factsheet: QIA's Key Investments," *Global Finance*, November 7, 2024, <https://gfmag.com/economics-policy-regulation/qia-key-investments>.

<sup>120</sup> Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood," 84–102.

<sup>121</sup> Fernandez, "Al-Qaradawi: Qatar's Islamist Empire Builder."

<sup>122</sup> al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Aqalliyat*; Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, *Global Mufti*; Lorenzo Vidino, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the West: Evolution and Western Policies," *Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence* (ICSR, February 2011), <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/1300106834ICSRTheNewMBintheWest.pdf>. On the European Council for Fatwa and Research as the institutional vehicle for this framework, see also Lorenzo Vidino, "Aims and Methods of Europe's Muslim Brotherhood," Hudson Institute, November 1, 2006, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/aims-and-methods-of-europe-s-muslim-brotherhood>.

<sup>123</sup> David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore, "One Nation under God? Yusuf al-Qaradawi's Changing Fiqh of Citizenship," *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 3 (2014): 217–37.

The Muslim Brotherhood's North American settlement framework was already in place when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa seized power in Doha in 1995 and made Muslim Brotherhood patronage a cornerstone of Qatar's foreign and domestic policy.<sup>124</sup> What Qatar provided from that point forward was the kind of state infrastructure that the Brotherhood had always called for in its own planning documents but had not been able to secure by itself: a sovereign safe haven, a global media platform, and a sovereign wealth fund capable of sustaining institutional penetration at a scale no non-state movement could independently achieve.

Doha has long portrayed its refusal to choose sides as a strategic asset, cultivating deep financial and diplomatic ties with Western governments while simultaneously funding Hamas, sheltering its political leadership in Doha,<sup>125</sup> and presenting itself to Western powers as an indispensable mediator. Analysts describe this state of affairs not as a tension Qatar seeks to resolve but as the very source of its leverage.<sup>126</sup>

This chapter examines Qatar's financing of Western educational institutions and its deployment of Al Jazeera as a narrative instrument, drawing principally on evidence from the United States, where disclosure requirements have produced the most complete record. However, the Canadian examples examined below confirm that the pattern is not confined to the United States.

## 2.2 Qatari Funding of US and Canadian Universities

Since 2001, Qatar has emerged as the largest foreign donor to American universities by a substantial margin, providing US\$6.25 billion to American colleges and universities over that period—97 percent of it concentrated in six institutions operating Education City branch campuses in Doha: Cornell, Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Georgetown, Northwestern, and Virginia Commonwealth.<sup>127</sup> In 2025 alone, Qatar reported over US\$1.1 billion in disclosed gifts to and contracts with US universities, more than any

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<sup>124</sup> Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood"; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>125</sup> Natalie Ecanow, "Israel Unveils New Proof of Qatar and Hamas's Close Collaboration," Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 11, 2025, [https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy\\_briefs/2025/06/11/israel-unveils-new-proof-of-qatar-and-hamass-close-collaboration/](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2025/06/11/israel-unveils-new-proof-of-qatar-and-hamass-close-collaboration/).

<sup>126</sup> Raymond Mason and Herman Shelanski, "It Is Time for Qatar to Choose a Side: The United States or Terror Groups," *The Algemeiner*, November 19, 2024, <https://www.algemeiner.com/2024/11/19/it-is-time-for-qatar-to-choose-a-side-the-united-states-or-terror-groups/>.

<sup>127</sup> Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout, "Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington," Quincy Brief no. 83 (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, September 8, 2025), <https://quincyinst.org/research/soft-power-hard-influence-how-qatar-became-a-giant-in-washington/#>.

other foreign country.<sup>128</sup> Qatari funding directed through the Qatar Foundation has shaped faculty recruitment and curriculum development at Georgetown, Columbia, Yale, and other elite institutions—extending Qatar’s influence well beyond the Education City footprint.<sup>129</sup>

Billions more flowed through channels designed to avoid disclosure entirely. For example, the Spanish energy company Iberdrola and its American subsidiary Avangrid were used to route Qatari funds into Yale University research partnerships without triggering Section 117 reporting requirements.<sup>130</sup> Santander Bank was similarly used to channel payments through joint programs with Qatari entities.<sup>131</sup>

Qatar’s defenders argue that most of this funding stays in Qatar, primarily serving Qatari students, and that when Education City contracts are excluded Qatar ranks considerably lower in payments to US campuses. What this argument obscures is that the contractual terms governing those campuses extend Qatari state control directly into institutions whose home campuses should be operating under American norms of academic freedom. Those contractual terms include curriculum changes, faculty appointments, student enrollment targets, annual budgets, intellectual property ownership, and legal compliance with Qatari law.<sup>132</sup>

Four specific cases reveal the above-mentioned pattern in detail and are directly instructive for understanding what remains largely untracked in Canada.

- Georgetown University received over US\$1 billion from Qatar over twenty years, much of it underreported to federal authorities.<sup>133</sup> Its Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding and its Center for Contemporary Arab

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<sup>128</sup> “Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Data—Section 117 Data—February 28, 2025,” Federal Student Aid, US Department of Education, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://fsapartners.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/Sec117PublicRecordsCompleteFeb2025.xlsx>.

<sup>129</sup> ISGAP, *Foreign Infiltration: Georgetown University, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FTM-GEORGETOWN-REPORT-2025-05-23-1.pdf>.

<sup>130</sup> ISGAP, *The Ongoing Failure to Report: Yale University, Qatar and Undisclosed Foreign Funding, Volume Two* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Yale\\_Report\\_V4-1.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Yale_Report_V4-1.pdf).

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Americans for Public Trust, *Foreign Money Flowing into U.S. Colleges and Universities* (Americans for Public Trust, March 2025), [https://americansforpublictrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/APT-Report\\_Foreign-Money-into-Universities.pdf](https://americansforpublictrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/APT-Report_Foreign-Money-into-Universities.pdf); “Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Data,” Federal Student Aid, US Department of Education, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/topics/section-117-foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting/section-117-foreign-gift-and-contract-data>.

<sup>133</sup> Americans for Public Trust, *Foreign Money*; ISGAP, *Foreign Infiltration*.

Studies have been identified as platforms promoting political Islam and minimizing Islamist extremism threats, with faculty research priorities shifting measurably toward perspectives aligned with Brotherhood-connected narratives.<sup>134</sup>

- Northwestern University’s Qatar campus received over US\$700 million under contractual terms requiring all faculty to comply with Qatari law and adhere to Qatari government cultural and religious policies.<sup>135</sup> Faculty holding dual appointments integrated anti-Israel narratives into undergraduate education on the main US campus.<sup>136</sup>
- Columbia University received at least US\$7.17 million in unreported Qatari funding.<sup>137</sup> Its Middle East Institute hosted faculty who praised the October 7 Hamas massacre and taught courses framing Israel as requiring dismantlement.<sup>138</sup>
- Brown University’s Choices Program illustrates how Qatari influence penetrates beyond the university, shaping formative narratives for elementary and secondary school children. The program produced K-12 curricula reaching over one million students across 8,000 American schools,<sup>139</sup> with Qatar Foundation International (QFI) directing multi-state workshop content, distributing curriculum awards, and embedding QFI priorities into teachers’ professional development—all below the threshold of public scrutiny.<sup>140</sup>

In March 2025, ISGAP released a report documenting QFI’s involvement in shaping the Choices Program’s curriculum and teacher training, and raising concerns about Brown’s compliance with federal foreign funding disclosure requirements.<sup>141</sup> Brown

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<sup>134</sup> “Section 117 Foreign Gift and Contract Data”; Benjamin Kerstein, “Qatar Is Biggest Foreign Funder of US Colleges, per Education Department,” JNS, January 9, 2026, <https://www.jns.org/ed-department-portal-finds-qatar-highest-source-of-foreign-funding-to-us-colleges-universities/>.

<sup>135</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>136</sup> ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*; ISGAP, *Ongoing Failure to Report*.

<sup>137</sup> Benjamin Baird, “How Qatar Fuels Campus Extremism in the United States,” Middle East Forum, September 8, 2025, <https://www.meforum.org/mef-reports/how-qatar-fuels-campus-extremism-in-the-united-states>  
Natalie Ecanow, “Is Qatari Money Corrupting American Education?” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 3, 2025, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/03/is-qatari-money-corrupting-american-education/>.

<sup>138</sup> Ecanow, “Is Qatari Money Corrupting American Education?”; ISGAP, *Columbia University: From the Classroom to Campus Politics: The Normalization of Antisemitism, Anti-Democratic Politics, Marginalization and Intimidation* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Columbia\\_University\\_Report\\_2024\\_.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Columbia_University_Report_2024_.pdf).

<sup>139</sup> ISGAP, *Anti-Israel Bias in K-12 Classrooms*; Ecanow, “Is Qatari Money Corrupting American Education?”; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>140</sup> ISGAP, *Anti-Israel Bias in K-12 Classrooms*.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

disputed ISGAP's findings, characterizing as "blatantly false" the claim that Qatar had funded the Choices Program and maintaining that QFI is an independent US-based nonprofit unaffiliated with the Qatari government.<sup>142</sup> ISGAP contested this characterization, noting that the foundation is chaired by the Emir of Qatar himself.<sup>143</sup> The independence claim is consistent with a broader Qatari pattern: Al Jazeera similarly presents itself as an editorially autonomous news organization, yet its funding, narrative priorities, and ideological orientation are state-directed. In both cases, the formal assertion of independence dissolves under scrutiny—what presents as civil society or free media is, in practice, an instrument of sovereign policy. Brown announced the closure of the Choices Program on April 11, 2025, citing financial constraints, but its curricular legacy across thousands of classrooms is likely to persist for years.<sup>144</sup>

- At Texas A&M University, the findings extend further into the structural and contractual domain. The university's long-standing presence in Qatar's Education City involved large-scale funding arrangements and contractual frameworks governing research activity, intellectual property, academic programs, and institutional operations. These arrangements raise concerns regarding control over research outputs, access to data, alignment with host-state priorities, and exposure in fields with potential dual-use implications.<sup>145</sup>

The institutional response at Texas A&M followed a different trajectory. In 2024, the university announced that it would terminate its operations in Doha and withdraw from Qatar's Education City. This decision followed sustained scrutiny of the university's contractual arrangements, research exposure, and compliance obligations, including concerns relating to intellectual property, research control, and potential dual-use applications. The withdrawal represents a rare instance in which long-term institutional engagement with a foreign state-linked framework was ended following sustained external and internal review.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> "Brown University History Curriculum Faced Anti-Israel Claims," *RI News Today*, April 22, 2025, <https://rinewstoday.com/brown-u-ends-its-k-12-history-curriculum-used-by-1-million-in-all-50-states-claims-of-anti-israel-bias>.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Francis J. Boyle, "Update on the Choices Program," Office of the Provost, Brown University, April 11, 2025, <https://provost.brown.edu/communications/update-choices-program>. See also "Important Information on the Choices Program," Department of History, Brown University, n.d., <https://history.brown.edu/community/choices-program>.

<sup>145</sup> ISGAP, *Hijacking Higher Education: Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Texas A&M: Buying Nuclear Research and Student Information* (ISGAP, 2023), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Texas\\_AM\\_Qatar.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Texas_AM_Qatar.pdf).

<sup>146</sup> "Texas A&M Qatar Campus to Close by 2028," Texas A&M University, February 8, 2024, <https://stories.tamu.edu/news/2024/02/08/texas-am-qatar-campus-to-close-by-2028/>.

Qatar's strategic *modus operandi* is consistent across all five cases: funding is directed toward Middle East studies, Islamic studies, and related educational initiatives (as well as ostensibly unrelated scientific and medical research); appointment and research priorities shift toward perspectives aligned with Muslim Brotherhood-connected narratives; disclosure obligations are minimized or circumvented through third-party conduits; and the resulting academic output gains scholarly legitimacy that amplifies its influence well beyond the university.<sup>147</sup>

Qatari universities, research authorities, and investment funds are not independent institutions but explicit instruments of state policy that help advance artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and big data as national development priorities. By Baghdady's own admission, research partnerships with Qatar University are joint ventures with a state-directed institution whose outputs serve the Emir's agenda. This assessment is drawn from a scholarly piece co-authored by Ahmed Baghdady, who after building his career at the RAND Qatar Policy Institute, the Qatar Foundation's World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) initiative, the Institute of International Education, and AMIDEAST served until 2025 as Manager of International Agreements at the University of Waterloo (discussed in Section III).<sup>148</sup>

It is precisely for this reason that connections between Canadian institutions and Qatari entities, including QFI, the Education Above All Foundation, and the broader apparatus of Qatari educational soft power, warrant rigorous scrutiny. The funding mechanisms, disclosure gaps, curricular influence, and ideological drift that ISGAP and allied researchers have documented exhaustively in the American context are not unique to American institutions. Rather, they reflect a systematic Qatari strategy that operates wherever disclosure infrastructure is weak.<sup>149</sup>

Canadian universities have entered analogous arrangements with far less public scrutiny and weak disclosure infrastructure to track them.

- The College of the North Atlantic operated in Qatar for two decades as the largest Canadian university presence in the country, with a satellite campus—CAN-Q—established through a service agreement with the Qatari government in 2001.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> ISGAP, *Corruption of the American Mind*; ISGAP, *Foreign Infiltration*; ISGAP, *Ongoing Failure to Report*.

<sup>148</sup> Matthew Hartley, Alan Ruby, and Ahmed Baghdady, "Qatar University: Local Identity and Global Opportunities," in *Pursuing Institutional Purpose: Profiles of Excellence*, ed. M. Hartley and A. Ruby, 90–104 (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

<sup>149</sup> ISGAP, *Corruption of the American Mind*; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*.

<sup>150</sup> Matt Reeder, "From Doha to Dal: Partnership Paves New Path for Qatari Students," Dal News (Dalhousie University), July 30, 2019, <https://www.dal.ca/news/2019/07/30/from-doha-to-dal-partnership-paves-new-path-for-qatari-students.html>; "CNA's Association with Qatar Campus Coming to an End," VOCM, November 12, 2021, <https://vocm.com/2021/11/12/cna-qatar-campus-end/>.

- Dalhousie University entered into a partnership with CNA-Q in 2019—its first-ever formal arrangement with a technical school outside Canada—creating bachelor’s degree pathways for Qatari students in Halifax.<sup>151</sup> In 2022, by decree of the Emir, it was replaced by the University of Doha for Science and Technology, Qatar’s first national applied university, with the transition explicitly framed as inheriting twenty years of Canadian academic expertise while reorienting toward Qatar’s national curriculum and workforce development priorities.<sup>152</sup>
- The University of Calgary established Qatar’s first nursing school, which operated until the 2025–2026 academic year.<sup>153</sup> SickKids Hospital Toronto maintained a five-year advisory partnership with Hamad Medical Corporation for hospital development in Qatar.<sup>154</sup>

During the 2018 Saudi-Canadian diplomatic crisis, when Riyadh imposed punitive measures in response to Canada’s human rights advocacy, Qatar broke from the Gulf Cooperation Council consensus and maintained its ties with Ottawa.<sup>155</sup> The positioning may have been strategic. By presenting itself as a reliable Gulf partner at a moment of Canadian regional isolation, Qatar expanded its institutional footprint in Canada while scrutiny was directed elsewhere. Western governments, including Canada, have consistently accepted Qatari partnership without adequately accounting for what that partnership conceals.

Canada has established no equivalent of Section 117 of the US Higher Education Act, which mandates disclosure of foreign gifts and contracts exceeding C\$250,000, no foreign gift reporting portal, and no federal investigation mechanism of the kind that has made even partial American accountability possible.<sup>156</sup> This regulatory gap means

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<sup>151</sup> Reeder, “From Doha to Dal.”

<sup>152</sup> Ayeni Olusegun, “UDST Launched, to Meet National and Industry Needs,” *The Peninsula*, March 1, 2022, <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/01/03/2022/udst-launched-to-meet-national-and-industry-needs>; Hatem Abdulhameed, “Qatar’s University of Doha for Science and Technology Graduates Its First Class,” *Al-Fanar Media*, August 25, 2022, <https://al-fanarmedia.org/2022/07/qatars-university-of-doha-for-science-and-technology-graduates-its-first-class/>; “About Us,” University of Doha for Science and Technology, n.d., <https://www.udst.edu.qa/about-udst>.

<sup>153</sup> “UCalgary Qatar Concludes Operations,” University of Calgary, May 7, 2025, <https://ucalgary.ca/news/ucalgary-qatar-concludes-operations>; Joe Adam George, “Muslim Brotherhood Infiltrating Canada with Help of Nonprofits,” *Middle East Forum*, July 16, 2025, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/muslim-brotherhood-infiltrating-canada-with-help-of-nonprofits>.

<sup>154</sup> “Transforming Paediatric Health Care in Qatar,” press release, Sick Kids, n.d., [https://www.sickkidsinternational.ca/press\\_release/transforming-paediatric-health-care-in-qatar/](https://www.sickkidsinternational.ca/press_release/transforming-paediatric-health-care-in-qatar/).

<sup>155</sup> “Qatar Distances Itself from the Saudi-Canadian Crisis” *Al Jazeera Arabic*, August 6, 2018 (in Arabic), <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2018/8/6/قطر-تنأى-بنفسها-عن-أزمة-السعودية-وكندا>.

<sup>156</sup> Government of Canada, Countering Foreign Interference Act, S.C. 2024, c. 16, assented to June 20, 2024, Government of Canada, [https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2024\\_16/FullText.html](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2024_16/FullText.html).

that the pattern visible in American data is almost certainly present in Canada—including at the Ontario educational institutions examined in Section III—but that the transparency infrastructure needed to track it is lacking.

Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, received Royal Assent on June 20, 2024 and includes provisions establishing a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.<sup>157</sup> As of this writing, the registry has not yet been launched.<sup>158</sup> Draft regulations were published for comment in January 2026,<sup>159</sup> and final regulations were published in July 2026.<sup>160</sup> An Order in Council has since set August 4, 2026, as the date on which the registry and the Commissioner's office will formally assume their duties.<sup>161</sup> A Commissioner—Anton Boegman, former Chief Electoral Officer of British Columbia—has been nominated but not yet formally appointed.<sup>162</sup> It is worth noting that, even once operationalized, the registry's initial scope will be limited to influence activities targeting federal political and governmental processes and will not extend to foreign funding of universities, research institutions, or civil society organizations—precisely the domain where Qatari influence is most extensively documented.

Moreover, when the Canadian Parliament considered closing this gap through Bill C-70, U15 Canada—the association representing Canada's fifteen leading research universities—actively opposed the measure, warning that disclosure requirements would produce a chilling effect on international research partnerships.<sup>163</sup> The fact that the institutions most exposed to foreign funding influence are also the most resistant to transparency requirements is not an accident; it is the same dynamic that allowed

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<sup>157</sup> Government of Canada, Countering Foreign Interference Act, S.C. 2024, c. 16, assented to June 20, 2024, Government of Canada, [https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2024\\_16/FullText.html](https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2024_16/FullText.html).

<sup>158</sup> “Canada's Foreign Influence Registry Expected to Take Effect in August,” *Hong Kong Watch*, July 6, 2026, <https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2026/7/6/canadas-foreign-influence-registry-expected-to-take-effect-in-august>.

<sup>159</sup> “Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Regulations,” *Canada Gazette*, pt. I, vol. 160, no. 1, January 3, 2026, <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2026/2026-01-03/html/reg1-eng.html>.

<sup>160</sup> “Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Regulations: SOR/2026-152,” *Canada Gazette*, pt. II, vol. 160, no. 13, July 1, 2026, <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2026/2026-07-01/html/sor-dors152-eng.html>.

<sup>161</sup> “Canada's Foreign Influence Registry Expected to Take Effect in August,” *Hong Kong Watch*, July 2026, <https://www.hongkongwatch.org/all-posts/2026/7/6/canadas-foreign-influence-registry-expected-to-take-effect-in-august>.

<sup>162</sup> Elizabeth Thompson, “Former B.C. Chief Electoral Officer Poised to Become Canada's First Foreign Influence Watchdog,” *CBC News*, January 28, 2026, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/anton-boegman-foreign-interference-9.7064764>.

<sup>163</sup> Jim Bronskill, “Canadian Universities Say Foreign Influence Registry Could Harm Research Partnerships,” *CBC News*, June 10, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/universities-foreign-influence-registry-1.7229929>; Chad Gaffield, Brief submitted to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, U15 Canada, June 6, 2024, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/SECU/Brief/BR13171201/br-external/U15-GroupOfCanadianResearchUniversities-067-240606-010-e.pdf>.

Qatari academic influence to metastasize in the American context before civil society and federal investigators intervened.<sup>164</sup>

Against that backdrop, the September 2024 framework agreement between Canada and Qatar is difficult to read as anything other than a deepening of precisely the kind of relationship that warrants scrutiny. During the Qatari Emir's visit to Ottawa, Canada and Qatar signed a \$95 million framework agreement on global education and development cooperation, with Qatar's Education Above All Foundation contributing \$40 million over five years.<sup>165</sup> Canada thereby formalized an educational collaboration with a state that operates media platforms defending and normalizing Hamas,<sup>166</sup> practices authoritarian censorship of any criticism of its ruling family,<sup>167</sup> and has been documented as pursuing institutional capture of Western universities through undisclosed funding and contractual control provisions—the same provisions that allow Qatar to override curriculum, appoint faculty, and own intellectual property at its satellite campuses. This agreement invites the same questions that Western governments have been slow to ask: on whose terms, and toward what ends, is this partnership being offered?

## 2.3 Al Jazeera as Strategic Media Infrastructure

The Al Jazeera Media Network, headquartered in Doha and funded primarily by the government of Qatar, functions as the central media pillar of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned narrative production globally.<sup>168</sup> Despite operating extensively in the United States, Al Jazeera has resisted registering under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). In September 2020, the DOJ's National Security Division determined that AJ+, Al Jazeera's US-based digital platform, must register under FARA because it engages in "political activities" on behalf of the Qatari government and is designed to "influence American perceptions" of domestic policy.<sup>169</sup> AJ+ has refused to comply. As of the time

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<sup>164</sup> ISGAP, *Corruption of the American Mind*; ISGAP, *Anti-Israel Bias in K-12 Classrooms*.

<sup>165</sup> Generation Unlimited, "Canada and Qatar Join Generation Unlimited as Lead Government Partners in Landmark Announcement," UNICEF, September 27, 2024, <https://www.unicef.org/genunlimited/stories/canada-and-qatar-join-generation-unlimited-lead-government-partners-landmark-announcement>.

<sup>166</sup> Ecanow, "Israel Unveils New Proof."

<sup>167</sup> Office of International Religious Freedom, "2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Qatar," (US Department of State, 2023), <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/qatar/>.

<sup>168</sup> "About," Al Jazeera Media Network, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/about>; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*; Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood"; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>169</sup> Natalie Ecanow, "Al Jazeera Must Register as a Foreign Agent of Qatar," Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 24, 2023, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/11/24/al-jazeera-must-register-as-a-foreign-agent-of-qatar/>; "Al Jazeera Condemns AJ+ FARA Registration Order in US," *Al Jazeera*, September 17, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/17/al-jazeera-condemns-aj-fara-registration-order-in-us>.

of writing, it remains unregistered despite a bipartisan Senate coalition led by Senators Chuck Grassley, Marco Rubio, Tom Cotton, Ted Cruz, and Todd Young formally pressing the DOJ to enforce its mandate.<sup>170</sup>

Al Jazeera operates a deliberately differentiated two-track strategy. Its Arabic-language channel delivers overtly ideological content to Muslim-majority audiences, platforming Muslim Brotherhood leaders and advancing Islamist narratives without the moderation that Western scrutiny requires.<sup>171</sup> Meanwhile, its English-language channel presents the same strategic objectives in the language and framing of Western journalism—human rights, anti-imperialism, press freedom—to audiences that might reject more explicit Islamist framing.<sup>172</sup> AJ+, its digital platform targeting younger Western audiences, repackages Muslim Brotherhood-aligned content in the language of social justice and identity politics, achieving reach into progressive Western communities through influencers and viral video formats.<sup>173</sup> This two-track strategy is the media-scale expression of the double discourse doctrine established by al-Qaradawi: the messages that Brotherhood-aligned organizations communicate to Western interlocutors and internally are deliberately calibrated for different audiences, with the distance between the two functioning as the primary instrument of institutional access.<sup>174</sup>

Al Jazeera broadcast Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s “Sharia and Life” program to a global audience of millions, making it the most widely distributed vehicle for Muslim Brotherhood jurisprudence in the television era.<sup>175</sup> When Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar in 2017, one of their primary demands was the closure of Al Jazeera, citing the network’s promotion of extremist ideology and support for Brotherhood-affiliated movements across the

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<sup>170</sup> Senators Chuck Grassley et al., Letter to Attorney General Merrick Garland, July 1, 2021, as reproduced in “Qatari-Backed Media Still Not Registered under Foreign Agents Law Despite Justice Department Determination, Senators Want to Know Why,” press release, Office of Senator Chuck Grassley, July 2, 2021, <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/qatari-backed-media-still-not-registered-under-foreign-agents-law-despite-justice-department-determination-senators-want-to-know-why>.

<sup>171</sup> Mohamed A. Satti, “Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English Websites: Agenda-Setting as a Means to Comparatively Analyze Online News Stories,” *Communication & Society* 33, no. 1 (2020); ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*; David Pollock, “Aljazeera: One Organization, Two Messages,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 28, 2011, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/aljazeera-one-organization-two-messages>.

<sup>172</sup> Pollock, “Aljazeera: One Organization”; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*, 14–15.

<sup>173</sup> Mohamed Zayani, “Digital Journalism, Social Media Platforms, and Audience Engagement: The Case of AJ+,” *Digital Journalism* 9, no. 3 (2020).

<sup>174</sup> Pollock, “Aljazeera: One Organization”; ISGAP, *Networks of Hate*.

<sup>175</sup> Warren and Gilmore, “One Nation under God?”

region. The diplomatic pressure of four Arab states identifying a single media outlet as a primary security threat illustrates its recognized operational role.<sup>176</sup>

Qatar's media influence extends well beyond Al Jazeera's political programming. In 2018, BBC Studios entered into a three-year co-development and distribution partnership with beIN Media Group—the Qatari state-linked conglomerate that also owns Miramax and Digiturk—extending the country's media reach into Western content markets including the United States, Canada, France, and Spain.<sup>177</sup> That model has since been replicated. In early 2025, CNN announced an expansion into Qatar under an arrangement in which Qatar's state-linked Media City would fund “facilities and technical support,” while CNN maintained nominal editorial control. The resulting program, “CNN Creators,” was produced in a purpose-built Doha studio and aired on CNN International without sponsorship disclosure. CNN's own staff questioned internally whether the arrangement constituted a quid pro quo, but the network declined to specify what it received in exchange for its editorial presence in Doha.<sup>178</sup> Qatari influence has thus penetrated mainstream news coverage, analysis, and entertainment infrastructure through partnerships with trusted Western brands, operating well below the threshold of political scrutiny.

Al Jazeera's influence extends beyond news coverage into the academic realm through its Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (AJCS), which describes itself as “a leading think tank” providing “credible geo-political insights” while operating as a research arm of the Al Jazeera Media Network—funded and run by the Qatari ruling family—under media laws that make criticism of the Emir a punishable offence.<sup>179</sup>

AJCS's academic programming is integral to Al Jazeera's media operation, allowing it to introduce Muslim Brotherhood-aligned narratives through news coverage and

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<sup>176</sup> Ben Smith, “Qatar Crisis,” Briefing Paper no. CBP 8030, House of Commons Library, June 30, 2017, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8030/>; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*, 120.

<sup>177</sup> “BBC Studios Extends Partnership with beIN Media Group across Qatar, MENA & Turkey,” press release, beIN Media Group, August 1, 2018, <https://www.beinmediagroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/BBC-Studios-beIN-Release-August-2018-Eng.pdf>.

<sup>178</sup> Collin Anderson and Eliana Johnson, “‘So Cringe It Hurt’: CNN Mocked for Sycophantic Show Praising Qatar after Hamas-Loving Sheikhs Paid for Its Flashy New Offices,” *Washington Free Beacon*, October 28, 2025, <https://freebeacon.com/media/so-cringe-it-hurt-cnn-mocked-for-sycophantic-show-praising-qatar-after-hamas-loving-sheikhs-paid-for-its-flashy-new-offices/>.

<sup>179</sup> “Al Jazeera Centre for Studies,” Al Jazeera Media Network, <https://network.aljazeera.net/en/channels/aljazeera-centre-studies>; Toby Dershowitz and Asher Boiskin, “Al Jazeera's Academic Arm Platforms Hamas Denialism and Anti-Israel Propaganda,” *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, December 8, 2025, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/08/al-jazeeras-academic-arm-platforms-hamas-denialism-and-anti-israel-propaganda/>.

analysis, bestow upon them scholarly legitimacy through the center’s conferences and publications, and circulate them back into the network as credentialed expert opinion.

At a November 2025 conference co-hosted with Qatar’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) entitled “International Media and the War on Gaza: Modalities of Discourse and the Clash of Narratives,” AJCS gathered academics to “‘deconstruct Western narratives’ and the alleged role of Western media in producing ‘propaganda manipulating international public opinion.’”<sup>180</sup> At the conference, researcher Fatima Alsmadi praised Hamas spokesperson Abu Obaida’s propaganda techniques and lectured that Israel “benefited” from Nazism.<sup>181</sup> A speaker from HBKU’s College of Islamic Studies, who had posted on October 7, 2023 that the Hamas massacre “was merely a rehearsal that shows that liberating Jerusalem is possible,” presented on “professional ethics” in war coverage.<sup>182</sup>

At a subsequent forum in February 2026, AJCS also hosted Hamas leader Khaled Meshal—charged by the US Department of Justice in 2024 with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiracy to murder US nationals for his role in October 7<sup>183</sup>—alongside Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and other Hamas officials, all under the banner of academic discourse.<sup>184</sup>

This infrastructure maps precisely onto the Explanatory Memorandum’s directive to establish “centers for studies and research” designed to generate the legitimacy that Brotherhood-aligned narratives require to circulate in Western institutional life.<sup>185</sup> In Canada, Al Jazeera reaches an estimated 1.3 million monthly viewers and has actively amplified anti-Israel protests, including coverage of celebrations and demonstrations following October 7, 2023.

In Canada, at least 781 antisemitic incidents have been reported in Ontario schools since October 7, 2023, of which more than 40 percent involved Holocaust denial, claims

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<sup>180</sup> Dershowitz and Boiskin, “Al Jazeera’s Academic Arm.”

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.; “‘International Media and the War on Gaza’ Conference Deconstructs Western Narratives,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, November 30, 2025, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/events/%E2%80%9Cinternational-media-and-war-gaza%E2%80%9D-conference-deconstructs-western-narratives-and-exposes>.

<sup>182</sup> Dershowitz and Boiskin, “Al Jazeera’s Academic Arm.”

<sup>183</sup> Toby Dershowitz and Eitan Fischberger, “Al Jazeera Centre for Studies: Academic Veneer Normalizing Terrorism,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 11, 2026, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/02/11/al-jazeera-centre-for-studies-academic-veneer-normalizing-terrorism/>.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.; Sealed Complaint, *United States v. Ismail Haniyeh et al.*, 24 MAG 438 (S.D.N.Y., filed February 1, 2024), [https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/24\\_mag\\_438\\_hamas\\_leadership\\_complaint.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/24_mag_438_hamas_leadership_complaint.pdf).

<sup>185</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum,” 18; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*, 124.

of excessive Jewish wealth or power, or the collective condemnation of Jews<sup>186</sup>—narratives systematically promoted by Al Jazeera’s news and scholarly arms.

## 2.4 Qatar’s Role in the Palestinianization of Islam, and the Islamization of Antisemitism

The Muslim Brotherhood engineered the “Palestinianization of Islam” in three sequential phases. Al-Banna framed the liberation of Palestine as a transcendent religious duty as early as 1936, declaring that “the Palestinian people are our brethren; those stopping short of helping Palestine are actually stopping short of defending Allah and His messenger.”<sup>187</sup> Qutb deepened the architecture by integrating it into his doctrine of *jahiliyyah*—transforming Palestinian liberation from a national struggle into a civilizational confrontation with undertones of Western imperialism, colonialism, and Jewish corruption. Al-Qaradawi completed the process by turning Palestine into the primary mobilizing cause for Muslim minorities in Western societies, the entry point for allyship, and the loyalty test through which broader Muslim Brotherhood ideological adoption follows. He also helped design the organizational network that would bring this strategy to fruition.

Antisemitism is a structural component of this strategy, not a byproduct. Qutb drew on the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Nazi-era materials to reframe European racial antisemitism in Islamic theological language, framing Jews as the hidden architects of Western moral rot.<sup>188</sup> Hamas’s founding charter operationalizes this framework directly—drawing on the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* to attribute the French Revolution, both World Wars, and Freemasonry to Jewish conspiracy, and calling for the killing of Jews until Judgment Day.<sup>189</sup> Qatar funds Hamas, shelters its political leadership in Doha, and acts as mediator on its behalf with Western powers, feigning moral neutrality and presenting a utilitarian peacemaking façade.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Robert Brym, “A Survey on Antisemitism in Ontario’s K-12 Schools,” *Canadian Jewish Studies* 41 (July 2025), <https://cjs.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/cjs/article/view/40434>; Robert Brym, *Antisemitism in Ontario’s K-12 Schools*, report commissioned by the Office of the Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism (Government of Canada, 2025), <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/canada-holocaust/antisemitism/antisemitism-ontario-schools.html>.

<sup>187</sup> “Hassan al-Banna’s Centenary ... Attitude Towards Palestinian Cause,” Ikhwanweb, n.d., <https://ikhwanweb.com/hassan-al-bannas-centenary/>.

<sup>188</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*, 14.

<sup>189</sup> “Hamas Covenant 1988,” arts. 7, 22, 32.

<sup>190</sup> “10 Things to Know About Hamas and Qatar,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 10, 2023, <https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/10-things-to-know-about-hamas-and-qatar.pdf>; Doron Peskin, “Cash Flow: 16 Years of Qatari Money to Hamas Has Created a Monster,” *CTech*, October 26, 2023, <https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/1retnzx9l>. Mason and Shelanski, “It Is Time for Qatar to Choose a Side.”

Qatar does not merely provide the financial infrastructure behind this ideological production; rather, it is an active participant in it. Al-Qaradawi, who was given Qatari citizenship and a permanent base in Doha, used Al Jazeera's platform—reaching approximately sixty million viewers—to call on God to “kill them [the Jews], down to the very last one,” describe the Holocaust as “divine punishment,” and call for its repetition “at the hand of the believers.”<sup>191</sup>

Other Gulf nations have accused Qatar-owned Al Jazeera of promoting antisemitic incitement. In 2017, a Saudi- and Emirati-led alliance charged Qatar with funding Islamist extremism and maintaining ties with Iran. The alliance demanded the network's closure, a move the United Nations condemned as a violation of free expression. The UAE's foreign minister, Anwar Gargash, defended the demand, alleging Al Jazeera “promoted anti-Semitic violence by broadcasting sermons by the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who ... praised Hitler, described the Holocaust as ‘divine punishment,’ and called on Allah to ‘take this oppressive, Jewish, Zionist band of people... and kill them, down to the very last one.’”<sup>192</sup> From his home base in Doha, al-Qaradawi reached an estimated six million weekly viewers with his flagship Al Jazeera show. Gargash's letter “also accuses Al Jazeera of having ‘repeatedly crossed the threshold of incitement to hostility, violence and discrimination’ and lists multiple examples, among them broadcasting the speeches of slain al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.”<sup>193</sup>

Qatar's domestic educational infrastructure reflects the same orientation. As recently as the 2020–2021 school year, Qatar's official seventh-grade Islamic studies textbook taught that “treachery and treason are among the traits of the Jews,” while an eleventh-grade history textbook covering World War II reproduced the Nazi “stab-in-the-back” myth and made no mention of the Holocaust.<sup>194</sup> Although Qatar removed some passages following Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and IMPACT-se exposés and State Department intervention, antisemitic content has persisted. Statements glorifying

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<sup>191</sup> “Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Theologian of Terror,” Anti-Defamation League, May 3, 2013, <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/Sheik-Yusuf-al-Qaradawi-2013-5-3-v1.pdf>.

<sup>192</sup> Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Letter to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, July 9, 2017, as cited in “UAE Slams Al-Jazeera for Anti-Semitism, Inciting Hate,” *France 24*, July 12, 2017, <https://www.france24.com/en/20170712-uae-slams-al-jazeera-anti-semitism-inciting-hate>.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> David Andrew Weinberg “Qatari Textbooks Teach that Jews Are Treacherous,” Anti-Defamation League, April 5, 2021, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/qatari-textbooks-teach-jews-are-treacherous>; Marcus Sheff and David Andrew Weinberg, “Qatari Textbooks Teach Anti-Semitism,” *Newsweek*, September 25, 2020, <https://www.newsweek.com/qatari-textbooks-teach-anti-semitism-opinion-1534102>.

martyrdom and jihad and expressing a deep hatred of *kafirs* or non-believers/infidels can still be found in Islamic studies and Arabic language materials.<sup>195</sup>

Examples of the above include an imam at a school prayer ceremony in Mesaieed calling for “jihad against the Jews with our souls, our wealth and our words”; a Qatari state-sponsored children’s magazine propagating militant content, such as justification of violence, glorification of martyrdom, and demonization of Jewish people, all in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and a Doha school exhibition displaying a student work entitled “The Traits of the Jews” that characterized Jews as arrogant, jealous, deceitful, corrupt, and prophet-killers.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> IMPACT-se, *Qatari National Curriculum: Review of Remaining Problematic Content 2023–2024* (Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education, June 2024), <https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Qatari-National-Curriculum-Review-of-Remaining-Problematic-Content-2023-2024.pdf>.

<sup>196</sup> Office of International Religious Freedom, “International Religious Freedom: Qatar”; Charles Asher Small, “It’s Time to Cut Off Qatar’s Unseen Hand in Fueling Global Antisemitism,” The Blogs, *Times of Israel*, January 29, 2024, <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/its-time-to-cut-off-qatars-unseen-hand-in-fueling-global-antisemitism/>; Z. Harel, “Antisemitic and Anti-Israel Content in Qatar’s Education System: Jews Are Enemies of Allah; Palestine Stretches from the River to the Sea,” MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series no. 1730, Middle East Media Research Institute, December 11, 2023, <https://www.memri.org/reports/antisemitic-and-anti-israel-content-qatars-education-system-jews-are-enemies-allah-palestine>; “State-Sponsored Qatari Children’s Magazine Justifies Terror, Incites against Jews, Israel and U.S.,” MEMRI Special Dispatch no. 11336, Middle East Media Research Institute, May 20, 2024, <https://www.memri.org/reports/state-sponsored-qatari-childrens-magazine-justifies-terror-incites-against-jews-israel-and>.

## SECTION II: THE CANADIAN NETWORK

The four domains of operational implementation of the Muslim Brotherhood's *tamkeen* (entrenchment) strategy identified above in section 1.4 are observable in practice in Canada, as documented in the chapters in this section using federal agency records, election filings, school board minutes, court decisions, and charitable tax returns. These sources collectively demonstrate the implementation, with a high degree of fidelity, of the civilizational framework outlined in the Muslim Brotherhood's "Explanatory Memorandum" for North America. In a number of cases, these activities have occurred alongside continued access to public funding and institutional support.

### Chapter 3: Federal Entryism and the Institutional Capture of Government

As discussed previously, the "Explanatory Memorandum" directs Brotherhood-aligned actors to work toward "enabling Islam and its Movement to become a part of the homeland" by acquiring "the keys and the tools" necessary to carry out its "civilization struggle" (jihadist) mission.<sup>197</sup> The stages of *tamkeen* (entrenchment) move from individual formation through organizational consolidation to the construction of a dense institutional ecosystem—mosques, schools, student organizations, civil society bodies, and legal infrastructure—from which ideologically aligned actors seek placement within existing governance structures to shape policy from the inside rather than contest it from without.<sup>198</sup>

Edmund Fitton-Brown—a former senior British diplomat with extensive experience across the Middle East and now a senior fellow at the US-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, where he heads its Muslim Brotherhood research—offers a stark assessment: "Amongst comparable Western countries like the U.K., France, and Australia, Canada stands out as being furthest down the road to Islamist infiltration and consolidation."<sup>199</sup> He attributes this trajectory to "naive politics, weak security and intelligence, reckless visa policy over decades, and the Anglo-French division that rewards the strategic wedge-driving that the Muslim Brotherhood is so skilled at."<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> "Explanatory Memorandum."

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Joe Adam George, "Islamism Risks Becoming Canada's Deadliest Export to U.S.," Middle East Forum, January 16, 2026, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-research/islamism-risks-becoming-canadas-deadliest-export-to-u-s>.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

These assessments are consistent with a small but developing body of research on Muslim Brotherhood activity in Canada. 'A 2025 ISGAP report examines aspects of Brotherhood entryism in Canada, mapping organizational networks, funding relationships, and institutional access across politics, academia, and civil society.<sup>201</sup> Approaching the question from the perspective of Canadian policy rather than network analysis, Nermin Allam finds that Canada has not developed a coherent position on Islamist political movements and that Canadian governments have maintained only limited engagement with them.<sup>202</sup> Lorenzo Vidino and Sergio Altuna, writing for the Program on Extremism at the George Washington University, draw on regulatory documents unsealed in Ontario to examine the Canada Revenue Agency's multi-year audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC). They report that the agency identified not only ideological but also organizational affiliations between MAC and the Muslim Brotherhood, including the transferability of membership between the Canadian entity and Brotherhood branches in the Middle East, while noting that it remains an open question whether these findings extend beyond the Canadian case.<sup>203</sup>

This chapter examines the available Canadian record, which reveals several alarming developments: the coordinated advocacy of the Muslim Federal Employees Network within the federal public service, including within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP); the role of the office of Amira Elghawaby in amplifying and institutionalizing this advocacy at the level of federal ministers and national security officials; and the implications of these developments for the agencies responsible for countering the networks examined in this report.

The analysis further finds that, in such cases, concepts such as Islamophobia can function as regulatory and discursive constraints on inquiry, limiting the ability of institutions, policymakers, and researchers to examine questions of influence, governance, and alignment. This distinction is central to the analysis and reflects the need to separate protections against discrimination from the use of terminology as a mechanism to undermine accountability and transparency. All the analysis in the

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<sup>201</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee? The Growing Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Politics, Academia, and Civil Society in Canada* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada\\_Report\\_Final\\_250622\\_EN\\_Final.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada_Report_Final_250622_EN_Final.pdf).

<sup>202</sup> Nermin Allam, "Responding to Political Islam: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Islam in Canada," in *Middle Power in the Middle East: Canada's Foreign and Defence Policies in a Changing Region*, ed. Thomas Juneau and Bessma Momani, 138–54 (University of Toronto Press, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.3138/9781487528461-011>.

<sup>203</sup> Lorenzo Vidino and Sergio Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West? Evidence from a Canadian Tax Authority Investigation* (Program on Extremism, The George Washington University, January 2025), [https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-01/The Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20the%20West\\_.pdf](https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-01/The%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20the%20West_.pdf).

present report is grounded in documented evidence relating to institutional conduct, funding relationships, and policy frameworks and does not attribute characteristics or intent to individuals or communities on the basis of their religion or identity.

A strong, professional, and non-partisan public service is fundamental to Canada's success. Every day, tens of thousands of dedicated public servants serve Canadians with integrity, impartiality, and a deep commitment to the public interest. Their professionalism and quiet dedication strengthen our democracy and deserve our respect and appreciation. It is in this spirit that the analysis that follows should be understood.

### 3.1 Institutional Access and Advocacy

Federal records obtained by a Canadian news publication, *Blacklock's Reporter*, indicate the presence of activists who are aggressively promoting pro-Palestine and Islamophobia narratives within Canada's federal bureaucracy, including inside the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the country's primary agency responsible for counterterrorism and national security enforcement.<sup>204</sup> In this context, the use of the term Islamophobia requires clarification. The present analysis does not address or seek to diminish legitimate concerns regarding anti-Muslim bigotry or prejudice, which are recognized as real and require prevention under law and policy. Rather, the use of the term relates to its operationalized form within a specific political and institutional context, where it is applied in ways that extend beyond protection from discrimination to encompass the shielding of ideological positions, organizational networks, and funding relationships from scrutiny.

These disclosures point to a pattern of internal lobbying that extends beyond workplace accommodation into coordinated efforts to shape the policy environment and institutional norms—a tactic that aligns with the Muslim Brotherhood's aforementioned broader *tamkeen* (entrenchment) strategy.

At the center of this activity is the Muslim Federal Employees Network (MFEN), an unincorporated internal advocacy group founded in 2021 by Leila El-Khatib, a strategic policy analyst within the RCMP's federal policing branch.<sup>205</sup> While publicly branded as

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<sup>204</sup> Office of the Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia, *Annual Report 2024–2025: A Canada Where We All Belong* (Department of Canadian Heritage, 2025), <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/combating-islamophobia-canada/annual-report-2024-2025.html>; “Activist Is in Federal Policing,” *Blacklock's Reporter*, December 8, 2025, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/activist-is-in-federal-policing/>.

<sup>205</sup> Mara Shaw, “RCMP Hosts First Eid al-Fitr Celebration at National Headquarters in Ottawa,” *RCMP Gazette*, July 5, 2024, <https://rcmp.ca/en/gazette/rcmp-hosts-first-eid-al-fitr-celebration-national-headquarters-ottawa>.

a volunteer support network, internal communications suggest a more expansive mandate, including coordinated political activism around Palestinian and Islamist causes that are consistent with the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological and strategic agenda. The MFEN comprises approximately seventy members across multiple federal departments and, despite maintaining a limited public profile, has actively circulated materials promoting the adoption of Palestinian political narratives within the public service.<sup>206</sup>

Internal correspondence from 2024 reveals that MFEN members objected to testimony delivered by a Jewish advocacy group, B’nai Brith Canada, before a House of Commons committee, criticizing what they described as a pro-Israel “narrative” and urging parliamentarians to receive “regular briefings” aligned with Palestinian perspectives.<sup>207</sup> Other communications complained that Palestinians “lack the same level of support from the federal public service that was extended to the Ukrainian community during the Ukraine-Russia situation,” while asserting that public servants felt unsafe expressing Palestinian identity in the workplace due to “fears of retaliation and potential harm.”<sup>208</sup> One memo even claimed that “Islamophobia looks like escorting an employee out of the workplace for making pro-Palestinian comments,” while an internal session said that racism included a failure to “acknowledge Palestinians as an Indigenous people.”<sup>209</sup>

The MFEN has also sought to redefine workplace norms through the dissemination of guidance materials, including a “Managers’ Guide to Supporting Muslim Employees.”<sup>210</sup> This document challenges established professional conventions by discouraging handshakes—on the grounds that “physical contact between sexes unless married or closely related is forbidden in Islam”—and advising managers that Islam “teaches there is only one god (Allah).”<sup>211</sup> “Muslims have five obligatory prayers a day,” the MFEN writes. “Sometimes up to three of the five prayers occur during a 9 am to 5 pm workday. Prayers must be performed within their allocated time periods which vary day to day.” Prayer breaks “can typically take between 10 to 15 minutes.”<sup>212</sup> Beyond

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<sup>206</sup> “Activist Is in Federal Policing,” *Blacklock’s Reporter*, December 8, 2025, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/activist-is-in-federal-policing/>

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Muslim Federal Employees Network (MFEN), “Managers’ Guide to Supporting Muslim Employees,” Association of Professional Executives of the Public Service of Canada (APEX), November 2023, [https://apex.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/MFENmanagersguidetosupportingMuslimemployees\\_BILaccessible.pdf](https://apex.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/MFENmanagersguidetosupportingMuslimemployees_BILaccessible.pdf).

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

cultural accommodation, the MFEN has lobbied for amendments to the Employment Equity Act to designate Muslims as a protected group akin to Indigenous Canadians, but a government task force rejected the request.<sup>213</sup>

The MFEN's lobbying efforts were backed by Amira Elghawaby during her three-year tenure as Canada's Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia from 2023 to 2026.<sup>214</sup>

Internal email records indicate that Elghawaby actively pressured federal managers to adopt measures aligned with the MFEN's demands.<sup>215</sup> In one instance, her office complained to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) when it failed to respond promptly to such a request. "Unfortunately, we have not yet received a response from the Agency regarding our inquiry into contemplation spaces," states an email sent from her office. "We do have plans to follow up with departments who did not issue a response in the coming weeks."<sup>216</sup> Despite Muslims comprising only about two percent of the federal workforce, Elghawaby had her office lobby federal deputy ministers to formally consider the MFEN's recommendations.<sup>217</sup> This dynamic illustrates how organized advocacy is translated into senior-level policy engagement, consistent with the institutional embedding and policy impact domains identified in Section I.

A "Strategic Plan" circulated by Elghawaby's office proposed extending taxpayer funding to the MFEN, although no specific allocation was indicated.<sup>218</sup> Additional Access to Information records reveal that Elghawaby's office circulated an undated memo, entitled "Championing Inclusion," that expanded the definition of Islamophobia beyond overt discrimination.<sup>219</sup> The memo asserted that the "spectrum of Islamophobia" includes not only explicit racism but also "failure to accommodate," specifically citing "employer refusal to adapt its policies, rules and practices to provide Muslim employees with equal opportunities to perform their jobs."<sup>220</sup> Elghawaby further lobbied ministers and senior national security and intelligence officials,

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<sup>213</sup> Raffy Boudjikianian, "Task Force Rejects Calls for Special Employment Status for Jewish, Muslim Public Servants," *CBC News*, February 1, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/employment-equity-act-jews-muslims-1.7100784>.

<sup>214</sup> "Demanded Fed Prayer Rooms," *Blacklock's Reporter*, October 17, 2025, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/demanded-fed-prayer-rooms/>.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

including former Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc<sup>221</sup> and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director Dan Rogers,<sup>222</sup> to prioritize combating Islamophobia.

Questions regarding the composition of federal advisory bodies have extended beyond Elghawaby. In June 2026, concerns were raised over Prime Minister Mark Carney's appointment of former Liberal cabinet minister Omar Alhabra to a newly established advisory council to combat racism, Islamophobia, antisemitism, and other forms of hate.<sup>223</sup> The establishment of this council, which arose in large part as a response to the rise of antisemitism across Canada,<sup>224</sup> was announced by Prime Minister Carney in a major speech at Holy Blossom Synagogue, Toronto, on June 1, 2026, after a spate of violent antisemitic attacks.<sup>225</sup>

Alhabra served as president of the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) from 2004 to 2005, before entering federal politics in 2006.<sup>226</sup> The Canadian government listed Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist entities in November and December 2002.<sup>227</sup> CAF opposed these listings in 2002, before Alhabra's presidency, and again in November 2006, in a policy statement issued after he had left the organization.<sup>228</sup> In September 2004, during Alhabra's presidency, CAF and the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations (NCCAR) lodged a complaint with the Ontario Press Council objecting to the *National Post's* description of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades as a "terrorist group," a designation Canada had applied to the group in April 2003.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Amira Elghawaby (@AmiraElghawaby), "Timely meeting with Minister of Public Safety, his Parliamentary Secretary...", X, November 9, 2023, <https://x.com/AmiraElghawaby/status/1722408101293285540>.

<sup>222</sup> CSIS Canada (@csiscanada), "Last week, CSIS Director Dan Rogers welcomed Special Representative @AmiraElghawaby...", X, February 17, 2025, <https://x.com/csiscanada/status/1891519113861775688>.

<sup>223</sup> Shira Li Bartov, "Canada's New Council to Tackle Antisemitism Divides Jewish Groups," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, June 5, 2026, <https://www.jta.org/2026/06/05/global/canadas-new-council-to-tackle-antisemitism-divides-jewish-groups>.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid. (noting that antisemitic hate crimes in Canada had risen to the highest levels seen since the Second World War).

<sup>225</sup> Shira Li Bartov, "'Canada's Civic Compact Is Failing Jewish Canadians,' Carney Says as He Unveils Effort to Address Antisemitism," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, June 1, 2026, <https://www.jta.org/2026/06/01/global/canadas-civic-compact-is-failing-jewish-canadians-carney-says-as-he-unveils-effort-to-address-antisemitism>.

<sup>226</sup> Tristin Hopper, "Arab Group Loses Appeal on Federal Funding Cut," *Ottawa Citizen*, August 28, 2015, <https://www.pressreader.com/canada/ottawa-citizen/20150828/281711203404876>.

<sup>227</sup> "Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Hamas Terrorist Attacks) Regulations," *Canada Gazette*, Part II, vol. 158, no. 21, October 9, 2024, <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2024/2024-10-09/html/sor-dors178-eng.html>; Global Affairs Canada, "Baird Welcomes EU Decision to List Hezbollah as Terrorist Entity," news release, Government of Canada, July 22, 2013, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/07/baird-welcomes-eu-decision-list-hezbollah-terrorist-entity.html>.

<sup>228</sup> Michael Starr, "Carney Appoints Denier of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Terror Status, Encampment Lawyer to Antisemitism Council," *Jerusalem Post*, June 2, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-898138>; National Post View, "NP View: Alhabra's Appointment an Insult to Jewish-Canadians," *National Post*, June 6, 2026, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/np-view-alhabras-appointment-a-poke-in-the-eye-of-jewish-canadians>.

<sup>229</sup> "Canadian PM Criticized for Including Omar Alhabra on Antisemitism Council," *Jewish Online*, June 2, 2026, <https://jewishonliner.org/p/canadian-pm-criticized-for-including-alhabra-antisemitism-council>.

During this same period, Alghabra made other statements that drew criticism. Upon Yasser Arafat's death in 2004, for example, he noted that Arafat "played a tremendous role in highlighting the Palestinian struggle for independence and making it visible in the international arena." In June 2005, he wrote to then-Toronto police chief Bill Blair to criticize Blair's decision to lead that year's "Walk with Israel" event, describing Israel as conducting "a brutal and the longest contemporary military occupation in the world."<sup>230</sup> In a January 2006 interview with the Jewish Tribune, he said, "I don't believe that Hamas wants the elimination of Israel," and declined to answer when specifically asked to denounce suicide bombings.<sup>231</sup>

However, Alghabra since appears to have moderated his positions. As Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he told the House of Commons on June 11, 2018, "We also absolutely and without equivocation condemn Iran's actions against Israel. We condemn the recent abhorrent statement by the supreme leader Khamenei that clearly incited hate and violence. ... We strongly condemn its incitement to violence as we condemn all of Iran's threats against Israel."<sup>232</sup>

On October 13, 2023, six days after the Hamas attacks, Alghabra wrote on X: "The terror attacks committed by Hamas against Israelis are horrific and unjustifiable. The images of mass destruction of Gaza are horrifying. Civilians in Gaza are defenceless and Israel has obligations under international law. I call for the protection of civilians."<sup>233</sup>

Nevertheless, Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre singled out Alghabra when speaking to reporters in early June 2026 in the context of the establishment of the aforementioned advisory council, stating that he was "not sure he's the right guy to combat antisemitism" and accusing Alghabra of "lobbying me before he was in politics to keep Hezbollah legal."<sup>234</sup> Poilievre's allegation describes a personal recollection of an encounter roughly two decades earlier. At the time of publication of this report, Alghabra has denied the allegation, calling it "obviously false" and describing the surrounding criticism as "political gamesmanship." No contemporaneous record of the alleged lobbying has surfaced in reporting.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Starr, "Carney Appoints Denier"; National Post View, "NP View: Alghabra's Appointment."

<sup>231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>232</sup> Omar Alghabra, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Consular Affairs), speaking on Opposition Motion—Iran, House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, Hansard no. 312, June 11, 2018, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/house/sitting-312/hansard>, also available at <https://openparliament.ca/debates/2018/6/11/omar-alghabra-1/only/>.

<sup>233</sup> Omar Alghabra (@OmarAlghabra), "The terror attacks committed by Hamas against Israelis are horrific and unjustifiable," X, October 13, 2023, <https://x.com/OmarAlghabra/status/1712894160825364929>.

<sup>234</sup> Bartov, "Canada's New Council."

<sup>235</sup> Stuart Benson "Former Liberal Minister Alghabra Calls Conservative Criticisms over His Inclusion in the Anti-Hate Council 'Absurd Political Gamesmanship,'" *The Hill Times*, August 12, 2026, <https://www.hilltimes.com/>

The activities of the MFEN, the advocacy efforts of Amira Elghawaby, and the continued engagement of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned organizations with senior government officials lend weight to longstanding warnings about Islamist entryism within Canadian institutions.

In 2015, Marc Lebuis, director of Point de Bascule—a Canadian research organization that monitors and publishes material on Islamist networks and ideology and has reported on jihadist-linked individuals, narratives, and support environments in Canada—testified before a Senate national security committee. In his testimony, Lebuis noted that individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood had encouraged their supporters in Canada to join law enforcement and intelligence agencies.<sup>236</sup> This dynamic reflects the application of the entryist methodology outlined in Chapter 1, in which institutional participation is not neutral but functions as a mechanism for long-term influence, access, and protection within state structures. “Leading influential Islamist leaders have specifically targeted Canada,” Lebuis cautioned.<sup>237</sup>

He further warned the committee about the Brotherhood’s attempt to infiltrate the judiciary, stating: “In the early 2000s, Jamal Badawi, a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood operating in Canada, said that at the present stage, Muslims should agree to become judges and officials in Canada, even though the country is not governed by sharia or Islamic law. He declared that once they become judges and government officials, they should take advantage of their position of influence to stop applying current national legal provisions that are incompatible with sharia law.”<sup>238</sup> Badawi’s institutional significance in the Brotherhood’s North American infrastructure was confirmed in the aforementioned “Explanatory Memorandum.”<sup>239</sup>

Viewed in this context, the activities of the MFEN and the role of Amira Elghawaby indicate the presence of certain dynamics within Canada’s federal apparatus. What is presented as employee advocacy actually conceals a coordinated effort to influence policy, reshape institutional norms, and embed ideological frameworks within government structures, consistent with the incremental logic of *tamkeen*. These developments suggest a blurring of the boundary between private belief and public

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[2026/08/12/former-liberal-minister-alghabra-calls-conservative-criticisms-over-his-inclusion-in-the-anti-hate-council-absurd-political-gamesmanship/514417/](https://www.ottawacitizen.com/2026/08/12/former-liberal-minister-alghabra-calls-conservative-criticisms-over-his-inclusion-in-the-anti-hate-council-absurd-political-gamesmanship/514417/).

<sup>236</sup> Dylan Robertson, “Watch for Islamist Infiltration, Blogger Tells Senate Inquiry,” *Ottawa Citizen*, June 1, 2020, <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/watch-for-islamist-infiltration-blogger-tells-senate-inquiry>.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> “Evidence,” Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, Issue 10, Senate of Canada, February 23, 2015, <https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/committee/412/secd/51929-e>.

<sup>239</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum.”

duty, with potential long-term implications for governance, institutional neutrality, and national security.

### 3.2 Electoral Politics and Political Mobilization

The Seventh Point of Departure outlined in the “The Project” instructs Muslim Brotherhood members to master “the art of coalitions,” specifying that collaboration with outside actors must remain instrumentalized, designed to maximize Brotherhood benefit without diluting the movement’s ideological objectives.<sup>240</sup> The “Explanatory Memorandum” translates this into a concrete directive to establish political organizations, build “relationships and alliances,” and advance the goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally.”<sup>241</sup>

In the American context, Domain 3 of the Brotherhood’s operational strategy, as analyzed in Chapter 1, has played out as follows: Muslim voter registration rose from 60 to 78 percent between 2016 and 2020;<sup>242</sup> Brotherhood-aligned organizations hosted presidential candidates at voter mobilization summits;<sup>243</sup> and organizations explicitly conditioned bloc voting in swing states on policy positions regarding Gaza and Islamophobia, with survey data confirming these issues as decisive factors in Muslim electoral behavior in 2024.<sup>244</sup>

Within a highly organized but diverse Canadian Muslim landscape that encompasses a wide range of ethnic, sectarian, religious, and political orientations, a small subset of Brotherhood-aligned organizations, by virtue of their resources and organizational capacity, have been able to exert disproportionate influence both within Muslim communities and across Canadian institutional and political spheres.<sup>245</sup>

These developments are occurring against a backdrop of significant demographic growth and geographic concentration. According to Statistics Canada, the Muslim population reached approximately 1.8 million in 2021—representing 4.9 percent of the

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<sup>240</sup> “The Project.”

<sup>241</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum.”

<sup>242</sup> “American Muslim Poll 2016,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, March 2016, <https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/poll2016-1.pdf>; “American Muslim Poll 2020: Amid Pandemic and Protest,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, October 1, 2020, <https://ispu.org/american-muslim-poll-2020-amid-pandemic-and-protest/>.

<sup>243</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Lorenzo Vidino and Sergio Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West? Evidence from a Canadian Tax Authority Investigation* (Program on Extremism, The George Washington University, January 2025), [https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-01/The%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20the%20West\\_.pdf](https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-01/The%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20the%20West_.pdf).

national population and more than doubling in size over the past two decades.<sup>246</sup> This growth has been accompanied by an increasing concentration in key urban regions, such as the Greater Toronto Area, Montreal, Ottawa, and Vancouver,<sup>247</sup> thus amplifying the electoral relevance of Muslim voters in a number of seat-rich constituencies.

The strategic framing of political participation as a communal and religious obligation by Muslim voter advocacy organizations further reinforces these mobilization efforts. The Canadian Muslim Vote has coordinated mosque-based sermons across multiple provinces in which imams explicitly framed voting as a social responsibility grounded in faith, with one imam telling congregants that “as believers, every single one of us has social responsibilities that our very faith is contingent upon.”<sup>248</sup> The organization has simultaneously pursued a targeted riding strategy, identifying between 60 and 80 federal ridings where the Muslim population exceeds or approaches the margin of victory and conducting get-out-the-vote campaigns specifically concentrated in those constituencies.<sup>249</sup> In the 2025 federal election, the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council mobilized over 100 Muslim organizations behind a coordinated declaration framing unified voting as a “collective responsibility,” formally endorsing candidates in 45 ridings on the basis of their positions on Gaza, Islamophobia, and related policy commitments.<sup>250</sup> In effect, this approach sought to transform a diverse population into an electoral bloc capable of exerting outsized influence in closely contested ridings.

The implications of this political engagement model are significant. While participation in democratic processes is both legitimate and expected, the convergence of sectarian mobilization, foreign policy activism, and coordinated electoral pressure introduces additional layers of complexity, raising questions about the extent to which domestic political outcomes may be shaped by organizations whose objectives are at odds with Canadian democratic norms and security interests.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> “A Snapshot of the Muslim Population in Canada,” Statistics Canada, January 23, 2025, <https://www.statcan.gc.ca/o1/en/plus/7639-snapshot-muslim-population-canada>.

<sup>247</sup> “Profile of Muslims in Canada: Challenges & Opportunities,” Justice For All, January 27, 2025, <https://www.justiceforall.org/resources/reports/profile-of-muslims-in-canada-challenges-opportunities/>

<sup>248</sup> Richard Agecoutay, “Ahead of Federal Election, Imams at 69 Canadian Mosques Deliver Message That Every Vote Counts,” *CBC News*, April 21, 2019, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/canadian-muslim-voters-2019-federal-election-1.5105355>.

<sup>249</sup> “The Canadian Muslim Vote Publishes List of 73 Swing Ridings in Six Provinces Where Muslim Voters Can Impact Government Makeup,” *Muslim Link*, October 29, 2019, <https://muslimlink.ca/news/the-canadian-muslim-vote-publishes-list-of-73-swing-ridings-in-six-provinces-where-muslim-voters-can-impact-government-makeup>; Joe Adam George, “Will Islamists Play Kingmaker in Canadian Election?,” *Middle East Forum*, April 28, 2025, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/will-islamists-play-kingmaker-in-canadian-election>.

<sup>250</sup> “CMPAC and Over 100 Muslim Organizations Unite for a Principled Vote,” Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, March 28, 2025, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/2025/03/28/cmpac-and-over-100-muslim-organizations-unite-for-a-principled-vote/>; MuslimsVote.ca, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, <https://muslimsvote.ca/>.

<sup>251</sup> Vidino and Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West?*; ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

With this dynamic in mind, the following section examines what the available record shows: the organizational structure and funding relationships of The Canadian Muslim Vote and the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council; the third-party electoral registrations filed ahead of the 2025 federal election; the documented ties between these organizations and Muslim Brotherhood-aligned charitable networks; and the explicit conditionality—Palestinian statehood, the APR framework, and Islamophobia policy—that has been attached to Muslim electoral mobilization in Canada.<sup>252</sup> Within this mobilization, the Palestinian cause functions precisely as envisioned in the “Explanatory Memorandum” and as articulated by al-Qaradawi: not as the most pressing domestic concern of Canadian Muslims but as the primary transnational loyalty cause through which allegiances are secured and ideological alignment is tested and reproduced.<sup>253</sup>

### 3.3 Primary Players

#### 3.3.1 The Canadian Muslim Vote

The Canadian Muslim Vote (TCMV) brands itself as a “national, non-partisan, and charitable organization dedicated to empowering Canadian Muslims through civic engagement and political education.”<sup>254</sup> However, Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) records indicate that the organization has reported operational activities extending beyond Canada, including in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan.<sup>255</sup> In December 2025, a TCMV-sponsored delegation—including six Canadian members of parliament—was denied entry to the West Bank by the Israeli authorities while attempting to enter from Jordan. The refusal was reportedly linked to TCMV’s links to Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), which has been designated as a terrorist organization by Israel and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> MuslimsVote.ca, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, accessed July 15, 2026, <https://muslimsvote.ca/>; George, “Will Islamists Play Kingmaker.” For the third party registration details of the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) in Canada’s 2025 federal election, see “Third Party Database,” Elections Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, <https://www.elections.ca/WPAPPS/WPR/EN/TP?referrer=PoliticalParticipants> (search for CMPAC under 45th general election).

<sup>253</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>254</sup> The Canadian-Muslim Vote, <https://canadianmuslimvote.ca/>.

<sup>255</sup> James Chaarani, “Mideast Trip for MPs with Group Canadian Muslim Vote a Chance to Hear Real Life Stories from Refugees,” *CBC News*, January 30, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/kitchener-waterloo/umair-ashraf-canadian-muslim-vote-1.7098001>.

<sup>256</sup> Nadine Yousif and James FitzGerald, “Six Canadian MPs Denied Entry by Israel to Occupied West Bank,” *BBC News*, December 17, 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30j90m09g8o>; Kirsty Weakley “Islamic Relief Labelled As ‘Terrorist’ Group by UAE,” *Civil Society*, November 18, 2014, <https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/islamic-relief-labelled-as-terrorist-group-by-uae.html>.

TCMV is also linked to other Brotherhood-aligned organizations operating in Canada. Its executive director, Umair Ashraf, previously led teams of volunteers nationally for Islamic Relief Canada,<sup>257</sup> the Canadian arm of IRW and a major Brotherhood-aligned charity in the country.<sup>258</sup> Mustafa Farooq—the former chief executive officer of the National Council of Canadian Muslims<sup>259</sup>—is listed as a director of TCMV on the organization’s Canada Revenue Agency T3010 registered charity information return.<sup>260</sup> The National Council of Canadian Muslims, formerly known as the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations, has been identified as part of the broader Brotherhood-aligned civil society network in Canada by ISGAP and other researchers.<sup>261</sup> In the 2021 federal election, both organizations ran parallel Muslim voter mobilization programs focused on holding candidates accountable on shared policy priorities,<sup>262</sup> underscoring the depth of coordination and interconnectivity within Brotherhood-aligned networks in Canada.

Beyond its ties with Brotherhood-aligned groups, TCMV has emerged as a key vehicle for the political mobilization of Muslim voters in Canada. Having recognized its expanding political leverage, TCMV established the Civic Leadership Institute in 2023 to equip and empower emerging Muslim leaders with the skills and knowledge needed to represent the community in the political landscape.<sup>263</sup> During a February 2026 meeting with Prime Minister Carney, TCMV highlighted data on Canadian Muslim civic engagement and voter turnout to demonstrate the community’s increasing political significance,<sup>264</sup> in a further reflection of the organization’s growing footprint in Canada’s socio-political arena. Although formally granted charitable status in 2019,<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> “The Canadian Muslim Vote Appoints Umair Ashraf as New Executive Director,” Muslim Link, October 20, 2022, <https://muslimlink.ca/news/the-canadian-muslim-vote-appoints-umair-ashraf-as-new-executive-director>.

<sup>258</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee?*

<sup>259</sup> “Mustafa Farooq,” profile, Broadbent Institute, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://broadbentinstitute.ca/people/mustafa-farooq/>.

<sup>260</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, 2024 Registered Charity Information Return (T3010) for The Canadian-Muslim Vote: Section B – Directors/Trustees and Like Officials, Government of Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, [https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/t3010DrctrsTrstsLkOffcls\\_dsplyovrvw/808633598RR0001/0](https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/t3010DrctrsTrstsLkOffcls_dsplyovrvw/808633598RR0001/0).

<sup>261</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee?*; “National Council of Canadian Muslims: The New Name Chosen by CAIR-CAN Helps Cover Its Links with Washington-Based/Hamas-Linked CAIR,” Point de Bascule Canada, May 23, 2014, <https://pointdebasculecanada.ca/national-council-of-canadian-muslims-the-new-name-chosen-by-cair-can-helps-cover-its-links-with-washington-based-hamas-linked-cair/>.

<sup>262</sup> NCCM, “Federal Election 2021,” National Council of Canadian Muslims, August 31, 2021, <https://nccm.ca/elections2021/>; “Muslim Vote Weekend,” The Canadian Muslim Vote, accessed July 15, 2026, [https://canadianmuslimvote.ca/past\\_impact/muslim-vote-weekend/](https://canadianmuslimvote.ca/past_impact/muslim-vote-weekend/).

<sup>263</sup> “About Us,” The Canadian Muslim Vote, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://canadianmuslimvote.ca/about-us/>.

<sup>264</sup> The Canadian Muslim Vote (@canadianmuslimvote), “Last week, TCMV joined leaders of Muslim organizations...,” Instagram, February 19, 2026, [https://www.instagram.com/p/DU9eyX\\_EoPg/](https://www.instagram.com/p/DU9eyX_EoPg/).

<sup>265</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, 2024 Registered Charity Information Return (T3010) for The Canadian-Muslim Vote, Government of Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/t3010ovrvw/808633598RR0001/0>.

evidence suggests that the organization was active as early as the 2015 federal election cycle.<sup>266</sup> Since 2018, TCMV has also been a recipient of significant federal funding, receiving a total of C\$212,137 through the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program administered by Employment and Social Development Canada.<sup>267</sup> Notably, while the organization received C\$9,018 and C\$9,680 through the CSJ program in 2021 and 2022, respectively,<sup>268</sup> these disbursements do not appear to have been disclosed in its corresponding tax filings,<sup>269</sup> raising additional concerns regarding financial transparency and compliance.

### 3.3.2 Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council

The agenda of the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) merits closer scrutiny given its leadership's apparent ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US Department of the Treasury in January 2026 for its material support of Hamas.<sup>270</sup> CMPAC was registered as a third party on March 27, 2025—just one month prior to the April 28, 2025 federal election—by its executive director, Khaled al-Qazzaz.<sup>271</sup> Al-Qazzaz previously served as foreign affairs secretary to Mohamed Morsi,<sup>272</sup> a long-time Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader, during his presidency of Egypt from 2012 to 2013.<sup>273</sup> Following Morsi's removal by the Egyptian military, al-Qazzaz was detained for nearly two years,

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<sup>266</sup> "Canadian Muslims Must Use Their Votes This Election," Alukah, August 30, 2015, [https://en.alukah.net/World\\_Muslims/2/6347/](https://en.alukah.net/World_Muslims/2/6347/)

<sup>267</sup> Open Government, "Grants and Contributions," search results for The Canadian Muslim Vote, Government of Canada, accessed April 9, 2026, [https://search.open.canada.ca/grants/?sort=agreement\\_start\\_date+desc&search\\_text=%22the+canadian-muslim+vote%22&page=1](https://search.open.canada.ca/grants/?sort=agreement_start_date+desc&search_text=%22the+canadian-muslim+vote%22&page=1).

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Charity Information Returns (T3010) for The Canadian-Muslim Vote, Government of Canada, 2021–2022, accessed July 15, 2026, available at: <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/dsplyRprtngPrd/808633598RR0001>.

<sup>270</sup> "Treasury and State Departments Designate Muslim Brotherhood Branches as Terrorist Organizations," US Department of the Treasury, January 13, 2026, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0357>.

<sup>271</sup> George, "Will Islamists Play Kingmaker"; "Third Party Database," Elections Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, <https://www.elections.ca/WPAPPS/WPR/EN/TP> (search Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, 45th general election). CMPAC's filed return names Khaled Alqazzaz as the registration applicant, distinct from the financial agent, Akram Raouf. Under the *Canada Elections Act*, a third party must register immediately after its regulated expenses reach \$500 in an election period, which began with the issue of the writs on March 23, 2025. The return records election advertising expenses of \$1,469 incurred on March 26 and \$395.50 on March 27, consistent with registration on the latter date. Total election advertising expenses for the campaign were \$54,429, against \$21,838 in monetary contributions from 127 contributors. See CMPAC's "Third Party's Electoral Campaign Return" from the 45th general election, Elections Canada, accessed July 15, 2026, [https://www.elections.ca/fin/oth/thi/advert/tp45/TP-0020\\_ecr.pdf](https://www.elections.ca/fin/oth/thi/advert/tp45/TP-0020_ecr.pdf).

<sup>272</sup> "Khaled Alqazzaz," profile, Middle East Eye, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/users/khaled-alqazzaz>.

<sup>273</sup> Samer Shehata, "Profile of Egypt's New President Mohamed Morsi," Wilson Center, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/profile-egypts-new-president-mohamed-morsi>.

though Egyptian authorities neither brought charges against him nor publicly clarified the basis for his arrest.<sup>274</sup> In 2025, al-Qazzaz authored an article in the *Toronto Star* that appeared to downplay Palestinian terrorism.<sup>275</sup> Writing for Honest Reporting Canada, Mike Fegelman observed that al-Qazzaz “did not share what exactly took place on Oct. 7,” while also failing to address the inflammatory rhetoric advanced by the anti-Israel protest movement in Canada.<sup>276</sup>

During a youth session at the 2026 Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) Convention in Toronto, al-Qazzaz presented Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna as a model for organized Islamic activism, emphasizing the role of youth in advancing Islamic revival and long-term societal change.<sup>277</sup> In a separate session, al-Qazzaz characterized the effort to influence Canadian public opinion as “our battle, our jihad,” emphasizing the importance of public engagement and narrative shaping in advancing the Islamist movement’s objectives.<sup>278</sup>

Al-Qazzaz is not the only figure at CMPAC with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, as multiple members of its board have identifiable ties to the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), a Brotherhood-aligned entity.<sup>279</sup> Yaser Haddara, CMPAC’s interim chair, previously served as a vice-president<sup>280</sup> and board member of MAC.<sup>281</sup> He also served as a member of the founding board of Islamic Relief Canada and as chair of the board of Islamic Relief USA.<sup>282</sup> His fellow board member Issam Saleh currently serves as Director of Community Engagement at MAC.<sup>283</sup> Other MAC-

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<sup>274</sup> Shanifa Nasser, “‘A Dream Come True’: Khaled Al-Qazzaz Stuck in Egypt Since 2013 Arrest Finally Home,” *CBC News*, September 1, 2016, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/a-dream-come-true-khaled-al-qazzaz-stuck-in-egypt-since-2013-arrest-finally-home-1.3744932>.

<sup>275</sup> Khaled Al-Qazzaz, “Why Gaza Matters to Every Canadian in the Federal Election,” *Toronto Star*, April 7, 2025, [https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/why-gaza-matters-to-every-canadian-in-the-federal-election/article\\_5548e68d-c63b-499b-b088-3cdb9a675b8e.html](https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/why-gaza-matters-to-every-canadian-in-the-federal-election/article_5548e68d-c63b-499b-b088-3cdb9a675b8e.html).

<sup>276</sup> Mike Fegelman, “Toronto Star Column Whitewashes Hamas, Pressures Voters with Misleading Anti-Israel Narrative,” *Honest Reporting Canada*, April 11, 2025, <https://honestreporting.ca/petitions/toronto-star-column-whitewashes-hamas-pressure-voters-with-misleading-anti-israel-narrative/#content>.

<sup>277</sup> Melanie Bennet, “Exclusive: Islamic Youth Session Promoted Antisemitic, Anti-Western, and Islamist Speakers at Muslim Association of Canada Convention,” *Juno News*, May 23, 2026, <https://www.junonews.com/p/exclusive-islamic-youth-session-promoted>.

<sup>278</sup> Melanie Bennet, “Lobby Group Launches Islamophobia Handbook Alleging anti-Muslim Audit Bias,” *Juno News*, June 7, 2026, <https://www.junonews.com/p/lobby-group-launches-islamophobia>.

<sup>279</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee?*

<sup>280</sup> Stewart Bell, “Auditors Allege Canadian Charity Helped Hamas Financier,” *Global News*, October 13, 2023, <https://globalnews.ca/news/10014362/cra-audit-canadian-charity-hamas-network/>.

<sup>281</sup> “Yaser Haddara,” profile, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/team/yaser-haddara/>

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>283</sup> “Issam Saleh,” profile, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/team/issam-saleh/>

affiliated figures on CMPAC's board include Nimao Ali, a MAC school principal in Ottawa,<sup>284</sup> and Mohammad Zahid Aboughoda,<sup>285</sup> who is listed on MAC's website as an instructor in MAC's eLearning program on Islam.<sup>286</sup> Aboughoda spoke at the 2026 MAC Convention in Toronto, where the speaker roster included Fadel Soliman, Jasser Auda, Siraj Wahhaj, Franck Amin Hensch, and Hussein Elkazzaz.<sup>287</sup> Soliman is a member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, the body founded and long chaired by Yusuf al-Qaradawi.<sup>288</sup> Wahhaj was named by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York in a February 1995 letter listing alleged co-conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and testified as a character witness for Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian cleric known as "the Blind Sheikh," who was convicted in October 1995 of seditious conspiracy for directing a campaign of "urban terrorism" that included a foiled plot to bomb New York City landmarks—among them the United Nations headquarters, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, and the George Washington Bridge—and was sentenced to life in prison.<sup>289</sup> On the stand, Wahhaj described Abdel-Rahman as a "respected scholar" and "bold, as a strong preacher of Islam."<sup>290</sup> Wahhaj was never charged, and the prosecutor who compiled the list has since stated that his inclusion carried no allegation of participation in the attack.<sup>291</sup>

### 3.3.3 The 2025 Federal Election

In the lead-up to Canada's 2025 federal election, multiple indicators pointed to a coordinated effort by Islamist-aligned activist networks to consolidate and deploy

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<sup>284</sup> "Nimao Ali," profile, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/team/nimao-ali/>

<sup>285</sup> "Mohammad Zahid," profile, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/team/mohammad-zahid/>

<sup>286</sup> "Sh. Mohammad Z. Aboughoda," profile, MACnet eLearning, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://elearning.macnet.ca/instructors/sh-mohammad-z-aboughoda/>.

<sup>287</sup> "Our Speakers," Muslim Association of Canada Convention 2026, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://macconvention.ca/our-speakers/>

<sup>288</sup> "Fadel Soliman," profile, Muslim Association of Canada Convention 2026, accessed April 9, 2026, <https://macconvention.ca/speakers/fadel-soliman/>.

<sup>289</sup> *United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman, et al.*, No. S5 93 CR 181 (MBM) (S.D.N.Y.), "Jury Verdict," October 1, 1995.

<sup>290</sup> Paul M. Barrett, *American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a Religion* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 115.

<sup>291</sup> *United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahman, et al.*, No. S5 93 CR 181 (MBM) (S.D.N.Y.), letter of United States Attorney Mary Jo White to defense counsel, February 2, 1995 (enclosing a list of persons "who may be alleged as co-conspirators"); "Man Arrested at New Mexico Compound Is Son of Imam with Possible Link to 1993 World Trade Center Bombing," *CBS News*, August 9, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/siraj-wahhaj-arrested-amalia-new-mexico-father-imam-possible-link-1993-world-trade-center-bombing-court-documents/>. On the limited significance of inclusion on such a list, see Andrew C. McCarthy, "Siraj Wahhaj and the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing ... Again," *National Review*, October 19, 2025, <https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/siraj-wahhaj-and-the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing-again/>.

electoral influence in a manner consistent with bloc-based political mobilization. This activity extended beyond routine civic participation, reflecting a structured campaign intended to shape outcomes in strategically significant ridings through targeted messaging, third-party interventions, and issue-driven voter alignment.<sup>292</sup>

At least three ideologically aligned organizations—the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC), Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), and Greater Toronto for Palestine (GTP)—registered as third parties with Elections Canada.<sup>293</sup> In the Canadian context, “third parties” are entities other than political parties or candidates that engage in political advertising. Their registration enabled coordinated messaging campaigns centered on specific policy demands, including calls for a Gaza ceasefire, the institutionalization of anti-Islamophobia measures, and the repeal of Quebec’s secularism law, Bill 21.<sup>294</sup> A pre-election survey conducted by CMPAC found that 75 percent of Canadian Muslim respondents identified Palestine as the most important issue influencing their vote.<sup>295</sup> A post-election poll conducted by Mainstreet Research on behalf of TCMV identified Palestine as the dominant issue for respondents at 45 percent.<sup>296</sup> These findings reflect the sustained salience of transnational politics on domestic electoral behavior within the Muslim community.

Though these groups claimed to be merely guiding and empowering the Muslim community to vote on values and principles rather than partisan lines, the explicit promotion of their preferred parties and candidates suggests they essentially canvassed Muslims to vote for those who would support their radical agenda. For example, while CMPAC endorsed forty-seven Liberal, New Democratic Party (NDP), and Green candidates via its MuslimsVote.ca platform,<sup>297</sup> a joint endorsement statement issued by CMPAC in tandem with four other Muslim advocacy organizations—Arab-Canadian Vote, Canadian Muslim Healthcare Network, HIKMA, and the National Muslim Action Fund—unanimously backed forty-one candidates.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid.

<sup>294</sup> Joseph Ryan, “Muslims Rallying Voters Have a Message for Party Leaders: Avoiding Important Issues Could Cost You Votes,” *CBC News*, April 12, 2025, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/muslim-canadian-voters-1.7507693>.

<sup>295</sup> “Community Survey Results: Insights into Canadian Muslim Voter Priorities,” MuslimsVote.ca, March 26, 2025, <https://muslimsvote.ca/2025/03/26/community-survey-results-insights-into-canadian-muslim-voter-priorities/>.

<sup>296</sup> *Highlights of TCMV-Commissioned Mainstreet Research Canada-wide Poll* (The Canadian Muslim Vote, November 2025), <https://canadianmuslimvote.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Mainstreet-Report.pdf>.

<sup>297</sup> “Endorsements,” MuslimsVote.ca, April 2025, <https://muslimsvote.ca/endorsements/>.

<sup>298</sup> “Joint Endorsement Statement by Muslim Advocacy Organizations,” Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, April 2025, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Joint-Endorsement-Statement-2-1.pdf>.

The statement encouraged Muslims to not only exercise their franchise in favor of these candidates but also to support and volunteer with them. A “Joint Statement of Muslim Organizations on Federal Election 2025” was drafted and approved by a committee including CMPAC, TCMV, and the NCCM.<sup>299</sup> Prominent Brotherhood-aligned groups such as the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) were among its signatories.<sup>300</sup>

Similarly, CJPME’s report card-styled Federal Election Guide 2025 gave the NDP and the Green Party the joint-highest grades for their strong support on issues concerning Palestine and Islamophobia, while the Conservative Party received a failing grade.<sup>301</sup> A popular campaign called Vote Palestine—backed by CJPME, CMPAC, and the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), an entity affiliated with the US-designated Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)<sup>302</sup>—secured the full endorsement of 344 candidates from four federal parties: the NDP, the Green Party, the Liberal Party, and the Bloc Québécois.<sup>303</sup>

Based on this evidence, the 2025 federal election cycle reveals a broader transition from passive demographic influence to active, organized political intervention. Through a combination of third-party campaigning, coordinated voter mobilization, and targeted advocacy, Brotherhood-aligned networks and their allies demonstrated a capacity to influence electoral dynamics, particularly in tightly contested ridings, in ways that are likely to prove decisive in future elections.

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<sup>299</sup> “Joint Statement of Muslim Organizations on Federal Election 2025,” National Council of Canadian Muslims, March 26, 2025, [https://nccm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/JointStatementMuslims\\_FederalElections2025-1.pdf](https://nccm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/JointStatementMuslims_FederalElections2025-1.pdf).

<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>301</sup> “Federal Election Guide 2025,” Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, April 24, 2025, [https://www.cjpme.org/election\\_guide\\_2025](https://www.cjpme.org/election_guide_2025).

<sup>302</sup> “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” US Department of State, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations>; “Palestinian Youth Movement,” profile, NGO Monitor, August 11, 2025, <https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/palestinian-youth-movement/>.

<sup>303</sup> “Candidates,” Vote Palestine, accessed April 13, 2026, <https://votepalestine.ca/candidates>.

## Chapter 4: Narrative Infrastructure: Islamophobia, Anti-Palestinian Racism, and the Discourse Architecture

In Canada, the convergence of Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism (APR) seems to operate as a discourse architecture that can insulate organizations from scrutiny while pre-emptively framing criticism as racism. This chapter examines Islamophobia-related frameworks across federal policy, school board guidance, and professional training materials, including: the rapid institutional uptake of the APR definition developed by the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA); the role of organizations, including the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM), in embedding these frameworks within government, education, and workplace policy; and the implications of these developments for free expression, institutional neutrality, and the integrity of Canada's liberal democratic framework, including national security and the safety and security of Jewish communities in Canada, as well as the capacity of Canadian institutions to examine the networks documented in this report.

The APR framework, in particular, is the logical endpoint of the Palestinianization strategy analyzed in Chapter 1. The installation, through an accelerated campaign of legal and social justice advocacy, of a framework in which criticism of Hamas-aligned positions is perceived as an enforceable form of racial discrimination rather than legitimate debate represents precisely the kind of narrative entrenchment envisioned by the “Explanatory Memorandum.”<sup>304</sup>

### 4.1 Campus and Civil Society Narrative Infrastructure

In Canada, the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist architecture is manifested in an interlocking network of student organizations, advocacy groups, and charitable entities, which create permission structures for the normalization of anti-Western sentiment, extremism, terrorism, and antisemitism. In the absence of proper foreign influence registries, disclosure laws, and political will to investigate its origin and deleterious consequences, this network is able to operate with far less scrutiny than comparable networks in the United States, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and even the United Kingdom.

The Muslim Students' Association (MSA)—named in the “Explanatory Memorandum” as one of the Brotherhood's foundational North American organizations—maintains chapters across Canadian universities, providing the critical infrastructure through

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<sup>304</sup> “Explanatory Memorandum,” 18; Majid, *Anti-Palestinian Racism*; Kogan et al., “Legal and Societal Perils.”

which the Palestinian cause is introduced as an Islamic religious obligation. Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapters, coordinated under the umbrella of National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), work in coalition with MSA chapters to extend this messaging into broader progressive campus communities, implementing the Memorandum's directive on coalition-building.<sup>305</sup>

The Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), which operates active chapters across Canada, has been linked to campus encampments and allegations of intimidation against Jewish students. It also has documented ties to the PFLP<sup>306</sup> and Samidoun,<sup>307</sup> which are both listed as terrorist entities in Canada.<sup>308</sup> Samidoun, which was registered as a federal non-profit from 2021 until its dissolution in March 2026,<sup>309</sup> operated openly in Canada for over a decade, during which time it ran national and regional events, glorified designated terrorists, celebrated the October 7 massacre, and led public chants calling for the death of Jews, Israel, Canada, and the United States.<sup>310</sup> Samidoun was only designated as a terrorist entity in October 2024 following sustained public pressure and prompting from the US Departments of State and Treasury.<sup>311</sup> Its non-profit status was not dissolved until March 2026, with concerns about the longevity of its organizational sphere of influence and that of its leaders remaining.<sup>312</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>306</sup> National Center for Combating Antisemitism, "Canada – Pro-Palestinian Groups to Hold Demonstration in front of the Israeli Consulate in Montreal – July 12, 2025," Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, n.d., [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/canada\\_propalestinian\\_demonstration\\_israeli\\_consulate\\_montreal\\_2025-07-12/en/mashlat\\_canada\\_propalestinian\\_demonstration\\_israeli\\_consulate\\_montreal\\_2025-07-12.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/canada_propalestinian_demonstration_israeli_consulate_montreal_2025-07-12/en/mashlat_canada_propalestinian_demonstration_israeli_consulate_montreal_2025-07-12.pdf).

<sup>307</sup> NGO Monitor, *The NGO Network Driving Antisemitism in Canada* (NGO Monitor, October 2024), <https://ngo-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Canada-Mapping-2024.pdf>.

<sup>308</sup> Public Safety Canada, "Government of Canada Lists Samidoun as a Terrorist Entity," news release, Government of Canada, October 15, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/10/government-of-canada-lists-samidoun-as-a-terrorist-entity.html>.

<sup>309</sup> Mark Blumberg, "Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network Is Now Dissolved," Canadian Charity Law, March 30, 2026, <https://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/blog/samidoun-palestinian-prisoner-solidarity-network-is-now-dissolved/>.

<sup>310</sup> "The Global Samidoun Network: Mapping Branches in Europe and North America," NGO Monitor, August 19, 2025, <https://ngo-monitor.org/reports/global-samidoun-network/>; Ellin Bessner, "Samidoun Designated as a Terrorist Group by Canadian and U.S. Governments," *Canadian Jewish News*, October 15, 2024, <https://thecjn.ca/news/samidoun-terrorists/>; "What Is Samidoun, the 'Charity' That Supports Anti-Israel Campus Protests and Fundraises for a Terror Group," American Jewish Committee, November 5, 2024, <https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-samidoun-the-charity-that-supports-anti-israel-campus-protests-and-fundraises-for-a>.

<sup>311</sup> "United States and Canada Target Key International Fundraiser for Foreign Terrorist Organization PFLP," press release, US Department of the Treasury, October 15, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>.

<sup>312</sup> Joel Ceasu, "Samidoun Dissolved as Canadian Non-Profit, But Questions Remain about Group's Ongoing Influence," *Canadian Jewish News*, April 1, 2026, <https://thecjn.ca/news/samidoun-dissolved-as-canadian-non-profit-but-questions-remain-about-groups-ongoing-influence/>.

The Canadian labour movement has provided additional institutional cover. The Canadian Union of Postal Workers endorsed BDS in 2008—the first national union in North America to do so—while the Ontario branch of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) passed a BDS resolution in 2006, with multiple local branches at the University of Toronto and York University subsequently following suit.<sup>313</sup> Taken together, this ecosystem constitutes precisely the settlement infrastructure that the “Explanatory Memorandum” envisioned, with the Palestinian cause functioning as the ideological entry point it was designed to create.

## 4.2 Islamophobia

In the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, debates concerning Islamist extremism have re-emerged across the Western political discourse, accompanied by a renewed and often indiscriminate invocation of Islamophobia as a countervailing charge.<sup>314</sup> Rather than serving as a tool to counter genuine anti-Muslim bigotry, the term Islamophobia increasingly appears to be deployed as a tool for lawfare<sup>315</sup> or, as some critics have argued, in order to impose blasphemy laws by the back door.<sup>316</sup> Such actions risk constraining legitimate scrutiny of Islamist extremism and its implications for free expression and liberal democratic norms. In certain contexts, this conflation has the effect of obscuring real security concerns. This has consequences for public discourse and, in extreme cases, may carry tangible risks for public safety.<sup>317</sup>

In Canada, this dynamic has manifested in institutional responses that appear to be misaligned with the evolving threat environment. Despite a reported 670 percent surge in anti-Jewish hate crimes following the attacks,<sup>318</sup> schools across the country have been urged to prioritize efforts addressing Islamophobia.<sup>319</sup> This emphasis has been

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<sup>313</sup> Caitlin Hewitt-White and Clare O’Connor, “Labour Solidarity for Palestine,” *Upping the Anti*, no. 7 (2009), <https://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/07-labour-solidarity-for-palestine>; “Who Supports BDS in Canada?,” Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, n.d., [https://www.cjpme.org/who\\_supports\\_bds](https://www.cjpme.org/who_supports_bds).

<sup>314</sup> Chuong Nguyen, “How the Charge of ‘Islamophobia’ Silences Critics of Political Islamism,” *Western Standard*, April 17, 2024, <https://www.westernstandard.news/opinion/nguyen-how-the-charge-of-islamophobia-silences-critics-of-political-islamism/53865>.

<sup>315</sup> Aura Carreño Rosas, “Muslim Charity’s Lawsuit Accuses Stoney Creek Church of ‘Bad Faith’ in Preventing Islamic School Lease,” *CBC News*, September 24, 2025, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/islamic-school-lawsuit-1.7641305>.

<sup>316</sup> “Critics Warn Islamophobia Definition ‘Blasphemy Law by the Back Door,’” posted on March 10, 2026, by TalkTV, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Os2G6wTiXFM>.

<sup>317</sup> Nguyen, “Charge of ‘Islamophobia’ Silences Critics.”

<sup>318</sup> Terry Glavin, “The Explosion of Jew-Hate in Trudeau’s Canada,” *The Free Press*, December 11, 2024, <https://www.thefp.com/p/explosion-of-jew-hate-in-canada-trudeau-israel-palestine>.

<sup>319</sup> Jessica Wong, “With anti-Muslim Occurrences on the Rise, Schools in Canada Urged to Address Islamophobia,” *CBC News*, December 2, 2023, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/education-islamophobia-muslim-schools-1.7041144>.

reinforced by the increasingly active role of Brotherhood-aligned organizations in discreetly shaping “anti-Islamophobia” strategies within Ontario’s education system.<sup>320</sup> Operating through a province-wide framework that guides school boards and directors of education,<sup>321</sup> these groups have embedded themselves in the development and implementation of policies that increasingly influence classroom instruction and institutional priorities.<sup>322</sup> For instance:

- The Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) has openly acknowledged its role in developing the framework, describing it as a “meaningful, equity-driven partnership with advocacy groups.”<sup>323</sup> CMPAC’s contributions focused on “advocating for cultural competency [and] addressing Islamophobia” within the education system.<sup>324</sup>
- Despite concerns about its extremist links,<sup>325</sup> the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) continues to be at the forefront of anti-Islamophobia education and advocacy in the K–12 space,<sup>326</sup> building on initiatives launched with the Ontario Ministry of Education, which awarded the organization C\$225,000 in 2021 to “raise awareness about Islamophobia” and develop strategies to “end Islamophobia, racism, and discrimination.”<sup>327</sup> MAC subsequently developed a digital platform comprising workshops, videos, and instructional materials aimed at introducing Islam to educators and “dismantling Islamophobia in schools.”<sup>328</sup>
- The NCCM, arguably one of the most active Brotherhood-aligned lobbying organizations in this space in Canada, having engaged federal officials 141 times in 2025 alone,<sup>329</sup> has established a sustained presence across multiple school boards,

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<sup>320</sup> Melanie Bennet, “The Islamic Lobby Groups Shaping Ontario’s Classrooms,” *Junonews*, January 15, 2026, <https://www.junonews.com/p/the-islamic-lobby-groups-shaping>.

<sup>321</sup> “Framework for Engaging with Advocacy Groups,” Council of Ontario Directors of Education, November 2024, <https://ontariodirectors.ca/resources/code-resources/framework-engaging-advocacy-groups>.

<sup>322</sup> Bennet, “Islamic Lobby Groups.”

<sup>323</sup> CMPAC, “Supporting Equity in Education: CMPAC’s Contribution to the CODE Framework,” Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, December 12, 2024, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/2024/12/12/supporting-equity-in-education-cmpacs-contribution-to-the-code-framework/>.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid.

<sup>325</sup> Melanie Bennet, “Ford Govt Accredited Islamic College Despite Audit Alleging Parent Org Had Muslim Brotherhood Links,” *Junonews*, September 24, 2025, <https://www.junonews.com/p/exclusive-ford-govt-accredited-islamic>.

<sup>326</sup> Bennet, “Islamic Lobby Groups.”

<sup>327</sup> “Ontario Combatting Islamophobia in Schools,” news release, Government of Ontario, June 29, 2021, <https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1000436/ontario-combatting-islamophobia-in-schools>.

<sup>328</sup> Islam Awareness, Muslim Association of Canada, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://islamawareness.ca/>.

<sup>329</sup> “National Council of Canadian Muslims—12-Month Lobbying Summary,” Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/clntSmmry?sMdky=1768405417239&clientOrgCorpNumber=358918>.

including Peel, Toronto, Thames Valley, and Durham.<sup>330</sup> Its involvement has extended to the development of anti-Islamophobia strategies, training programs, and educational initiatives, as well as contributions to Manitoba's provincial action plan on combating Islamophobia for schools.<sup>331</sup> Since 2018, the organization has received more than C\$2 million in public funding, including over C\$750,000 from Ontario's Ministry of Education.<sup>332</sup>

Ontario's education system has adopted the language of intersectional social justice and human rights, with concepts such as "systemic racism," "anti-oppression," and "culturally relevant and responsive pedagogy" shaping governance and curriculum development.<sup>333</sup> Brotherhood-aligned groups have adapted their messaging accordingly, aligning Islamophobia discourse with prevailing anti-racism paradigms.<sup>334</sup> For instance, the Durham District School Board's Islamophobia guide asserts that "anti-Muslim racism is grounded in White supremacy" and targets Muslims based on "race" and "ethnicity,"<sup>335</sup> effectively conflating religious identity with race. Similarly, Manitoba's Islamophobia action plan defines Islamophobia as "racism, prejudice, stereotypes, fear, or acts of hostility" toward Muslims "as well as toward Islam as a religion,"<sup>336</sup> reinforcing the idea that Islam itself requires protection while using the language of race.

Islamophobia featured among the stated priorities of the 2025 joint electoral statement issued by CMPAC, NCCM, the National Muslim Action Fund, The Canadian Muslim Vote, and over one hundred signatory organizations, including the MAC and twenty-three of its centres, ISNA Canada, and ICNA Canada. The statement urged voters to question candidates on Gaza, human rights, Islamophobia, and economic justice, and identified Quebec's Bill 21 as evidence of rising Islamophobia.<sup>337</sup> The sustained advocacy of these entities has yielded tangible policy responses. In January 2023, former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed Amira Elghawaby as Canada's first

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<sup>330</sup> Bennet, "Islamic Lobby Groups."

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

<sup>332</sup> Melanie Bennet, "How Canada's Foremost Islamic Lobby Group Shaped Toronto's "Islamophobia" Curriculum," *Juno News*, January 9, 2026, <https://www.junonews.com/p/how-canadas-foremost-islamic-lobby>.

<sup>333</sup> Bennet, "Islamic Lobby Groups."

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> *Guide to Support Muslim Students, Staff, and Families* (Durham District School Board, October 2025), <https://www.ddsb.ca/media/rlsphrci/ddsb-guide-to-support-muslim-students.pdf>.

<sup>336</sup> *Anti-Islamophobia Action Plan: Addressing Islamophobia in the K-12 Education System* (Government of Manitoba, December 2025), <https://www.edu.gov.mb.ca/k12/docs/support/anti-islamophobia-action-plan/anti-islamophobia.pdf>.

<sup>337</sup> "CMPAC and over 100 Muslim Organizations Unite for a Principled Vote," Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, March 28, 2025, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/2025/03/28/cmpac-and-over-100-muslim-organizations-unite-for-a-principled-vote/>.

Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia,<sup>338</sup> following relentless pressure from the NCCM.<sup>339</sup> However, this initiative was soon deemed insufficient by the NCCM, which in the lead-up to the 2025 federal election publicly pressed political parties to advance a comprehensive national strategy on Islamophobia as a prerequisite for securing support from Muslim voters.<sup>340</sup>

Notwithstanding their controversial associations, the federal government has identified both the NCCM and CMPAC as key organizations to “help people learn about and combat Islamophobia.”<sup>341</sup> Records disclosed under access to information requests show that the Special Representative’s office lobbied deputy ministers and the Canada Revenue Agency on behalf of the Muslim Federal Employees Network (MFEN) and proposed taxpayer funding for it,<sup>342</sup> and that the MFEN’s Managers’ Guide contained advice on prayer spaces, prayer timing, and physical contact between the sexes.<sup>343</sup> Public servants, particularly in security agencies, are bound by neutrality requirements,<sup>344</sup> and commentators have argued that advocacy of this kind sits uneasily with them.<sup>345</sup> In December 2025, the NCCM pressured Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director Dan Rogers into issuing a formal apology for failing to reference “violent Islamophobia” in his annual remarks.<sup>346</sup> In another contentious instance the same year, Elghawaby met Rogers to discuss how they might work together to “combat Islamophobia and all forms of hate.”<sup>347</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> “Prime Minister Announces Appointment of Canada’s First Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia,” Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, January 26, 2023, <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/01/26/prime-minister-announces-appointment-canadas-first-special>.

<sup>339</sup> Office of Islamophobia, National Council of Canadian Muslims, <https://nccm.ca/office-on-islamophobia/>.

<sup>340</sup> Ryan, “Muslims Rallying Voters.”

<sup>341</sup> “Resources on Combatting Islamophobia,” Government of Canada, <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/combating-islamophobia-canada/resources.html>.

<sup>342</sup> “Demanded Fed Prayer Rooms,” *Blacklock’s Reporter*, October 17, 2025, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/demanded-fed-prayer-rooms/>; Joe Adam George, “Canadian Islamists Assail Workplace Neutrality in Government Offices,” *Middle East Forum*, January 22, 2026, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/canadian-islamists-assail-workplace-neutrality-in-government-offices>.

<sup>343</sup> “Muslim Federal Employees Network: Managers [sic] Guide to Supporting Muslim Employees,” Association of Professional Executives of the Public Service of Canada, accessed April 9, 2026, [https://apex.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/MFENmanagersguidetosupportingMuslimemployees\\_BILaccessible.pdf](https://apex.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/MFENmanagersguidetosupportingMuslimemployees_BILaccessible.pdf); “Federal Guide Advises Prayer Spaces, Limits Handshakes for Muslim Employees,” *Western Standard*, February 23, 2025, <https://www.westernstandard.news/news/federal-guide-advises-prayer-spaces-limits-handshakes-for-muslim-employees/62424>.

<sup>344</sup> *Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector* (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2011), <https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=25049&section=HTML>; Public Safety Canada, “Code of Conduct,” Government of Canada, modified January 21, 2019, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/cd-cndct-en.aspx>.

<sup>345</sup> George, “Canadian Islamists Assail.”

<sup>346</sup> NCCM (@nccm), “Yesterday, CSIS Director Dan Rogers met with the NCCM CEO Stephen Brown...,” X, December 12, 2025, <https://x.com/nccm/status/1999545114931102041>.

<sup>347</sup> Amy Hamm, “It’s Not CSIS’s Job to Worry about ‘Islamophobia’ Accusations,” *National Post*, March 6, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/amy-hamm-csis-appears-more-worried-about-islamophobia-than-terrorism>.

Until recently, the interlocking frameworks of Islamophobia and APR were reinforced<sup>348</sup> at the highest levels of government by Amira Elghawaby, Canada's former Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia and a former communications director of the National Council of Canadian Muslims.<sup>349</sup>

Among other advocacy initiatives, Elghawaby in 2025 endorsed a report produced by the Islamophobia Research Hub at York University<sup>350</sup> recommending punitive measures against members of parliament, senators, and media organizations deemed insufficiently supportive of the Palestinian cause.<sup>351</sup> Access to Information records subsequently revealed that she had secretly authorized C\$80,000 in taxpayer funding in support of the report, although her office publicly denied making any such payment.<sup>352</sup> In February 2026, the federal government dissolved her office,<sup>353</sup> eliminating her C\$191,300 position, a five-member staff, and a C\$5.4 million operating budget, a decision that met with protest from Muslim Brotherhood-aligned organizations.<sup>354</sup>

These developments reinforce the core argument that the concept of Islamophobia has evolved from a means of addressing anti-Muslim discrimination into a strategic narrative that shapes policy, institutional behavior, and even the national security discourse. Brotherhood-aligned organizations have leveraged this framework to embed influence across education, government, and security services, in the process blurring the line between legitimate advocacy and ideological pressure. The result is a growing

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<sup>348</sup> Holly Doan, "Demanded Fed Prayer Rooms," *Blacklock's Reporter*, October 17, 2025, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/demanded-fed-prayer-rooms/>.

<sup>349</sup> "Human Rights Advocate," profile, website of Amira Elghawaby, accessed July 24, 2026, <https://www.amiraelghawaby.net/>; Adam Rasmi, "The People Do Good Stuff Issue: Amira Elghawaby," *This Magazine*, January 13, 2016, <https://this.org/2016/01/13/the-people-do-good-stuff-issue-amira-elghawaby/>.

<sup>350</sup> Islamophobia Research Hub, *Documenting the "Palestine Exception": An Overview of Trends in Islamophobia, Anti-Palestinian, and Anti-Arab Racism in Canada in the Aftermath of October 7, 2023* (York University, 2025), <https://www.yorku.ca/laps/research/islamophobia/wp-content/uploads/sites/874/2025/09/documenting-the-palestine-exception-2025.pdf>.

<sup>351</sup> "Research Hub Releases Report on Islamophobia in Canada," *Headline Politics*, CPAC, August 6, 2025, <https://www.cpac.ca/headline-politics/episode/research-hub-releases-report-on-islamophobia-in-canada-august-6-2025?id=eafbdeb5-d603-4742-8eb9-d9dafc24b9b2>.

<sup>352</sup> Dave Naylor, "'Islamophobia' Advisor Hid \$80K Pro-Palestine Grant from Taxpayers," *Western Standard*, December 17, 2025, <https://www.westernstandard.news/news/islamophobia-advisor-hid-80k-pro-palestine-grant-from-taxpayers/69867>; Holly Doan, "Hid \$80K Pro-Palestine Grant," *Blacklock's Reporter*, December 17, 2025, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/hid-80k-pro-palestine-grant/>.

<sup>353</sup> Canadian Heritage, "Statements by Minister Marc Miller and Special Representative Amira Elghawaby on Ms. Elghawaby's Resignation," Government of Canada, February 25, 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2026/02/statements-by-minister-marc-miller-and-special-representative-amira-elghawaby-on-ms-elghawabys-resignation.html>.

<sup>354</sup> NCCM (@nccm), "We are deeply disappointed by the federal government's decision to dissolve the Office of the Special Representative on Combatting Islamophobia...", X, February 4, 2026, <https://x.com/nccm/status/2019097235254906984>.

convergence of narrative control and institutional access with far-reaching implications for governance, public safety, and the integrity of Canada's national security architecture.

### 4.3 Anti-Palestinian Racism

Following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, a previously marginal concept<sup>355</sup>—anti-Palestinian racism (APR)—rapidly gained prominence in the Canadian public discourse. Since its formalization as a defined term and framework in April 2022 by the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA) in a report entitled *Anti-Palestinian Racism: Naming, Framing and Manifestations*,<sup>356</sup> APR has been promoted by pro-Palestinian activist networks as an instrument to contest established Canadian positions on Israel and antisemitism and constrain legitimate debate.<sup>357</sup> Besides ACLA, Muslim Brotherhood-aligned entities such as the NCCM are also actively lobbying to institutionalize APR within government, education, and workplace settings.<sup>358</sup>

The ACLA defines APR as “a form of anti-Arab racism that silences, excludes, erases, stereotypes or dehumanizes Palestinians,” with examples ranging from the failure to recognize Palestinians as indigenous to allegations that labeling activists as antisemitic, anti-democracy, or sympathetic to terrorism constitutes racial discrimination.<sup>359</sup> While presenting itself as a conventional anti-racism tool, the concept's practical application reveals a more expansive function. In effect, APR has been deployed as a lawfare mechanism analogous to Islamophobia. Just as Islamophobia is often invoked to suppress criticism of Islam and inconspicuously impose an informal blasphemy law,<sup>360</sup> APR reframes criticism of Palestinian militant organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as a form of racism, thereby shielding such actors from scrutiny and constraining open discourse.<sup>361</sup> This functional overlap is central to the

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<sup>355</sup> *Unmasking Anti-Palestinian Racism: An HRC Investigation* (Honest Reporting Canada, August 2025), <https://honestreporting.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/APR-HRC-Final-Dokument.pdf>.

<sup>356</sup> Majid, *Anti-Palestinian Racism*.

<sup>357</sup> Shimon Koffler Fogel, “The Push to Define anti-Palestinian Racism Is Not about Fighting Discrimination,” *National Post*, July 2, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/the-push-to-define-anti-palestinian-racism-is-not-about-fighting-discrimination>.

<sup>358</sup> “Palestine Campaign,” National Council of Canadian Muslims, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://nccm.ca/palestinecampaign/>.

<sup>359</sup> Majid, *Anti-Palestinian Racism*.

<sup>360</sup> Robin Simcox, “Left's Use of Islamophobia a Cynical Ploy to Shut Down Disagreement,” The Heritage Foundation, May 1, 2019, <https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/commentary/lefts-use-islamophobia-cynical-plot-shut-down-disagreement>.

<sup>361</sup> CIJA, “Ten Major Concerns with the Concept of ‘Anti-Palestinian Racism,’” Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, June 20, 2024, [https://www.cija.ca/ten\\_major\\_concerns\\_with\\_the\\_concept\\_of\\_anti\\_palestinian\\_racism](https://www.cija.ca/ten_major_concerns_with_the_concept_of_anti_palestinian_racism).

criticism that APR has attracted. CIJA has argued that the concept diverges from established anti-racism definitions, is redundant under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and undermines the work of combating Islamophobia.”<sup>362</sup>

Legal scholars have identified fundamental defects in the APR framework: it codifies a contested political narrative about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an enforceable human rights standard; it effectively classifies Zionism—a core expression of Jewish identity—as racism, thereby institutionalizing antisemitism in the name of combating it; and it pre-emptively designates any identification of antisemitism within pro-Palestinian discourse as itself an act of anti-Palestinian racism, insulating Muslim Brotherhood-aligned narratives from institutional accountability—achieving precisely the kind of narrative entrenchment the “Explanatory Memorandum” envisioned without requiring any visible organizational presence.<sup>363</sup>

Concerns about the real-world implications of the APR framework have already begun to surface. In a submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the Jewish Educators and Families Association (JEFA), a Canadian Jewish education group, highlights a series of cases illustrating how APR allegations are being applied in practice.<sup>364</sup> According to JEFA, a student in a Halton District school was accused of APR after raising concerns about a map depicting Israel as Palestine.<sup>365</sup> Similarly, Lisa Levitan—a teacher within the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board and a recipient of the Prime Minister’s Certificate of Achievement for Teaching Excellence in 2022—was targeted by a national letter-writing campaign accusing her of APR following social media posts in which she expressed support for Israel and condemned Hamas in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 attacks.<sup>366</sup>

Further apprehensions regarding APR’s origins and utility are compounded by the absence of independent validation and its popularity among activist groups.<sup>367</sup> Substantively, the concept offers little analytical distinction, overlapping significantly with Islamophobia and other discrimination categories based on ethnicity.<sup>368</sup> At the same time, APR proponents have actively opposed the International Holocaust

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<sup>362</sup> Ibid.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> Mitchell Consky, “What Is anti-Palestinian Racism—And What Does It Mean for Ontario Schools?,” *Canadian Jewish News*, February 11, 2026, <https://thecjn.ca/news/what-is-anti-palestinian-racism-and-what-it-means-for-ontario-schools/>.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid.

<sup>367</sup> CIJA, “Ten Major Concerns.”

<sup>368</sup> Joe Adam George, “Canadian Scholars Unveil New ‘Islamophobia’ —Anti-Palestinian ‘Racism,’” *Middle East Forum*, October 15, 2025, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/canadian-scholars-unveil-new-islamophobia-anti-palestinian-racism>.

Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism,<sup>369</sup> which encompasses phenomena such as Holocaust inversion, allegations of dual loyalty, and conspiracy narratives concerning Jewish influence in the media, government, and finance.<sup>370</sup>

Institutional uptake of APR is already underway. The Toronto District School Board—Canada’s largest school board serving approximately 235,000 students<sup>371</sup>—formally incorporated APR into its anti-hate framework,<sup>372</sup> establishing a precedent that could be replicated nationwide. At the federal level, a parliamentary committee report on Islamophobia endorsed the APR concept, further legitimizing its integration into public policy.<sup>373</sup> APR has also surfaced in legal proceedings, with pro-Palestinian groups invoking it during litigation related to the dismantling of encampments at the University of Toronto.<sup>374</sup>

Academic institutions have played a parallel role in advancing APR. A report by the Islamophobia Research Hub at York University called on governments across Canada to formally “recognize and adopt” APR as a distinct form of racism embedded across state and society.<sup>375</sup> Notably, at least two contributors to the report—Sarah Abou-Bakr and Lina El Bakir—previously held positions with the NCCM, highlighting the degree of overlap between Brotherhood-aligned networks and academic institutions.<sup>376</sup>

In recent months, the substance and distribution of APR-related materials have come under increasing scrutiny. Leaked documents reviewed by Juno News, a Canadian news outlet, indicate that more than 8,600 teachers within the Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board viewed an APR training video in November 2024 that reportedly linked APR activism to “anti-colonialism.”<sup>377</sup> Notably, the board had previously refused

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<sup>369</sup> Koffler Fogel, “The Push to Define anti-Palestinian Racism.”

<sup>370</sup> IHRA, “Working Definition of Antisemitism,” International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, adopted May 26, 2016, <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>.

<sup>371</sup> “About Us,” Toronto District School Board, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://www.tdsb.on.ca/About-Us>.

<sup>372</sup> Ziad Arab-Oagley, “TDSB Accelerates Plan to Combat Anti-Palestinian Racism in Schools,” *City News* (Toronto), May 30, 2025, <https://toronto.citynews.ca/2025/05/30/tdsb-accelerates-plan-to-combat-anti-palestinian-racism-in-schools/>.

<sup>373</sup> CIJA, “House of Commons Justice Committee Releases Dangerous Report Furthering Anti-Palestinian Racism (APR),” Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, December 11, 2024, [https://www.cija.ca/house\\_of\\_commons\\_justice\\_committee\\_releases\\_dangerous\\_report\\_furthering\\_anti\\_palestinian\\_racism\\_apr](https://www.cija.ca/house_of_commons_justice_committee_releases_dangerous_report_furthering_anti_palestinian_racism_apr).

<sup>374</sup> Koffler Fogel, “The Push to Define anti-Palestinian Racism.”

<sup>375</sup> Peter Zimonjic, “Anti-Palestinian Racism Report Calls for Canada to Recognize May 15 as Nakba Day,” *CBC News*, August 6, 2023, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/york-university-islamophobia-report-1.7602409>.

<sup>376</sup> “Team,” Islamophobia Research Hub, York University, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://www.yorku.ca/laps/research/islamophobia/team/>.

<sup>377</sup> Melanie Bennet, “School Board Refuses to Disclose \$70K anti-Palestinian Racism Training Video,” *Juno News*, February 22, 2026, <https://www.junonews.com/p/school-board-refuses-to-disclose>.

a request from the same outlet to release its APR training session, which had cost over C\$70,000 in public funding, on the grounds that disclosure could pose a “danger to safety or health.”<sup>378</sup> In June 2026, the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) cancelled a private permit for an educational event on anti-Palestinian racism, citing concerns from parents over its “divisiveness” and errors in the original promotional materials.<sup>379</sup>

Critics such as Tamara Gottlieb of JEFA caution that APR-driven activism risks enabling foreign influence within Canada’s education system and public institutions, with potential long-term implications for national interests. Gottlieb has noted that “APR frameworks recast any criticism of the ‘Palestinian narrative’ as racism. That narrative—rooted in a foreign geopolitical agenda—is now being smuggled into Canadian schools and policy under the guise of anti-racism. Zionism and Jewish identity are treated as hate, and even acknowledging historical facts is labelled racist. A society that substitutes fundamental freedoms and objective truth with virtuous-sounding propaganda becomes vulnerable to foreign and ideological interference.”<sup>380</sup>

In testimony delivered before the House Committee on Education and Workforce’s Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education on September 10, 2025, Brandy Shufutinsky—Director of the Education and National Security Program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies—warned US lawmakers that foreign-funded training initiatives such as APR initiative had penetrated American school systems and were contributing to the rise of antisemitism in classrooms.<sup>381</sup> Citing nearly C\$100,000 in Canadian federal grants awarded to ACLA for APR-related training and educational programming—along with an additional C\$2,000 grant for translation—Dr. Shufutinsky also highlighted the transnational implications of such efforts,<sup>382</sup> noting that the APR initiative demonstrates how “a program funded by a foreign government can generate publications that fuel anti-Israel activism in U.S. schools,” and adding that it has now “become a key source for U.S.-based activists.”<sup>383</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

<sup>379</sup> Cherise Seucharan, “TDSB Cancels Permit for anti-Palestinian Racism Workshop over ‘Divisiveness,’” *Toronto Today*, June 18, 2026, <https://www.torontotoday.ca/local/education/anti-palestinian-racism-tdsb-permit-cancelled-over-divisiveness-12442066>.

<sup>380</sup> George, “Canadian Scholars Unveil New ‘Islamophobia.’”

<sup>381</sup> Brandy Shufutinsky, “From Playground to Classroom: The Spread of Antisemitism in K-12 Schools,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 10, 2025, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/09/10/from-playground-to-classroom/>.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid.

### 4.3.1 Arab Canadian Lawyers Association

Founded in 2005, the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA) is a Toronto-based non-profit led by directors Ameena Sultan, Jerry Khouri, and Dania Majid.<sup>384</sup> Khouri and Majid are also affiliated with Hearing Palestine,<sup>385</sup> a University of Toronto–based initiative that promotes narratives challenging the designation of Palestinian organizations as terrorist entities<sup>386</sup> under the banners of “academic freedom” and “equity and inclusion.”<sup>387</sup> While neither ACLA nor its leadership have discernible links to the Muslim Brotherhood, their promotion of the APR framework aligns in practice with the Islamist group’s broader strategy of entryism by facilitating the diffusion of pro-Palestinian narratives into Western civil society, educational institutions, and political structures via methods that fall largely outside the scope of traditional counterterrorism strategies.<sup>388</sup> In addition, the NCCM, which does align itself with Brotherhood ideology, has supported ACLA’s lobbying efforts by successfully pushing the federal government to commit to adopting the concept of anti-Palestinian racism.<sup>389</sup> Although Majid is the founder and president of ACLA,<sup>390</sup> the principal driver behind the campaign to institutionalize APR appears to be her fellow director, Ameena Sultan—a Toronto-based immigration lawyer and founder of Sultan Law.<sup>391</sup>

At a November 2024 consultation hosted by the Canadian Council for Refugees and attended by then Immigration Minister Marc Miller, Sultan alleged that Canada’s immigration system was permeated with APR and accused Israel of undermining asylum claims to “erase Palestinian identity.”<sup>392</sup> Her prior affiliations and actions further illuminate the ideological context underpinning her APR activism. For

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<sup>384</sup> “Arab Canadian Lawyers Association,” profile, OpenGovCa, n.d., <https://opengovca.com/corporation/13168255>.

<sup>385</sup> “People,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/people/>.

<sup>386</sup> “Silenced Voices: The Impact of Terrorism Designations on Palestinian Advocacy in Canada,” event announcement, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, February 2025, <https://www.crimsl.utoronto.ca/events/silenced-voices-impact-terrorism-designations-palestinian-advocacy-canada-basema-al-alamy>.

<sup>387</sup> “About,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/about/>.

<sup>388</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*.

<sup>389</sup> “Office on Islamophobia,” National Council of Canadian Muslims, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://nccm.ca/issues/office-on-islamophobia/>.

<sup>390</sup> “Anti-Palestinian Racism Is a Distinct Type of Prejudice, Says Lawyer,” *CBC News*, July 26, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/video/9.6459076>.

<sup>391</sup> Sultan Law, <https://sultanlaw.ca/>.

<sup>392</sup> CCR, *Fall 2024 Consultation Report: Reclaiming Public Support: Building the Movement for Refugee and Migrant Rights* (Canadian Council for Refugees, March 2025), [https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/2025-03/2024\\_Fall\\_Consultation\\_Report%20%28EN%29.pdf](https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/2025-03/2024_Fall_Consultation_Report%20%28EN%29.pdf).

example, Sultan and ACLA were also among the signatories of a November 2023 open letter—endorsed by approximately 600 Canadian legal professionals—that appeared to justify Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks.<sup>393</sup> Moreover, according to her LinkedIn profile, Sultan previously served on the board of the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF),<sup>394</sup> which lost federal funding in 2009 following allegations of support for terrorist groups.<sup>395</sup> In 2005, while representing CAF before a parliamentary committee, she opposed measures to revoke the citizenship of or deport individuals convicted of terrorism, describing such actions as “highly problematic.”<sup>396</sup> In 2012, she also participated in an event organized by Samidoun—a group designated as a terrorist entity by Canada and the United States in 2024<sup>397</sup>—marking International Palestinian Prisoners Day.<sup>398</sup>

In May 2026, *Blacklock’s Reporter* revealed that the Department of Canadian Heritage was seeking to recover a C\$99,500 grant awarded in 2025 to Toronto Palestinian Families (TPF), a parent advocacy group closely associated with Sultan,<sup>399</sup> over concerns related to its social media activity.<sup>400</sup> According to the report, the department cited Instagram posts depicting Israelis as homicidal slave masters and the use of a symbol linked to Hamas. Similar concerns had already led the department to reject TPF’s application for an identical amount in March 2026.<sup>401</sup>

The activities of ACLA and its leadership illustrate how ideological lawfare is conducted under the guise of legal advocacy to advance ideologically motivated

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<sup>393</sup> “Exposing the Hateful Letter Signed by Members of Canada’s Legal Community Justifying Hamas Terrorism,” Honest Reporting Canada, November 9, 2023, <https://honestreporting.ca/exposing-the-hateful-letter-signed-by-members-of-canadas-legal-community-justifying-hamas-terrorism/>.

<sup>394</sup> Aameena Sultan, profile, LinkedIn, accessed April 10, 2026, <https://www.linkedin.com/in/ameena-sultan-a60ab42a/>.

<sup>395</sup> Tanya Talaga, “Kenney Has No Regrets over Cutting Off Arab Group,” *Toronto Star*, March 19, 2009, [https://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/kenney-has-no-regrets-over-cutting-off-arab-group/article\\_f61e27c7-bee4-5bfe-b126-e3151dc22c4c.html](https://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/kenney-has-no-regrets-over-cutting-off-arab-group/article_f61e27c7-bee4-5bfe-b126-e3151dc22c4c.html).

<sup>396</sup> “Evidence,” House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting no. 18, House of Commons of Canada, February 8, 2005, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/38-1/CIMM/meeting-18/evidence>.

<sup>397</sup> Stuart Thomson, “Federal Government Is ‘Urgently’ Trying to Dissolve B.C.-based Terror Group Samidoun, Joly Says,” *National Post*, September 11, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/federal-government-trying-to-dissolve-samidoun-terror-group-joly>.

<sup>398</sup> “April 17, Toronto: Palestinian Prisoners’ Day: Perspectives on the Current Struggle,” event announcement, Samidoun, April 6, 2012, <https://samidoun.net/2012/04/april-17-toronto-palestinian-prisoners-day-perspectives-on-the-current-struggle/>.

<sup>399</sup> Seucharan, “TSDB Cancels Permit.”

<sup>400</sup> “Feds Pull Palestinian Funding,” *Blacklock’s Reporter*, May 4, 2026, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/feds-pull-palestinian-funding/>.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

agendas from classrooms to government offices. Far from constituting benign activism, the institutionalization of APR reflects a broader campaign with significant implications for public discourse, social cohesion, and national security.

## Chapter 5: Charities and Non-Profits

This chapter examines the role of charities and non-profit organizations. As outlined above, the concept of *tamkeen* describes a phased process of entrenchment whereby influence is established within civil society structures and extended into broader governance environments. These dynamics can also be observed in the Canadian charitable sector provides. The analysis that follows draws on regulatory records, audit findings, court proceedings, and public disclosures to assess how organizational activity, funding relationships, and governance practices interact with the broader patterns identified in this report.

No organization within Canada's non-profit sector better illustrates the convergence of those dynamics than the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC). An earlier ISGAP report on the Muslim Brotherhood's growing influence in Canada identifies MAC as the first and most significant of six Brotherhood-affiliated organizations embedded within Canada's civil, academic, political, and financial spheres.<sup>402</sup> The report also identified the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM), Islamic Relief Canada (IRC), ISNA Canada, the Arab Medical Union, and IRFAN-Canada as part of this network. It noted that MAC had provided funding to IRFAN-Canada, a proscribed terrorist entity, and received substantial funding from Qatar Charity—itsself linked to Hamas and al-Qaeda—while continuing to operate as a registered charity and receive federal government support.<sup>403</sup>

MAC sits at the intersection of every domain examined in this report: it supplies personnel to Brotherhood-aligned advocacy organizations, provides premises and infrastructure to networks under regulatory scrutiny, has maintained documented relationships with entities designated as terrorist organizations, and has been the subject of a multi-year Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audit that identified some of the most serious compliance failures in the history of Canadian charitable regulation.<sup>404</sup> What follows is not simply an account of a charity in dispute with its regulator but a case study of how Brotherhood-aligned organizations embed themselves within legitimate civic, educational, and charitable structures and how coordinated campaigns combining legal challenges, political lobbying, and academic framing are deployed to neutralize regulatory enforcement and reshape the institutional response of the Canadian state.

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<sup>402</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee?*

<sup>403</sup> Ibid.

<sup>404</sup> Vidino and Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West?*

## 5.1 Muslim Association of Canada

### 5.1.1 Organizational Background

The Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) is a faith-based registered charity established in 1997.<sup>405</sup> Since its inception, the MAC has developed into what it describes as the “largest grass-roots Muslim organization” in the country, with a nationwide presence anchored in local chapters across thirteen cities.<sup>406</sup> Its operational footprint is substantial: twenty-three community centers, nine full-time schools, twenty weekend schools, and four childcare facilities, collectively serving more than 55,000 individuals on a weekly basis.<sup>407</sup> This extensive infrastructure positions MAC as a key figure within Canada’s organized Muslim community, with significant reach and considerable influence in Canada’s religious, educational, social, and political spheres.

MAC’s ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood are substantial, and it openly portrays the movement in a positive light. On its website, it characterizes the Brotherhood as the “most influential Islamist revivalist organization in the Muslim world,”<sup>408</sup> and refers to its founder, Hassan al-Banna, as an “intellectual”<sup>409</sup> and a “renowned reformist.”<sup>410</sup> In fact, al-Banna was notorious for his ideological hostility toward the West, Israel, and Jews, alongside documented expressions of admiration for Adolf Hitler.<sup>411</sup> MAC’s founding philosophy, as articulated in its governing bylaws at the time of the CRA audit, was explicitly rooted in the “intellectual revivalist effort” of the early twentieth century, culminating in the “writings of the late Imam Hassan al-Banna and the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood.”<sup>412</sup> When pressed by auditors, MAC asserted that this reference pertained to the religious movement rather than the

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<sup>405</sup> “Frequently Asked Questions,” Muslim Association of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://www.macnet.ca/faq-2/>.

<sup>406</sup> “About MAC,” Muslim Association of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://www.macnet.ca/about-mac/>.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid.

<sup>408</sup> “Frequently Asked Questions,” Muslim Association of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://www.macnet.ca/faq-2/>.

<sup>409</sup> Ibid.

<sup>410</sup> “About MAC,” Muslim Association of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://www.macnet.ca/about-mac/>.

<sup>411</sup> Joe Adam George and Dagny Pawlak, “Opinion: The Muslim Brotherhood Poses an Insidious Threat to Canadian Society,” *National Post*, September 8, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/the-muslim-brotherhood-poses-an-insidious-to-canadian-society>; Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (Yale University Press, 2009); Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (Telos Press, 2007); Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942* (Ithaca Press, 1998).

<sup>412</sup> Jamie Sarkonak, “Muslim Charity under CRA Microscope for Ties to Alleged Hamas Front,” *National Post*, November 17, 2023, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/jamie-sarkonak-the-cras-complex-allegations-of-systemic-islamophobia>.

Egyptian political entity.<sup>413</sup> Following heightened regulatory scrutiny, the organization notably removed all references to the Muslim Brotherhood from its bylaws in 2017.<sup>414</sup> References to al-Banna and the Brotherhood reflect MAC's alignment with the movement's intellectual and ideological lineage, reinforcing assessments of MAC's central role within Canada's Brotherhood ecosystem.<sup>415</sup>

Various media investigations have also reinforced these concerns. For example, a *Toronto Sun* report notes that "MAC has expressed open support for Hamas' ideological forebears, the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt considers a terrorist organization."<sup>416</sup>

### 5.1.2 Preliminary Canada Revenue Agency Audit Report

However, the evidentiary record established by Canadian regulators is more significant in this regard. Midway through its 2021 audit of MAC, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) issued a set of preliminary findings in an Administrative Fairness Letter to the organization on March 17, 2021, alleging multiple breaches of tax law between July 1, 2012, and June 30, 2015, and signaling its intent to expand the scope of its investigation.<sup>417</sup> The audit identified a series of serious infractions, most notably that MAC had been "advancing" the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood—deemed by the CRA to be an unstated and non-charitable purpose—while also providing resources to the Canada-based International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (IRFAN-Canada),<sup>418</sup> a formerly registered charity that was listed as a terrorist entity in 2014 by the Canadian government.<sup>419</sup> IRFAN-Canada's charitable status was revoked by the CRA in 2011 following findings that the organization had directed more than C\$14.6 million in resources to entities linked to Hamas, including partners operated by Hamas officials, groups that openly supported or funded Hamas, or organizations designated in multiple jurisdictions for ties to terrorist activity.<sup>420</sup> The charity was also listed as an

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<sup>413</sup> Ibid.

<sup>414</sup> Ibid.

<sup>415</sup> Vidino and Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West*?

<sup>416</sup> Brian Daly, "Canadian Muslim Group Funnelled \$300K to Hamas-Linked Charity: Documents," *Toronto Sun*, January 28, 2015, available at: <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/canadian-muslim-group-funnelled-300k-to-hamas>.

<sup>417</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, Letter concerning the audit of the Muslim Association of Canada, March 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CRA-Audit-letters-of-Muslim-Association-of-Canada-MAC-dated-March-17-2021.pdf>.

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

<sup>419</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, "Revoked Canadian Charity Listed under the Criminal Code as Terrorist Entity," news release, Government of Canada, April 29, 2014, <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/charities-giving/charities/whats-new/revoked-canadian-charity-listed-under-criminal-code-terrorist-entity.html>.

<sup>420</sup> Ibid.

unindicted co-conspirator in the 2007–2008 Holy Land Foundation (HLF) terrorism financing trial in the United States and identified in government filings as part of the “Global Hamas financing mechanism.”<sup>421</sup> The CRA audit concluded with a preliminary determination that “there are sufficient grounds for the revocation of the Organization’s charitable registration,”<sup>422</sup> highlighting the severity of the violations identified during the audit process.

### 5.1.3 Legal Battles with the CRA

MAC challenged the audit’s findings by initiating proceedings against the CRA before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 2023.<sup>423</sup> The charity argued that the audit had been conducted through a “Protestant-Christian lens,” amounting to “systemic Islamophobia,” and alleged violations of its rights to freedom of religion, expression, and association under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.<sup>424</sup>

Representing the CRA, the Attorney General of Canada moved to have the application dismissed, asserting that selecting MAC for audit and conducting the review fell squarely within the CRA’s statutory mandate and did not infringe any Charter protections.<sup>425</sup> In a written submission to the court, government lawyers emphasized that the CRA’s preliminary findings had identified “several serious issues” of non-compliance, including MAC’s “involvement in political activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, buying considerable real estate, providing support to an organization listed as a terrorist entity and issuing improper donation receipts.”<sup>426</sup>

The court ultimately rejected MAC’s challenge, allowing the audit to proceed.<sup>427</sup> The charity subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, but the appeal was dismissed on July 8, 2024, with the court affirming that the application was premature given that the CRA’s audit had not yet been finalized.<sup>428</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Government’s Trial Brief, Attachment A: List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, No. 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), [https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case\\_docs/423.pdf](https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/423.pdf).

<sup>422</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, Letter concerning the audit of the Muslim Association of Canada.

<sup>423</sup> Sarkonak, “Muslim Charity under CRA Microscope.”

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>425</sup> Jim Bronskill, “Muslim Charity Alleges Systemic Bias in Bid to Halt Revenue Agency’s ‘Tainted’ Audit,” *LethbridgeNewsNow*, April 3, 2023, <https://lethbridgenewsnow.com/2023/04/03/muslim-charity-alleges-systemic-bias-in-bid-to-halt-revenue-agencys-tainted-audit/>.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>427</sup> *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2023 ONSC 5171 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/k07t8>.

<sup>428</sup> *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2024 ONCA 451 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/k5nlp>.

It is worth noting that the details of the preliminary audit—and the scope and nature of MAC’s alleged violations—only entered the public domain in 2023 after the charity sought to seal portions of the court record but failed to do so.<sup>429</sup> MAC argued that disclosure of the CRA’s evidence would harm the “dignity, reputation and physical safety” of the organization, its members, and Muslim Canadians.<sup>430</sup> The court’s refusal to grant such a sealing order ensured that these findings were subject to public scrutiny, revealing the extent of regulatory concerns surrounding one of Canada’s most prominent Muslim charitable organizations.

#### 5.1.4 Attempts to Delegitimize the CRA

Soon after MAC received a compliance letter from the CRA outlining its alleged breaches of charity law, several leading Brotherhood-aligned organizations mobilized in response, launching a coordinated, multi-pronged communications campaign that painted them all as victims and accused the CRA of religious discrimination and institutional bias. The campaign continues to this day.

As part of this campaign, the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC)—which has strong links to MAC as discussed elsewhere in this report—published an opinion piece by Faisal Kutty, former Vice Chair and Legal Counsel of the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM),<sup>431</sup> on its website entitled “Canada Revenue Agency Profiling of Muslim Charities May Pose a National Security Threat.”<sup>432</sup> In the article, Kutty claimed that the CRA’s audits of Muslim charities were “rooted in Islamophobia” and instead of thwarting radicalization only served to “fuel greater radicalization by giving extremists the fodder they can exploit by confirming a war on Islam and Muslim discrimination.”<sup>433</sup>

On March 29, 2021, in partnership with the Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS) at the University of Toronto, the NCCM released a report entitled *Under Layered Suspicion: A Review of CRA Audits of Muslim-led Charities*.<sup>434</sup> The report was authored by Anver M.

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<sup>429</sup> *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, 2023 ONSC 1923 (CanLII), accessed July 15, 2026, <https://canlii.ca/t/jwcz5>.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid.

<sup>431</sup> “Faisal Kutty,” profile, website of Faisal Kutty, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://www.faisalkutty.com/>.

<sup>432</sup> Faisal Kutty, “Canada Revenue Agency Profiling of Muslim Charities May Pose a National Security Threat,” Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, May 17, 2021, <https://canadianmuslimpac.ca/2021/05/17/canada-revenue-agency-profiling-of-muslim-charities-may-pose-a-national-security-threat/>.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.

<sup>434</sup> Anver M. Emon and Nadia Z. Hasan, *Under Layered Suspicion: A Review of CRA Audits of Muslim-led Charities* (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2021), <https://nccm.ca/cra/>.

Emon, Canada Research Chair in Islamic Legal History and Professor of Law and History at the University of Toronto, and Nadia Z. Hasan, a former chief operating officer of the National Council of Canadian Muslims,<sup>435</sup> who is now an assistant professor at York University and leads multiple research initiatives focused on Islamophobia.<sup>436</sup> That same day, the Brotherhood-aligned group also led a delegation of Canadian Muslim leaders to meet with Canadian members of parliament from across all parties to discuss the findings of the report.<sup>437</sup>

The report alleged that the CRA has implicit biases and practices that unfairly target Muslim charities in Canada.<sup>438</sup> Notably, one of the three organizations that was prominently featured in the report as a “case study” to highlight the CRA’s perceived unfair audit practices was the International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (IRFAN-Canada),<sup>439</sup> a former registered charity that was listed as a terrorist entity in 2014 by Canada.<sup>440</sup> The report claimed that IRFAN-Canada’s “odyssey” with the CRA began as a consequence of “many right-wing politicians,” particularly former parliamentarian Stockwell Day, arguing that there was no difference between Hamas’s military, fundraising, and political wings.<sup>441</sup> According to the authors of the report, another reason why the former charity was being subjected to CRA scrutiny was the “politicization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through bickering over which party was tougher in the War on Terror.”<sup>442</sup>

The report recommended suspending the CRA’s Review and Analysis Division (RAD) pending a review of its Risk-Based Assessment (RBA) model and Canada’s national strategy on extremism; suspending discretionary revocation powers in audits of Muslim-led charities informed by anti-terrorism financing or counter-radicalization policies; and enhancing transparency between the Charities Directorate and charities audited on suspicion of terrorism financing or radicalization. It also urged Finance Canada to review and revise its risk-based assessment of terrorism financing, and called on Public Safety Canada to provide clearer guidance to government officials on applying counter-radicalization policies in a non-discriminatory manner.<sup>443</sup>

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<sup>435</sup> Ibid.

<sup>436</sup> “Nadia Hasan,” profile, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies, York University, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://profiles.laps.yorku.ca/profiles/nzh/>.

<sup>437</sup> Emon and Hasan, *Under Layered Suspicion*.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid.

<sup>439</sup> Ibid.

<sup>440</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, “Revoked Canadian Charity.”

<sup>441</sup> Emon and Hasan, *Under Layered Suspicion*.

<sup>442</sup> Ibid.

<sup>443</sup> Ibid.

The findings of the report were echoed in a June 2021 report by the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG),<sup>444</sup> which describes itself as a “national coalition of Canadian civil society organizations that was established after the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called ‘war on terror.’”<sup>445</sup> The ICLMG report alleged that the “secretive” RAD within the CRA’s Charities Directorate operated with limited accountability and minimal independent oversight.<sup>446</sup>

Of particular note is the makeup of the ICLMG’s membership, which includes Brotherhood-aligned groups, organizations that have previously come under scrutiny by the CRA, and entities alleged to have links to or sympathies with violent extremism. It also encompasses other organizations, including the National Council of Canadian Muslims, Islamic Relief Canada,<sup>447</sup> the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council,<sup>448</sup> Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East,<sup>449</sup> the International Development and Relief Foundation,<sup>450</sup> CARE Canada,<sup>451</sup> the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association,<sup>452</sup> the Canadian Muslim Forum,<sup>453</sup> Independent Jewish Voices,<sup>454</sup> the Canadian Arab Federation,<sup>455</sup> and Human Concern International.<sup>456</sup> The ICLMG’s

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<sup>444</sup> Tim McSorley, *The CRA’s Prejudiced Audits: Counter-Terrorism and the Targeting of Muslim Charities in Canada* (International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, May 2021), <https://iclmg.ca/prejudiced-audits/>.

<sup>445</sup> “About Us,” International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://iclmg.ca/about-us/>.

<sup>446</sup> McSorley, *CRA’s Prejudiced Audits*.

<sup>447</sup> ISGAP, “Canada Faces Rising National Security Risk from Muslim Brotherhood Infiltration, Report Warns,” Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, June 26, 2025, <https://isgap.org/post/2025/06/canada-faces-rising-national-security-risk-from-muslim-brotherhood-infiltration-report-warns/>.

<sup>448</sup> “Members and Partners,” International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, accessed July 15, 2026, <https://iclmg.ca/about-us/members-and-partners/>.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid.

<sup>450</sup> Warren Kinsella, “Ottawa Turns a Blind Eye to Questionable Pro-Palestinian Charities,” *Toronto Sun*, August 10, 2024, <https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/kinsella-ottawa-turns-a-blind-eye-to-questionable-pro-palestinian-charities>.

<sup>451</sup> Bryan Passifiume, “Report Accuses Liberal Government’s Gaza Donor Program of Including Charities with Alleged Terror Links,” *National Post*, December 4, 2023, <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/global-affairs-gaza-charities-terror-links>.

<sup>452</sup> “Legal Group Apologizes after Disinventing ‘Peace by Chocolate’ Owner over Gaza Comment,” *The Canadian Press*, April 8, 2025, available at: <https://www.orilliamatters.com/national-news/legal-group-apologizes-after-disinventing-peace-by-chocolate-owner-over-gaza-comment-10491834>.

<sup>453</sup> “About CMF,” Canadian Muslim Forum, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://www.fmc-cmf.ca/>.

<sup>454</sup> NGO Monitor, *The NGO Network Driving Antisemitism in Canada* (NGO Monitor, October 2024), <https://ngo-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Canada-Mapping-2024.pdf>.

<sup>455</sup> “Tory Decision to Cut Arab Federation Funding Upheld by Judge,” *The Canadian Press*, January 7, 2014, available at: <https://globalnews.ca/news/1067727/tory-decision-to-cut-arab-federation-funding-upheld-by-judge/>.

<sup>456</sup> Jim Bronskill, “Canadian Muslim Charity Asks Supreme Court to Review CRA Suspension,” *Global News*, July 14, 2022, <https://globalnews.ca/news/8989248/muslim-charity-supreme-court-review-cra-suspension/>; “Members and Partners,” International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://iclmg.ca/about-us/members-and-partners/>.

membership also encompasses prominent left-leaning activists, NGOs, and labor organizations such as Amnesty International, the David Suzuki Foundation, Greenpeace, the Canadian Labour Congress, Unifor, and the Public Service Alliance of Canada.<sup>457</sup> The convergence of such entities within a single platform demonstrates the extent to which civil liberties coalitions can serve as a vehicle for advancing ideological agendas, effectively redirecting their mission toward uniform political mobilization.

With a federal election scheduled on September 20, 2021 and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau facing a credible challenge from the Conservative Party of Canada led by Erin O'Toole,<sup>458</sup> the Liberal government convened the first-ever National Summit on Islamophobia on July 22, 2021,<sup>459</sup> in an effort to court the politically significant Muslim voting bloc. In his opening remarks at the virtual summit, Trudeau called on the CRA and federal security agencies to end practices that “target” Muslim communities, stating that they need to do more to combat Islamophobia.<sup>460</sup> In a news release accompanying the summit, the federal government outlined a series of initiatives aimed at addressing this and other Islamophobia-related concerns<sup>461</sup>—many of which closely mirrored the sixty policy recommendations released by the National Council of Canadian Muslims just days prior.<sup>462</sup> The release included statements from both the NCCM and MAC, signaling their involvement in shaping and supporting the event.<sup>463</sup>

Also in attendance was then National Revenue Minister Diane Lebouthillier, whose portfolio included oversight of the CRA.<sup>464</sup> Lebouthillier announced that the government would ensure representation from the Muslim community on the CRA's Advisory Committee on the Charitable Sector, which helps shape departmental policy.<sup>465</sup> She also committed to having the taxpayers' ombudsperson review concerns about the treatment of Muslim charities within the tax system.<sup>466</sup> Both commitments

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<sup>457</sup> Ibid.

<sup>458</sup> Steve Scherer and David Ljunggren, “Canada's Trudeau Sought an Election He Risks Losing with Only a Week to Go,” *Reuters*, September 14, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canadas-trudeau-sought-an-election-he-risks-losing-with-only-week-go-2021-09-13/>.

<sup>459</sup> Canadian Heritage, “The Government of Canada Concludes National Summit on Islamophobia,” news release, Government of Canada, July 22, 2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2021/07/the-government-of-canada-concludes-national-summit-on-islamophobia.html>.

<sup>460</sup> Darren Major, “Trudeau Calls Out Federal Agencies during National Summit on Islamophobia,” *CBC News*, July 22, 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/national-summit-islamophobia-1.6111405>.

<sup>461</sup> Canadian Heritage, “Government of Canada Concludes.”

<sup>462</sup> NCCM, *2021 Federal Election Guide* (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2021), [https://nccm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Federal-Election-Guide\\_English-3.pdf](https://nccm.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Federal-Election-Guide_English-3.pdf).

<sup>463</sup> Canadian Heritage, “Government of Canada Concludes.”

<sup>464</sup> Major, “Trudeau Calls Out Federal Agencies.”

<sup>465</sup> Ibid.

<sup>466</sup> Ibid.

were promptly implemented. Two Muslims, Sheherazade Hirji and Anver M. Emon were appointed to the advisory committee for a two-year term starting on May 1, 2022.<sup>467</sup> Emon co-authored the aforementioned NCCM–IIS report alleging bias within the CRA against Muslim charities. In an August 2021 letter, Lebouthillier also directed the Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson, François Boileau, to undertake a review of the CRA’s treatment of Muslim charities.<sup>468</sup> Boileau formally launched his review on August 5, 2021.<sup>469</sup> After almost two years, he released a report, entitled “Charity Begins with Fairness: More to Explore,” in which he noted that “several challenges” resulting from administrative decisions and legislative constraints had prevented him from examining the issues “deeply enough” to make any assessment regarding the existence of potential bias in the CRA’s processes.<sup>470</sup> Nonetheless, he recommended the introduction of mandatory unconscious bias training within the Charities Directorate, particularly for personnel involved in audit functions, including senior decision-makers.<sup>471</sup>

Following Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s re-election in September 2021, MAC moved to engage with senior officials within his government. Records from the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada indicate that MAC retained seasoned lobbyist John Matheson of StrategyCorp Inc. to conduct business on its behalf, with executive director Sharaf Sharafeldin listed as the organization’s representative.<sup>472</sup> Given the prior regulatory concerns concerning MAC’s links to the Muslim Brotherhood, this outreach is particularly noteworthy. In its aforementioned 2021 Administrative Fairness Letter, the CRA raised concerns about Sharafeldin’s “apparent relationships with high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood officials and the potential impact and influence these individuals could have on Mr. Sharafeldin and the organization [MAC].”<sup>473</sup> The agency further noted that Sharafeldin “worked in support” of Mohamed Morsi’s Egyptian presidential campaign and that internal emails suggested the Brotherhood “appears to exhibit some authority” over him.<sup>474</sup>

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<sup>467</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, “New Members Appointed to the Advisory Committee on the Charitable Sector,” news release, Government of Canada, April 5, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/news/2022/04/new-members-appointed-to-the-advisory-committee-on-the-charitable-sector.html>.

<sup>468</sup> Office of the Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson, *Charity Begins with Fairness: More to Explore* (Minister of Public Services and Procurement Canada, 2023), <https://www.canada.ca/en/taxpayers-ombudsperson/programs/reports-publications/special-reports/charity-begins-with-fairness.html>.

<sup>469</sup> Ibid.

<sup>470</sup> Ibid.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid.

<sup>472</sup> “Muslim Association of Canada / John Matheson, Consultant,” Registry of Lobbyists, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg?cno=338606&regId=902391>.

<sup>473</sup> Stewart Bell, “Auditors Allege Canadian Charity Helped Hamas Financier,” *Global News*, October 13, 2023, <https://globalnews.ca/news/10014362/cra-audit-canadian-charity-hamas-network/>.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid.

It is important to note that, while Canadian lobbying laws mostly require that registered lobbyists disclose their oral, arranged, or in-person meetings with designated public office holders, the details of such meetings are often described in vague terms, producing persistent gaps in transparency. These disclosures do not, in themselves, suggest any form of wrongdoing on the part of Matheson, whose activities fall within the scope of regulated lobbying practices. Nonetheless, the monthly communication reports filed by Matheson with the federal lobbying watchdog indicate that he secured multiple high-level meetings within weeks of the election. On November 11, 2021, he met with Zubair Patel, Acting Director—Outreach, Prime Minister’s Office; Tyler Meredith, Director of Economic Strategy and Planning, Minister’s Office, Finance Canada; and Maaz Yassin, Advisor—Stakeholder Relations, Office of the Deputy Minister and Minister of Finance, Finance Canada.<sup>475</sup> The subject matter was listed as “Taxation and Finance,”<sup>476</sup> while associated meeting records state that the purpose was “to discuss administrative interpretations and legislation related to taxation and tax exempt entities.”<sup>477</sup> These engagements are particularly significant given that Finance Canada oversees the country’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing (AML/ATF) regime, including the legislative framework under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.<sup>478</sup> Interestingly, the aforementioned 2021 NCCM-IIS report recommended that Finance Canada “review and revise Canada’s anti-terrorism financing regime,”<sup>479</sup> claiming that the country’s existing counter-terrorism financing framework unfairly subjects Muslim charities to heightened scrutiny.

A second communication report indicates that on November 29, 2021, Matheson met with Bill Blair, then Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, to discuss “Religion.”<sup>480</sup> Corresponding meeting records state that the discussion focused on “issues around the relationships between Public Safety Canada and its agencies and

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<sup>475</sup> “Monthly Communication Report: 338606-516313,” Registry of Lobbyists, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, December 15, 2021, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/cmmLgPblcVw?comlogId=516313&blnk=1>.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid.

<sup>477</sup> “Muslim Association of Canada / John Matheson, Consultant,” Registry of Lobbyists, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg?cno=338606&regId=902391>.

<sup>478</sup> Department of Finance Canada, *Canada’s Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime: Report on Performance Measurement Framework* (Department of Finance Canada, March 2023), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/financial-sector-policy/canadas-anti-money-laundering-and-anti-terrorist-financing-regime-report-performance-measurement-framework-released-march-2023.html>.

<sup>479</sup> Emon and Hasan, *Under Layered Suspicion*.

<sup>480</sup> “Monthly Communication Report: 338606-516313,” Registry of Lobbyists, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, December 15, 2021, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/cmmLgPblcVw?comlogId=516313&blnk=1>.

racial/religious minority groups.”<sup>481</sup> This also echoes the earlier NCCM-IIS report, which recommended that Public Safety Canada “provide greater guidance to government officers on how its counter-radicalization strategy is to be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion.”<sup>482</sup>

Two “Access to Information” requests submitted to Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada seeking records of these two meetings—including memos, meeting minutes, and emails—did not return any documents. The identical response received from both federal departments claimed that “after a thorough search” no information or records regarding the meetings were found.<sup>483</sup> Follow-up complaints were sent to the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada seeking further investigation of these claims. However, the investigation concluded that both departments had carried out “reasonable” searches and that, since the individuals involved in the meetings no longer worked in the departments in question, the records had likely been transitory and/or purged.<sup>484</sup> In this context, it is worth noting that in September 2025 Information Commissioner Caroline Maynard warned that the federal government was abusing Access to Information laws to avoid releasing documents.<sup>485</sup> Despite this warning, federal employees were issued new guidelines for concealing records effective January 26, 2026, including the permanent deletion of chat posts within fifteen days.<sup>486</sup>

As its legal battle with the CRA intensified, MAC received a significant boost from the release of a report by the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights entitled *Combating Hate: Islamophobia and its Impact on Muslims in Canada* in November 2023.<sup>487</sup>

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<sup>481</sup> “Muslim Association of Canada / John Matheson, Consultant,” Registry of Lobbyists, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, accessed April 11, 2026, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/oclr/irs/do/vwRg?cno=338606&regId=902391>.

<sup>482</sup> Emon and Hasan, *Under Layered Suspicion*.

<sup>483</sup> Letter from Finance Canada, dated February 6, 2025, in response to a request under the Access to Information Act 2021, available at: [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada\\_report\\_official\\_responses.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada_report_official_responses.pdf); Letter from Public Safety Canada, dated February 10, 2025, in response to a request under the Access to Information Act 2021, available at: [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada\\_report\\_official\\_responses.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada_report_official_responses.pdf).

<sup>484</sup> Final Report of the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, dated November 5, 2025, pertaining to a complaint regarding Finance Canada, available at: [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada\\_report\\_official\\_responses.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada_report_official_responses.pdf); Final Report of the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, dated April 8, 2026, pertaining to a complaint regarding Public Safety Canada, available at: [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada\\_report\\_official\\_responses.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada_report_official_responses.pdf).

<sup>485</sup> Marie Woolf, “Ottawa Abusing Access to Information Law to Avoid Releasing Documents, Watchdog Says,” *Globe and Mail*, September 28, 2025, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-abusing-access-to-information-law-watchdog-says/>.

<sup>486</sup> “Act Quicker To Hide Records,” *Blacklock’s Reporter*, January 16, 2026, <https://www.blacklocks.ca/act-quicker-to-hide-records/>.

<sup>487</sup> Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, *Combating Hate: Islamophobia and Its Impact on Muslims in Canada* (Senate of Canada, November 2023), [https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/RIDR/reports/Islamophobia\\_FINAL\\_e.pdf](https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/RIDR/reports/Islamophobia_FINAL_e.pdf).

The report concluded that “it is clear that RAD’s work to date—regardless of the intentions of its employees—has demonstrated systemic bias against Muslim charities” and more broadly asserted that “Islamophobia is present in Canadian society and in many of our institutions.”<sup>488</sup>

The findings put additional pressure on the CRA, particularly as several witnesses contributing to the study were drawn from Brotherhood-aligned organizations, including the NCCM, CMPAC, Islamic Relief Canada, and the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA).<sup>489</sup>

Among the notable individuals who testified were Mustafa Farooq (NCCM), Khaled al-Qazzaz (CMPAC), and Amira Elghawaby (Canada’s former Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia).<sup>490</sup>

On February 29, 2024, the Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS) at the University of Toronto hosted a “dialogue” between the CRA and Muslim-led charities to “address concerns and deepen understanding” that was attended by representatives from MAC,<sup>491</sup> Islamic Relief Canada, and the NCCM.<sup>492</sup> In addition to reviewing the 2021 NCCM-IIS report, the two-day event included a panel discussion featuring the following individuals: Sharmila Khare, Director General, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, Canada Revenue Agency; Robert Delaney, Director, Policy, Planning and Legislation Division, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, Canada Revenue Agency; Soren Halverson, Assistant Commissioner, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, Canada Revenue Agency; Anver Emon, Director, Institute of Islamic Studies and Professor of Law, University of Toronto; Irfan Syed, Principal, SyedLaw; Faghya Shafiq, Chief Financial Officer, Islamic Relief Canada; and Fahad Ahmad, Assistant Professor, Criminology, Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU).<sup>493</sup>

In this context, it is worth mentioning that in 2025 Ahmad co-authored a TMU-funded research paper arguing that Canada’s designation of Islamist groups such as Hamas,

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<sup>488</sup> Ibid.

<sup>489</sup> ISGAP, *Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Entryism*; Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, *Combating Hate: Islamophobia*.

<sup>490</sup> Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, *Combating Hate: Islamophobia*.

<sup>491</sup> Abdul Nakua, “Muslim Charities Want a Tough Talk with the CRA,” *Canada’s National Observer*, May 22, 2024, <https://www.nationalobserver.com/2024/05/22/opinion/cra-audits-Muslim-charities-islamophobia>.

<sup>492</sup> “[Feb 29 & Mar 1, 2024] In Dialogue: Canada Revenue Agency & Muslim-led Charity Sector,” event announcement, Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Toronto, n.d., <https://islamicstudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/events/feb-29-mar-1-2024-in-dialogue-canada-revenue-agency-muslim-led-charity-sector/>.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid.

Hezbollah, and ISIS as terrorist organizations is fundamentally flawed due to “systemic Islamophobia” and racism.<sup>494</sup> The paper, entitled “Racialized Knowledges: Understanding the Construction of the Muslim ‘Terrorist’ in the Policy Process,” further contends that “policymakers rely on white logic to depict state institutions as neutral, obscuring their inherent anti-Muslim orientation” and asserts that Canadian security agencies “maintain the association of ‘terrorism’ with Muslims” regardless of the identity of the perpetrators of violent acts.<sup>495</sup>

The long-running saga between MAC and the CRA reached a critical inflection point when the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)—an independent external review body reporting to the Canadian parliament—released its highly-publicized review of the CRA’s Review and Analysis Division (RAD) in October 2025.<sup>496</sup> Noting that 67 percent of charities audited by RAD between 2009 and 2022 were discernibly Muslim, the review concluded that a “lack of rigour” in its selection and audit processes “introduced risks of bias and discrimination.”<sup>497</sup> It further found that RAD lacked an “evidence-based method” to validate the risk indicators used to justify scrutiny of Muslim charities for terrorism-related concerns.<sup>498</sup> The intelligence watchdog recommended that the CRA “collect and evaluate” demographic data from the charitable sector to ensure that RAD does not fall foul of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.<sup>499</sup>

For context, the NSIRA review followed a key recommendation in the aforementioned 2021 ICLMG report urging scrutiny of RAD’s audit selection processes to ensure Muslim charities were not targeted on the basis of racial or religious bias.<sup>500</sup> Acting on this, NSIRA notified the CRA on March 8, 2023, of its intent to initiate a review of the division.<sup>501</sup> Notably, one of the NSIRA’s committee members at the time was Faisal Mirza,<sup>502</sup> who, according to court documents dated February 24, 2017, acted as counsel

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<sup>494</sup> Sanaa Ali-Mohammed and Fahad Ahmad, “Racialized Knowledges: Understanding the Construction of the Muslim ‘Terrorist’ in the Policy Process,” *Critical Policy Studies* 19, no. 4 (2025): 701–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2025.2462599>.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid.

<sup>496</sup> *Review of the Canada Revenue Agency’s Review and Analysis Division*, Review no. 23-08 (National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, October 2, 2025), [https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/23-08\\_Rvw\\_CRA\\_RAD\\_-EN-46815.pdf](https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/23-08_Rvw_CRA_RAD_-EN-46815.pdf).

<sup>497</sup> Ibid.

<sup>498</sup> Ibid.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid.

<sup>500</sup> McSorley, *CRA’s Prejudiced Audits*.

<sup>501</sup> National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, Notification Letter to the Canada Revenue Agency, March 8, 2023, <https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/Notification-Letter-Canada-Revenue-Agency-EN.pdf>.

<sup>502</sup> “Prime Minister Announces Members of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency,” news release, Prime Minister of Canada, October 9, 2020, <https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2020/10/09/prime-minister-announces-members-national-security-and-intelligence>.

for Rasem Abdel-Majid, the former executive director and manager of IRFAN-Canada, the now-defunct charity that was designated as a terrorist group by Canada in 2014.<sup>503</sup> In that capacity, Mirza represented Abdel-Majid in a federal court application seeking judicial review of a decision denying the request to remove the former charity from Canada's list of terrorist entities.<sup>504</sup> He also previously served as president of the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association and co-founded the Muslim Legal Support Centre<sup>505</sup>—a taxpayer-funded initiative that offered free legal assistance to attendees of the annual Al-Quds Day demonstration held in Toronto on March 14, 2026, in support of the Iranian regime.<sup>506</sup>

Predictably, the NSIRA's findings were welcomed by Brotherhood-aligned organizations, including MAC and the NCCM, both of which used the report to reinforce longstanding claims of bias within the CRA.<sup>507</sup> MAC asserted that “no terrorism financing concerns were found” during its seven-year audit, while the NCCM characterized RAD as “broken” and “unaccountable,” calling on the federal government to “dismantle” it.<sup>508</sup> Building on this momentum, MAC continued to advance its case against the CRA through external validation. In April 2026, CBC News reported on a study authored by Michelle Gallant, a University of Manitoba professor specializing in terrorism financing and money laundering, which concluded that the CRA's approach to policing terrorist abuse “proved seriously deficient.”<sup>509</sup> The review was reportedly commissioned at MAC's request, although Gallant claimed she was not compensated for the work and had no prior ties to either the charity or the revenue agency.<sup>510</sup> However, it is worth noting that Gallant was listed among the signatories of a letter that has been characterized as being anti-Israel,<sup>511</sup> a detail that raises additional questions about the study's ideological lens and conclusions.

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<sup>503</sup> Notice of Application, *International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (Canada) and Rasem Abdel Majid v. Attorney General of Canada*, Federal Court of Canada, filed on February 24, 2017, <https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ottawa.pdf>.

<sup>504</sup> Ibid.

<sup>505</sup> “Faisal Mirza,” profile, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, accessed April 13, 2026, <https://jackmanlaw.utoronto.ca/people/faisal-mirza>.

<sup>506</sup> “Why Did the Taxpayer-Funded Muslim Legal Support Centre Offer to ‘Support’ Demonstrators at the Extremist Al-Quds Day Demonstration?,” *Honest Reporting Canada*, March 24, 2026, <https://honestreporting.ca/why-did-the-taxpayer-funded-muslim-legal-support-centre-offer-to-support-demonstrators-at-the-extremist-al-quds-day-demonstration/>.

<sup>507</sup> Catherine Tunney, “CRA Couldn’t Justify Why It Was Auditing Muslim Charities: Report,” *CBC News*, October 2, 2025, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cra-muslim-charities-nsira-1.7649492>.

<sup>508</sup> Ibid.

<sup>509</sup> Jim Bronskill, “Changes Needed at Canada Revenue Agency after Audit of Muslim Charity: Report,” *CBC News*, March 27, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/canada-revenue-agency-muslim-association-audit-report-9.7149904>.

<sup>510</sup> Ibid.

<sup>511</sup> Mark Kersten et al., “A Message to the Canadian Government: Stop Dithering, and Support the ICC’s Work in Israel and Palestine Now,” *Justice in Conflict*, May 29, 2024, <https://justiceinconflict.org/2024/05/29/a-message-to-the-canadian-government-stop-dithering-and-support-the-iccs-work-in-israel-and-palestine-now/>.

At a June 2026 press conference on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, CMPAC Executive Director Khaled Al-Qazzaz and New Democratic Party (NDP) MP Heather McPherson promoted the organization's newly published Islamophobia handbook, including its recommendations for reforming how Canadian authorities audit Muslim charities.<sup>512</sup>

The five-year long coordinated crusade by Brotherhood-aligned groups and their allies is part of a sustained campaign to challenge and reshape elements of Canada's national security apparatus under the guise of rights-based advocacy. Through a coordinated blend of lawfare, political lobbying, academic laundering, and media amplification, they have sought not only to contest specific CRA actions but to recast counterterrorism enforcement itself as discriminatory. The composition of this coalition and the ideological framing of key interventions raise concerns about the extent to which regulatory processes are being shaped by activist narratives that favor these groups. This convergence risks diluting the rigor and objectivity of Canada's counterterrorism and charitable compliance enforcement, gradually redefining vigilance as bias, and, in the process, weakening the state's capacity to identify and respond to existential national security threats.

#### 5.1.5 CRA's Final Audit Decision on MAC

The CRA's 2023 final audit decision on MAC is notable for several reasons, particularly for the breadth of non-compliance initially identified—including alleged involvement in foreign political activities, real estate acquisitions, support for a terrorist-listed entity, and improper donation receipts—and for the restraint of the outcome ultimately reached: a compliance agreement addressing “technical governance issues,” with MAC's charitable status neither suspended nor revoked.<sup>513</sup> After a lengthy audit, including an Administrative Fairness Letter setting out sufficient grounds for the revocation of MAC's charitable status, and multiple rounds of written representations from MAC, the CRA concluded that the organization remained non-compliant with the Income Tax Act and Income Tax Regulations across a wide range of areas, including the advancement of an unstated non-charitable collateral purpose tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, activities contrary to public policy and failures of due diligence, a lack of

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<sup>512</sup> Melanie Bennet, “Lobby Group Launches Islamophobia Handbook Alleging anti-Muslim Audit Bias,” *Junonews*, June 7, 2026, <https://www.junonews.com/p/lobby-group-launches-islamophobia>.

<sup>513</sup> For the full text of the CRA's final audit decision discussed in this section, as well as the compliance agreement and the notice of penalty, see Court of Appeal for Ontario, *Muslim Association of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada*, Affidavit of Sophie Amberg, affirmed on November 28, 2023, Court File no. 23-CV-1096, filed October 10, 2024 [hereinafter, Affidavit of Sophie Amberg], available at: [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada\\_report\\_MACvAG\\_23-CV-1096.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/canada_report_MACvAG_23-CV-1096.pdf). See also Bronskill, “Changes Needed at Canada Revenue Agency.”

public benefit, a failure to devote resources to charitable activities, a lack of direction and control over resources, improper receipting, deficient books and records, inaccurate T3010 filings, and inadequate employee payment documentation. Yet despite these findings the CRA declined to revoke MAC's charitable status, opting instead for a compliance agreement and a financial penalty.<sup>514</sup>

These measures are difficult to reconcile with the seriousness of the conduct described in the audit record. The CRA's own affidavit states that the 2021 Administrative Fairness Letter had set out an evidentiary basis for revoking MAC's charitable status and that the organization was given every opportunity to respond, submit additional documents, and make written representations as to why its status should not be revoked. After considering those representations, including additional submissions made in 2023, the CRA still found that MAC remained non-compliant.<sup>515</sup> The agency's decision was thus a contemplated regulatory judgment made after MAC had been afforded repeated chances to disprove or alleviate the CRA's concerns.

The most consequential findings were related to MAC's exposure to extremist networks and terrorism-linked entities, including concerns about its links to the Muslim Brotherhood milieu, which according to the audit had only been partially alleviated.<sup>516</sup> The audit also determined that MAC had engaged in activities advancing the interests of the Brotherhood and its Egyptian political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, beyond what could be justified under the heading of the advancement of religion.<sup>517</sup> While the CRA stopped short of characterizing MAC as a formal branch of the Brotherhood, it identified "numerous apparent links" between the two and expressed concern about MAC's leaders being "directly or indirectly" associated with the movement and the potential influence of those ties on MAC's decisions and activities.<sup>518</sup>

The audit further highlights the role of former MAC president Wael Haddara, whose involvement in Mohamed Morsi's 2012 presidential campaign was deemed significant, particularly given evidence suggesting that, contrary to MAC's claims of transparency, the organization had attempted to conceal his role.<sup>519</sup> The CRA also rejected MAC's characterization of communications involving executive director Sharaf Sharafeldin, finding that emails linked to senior Brotherhood figure Mahmoud Ezzat were

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<sup>514</sup> Affidavit of Sophie Amberg, 1–2.

<sup>515</sup> *Ibid.*, 2–3.

<sup>516</sup> *Ibid.*, 15–29.

<sup>517</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>518</sup> *Ibid.*, 16, 23.

<sup>519</sup> *Ibid.*, 20–25, esp. 23–24.

individualized rather than generic mass communications, indicating an ongoing relationship with a senior member of the organization.<sup>520</sup>

Another such example involves IRFAN-Canada, an organization whose charitable status was revoked in 2011, in part for transferring C\$14.6 million in resources to Hamas, and which was subsequently listed as a terrorist entity in Canada in 2014. The CRA found that MAC's representations only "partially alleviated" concerns regarding its relationship with IRFAN. In the audit, the CRA concluded that MAC and IRFAN "continued to have a relationship between the time IRFAN was revoked for supporting Hamas, and when IRFAN became a listed terrorist entity." It further noted that MAC's representations "do not alleviate" its concerns that the organization "provided a platform, visibility, and non-monetary resources to IRFAN," such as promotional support on posters and websites and allowing their presence at MAC events during the specified period. The agency further maintained that, while MAC's electronic resources "did appear to have been used to further IRFAN's interests and agenda," the organization had also permitted IRFAN to host an event with a fundraising component at its Olive Grove School in Mississauga.<sup>521</sup>

Similarly, MAC completely failed to alleviate the CRA's concerns that some of its prominent members, directors, and officials were involved in a network of charities, including IRFAN, the Povrel Jerusalem Fund for Human Services (JFHS), and the Canadian Middle East Information Centre (CMIC), which appeared to have been used to promote and fundraise for Hamas in Canada. The CRA maintained that their presence within MAC raised the possibility of related influence on the organization's activities to provide support/resources to IRFAN.<sup>522</sup>

MAC also failed to demonstrate meaningful due diligence in its allocation of resources. The CRA found that it had allowed two groups—the Egyptian Canadian Coalition for Democracy (ECCD) and the Montreal-based Egyptian Canadian Home Organization (ECHO)—to use its premises free of charge, despite both being "openly" supportive of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party.<sup>523</sup> The CRA further raised concerns that these groups appeared to have links to the Egyptian Revolutionary Council (ERC), an entity assessed as encouraging violence.<sup>524</sup>

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<sup>520</sup> Ibid., 20–25, esp. 24–25.

<sup>521</sup> Ibid., 40–45, esp. 44.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid., 43, 45.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid., 27–28, 45–46.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid., 45–46.

The audit determined that MAC did not implement its own anti-terrorism policy in “a meaningful way,” indicating systemic governance failures rather than isolated lapses on the part of the organization.<sup>525</sup> The CRA found no evidence that donor or program reviews were being properly conducted by MAC’s Executive Council, despite the organization’s claims to the contrary. In one instance, MAC submitted a program review after previously acknowledging that no such reviews had been carried out; however, a forensic review of its email and electronic records provided no indication of when the document was created, raising concerns that it may have been produced retroactively to demonstrate compliance.<sup>526</sup> The CRA emphasized that due diligence extends beyond simply screening names against terrorist lists and requires the substantive implementation of internal safeguards.<sup>527</sup> In effect, the agency concluded that MAC’s anti-terrorism controls were largely nominal rather than operational.

MAC also failed to “fully alleviate” CRA’s concerns regarding its links to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) and fundraising activities for Syria. The agency remained concerned that MAC “may have continued relationships with groups, or allowed groups that have real or possible links to Terrorist Activities or Terrorist Groups” to use its “vast network and membership, electronic resources, and physical locations for the purpose of fundraising to advance the cause of a third party.”<sup>528</sup>

On the matter of receiving communications from high-ranking SMB officials requesting financial assistance, including for weapons and ammunition, and offering mosque-based fundraising strategies, the CRA remained concerned that MAC would be associating with individuals from the SMB-linked Free Syrian Army that were “actively promoting and soliciting weaponry and ordnance.”<sup>529</sup> Although the CRA stated it had no direct evidence that MAC itself funded the SMB, it nonetheless treated the correspondence as significant because it contradicted MAC’s denial that it had any “connection with any Muslim Brotherhood outside of Canada or that it receives guidance from any organization.”<sup>530</sup> These concerns were exacerbated by the organization’s “apparent lack of internal controls and due diligence procedures identified by the CRA in relation to apparent fundraising for Syria.”<sup>531</sup>

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<sup>525</sup> Ibid., 37–50, esp. 39.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., 38–39.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid., 47–49, esp. 48.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid., 48. See also Elhanan Miller, “Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood Confirms It Has Battalions Fighting Assad,” *Times of Israel*, August 5, 2012, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/syrian-muslim-brotherhood-forms-fighting-battalions-movement-spokesman-acknowledges/>.

<sup>530</sup> Affidavit of Sophie Amberg, 15.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid., 48.

Concerning the issue of allowing an organization called WATAN to use its premises for Syria-related fundraising, the audit notes that MAC “failed to respond to concerns that WATAN groups outside of Canada have a history of collaborating with groups that have links to terrorism.”<sup>532</sup>

Further concerns arose from the use of MAC’s own communications infrastructure in ways that exposed it to extremist financing. The CRA found that Mohammed al-Khatib, an individual with past associations to organizations alleged to have been involved in terrorism financing or support, had used MAC’s distribution lists to solicit donations for Syrian refugee camps in Jordan. While one narrow explanation relating to clothing donations was accepted, the substance of the CRA’s concerns were not. The CRA remained troubled that MAC had allowed its contact lists to be used to divert donations to causes over which it had no control and whose ultimate destination the audit could not verify. Such conduct indicates poor charitable control over the solicitation of funds, exactly the kind of vulnerability that anti-terrorist financing oversight is supposed to prevent.<sup>533</sup>

#### 5.1.6 Limited Consequences, Continued Influence

In spite of all this, the CRA chose not to revoke MAC’s charitable registration. Instead, it imposed a penalty of C\$1,119,054—representing 105 percent of C\$1,065,766 in undue benefits and gifts to non-qualified donees<sup>534</sup>—while requiring MAC to enter into a compliance agreement.<sup>535</sup> The penalty itself was tied to “conferring an undue benefit and resourcing non-qualified donees,” and the notice explicitly states that the audit found that MAC had gifted over C\$1 million to non-qualified donees in contravention of the requirement that a charity devote all of its resources to charitable activities carried on by the organization itself.<sup>536</sup> Even then, the CRA left the door open for MAC to preserve its status through corrective measures, reserving revocation for future non-compliance or failure to pay.<sup>537</sup>

According to Sharaf Sharafeldin, the MAC audit is ongoing as of April 1, 2026.<sup>538</sup> The organization has reportedly entered into a compliance agreement addressing what it describes as “technical governance issues” that resulted in financial penalties that are currently under appeal.<sup>539</sup>

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<sup>532</sup> Ibid.

<sup>533</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>534</sup> Ibid., 107–108, 184–185.

<sup>535</sup> Ibid., 156–163.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>537</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>538</sup> Bronskill, “Changes Needed at Canada Revenue Agency.”

<sup>539</sup> Ibid.

At the 2026 MAC Convention in Toronto, attendees at a youth session entitled “Visionaries of the Ummah: Youth Activism Lab” were asked to electronically submit words describing the *ummah*—the global community of Muslims united by faith—that they hoped to build. The responses were subsequently displayed in a word cloud on a large screen. Among the terms prominently shown was the phrase “Jew free,” indicating that at least one participant associated the ideal future community with the absence of Jews. Other conspicuously displayed responses included “justice,” “united,” “strong,” “Islam,” and “manipulate.”<sup>540</sup>

Nonetheless, MAC continues to attract high-level political engagement. At a June 2025 Eid al-Adha event it hosted in Ottawa, Prime Minister Mark Carney declared that “Muslim values are Canadian values,”<sup>541</sup> a statement that sparked widespread public criticism.<sup>542</sup>

## 5.2 Islamic Society of North America Canada

### 5.2.1 Organizational Background

The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was one of the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned organizations identified as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism-financing case. According to Congressional records dated January 8, 2016, ISNA was founded in 1981 by the Saudi-funded Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), an organization established in part by Muslim Brotherhood activists. The same records indicate that the relationship between ISNA and the MSA amounts to an enduring institutional partnership.<sup>543</sup>

Its Canadian affiliate, the Islamic Society of North America Canada (ISNA Canada), was established in 1982. ISNA Canada is a prominent non-profit religious and charitable organization that has served Muslims in Canada and internationally for over forty years. It is one of the oldest and longest serving national organizations in Canada

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<sup>540</sup> Terry Newman, “Youth at Toronto Muslim Convention Express Desire for ‘Jew-Free’ Community,” *National Post*, May 28, 2026, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/terry-newman-youth-at-toronto-muslim-convention-express-desire-for-jew-free-community>.

<sup>541</sup> Avi Benlolo, “We Are Zionists, Not Roaches, Rats or Scum,” *National Post*, June 12, 2026, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/avi-benlolo-we-are-zionists-not-roaches-rats-or-scum>.

<sup>542</sup> “‘These Are Muslim Values, These Are Canadian Values’: PM Mark Carney Trolled on Social Media for His Eid Message,” *Times of India*, June 12, 2025, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/these-are-muslim-values-these-are-canadian-values-pm-mark-carney-trolled-on-social-media-for-his-eid-message/articleshow/121700441.cms>.

<sup>543</sup> Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 162, no. 5, January 8, 2016, pp. H215–20, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2016-01-08/html/CREC-2016-01-08-pt1-PgH215-4.htm>.

advancing the Islamic faith. At any given time, the charity operates over thirty different charitable programs, including educational programs, youth development, and social services such as food banks, mental health counseling, and funeral support.<sup>544</sup>

## 5.2.2 History of Financial Abuse

ISNA Canada and other affiliated entities have been the subject of multiple regulatory actions by the Canadian tax authorities on matters relating to governance, financial controls, and the transfer of charitable funds to groups with extremist links.

The first major public indication of these concerns emerged in 2010, when a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audit found that the charity had improperly used more than C\$600,000 in donor contributions. The audit concluded that certain expenditures constituted personal expenses paid from charitable funds, describing the practice as “unethical” and “tantamount to misappropriation of funds.”<sup>545</sup>

In 2011, following the discovery of financial irregularities, the CRA broadened its scrutiny to ISNA Canada’s wider organizational network by launching audits of the charity and three of its former affiliates, namely ISNA Development Foundation, ISNA Islamic Services of Canada, and the Canadian Islamic Trust Foundation.<sup>546</sup> The audits covered the period from 2007 to 2009. The four charities were selected for review on the basis that the CRA considered them “in a sense indistinguishable,” raising concerns about their operational and organizational overlap.<sup>547</sup>

The first of these audits culminated in the revocation of the ISNA Development Foundation’s charitable status in 2013 after the audit raised concerns that funds transferred abroad may have benefited entities linked to Islamist extremism in South Asia. Specifically, the audit found that the foundation had transferred more than C\$280,000 to the Relief Organization for Kashmiri Muslims (ROKM), a Pakistan-based organization identified by the CRA as the charitable arm of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI).<sup>548</sup> A

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<sup>544</sup> “About,” ISNA Canada, accessed June 22, 2026, <https://www.isnacanada.com/about/>.

<sup>545</sup> “ISNA Canada Misspent \$600,000 in Charity,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, January 20, 2011, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/2508/isna-canada-misspent-600000-in-charity>.

<sup>546</sup> Stewart Bell and Sean Craig, “Government Revokes Group’s Charity Status, Audit Cites Possible Funding of Pakistani Militants,” *Global News*, July 19, 2017, <https://globalnews.ca/news/3606224/government-revokes-groups-charity-status-audit-cites-pakistani-militants/>.

<sup>547</sup> Ibid.

<sup>548</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, “Canada Revenue Agency Revokes Registration of ISNA Development Foundation as a Charity,” news release, Government of Canada, September 20, 2013, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/09/canada-revenue-agency-revokes-registration-isna-development-foundation-charity.html>.

Muslim Brotherhood–inspired Islamist movement,<sup>549</sup> JeI has long supported insurgent activity in India through its armed wing, Hizbul Mujahideen,<sup>550</sup> which is designated as a terrorist organization by both the United States<sup>551</sup> and Canada.<sup>552</sup>

The CRA’s scrutiny subsequently resulted in further sanctions against ISNA Canada’s other two affiliates: ISNA Islamic Services of Canada and the Canadian Islamic Trust Foundation. Both lost their charitable status in 2017 after the federal tax authority uncovered serious compliance violations. The CRA revoked ISNA Islamic Services of Canada’s status over fundraising activities linked to Hizbul Mujahideen. The Canadian Islamic Trust Foundation, meanwhile, was sanctioned after the CRA found that it had “allowed itself to be governed” in the interests of several for-profit Islamic housing cooperatives and had transferred funds to organizations that did not qualify as eligible recipients under Canadian charity law.<sup>553</sup>

Eventually, ISNA Canada itself was sanctioned by the CRA in 2018. The federal tax authority imposed a one-year suspension of the charity’s receipting privileges and ordered it to pay a C\$550,000 penalty after an audit concluded that it had functioned as a “conduit” for other organizations and “failed to conduct any meaningful due diligence” when transferring C\$136,000 that may have supported armed militancy in the war-torn Kashmir region. “It is the CRA’s view that the society’s resources may have, directly or indirectly, been used to support the political efforts of Jamaat-e-Islami and/or its armed wing Hizbul Mujahideen,” the federal tax authority alleged in its audit.<sup>554</sup>

### 5.2.3 Persistent Political Patronage

Despite the regulatory scrutiny it faced, ISNA Canada has continued to enjoy access to and engagement with senior political figures across the Canadian political spectrum.<sup>555</sup> Former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre, and

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<sup>549</sup> “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe: Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2010, <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami/>.

<sup>550</sup> “Hizbul Mujahideen (HM),” National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed June 22, 2026, [https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist\\_groups/hm.html](https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/hm.html).

<sup>551</sup> Ibid.

<sup>552</sup> “Currently Listed Entities,” Public Safety Canada, accessed June 22, 2026, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrnt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#300>.

<sup>553</sup> Bell and Craig, “Government Revokes Group’s Charity Status.”

<sup>554</sup> Stewart Bell, “CRA Suspends, Fines Major Islamic Charity over Concerns It May Have ‘Provided Resources’ to Armed Militants,” *Global News*, October 1, 2018, <https://globalnews.ca/news/4490892/cra-suspends-fines-major-islamic-charity-over-concerns-it-may-have-provided-resources-to-armed-militants/>.

<sup>555</sup> ISNA Canada (@isna\_canada), “During Ramadan, We Co-Hosted Our First Iftar at Parliament Hill...,” Instagram, April 10, 2026, [https://www.instagram.com/isna\\_canada/p/DW9ltCyDh7i/](https://www.instagram.com/isna_canada/p/DW9ltCyDh7i/).

former New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jagmeet Singh have all attended ISNA-affiliated events.<sup>556</sup>

Similarly, in 2019, ISNA Canada was approved to receive C\$25,787 in federal funding through the Canada Summer Jobs program administered by Employment and Social Development Canada while still serving a one-year suspension imposed by the CRA based on concerns over terrorist financing.<sup>557</sup> According to CRA records, ISNA Canada received C\$1,812,425 in taxpayer funding between 2020 and 2024 from various government sources.<sup>558</sup>

In 2022, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a contribution of C\$686,910 toward the construction of an Islamic center associated with ISNA Canada, with the charity contributing an additional C\$860,738 to the project.<sup>559</sup> Located in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, the Islamic Centre of Yellowknife (ICYK) opened in February 2026 after years of delays,<sup>560</sup> with reported construction costs increasing from an initial estimate of C\$2.5 million to C\$6.5 million.<sup>561</sup>

## 5.3 Islamic Relief Canada

### 5.3.1 Organizational Background

Founded in 2006, Islamic Relief Canada (IRC) is a Muslim charity that administers emergency relief, sustainable development, and orphan-support programs in Canada and abroad.<sup>562</sup> It serves as the Canadian affiliate of Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), a global humanitarian network that has faced longstanding allegations regarding its ties

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<sup>556</sup> Joe Adam George, “Canadian Charity with Alleged Terror Ties Builds \$6.5M Islamic Center Amid Financial Mismanagement Concerns,” *Middle East Forum*, June 18, 2025, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/canadian-charity-with-alleged-terror-ties-builds-6-5m-islamic-center-amid-financial-mismanagement-concerns>.

<sup>557</sup> Stewart Bell, “Charity Suspended over Militant-Funding Concerns Gets Canada Summer Jobs Grant,” *Global News*, June 13, 2019, accessed June 23, 2026, <https://globalnews.ca/news/5382103/charity-suspended-gets-canada-summer-jobs-grant/>.

<sup>558</sup> “Charity Quick View: Islamic Society of North America—Canada,” Canada Revenue Agency, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/dsplyQckVw?selectedCharityBn=118971886RR0001>.

<sup>559</sup> Emily Blake Kopek, “Yellowknife’s New Islamic Centre Nears Completion,” *Cabin Radio*, January 9, 2025, <https://cabinradio.ca/217408/news/yellowknife/yellowknifes-new-islamic-centre-nears-completion/>.

<sup>560</sup> “Yellowknife Mosque Opens Its Doors to the Public,” *CBC News*, February 23, 2026, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/mosque-opens-doors-yellowknife-9.7102011>.

<sup>561</sup> Nadeer Hashmi, “Opening of Yellowknife’s Islamic Centre Delayed Again Amid Funding Shortfall,” *CBC News*, March 4, 2025, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/opening-of-yellowknife-s-islamic-centre-delayed-again-amid-funding-shortfall-1.7474247>.

<sup>562</sup> “Islamic Relief Canada,” *Charity Intelligence Canada*, accessed June 23, 2026, <https://www.charityintelligence.ca/charity-details/501-islamic-relief-canada>.

to Islamist movements, including Hamas, as well as repeated controversies involving antisemitism within its leadership.<sup>563</sup>

Concerns regarding IRW's links to extremist networks span more than a decade. In 2014, Israel banned the UK-based charity from operating in the West Bank, alleging that it had channeled funds to Hamas.<sup>564</sup> That same year, the United Arab Emirates included IRW on a list of designated terrorist organizations that also featured several Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated entities.<sup>565</sup> In 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reportedly compiled a criminal case to examine IRW's links to terrorism.<sup>566</sup> In 2020, the US State Department severed its relationship with IRW following multiple incidents of antisemitism involving senior officials.<sup>567</sup> Several major financial institutions, including HSBC, Credit Suisse, and UBS, likewise ended their relationships with the organization amid concerns that charitable funds could be diverted to terrorist-linked actors.<sup>568</sup>

Recent developments have further intensified scrutiny of the Islamic Relief network. In March 2026, following a congressional investigation into its alleged terrorist links, Islamic Relief USA (IRUSA) filed a lawsuit against IRW,<sup>569</sup> alleging unlawful fundraising practices, obstruction of audits, and other conduct that, according to the complaint, impaired IRUSA's ability to operate in the United States without heightened regulatory scrutiny. The lawsuit further claimed that US officials viewed elements of the Islamic Relief network as potential conduits for funding anti-Western Islamist actors. IRW rejected the allegations and sought dismissal of the case, characterizing the lawsuit as a "publicity stunt" designed to appease US lawmakers.<sup>570</sup>

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<sup>563</sup> "Ways & Means Investigation Leads to Tax-Exempt Organization Cutting Ties with Terrorist-Affiliated Group," news release, US House Committee on Ways and Means, March 30, 2026, <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/2026/03/30/ways-means-investigation-leads-to-tax-exempt-organization-cutting-ties-with-terrorist-affiliated-group/>.

<sup>564</sup> Dan Williams, "Israel Bans UK-Based Muslim Charity Accused of Funding Hamas," *Reuters*, June 19, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uk/israel-bans-uk-based-muslim-charity-accused-of-funding-hamas-idUSKBN0EU1FD/>.

<sup>565</sup> "Outrage over UAE's New Terror List," ReliefWeb, November 18, 2014, <https://reliefweb.int/report/united-arab-emirates/outrage-over-uaes-new-terror-list>.

<sup>566</sup> "Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW)," NGO Monitor, July 26, 2023, [https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/islamic\\_relief\\_worldwide\\_irw/](https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/islamic_relief_worldwide_irw/).

<sup>567</sup> Ibid.

<sup>568</sup> "Ways & Means Investigation Leads to Tax-Exempt Organization Cutting Ties with Terrorist-Affiliated Group," news release, US House Committee on Ways and Means, March 30, 2026, <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/2026/03/30/ways-means-investigation-leads-to-tax-exempt-organization-cutting-ties-with-terrorist-affiliated-group/>.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid.

<sup>570</sup> Dexter Van Zile, "Islamic Relief Franchise Takes Another Hit, This Time in Germany," *Middle East Forum*, June 10, 2026, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/islamic-relief-franchise-takes-another-hit-this-time-in-germany>.

Additional concerns emerged in Germany, where Islamic Relief Deutschland (IRD), IRW's German affiliate, was expelled from Aktion Deutschland Hilft (ADH), a consortium of major humanitarian organizations. The expulsion followed a confidential audit that found German authorities had provided funding to IRD while failing to adequately monitor its use until 2019, despite acknowledging that both IRD and IRW had significant personnel links to the Muslim Brotherhood or organizations closely associated with it.<sup>571</sup>

### 5.3.2 Questionable Funding and Relationships

Notwithstanding these controversies, IRC continues to maintain extensive financial ties with the broader Islamic Relief network. According to CRA records, IRC transferred C\$67.5 million to IRW affiliates worldwide in 2024 alone. The largest recipient was Islamic Relief's West Bank and Gaza affiliate, which received C\$16.3 million.<sup>572</sup>

Given the longstanding concerns surrounding IRW and several of its affiliates, IRC's continued access to public funding warrants further scrutiny. CRA records indicate that the charity received more than C\$6.6 million in government funding from federal, provincial, and municipal sources between 2020 and 2024,<sup>573</sup> despite the repeated investigations, sanctions, and regulatory actions directed at elements of the Islamic Relief network internationally.

IRC has also engaged with activist organizations operating on Canadian university campuses. Days after the October 7, 2023 attacks in Israel, IRC partnered with the Carleton University chapters of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and the Palestinian Students Association (PSA) to organize a fundraising bake sale for Gaza. According to a post on SJP Carleton's Instagram account, the initiative raised over C\$15,000.<sup>574</sup> Both student organizations play prominent roles in pro-Palestinian activism at Carleton University,<sup>575</sup> and former members of SJP Carleton have been

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<sup>571</sup> Mathilda Heller, "Germany Supported Hamas-Linked Organization for Years without Tracking Funds, Audit Finds," *Jerusalem Post*, May 25, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/international/islamic-terrorism/article-897262>.

<sup>572</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, 2024 Registered Charity Information Return (T3010) for Islamic Relief Canada: Schedule 2 – Activities outside Canada, Government of Canada, accessed June 23, 2026, [https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/t3010SchedI2\\_dsplyovrvw/821896875RR0001/1](https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/t3010SchedI2_dsplyovrvw/821896875RR0001/1).

<sup>573</sup> Canada Revenue Agency, Registered Charity Information Returns (T3010) for Islamic Relief Canada, 2020–2024, Government of Canada, accessed June 23, 2026, available at: <https://apps.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/hacc/srch/pub/dsplyRprtngPrd/808633598RR0001>.

<sup>574</sup> SJP Carleton (@sjpcarleton), "On October 17th and 18th, SJP, in collaboration with...", Instagram, November 1, 2023, [https://www.instagram.com/p/CzH5jVQR59z/?img\\_index=1](https://www.instagram.com/p/CzH5jVQR59z/?img_index=1).

<sup>575</sup> Brendon Poste, "In Photos: Ottawa Protesters Mark Two-Year Anniversary of Military Siege in Gaza," *The Charlatan*, October 7, 2025, <https://charlatan.ca/in-photos-ottawa-protesters-mark-two-year-anniversary-of-military-siege-in-gaza/>.

associated with incidents involving antisemitic rhetoric, expressions of support for Hamas and other designated terrorist organizations, and anti-Israel activism.<sup>576</sup>

## 5.4 Asymmetric Enforcement

The actions and affiliations of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC), ISNA Canada, and Islamic Relief Canada (IRC) raise broader concerns regarding the application of Canada's charitable regulatory regime. Despite documented findings related to extremist-linked networks, terrorist financing concerns, governance deficiencies, and other compliance failures, these organizations have continued to operate, access public funding, leverage political influence, and maintain charitable status with few enduring regulatory repercussions.

In contrast, enforcement actions against other religious charities have been markedly swifter and more severe. In the last two years alone, eight Jewish charities reportedly had their charitable status revoked for various violations.<sup>577</sup> Similarly, eight of the twenty-nine charities stripped of their charitable status in 2025 were Christian organizations,<sup>578</sup> despite the fact that the violations cited in those cases were not related to terrorism financing or extremist entities.

The cases of MAC, ISNA Canada, and the IRC point to a widening gap between regulatory findings and consequences for Brotherhood-aligned groups. When credible concerns involving extremist-linked networks and financial irregularities fail to trigger the revocation of charitable status, the threshold for enforcement becomes increasingly opaque. Absent consistent and transparent standards, the integrity of Canada's charitable oversight regime risks erosion, potentially undermining public confidence in its ability to address national security concerns associated with the charitable sector.

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<sup>576</sup> "Advanced Search: Carleton University SJP," Canary Mission, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://canarymission.org/advancedSearch?query=carleton%20university%20SJP&organizations%5B0%5D=SJP&universities%5B0%5D=Carleton>.

<sup>577</sup> Tristin Hopper, "As Jew-Hate Hits All-Time Highs, Canada Is 'Systematically' Purging Its Rolls of Jewish Charities," *National Post*, March 17, 2026, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/as-jew-hate-hits-all-time-highs-canada-is-systematically-purging-its-rolls-of-jewish-charities>; Jonathan Rothman, "Two More Israel-Focused Charities Have Their Tax Status Revoked by the CRA," *Canadian Jewish News*, March 1, 2026, <https://thecjn.ca/news/two-more-israel-focused-charities-have-their-tax-status-revoked-by-the-cra/>.

<sup>578</sup> Bethany Lindsay, "Christian Charities See Spike in Revocations for Serious Violations in 2025," *Business in Vancouver*, January 2, 2026, <https://www.biv.com/news/economy-law-politics/christian-charities-see-spike-in-revocations-for-serious-violations-in-2025-11692529>.

## SECTION III: THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES

### Chapter 6: Introduction

The national security risks associated with foreign student and researcher presence at Canadian universities are not hypothetical: they are documented in successive Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) public reports and parliamentary intelligence reviews. CSIS has repeatedly warned that foreign states exploit the open and collaborative nature of Canadian universities through “non-traditional intelligence collectors.” These are individuals without formal intelligence training—including students and researchers—who can identify and extract valuable information while operating without raising suspicion and who may be legally compelled to produce material for a foreign state security agency.<sup>579</sup> In its 2019 annual report, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians concluded that Canada is the target of “significant and sustained foreign interference activities” specifically targeting postsecondary campuses.<sup>580</sup>

The report states that

“some states seek to utilize the open and innovative features of these institutions to further their own objectives, which include interference activities but also other actions with hostile intent (e.g. espionage and intellectual property theft). Foreign interference activity seeks to influence public opinion and debate, thereby obstructing fundamental freedoms such as speech and assembly, and the independence of academic institutions. In trying to influence public debate at academic institutions, foreign states may sponsor specific events to shape discussion rather than engage in free debate and dialogue. They may also directly or indirectly attempt to disrupt public events or other activities perceived as problematic.”<sup>581</sup>

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<sup>579</sup> Joe Friesen, “CSIS Warns Canadian Universities to Be on Alert for International Espionage,” *Globe and Mail*, July 26, 2021, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-csis-cautions-canadian-universities-to-be-on-alert-for-international>.

<sup>580</sup> National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, *Annual Report 2019* (Government of Canada, 2019), [https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/nsicop-cpsnr/documents/annual\\_report\\_2019\\_public\\_en.pdf](https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/nsicop-cpsnr/documents/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf).

<sup>581</sup> *Ibid.*

In January 2024, the federal government went further, barring researchers affiliated with foreign institutions connected to military, national defense, or state security entities from accessing federal grants in sensitive fields—a policy driven by documented cases of Canadian intellectual property flowing to state-linked foreign institutions.<sup>582</sup> The framework Canada has developed to address these risks has thus far focused almost exclusively on China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Qatar—a state whose research funding apparatus is directly linked to its ruling family, whose national security and defense institutions co-fund research at Canadian universities, and whose connection to the underwriting of terrorist groups and extremist networks is well documented<sup>583</sup>—has not featured in that framework. The disclosure gap examined in Chapter 2 is thus not merely an administrative deficiency; it is the condition that makes this blind spot possible.

The vulnerabilities of Canada’s academic milieu are clearly illustrated by the case of Mohammadreza Pakatchian, an Iranian doctoral student admitted on scholarship to Carleton University’s Department of Aerospace Engineering in 2022, despite classified intelligence assessments from both the CSIS and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) identifying him as a national security threat. Since 2009 Pakatchian, had been employed by MAPNA, an Iranian engineering conglomerate sanctioned by Canada in 2016 for a “grave breach of international peace and security”<sup>584</sup> and for its connection to weapons of mass destruction.<sup>585</sup>

The CSIS described the research of Pakatchian’s Iranian academic reference, Mahmoud Mani of Amirkabir University in Tehran, as “unequivocally and overwhelmingly focused on military end-use applications,” including missile

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<sup>582</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *CSIS Public Report 2023* (Government of Canada, 2024), [https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis-scrs/documents/publications/Public\\_Report\\_2023-eng-DIGITAL.pdf](https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis-scrs/documents/publications/Public_Report_2023-eng-DIGITAL.pdf); Catharine Tunney, “Canada Names 100 Chinese, Russian, Iranian Research Institutions It Says Pose a Threat to National Security,” *CBC News*, January 16, 2024, <https://cbc.ca/amp/1.7085391>.

<sup>583</sup> “Written Evidence submitted by Steven Merley,” House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Global Islamist Terrorism Inquiry, February 26, 2018, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/87421/pdf/>; “Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship,” hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 115th Congress, First Session, July 26, 2017, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20170726/106329/HHRG-115-FA13-Transcript-20170726.pdf>; “ Hamas Political Leaders Leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar,” *BBC News*, February 28, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17192278>.

<sup>584</sup> Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations [Canada], SOR/2010-165, last amended March 25, 2026, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/sor-2010-165/fulltext.html>.

<sup>585</sup> Stewart Bell, “Why Carleton University Student Has Been Flagged as a Security Threat,” *Global News*, June 24, 2026, <https://globalnews.ca/news/11916178/csis-ottawa-phd-student-iran-weapons/>.

aerodynamics, rocket engines, and ballistic missiles.<sup>586</sup> The CBSA concluded that allowing Pakatchian to complete his Canadian PhD would facilitate “intangible technology transfer” that “could advance Iran’s military programs and capabilities”—and that upon graduation he intended to return to the same sanctioned employer, MAPNA.

That this failure occurred within a bilateral relationship defined by sanctions, blacklisted entities, and active CSIS and CBSA investigations raises a direct question about the adequacy of oversight where no comparable scrutiny has ever been applied—as in the case of Qatar.

The following chapters show that this threat operates simultaneously on two tracks that Canadian security policy has not been designed to consider together. The first is the research and technology transfer track. In this track, Qatari state entities fund projects at the University of Toronto (U of T), the University of Waterloo (UW), and Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU) in smart grid security, high-voltage materials science, cryptography, solar cell technology, and AI-assisted critical infrastructure monitoring—fields the Canadian government has itself identified as requiring safeguarding—through grant agreements whose IP and technology transfer terms remain entirely undisclosed. The second track is the narrative and institutional track. This track encompasses the systematic installation, through student organizations, faculty networks, academic programming, and governance mechanisms, of an interpretive framework that delegitimizes Israel, characterizes Canada’s counterterrorism architecture as racist and Islamophobic, and generates sustained pressure to sever institutional ties with all Israeli educational institutions while deepening those with Qatari without scrutiny.

Significantly, one TMU research project funded through the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) involves direct collaboration with Barzan Holdings, the procurement arm of Qatar’s Ministry of Defense.<sup>587</sup> This project involves joint research on defense, AI, and sensor technology through a partnership anchored at a Qatari state military entity, without any disclosed oversight framework governing the transfer of knowledge or technology.

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<sup>586</sup> Ibid.

<sup>587</sup> “Artificial Intelligence Assisted and Computationally Efficient Smart Vision Sensor,” Project no. NPRP 13S-0212-200345, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed June 25, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/34794>; Craig Hoyle, “How Barzan Holdings Is Driving Qatar’s Defence Industry Growth,” FlightGlobal, October 5, 2023, <https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/2023/10/how-barzan-holdings-is-driving-qatars-defence-industry-growth/>.

The aforementioned tracks frequently converge. At each of the three universities examined in this section, the same institutional environment that has been shaped by years of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned narrative investment is also the environment in which Qatari research partnerships have expanded, without appropriate examination of their details and implications. While a research partnership with Israel's leading technical university was terminated by UW under activist pressure,<sup>588</sup> the university's research ties with Qatar continued to expand over the same period. UW ranks ninth among Canadian institutions on QatarEnergy's own 2025 University Priority List, which identifies it as a preferred partner for research collaboration and recruitment.<sup>589</sup> The asymmetry is not coincidental. It is the operational signature of the *tamkeen* strategy this report documents.

Underlying both tracks is a structural financial vulnerability that the *tamkeen* strategy is positioned to exploit. At all three universities, frozen domestic tuition and capped government grants have produced a deepening dependency on international student revenue. At U of T, international students account for approximately 30 percent of enrollment but are estimated to generate more than half of the university's C\$2.3 billion in annual student fee revenue—a consequence of domestic tuition being frozen at roughly C\$6,100 since 2019, while international undergraduate fees range from C\$45,000 to C\$70,000 annually.<sup>590</sup>

At TMU, international students represent just over 10 percent of undergraduate enrollment, yet generate an estimated 28 percent of total student fee revenue, as documented in section 9.3 below.<sup>591</sup> This structural dependency creates institutional

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<sup>588</sup> Alicia Wang, "UW Will Not Renew Partnership with Technion," *Imprint*, September 22, 2025, <https://uwimprint.ca/article/uw-will-not-renew-partnership-with-technion/>.

<sup>589</sup> "QatarEnergy's University Priority List 2025," QatarEnergy, November 12, 2024, <https://www.qatarenergy.qa/en/Careers/UniversityProgramApplication/Documents/University%20Priority%20List%202025.pdf>.

<sup>590</sup> Planning and Budget Office, *Enrolment Report 2023–24 and Long-Range Enrolment Plans 2024–25 to 2028–29* (University of Toronto, February 13, 2024), <https://planningandbudget.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/23-24-Enrolment-Report.pdf>; University of Toronto Financial Services, *Financial Report 2024* (University of Toronto, April 30, 2024), <https://finance.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024FR.pdf>. Revenue share is the authors' estimate based on published enrollment FTE figures (international undergraduate FTE: 21,240; international graduate FTE: 5,702; total FTE: 88,652) and approximate 2023–24 tuition rates (international undergraduate average: ~\$50,000; international graduate average: ~\$35,000; domestic undergraduate Ontario rate: ~\$6,100). The enrollment report separately confirms that 6 percent of international undergraduate tuition revenue (budgeted at \$76 million for 2024–25) is earmarked for international student scholarships, implying international undergraduate tuition revenue of approximately \$1.27 billion. Across all rate assumptions modeled, the international share of total student fee revenue falls between 49 and 61 percent, with a central estimate of approximately 55 percent.

<sup>591</sup> "Undergraduate Students Enrolment Data (2023–24)," Excel chart, Toronto Metropolitan University, last modified August 8, 2024, [https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/university-planning/Data-Statistics/Key-Statistics/summer-2024/UG\\_AllYears\\_Enrolment\\_2019-2023\\_FINAL.xlsx](https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/university-planning/Data-Statistics/Key-Statistics/summer-2024/UG_AllYears_Enrolment_2019-2023_FINAL.xlsx); "Consolidated Financial Statements:

incentives to avoid scrutiny of foreign state relationships—including research partnerships, scholarship pipelines, and commercialization agreements—through which that revenue flows. Universities that cannot afford to lose international students and funding relationships are universities that are structurally reluctant to examine those relationships.

Academic freedom does not confer institutional immunity from sanctions compliance. The Pakatchian case, together with the broader pattern documented in the following chapters, demonstrates that the universities examined in this report have neither the institutional culture nor the operational protocols to apply meaningful due diligence to research relationships with potential bad actors. In the Pakatchian case, the CBSA warned explicitly that intangible technology transfer through graduate training constitutes a vector for advancing Iran’s weapons programs.

That warning has not produced a commensurate institutional response. The chapters that follow document the same failure with respect to Qatar—a failure that has proceeded further, with less scrutiny, and without even the partial regulatory framework that governs Iranian entanglement. At each of the three Ontario universities examined, the ideological and organizational networks are similar and the narrative frameworks are substantially consistent. What differs is only the depth of penetration and the specific institutional outcomes achieved. Taken together, the following chapters provide a substantial account of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned and Qatari institutional influence in Canadian academia.

## **6.1 Qatar National Research Fund: A State Instrument in Canadian Universities**

Most of the research funding examined in the following chapters is primarily channeled through a single institutional instrument: the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF). Established in 2006 under Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development—itsself a royal family initiative operating under the direct authority of the Emir—QNRF was designated by Qatari state law as the implementation arm for national research funding.<sup>592</sup>

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Year Ended April 30, 2024,” Toronto Metropolitan University, June 2024, <https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/financial-services/reporting/docs/tmu-consolidated-financial-statements-2024.pdf>; “2026–27 Budget Process: Frequently Asked Questions,” Toronto Metropolitan University, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.torontomu.ca/budget/FAQ/>.

<sup>592</sup> Gary Cecchine et al., *Sustaining the Qatar National Research Fund* (RAND Corporation, August 22, 2012), [https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\\_reports/TR1125.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1125.html).

Its governing mandate is not the disinterested advancement of knowledge but the explicit acceleration of the “Qatar National Vision 2030” strategy: the conversion of a hydrocarbon-dependent economy into a diversified, knowledge-based one.<sup>593</sup> As Ahmed Baghdady, then QNRF’s program officer, stated publicly, the fund’s core purpose is promoting “learning-by-doing” and “hands-on” research activities.<sup>594</sup> This is an effective method for building Qatar’s knowledge-based economy—research programming explicitly oriented toward Qatar’s national development agenda. QNRF-funded projects are expected to address “challenges and opportunities specific to Qatar’s environment, economy, and society.”<sup>595</sup>

The research projects examined below should be understood not as mere bilateral academic collaborations of the kind routinely conducted between peer institutions. They are grants awarded by a Qatari state entity, under terms that have not been disclosed publicly, for research whose applied orientation—smart grid security, high-voltage insulation materials, groundwater contamination in arid hydrocarbon environments, and cybersecurity for critical infrastructure—maps directly onto the national infrastructure priorities of a state committed to *tamkeen* and the normalization, promotion, and funding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology and organizational network.

The scale and terms of comparable Qatari funding arrangements have been examined extensively in ISGAP’s investigation of Qatar Foundation–funded research at Texas A&M University.<sup>596</sup> That investigation revealed that Qatar had acquired contractual ownership of more than 500 research projects—including approximately fifty-eight projects with dual-use or military application potential in the fields of cybersecurity, advanced materials, and energy technology—and broad access to faculty, curriculum, budgets, and student records in exchange for over one billion US dollars in funding.<sup>597</sup>

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<sup>593</sup> Matthew Hartley, Alan Ruby, and Ahmed Baghdady, “Qatar University: Local Identity and Global Opportunities,” in *Pursuing Institutional Purpose: Profiles of Excellence*, ed. M. Hartley and A. Ruby, 90–104 (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

<sup>594</sup> Wajeeha Malik and Neha Rashid, “Spotlight: QNRF’s Undergraduate Research Experience Program,” NU-Q Views [Northwestern University in Qatar], February 18, 2015, <https://qviews.qatar.northwestern.edu/4479/uncategorized/spotlight-qnrfs-undergraduate-research-experience-program/>.

<sup>595</sup> “Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF),” Devex, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.devex.com/organizations/qatar-national-research-fund-qnrf-96602>.

<sup>596</sup> ISGAP, *Hijacking Higher Education, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood and Texas A&M, Volume 2* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/TAMUQ\\_Report\\_Volume\\_Two-1.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/TAMUQ_Report_Volume_Two-1.pdf).

<sup>597</sup> ISGAP, *Hijacking Higher Education, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Texas A&M: Buying Nuclear Research and Student Information* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Texas\\_AM\\_Qatar.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Texas_AM_Qatar.pdf).

In February 2024, following ISGAP's disclosures, Texas A&M voted to terminate its Qatar Foundation contracts and close its Doha campus by 2028.<sup>598</sup>

The question this report poses is whether Canada's undisclosed QNRF agreements and other connections to the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological and organizational ecosystem replicate that model. Qatar is a state that has been documented as hosting terrorist organizations, funding extremist networks, and exporting Muslim Brotherhood ideology through academic and media infrastructure.<sup>599</sup> In spite of this, the terms governing its research partnerships with Canadian universities have never been subjected to meaningful scrutiny by academic oversight bodies, law enforcement agencies, or Canada's regulatory system.

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<sup>598</sup> "Texas A&M Qatar Campus to Close by 2028," Texas A&M University, February 8, 2024, <https://stories.tamu.edu/news/2024/02/08/texas-am-qatar-campus-to-close-by-2028/>.

<sup>599</sup> ISGAP, *The Qatari Regime, Hamas, and Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/QATAR-REGIME\\_HAMAS\\_MB\\_FINAL.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/QATAR-REGIME_HAMAS_MB_FINAL.pdf); ISGAP, *The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into the United States: A Systemic Analysis* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf>.

## Chapter 7: University of Toronto

The University of Toronto (U of T) is not simply another Canadian campus where Muslim Brotherhood-aligned activism has taken hold; it is the institution where the narrative infrastructure examined in Chapter 1 was first institutionalized in Canada. In particular, it is the originating site of Israeli Apartheid Week, the location of one of the largest and longest-running campus encampments in North American history, home to over 1,000 student organizations,<sup>600</sup> of which a significant and coordinated subset has pursued a sustained campaign to embed BDS ideology and the Palestinianization framework into university governance, and a faculty environment in which pro-Palestinian networks have provided sustained institutional legitimization to that campaign while simultaneously overlapping with Qatari academic initiatives documented in detail in this chapter. At no other Canadian university do all four domains of *tamkeen* (entrenchment) converge with the same depth, the same organizational density, and the same two-decade trajectory. As will be demonstrated, the dynamics underlying the virulent anti-Israel activism at U of T started long before October 7, 2023.

### 7.1 Twenty Years of Narrative Infrastructure: From Israeli Apartheid Week to the Classroom

U of T has distinguished itself over the past two decades as the originating institution of Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW). This annual event promoting and disseminating anti-Israel and anti-Zionist material at universities across the globe traces its roots to an event at U of T in 2004.<sup>601</sup> Beyond the name itself, which mainstreams the false claim that Israel is an apartheid state, IAW events have over the years included calls to “kill the Jews and rape their women,” and to destroy the Jewish state.<sup>602</sup>

This reflects a sustained narrative investment, with two decades of doctrinal implementation establishing the interpretive framework underpinning the conditions documented in this chapter. Faculty for Palestine<sup>603</sup> has maintained an active presence at U of T since at least 2016, organizing events including film screenings during IAW

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<sup>600</sup> “Groups,” Student Organization Portal, University of Toronto, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://sop.utoronto.ca/groups/>

<sup>601</sup> Avi Weinryb, “The University of Toronto—The Institution Where Israel Apartheid Week Was Born,” Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, December 24, 2008, <https://jcfa.org/article/the-university-of-toronto-the-institution-where-israel-apartheid-week-was-born/>.

<sup>602</sup> Stuart Kamenetsky, “Universities in Crisis,” *Fathom* (November 2023), <https://fathomjournal.org/universities-in-crisis-opinion-there-is-no-academic-freedom-for-jewish-faculty-at-the-university-of-toronto/>.

<sup>603</sup> Website of Faculty for Palestine, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://faculty4palestine.ca/>

programming, demonstrating that institutional tolerance of sustained anti-Israeli activism long predates October 7.<sup>604</sup>

This narrative penetration extends into the curriculum. A *National Post* report from September 2022, for example, notes that “at least two courses at U of T effectively erase the State of Israel from their description.”<sup>605</sup> The outline for one of the courses, “Rethinking Palestine,” claims to examine such concepts as “colonialism” and “occupation” while omitting any mention of the modern state of Israel.<sup>606</sup> Another course, “Modern Palestine,” starts from the false premise that a Palestinian state exists, with the goal of providing “an overview of the political struggle over Palestine between Zionist and Palestinian national movements.”<sup>607</sup>

## 7.2 The Encampment: Physical Consolidation and the Red-Green Alliance

The anti-Israel encampment at U of T, the physical manifestation of this narrative infrastructure, was set up at the heart of the university’s downtown campus on May 2, 2024, by U of T Occupy for Palestine.<sup>608</sup> Occupy for Palestine (O4P), which is not a formally registered student organization in U of T’s official student groups directory but operates as an activist encampment collective, organized what it called the “People’s Circle for Palestine,” demanding university disclosure of investments, divestment from companies profiting from Israeli policies, and the severing of ties with Israeli institutions. Its actions included occupying the President’s office and sustaining the encampment for over two months.<sup>609</sup> According to U of T associate professor Kevin A. Bryan, who entered the encampment posing as a supporter, “a strict majority of people” were neither students nor affiliated with the university.<sup>610</sup> In his report to the *National Post*, he added that attendees were specifically told that, if they did not support the collective’s views on Palestine, they were not welcome and would be removed.<sup>611</sup>

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<sup>604</sup> Ibid.; Omar Taleb, “Our University is Complicit,” *The Media Co-op*, May 3, 2024, <https://mediacoop.ca/node/119224>.

<sup>605</sup> Avi Benlolo, “University of Toronto Succumbs to anti-Israel Propaganda,” *National Post*, September 9, 2022, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/avi-benlolo-university-of-toronto-succumbs-to-anti-israel-propaganda>.

<sup>606</sup> Ibid.

<sup>607</sup> Ibid.

<sup>608</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee? The Growing Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Politics, Academia, and Civil Society in Canada* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada\\_Report\\_Final\\_250622\\_EN\\_Final.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada_Report_Final_250622_EN_Final.pdf).

<sup>609</sup> Pichak Sheikh, Girish Daswani, and Katherine Blouin, “On the People’s Circle for Palestine at the University of Toronto,” *Fieldsights* (blog of Society for Cultural Anthropology), October 15, 2024, <https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/on-the-peoples-circle-for-palestine-at-the-university-of-toronto>.

<sup>610</sup> “Not a ‘Student Encampment’: U of T Professor Visits anti-Israel Protest,” *National Post*, May 3, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/news/toronto/university-of-toronto-anti-israel-protest-encampment>.

<sup>611</sup> Ibid.

Reports of anti-Jewish discrimination at the encampment included the need to pass unofficial border guards wearing keffiyehs who asked for identification or proof of religion, affiliation, or ideology in order to enter the so-called “Little Gaza” and blocked access to Jews unless they were “approved.”<sup>612</sup> These “onboarding booths” at the entrance to the encampment ensured that those entering agreed with Palestinian resistance and the right of return and were intended to root out anyone with Zionist views.<sup>613</sup>

Another witness, Joshua Loewen-Samuels, a PhD student at U of T, reported overhearing children inside the encampment being told to say “f\*\*\* Jews” and Jews being described as “baby killers, kikes, evil Zionists” who should “go back to Europe.”<sup>614</sup> On an occasion where a woman managed to enter the encampment undetected, Bryan describes her being set upon by roughly fifty individuals chanting slogans to the effect that all Zionists are evil, while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge that terms like “honor the martyrs” and “intifada” are violent.<sup>615</sup>

While university administrators acknowledged the dangerous situation on campus, including reports of “assaults and hate speech,” and expressed concern about the number of members of the public who were descending upon the university to participate in the protests against Israel, no further action was taken by the university or law enforcement at this time.<sup>616</sup>

The encampment was also protected and defended by Ontario union leaders, who vowed to physically defend the protesters when pressure to dismantle the encampment started to increase.<sup>617</sup> JP Hornick, president of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), told a crowd of protesters that their job was to physically guard the protesters from recriminations, stating that “we will be your human shields. We will be your line of defence” in case the police arrive.<sup>618</sup> The Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) and

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<sup>612</sup> Joe Warmington, “Marshals Wearing Keffiyehs at U of T Tell Jews They Can’t Enter Little Gaza Camp,” *Toronto Sun*, May 6, 2024, <https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/warmington-marshals-wearing-keffiyehs-at-u-of-t-tell-jews-they-cant-enter-little-gaza-camp>.

<sup>613</sup> Jesse Kline, “Fear and Loathing on the Occupied University of Toronto Campus,” *National Post*, May 8, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/jesse-kline-fear-and-loathing-on-the-occupied-university-of-toronto-campus>.

<sup>614</sup> Warmington, “Marshals Wearing Keffiyehs.”

<sup>615</sup> Ibid.

<sup>616</sup> Ibid.

<sup>617</sup> Ben Cohen et al., “‘We Will Be Your Human Shields’: Why Unions Are Showing Up in Force to Support the U of T pro-Palestinian Protest Encampment,” *Toronto Star*, May 30, 2024, [https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/we-will-be-your-human-shields-why-unions-are-showing-up-in-force-to-support/article\\_562a3da0-1c62-11ef-91f5-2f4615a0758e.html](https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/we-will-be-your-human-shields-why-unions-are-showing-up-in-force-to-support/article_562a3da0-1c62-11ef-91f5-2f4615a0758e.html).

<sup>618</sup> Ibid.

Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)—Canada’s largest labor union,<sup>619</sup> whose Ontario president Fred Hahn had reacted to the October 7 massacre with a celebratory post about the “power of resistance”—made similar pledges.<sup>620</sup> Despite subsequently releasing a statement apologizing for his choice of words and their timing, Hahn nonetheless blamed Israel for the “disproportionate” response to the attacks.<sup>621</sup>

The labour movement’s physical protection of the encampment is a clear manifestation of the Red-Green alliance doctrine, as codified in the Seventh Point of Departure of “The Project,” which refers to coalition partners contributing operational support without sharing ideological objectives under the cover of shared anti-imperialist framing.<sup>622</sup>

The U of T administration has similarly been accused of applying a double standard in relation to the campus encampments set up in the summer of 2024. The anti-Israel “Little Gaza” encampment was fully fenced off and was allowed to grow in size for over a month, while a small counter-protest encampment was removed by campus security within minutes of being established as it was “simply small enough to remove.”<sup>623</sup>

### 7.3 An Interlocking Organizational Ecosystem

The organizational infrastructure sustaining campus activism at U of T follows the pattern described in section 1.4.2 (Domain 2: Institutional Embedding) and is similar to the networks at Waterloo and TMU, only much larger.

The pro-Palestinian organizations active across U of T’s three campuses include sophisticated and coordinated academic initiatives, such as Hearing Palestine, and a plethora of sanctioned and unsanctioned activist groups, including the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), UTM’s Association of Palestinian Students (APS), UTSC’s Palestinian Culture Club (PCC), U of T Occupy for Palestine (O4P), and Tkarón:to Students in Solidarity with Palestine (TSSP) (formerly Tkarón:to Students for Palestine), three of

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<sup>619</sup> Ibid.

<sup>620</sup> Ibid.

<sup>621</sup> Josh Rubin, “CUPE Ontario President Fred Hahn Apologizes for Palestine statement,” *Toronto Star*, October 21, 2023, [https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/cupe-ontario-president-fred-hahn-apologizes-for-palestine-statement/article\\_854c9b44-d05d-5fca-b492-3c202814104a.html](https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/cupe-ontario-president-fred-hahn-apologizes-for-palestine-statement/article_854c9b44-d05d-5fca-b492-3c202814104a.html).

<sup>622</sup> “The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy” (1982), translated by Scott Burgess in December 2005 based on French version published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l’Occident* (Seuil, 2005), available at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf>.

<sup>623</sup> “B’nai Brith Astounded After U of T Dismisses Jewish Community’s Concerns,” B’nai Brith Canada, October 31, 2024, <https://www.bnaibrith.ca/bnai-brith-astounded-after-u-of-t-dismisses-jewish-communitys-concerns/>.

which co-organized a joint rally in October 2025.<sup>624</sup> Many of these organizations are involved in coordinated and sustained political mobilization, including public rallies, commemorative campaigns, and calls for divestment and academic boycotts.<sup>625</sup>

On November 29, 2023, less than two months after the Hamas attacks of October 7, the U of T Mississauga Students' Union (UTMSU) passed a motion calling on the union to officially adopt a “pro-Palestine stance” that would affect all clubs and services funded by the union.<sup>626</sup> In addition, the motion tasked UTMSU with creating comprehensive resource booklets, including contacts for legal counsel, for students seeking “Palestinian liberation and the end of the occupation of Gaza.”<sup>627</sup>

In October 2025, UTMSU and U of T's Palestinian Culture Club (PCC) held commemorative events on campus honoring Palestinian “martyrs” on the anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attacks. In social media posts, UTMSU announced that it would “gather to commemorate two years of genocide in Palestine,” while the PCC posted that there would be a “vigil for our martyrs” on the St. George and Scarborough campuses.<sup>628</sup>

What distinguishes U of T pro-Palestinian ecosystem is not merely its scale but its institutional depth: where other campuses host student clubs and protest coalitions, U of T has produced a purpose-built academic infrastructure for the Palestinianization framework—one that operates not at the margins of the university but from within its most prestigious scholarly institutions.

### 7.3.1 Hearing Palestine

Among the organizational nodes sustaining the narrative infrastructure at U of T, Hearing Palestine occupies a distinct position. Unlike student clubs or informal protest

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<sup>624</sup> Tkarón:to Students in Solidarity with Palestine (@torontostudentsforpalestine), Instagram profile, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.instagram.com/torontostudentsforpalestine/>; “Association of Palestinian Students,” Student Organization Portal, University of Toronto, <https://sop.utoronto.ca/group/association-of-palestinian-students-aps/>; Palestinian Culture Club at the University of Toronto (@uoftpcc), Instagram profile, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.instagram.com/uoftpcc/>.

<sup>625</sup> Ella MacCormack, “October 8 Student Rally for Palestine Stops Traffic,” *The Varsity*, October 20, 2025, <https://thevarsity.ca/2025/10/20/october-8-student-rally-for-palestine-stops-traffic/>.

<sup>626</sup> Kamilla Bekbossynova, “Students Pass Motion to Officially Take ‘pro-Palestine’ Stance at UTMSU 2023 AGM,” *The Varsity*, January 8, 2024, <https://thevarsity.ca/2024/01/08/students-pass-motion-to-officially-take-pro-palestine-stance-at-utmsu-2023-agm/>.

<sup>627</sup> Ibid.

<sup>628</sup> Jennifer Pagliaro and Kate Allen, “U of T Mississauga Students' Union, Club Host Events Honouring Palestinian ‘Martyrs’ on Anniversary of Oct. 7 Attacks on Israel,” *Toronto Star*, October 9, 2025, [https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/u-of-t-mississauga-students-union-club-host-events-honouring-palestinian-martyrs-on-anniversary-of/article\\_646efca3-21ff-4e14-9d9c-c955587a2d05.html](https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/u-of-t-mississauga-students-union-club-host-events-honouring-palestinian-martyrs-on-anniversary-of/article_646efca3-21ff-4e14-9d9c-c955587a2d05.html).

collectives, it is an institutionally embedded academic initiative housed within U of T's Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS), governed by a faculty steering committee and supported by an international advisory board.<sup>629</sup> Its stated research vision is to “centre Palestine as a subject of research and method of public inquiry at U of T and across Canada.”<sup>630</sup> This structure is consistent with the institutional embedding pattern described in Section I.<sup>631</sup> Hearing Palestine enjoys founding sponsorship from six university academic units, including the Institute of Islamic Studies, the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, the Departments of History, Anthropology, and Religion, and the Centre for the Study of the United States at the Munk School, lending the initiative extraordinary academic sheen.<sup>632</sup> The initiative was established in the fall of 2020,<sup>633</sup> explicitly framed as a response to what it characterizes as the “Palestine Exception to Academic Freedom” and alleged anti-Palestinian discrimination on campus.<sup>634</sup> Its programming is organized around the interpretive framework documented in Chapter 1—settler colonialism, anti-Zionism, liberation discourse, BDS normalization, and anti-Palestinian racism. Key events have included lectures and conferences, such as “Decolonization and the War on Gaza,” “International Law after the Gaza Genocide” (with Francesca Albanese), and “The Anti-Zionist Idea,” as well as recurring Nakba commemoration programming.<sup>635</sup>

Hearing Palestine's governance structure illustrates the consolidation phase of Domain 2's institutional embedding strategy with particular clarity. Its administrative director is Professor Anver M. Emon, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies and Canada Research Chair in Islamic Law and History.<sup>636</sup> Emon's broader advocacy work is directly relevant in this context. In 2024, following the CRA's audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) (see Section II), Emon authored a report arguing that Canada's anti-terrorism financing regulations imposed disproportionate scrutiny on

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<sup>629</sup> “About,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/about/>.

<sup>630</sup> Ibid.

<sup>631</sup> See section 1.4 (Four Domains of Operational Implementation of the Muslim Brotherhood's *Tamkeen* (Entrenchment) Strategy).

<sup>632</sup> “About,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/about/>.

<sup>633</sup> Yasmeen Atassi, Racha Ghanem, and Salwa Iqbal, “U of T Hasn't Been Welcoming to Palestinian Community Members: A New Initiative Hopes to Change That,” *The Varsity*, September 12, 2021, <https://thevarsity.ca/2021/09/12/u-of-t-hasnt-been-welcoming-to-palestinian-community-members-a-new-initiative-hopes-to-change-that>.

<sup>634</sup> Ibid.

<sup>635</sup> “Events,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/events/>.

<sup>636</sup> “People,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/people/>.

Muslim charities and needed to be reformed.<sup>637</sup> In a subsequent report, he argued that Canada’s anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing sanctions regime places a disproportionate burden on Muslim charities through biased audits, financial de-risking, and humanitarian de-risking—and that this undermines legitimate religious and humanitarian work without meaningfully reducing actual security risk.<sup>638</sup> In effect, Emon has positioned himself as the primary academic advocate both for the centering of Palestine in the Islamic academic milieu and for reducing the institutional transparency requirements that would make the financial architecture of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned charitable networks (as described in Sections I and II) legible to Canadian oversight bodies.

Organizationally, Hearing Palestine functions as a network hub. Its international advisory board includes Diana Buttu, a former adviser to the PLO’s negotiating team, and Michael Lynk, a former UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.<sup>639</sup> Similarly, steering committee member Dania Majid is simultaneously co-founder and president of the Arab Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA) (authors of the white paper on anti-Palestinian racism discussed in Chapter 4) and co-founder and artistic director of the Toronto Palestine Film Festival—two organizations that feature heavily in Hearing Palestine’s programming and resource lists.<sup>640</sup> Advisory board member Azeezah Kanji is Director of Programming at the Noor Cultural Centre.<sup>641</sup> Hearing Palestine frequently co-hosts events with student groups such as the Palestinian Culture Club (PCC) and Tkarón:to Students in Solidarity with Palestine (TSSP).<sup>642</sup>

Among its many affiliations, Hearing Palestine promotes that work of Visualizing Palestine, an advocacy organization founded in 2012 that produces and freely distributes infographics explicitly designed to advance Palestinian nationalism, promote BDS, and frame all Israel’s actions as acts of genocide—from agriculture to law

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<sup>637</sup> Anver M. Emon and Nadia Z. Hasan, *Under Layered Suspicion: A Review of CRA Audits of Muslim-led Charities* (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2021), <https://nccm.ca/cra/>.

<sup>638</sup> Anver M. Emon, *Humanitarianism and the Exclusion of Muslim Charities from the Financial Sector* (Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Toronto, 2026), <https://islamicstudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/report-humanitarianism-and-the-exclusion-of-muslim-charities-from-the-financial-sector/>

<sup>639</sup> “People,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/people/>.

<sup>640</sup> “People,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/people/>.

<sup>641</sup> Ibid.

<sup>642</sup> “International Law after the Gaza Genocide [Nov 7th, 2024],” event announcement, Hearing Palestine, October 18, 2024, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/international-law-after-the-gaza-genocide/>; “[October 16, 2024] Palestine and Lebanon: Between Catastrophe and Liberation,” event announcement, Hearing Palestine, October 16, 2024, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/palestine-and-lebanon-between-catastrophe-and-liberation/>

enforcement—treating such framing not as a contested legal characterization but as an organizing premise across all its output.<sup>643</sup>

In March 2025, Hearing Palestine hosted an event with Rana Barakat of Birzeit University, entitled “Ongoing Return, Ongoing Nakba: Stories of Belonging.”<sup>644</sup> Platforming a Birzeit academic is notable as Birzeit University, the West Bank’s leading academic institution, has been documented as a hub of Hamas-affiliated extremism, with Hamas’s student faction dominating student government in successive landslide elections, military-style parades glorifying terrorist attacks being held on campus, buildings named after convicted terrorists, a policy of barring Israeli Jews, and students being arrested for planning and financing terrorist attacks.<sup>645</sup>

What distinguishes Hearing Palestine from the student activism documented elsewhere in this chapter is precisely its institutional location. Its donor pathway runs not through an independent charity or student club account but through the U of T’s own financial infrastructure—donations processed through the IIS donation platform and allocated to Hearing Palestine programming are allocated through the university’s internal fund allocation system.<sup>646</sup> Hearing Palestine also offers postdoctoral fellowships (valued at C\$70,000 annually), manuscript reviews, an in-house journal, an archive of Palestinian student activities, and scholars and artists in residence.<sup>647</sup> Far from being a protest collective, it is an institutionalized academic node for the production and dissemination of pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist content, operating within and sustained by Canada’s top-ranked research university.

### 7.3.2 Muslim Students’ Association

The Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) at U of T is not a typical student club. Founded in 1965 as the first MSA chapter in Canada, it has grown into the university’s largest

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<sup>643</sup> “Resources,” Hearing Palestine, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/resources/>; “Visualizing Palestine,” profile, InfluenceWatch, accessed June 23, 2026, <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/visualizing-palestine/>.

<sup>644</sup> “[March 20, 2025] Ongoing Return, Ongoing Nakba: Stories of Belonging,” event announcement, Hearing Palestine, February 13, 2025, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/ongoing-return-ongoing-nakba-stories-of-belonging/>.

<sup>645</sup> Akiva Van Koningsveld, “As Hamas Terror Group Takes Control of West Bank’s Birzeit University, Will European Partner Institutions Respond?,” Honest Reporting, May 19, 2022, <https://honestreporting.com/as-hamas-terror-group-takes-control-of-west-banks-birzeit-university-will-european-partner-institutions-respond/>.

<sup>646</sup> “Donate,” Institute of Islamic Studies, University of Toronto, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://islamicstudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/donate/>.

<sup>647</sup> “Call for Post-Doctoral Fellowship in Palestine Studies,” Hearing Palestine, March 16, 2026, <https://palestinestudies.artsci.utoronto.ca/call-for-post-doctoral-fellowship-in-palestine-studies/>

student organization—with over 1,500 members, a financial architecture, a charitable transfer network, and external organizational relationships—making it both the earliest and the most consequential example of the institutionalization of the Brotherhood’s North American strategy on Canadian soil.<sup>648</sup> Its significance cannot be understood without reference to the organization’s parent body, the Muslim Students’ Association of the United States and Canada, which is explicitly named in the “Explanatory Memorandum” as one of the organizations established by the Muslim Brotherhood to implement its *tamkeen* (entrenchment) strategy in North America—a strategy it describes as a “grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within.”<sup>649</sup>

The MSA’s financial reports, published on its website, reveal an operation functioning less like a campus club and more like a mid-level philanthropic entity, with diversified revenue streams, an events infrastructure, and significant annual charitable transfers to external organizations.<sup>650</sup> Its most significant donee is the Orphan Sponsorship Program (OSP), which since its inception in 2003 has raised over C\$1 million for orphans globally, transferring funds semi-annually to three primary partner charities: Human Concern International (HCI), Islamic Relief Canada, and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA).<sup>651</sup> HCI consistently receives the largest share of OSP transfers by a significant margin, in some years receiving more than double the amounts distributed to the other two partners individually.<sup>652</sup>

Following an audit of HCI’s financial records from 2011 to 2013, the CRA found that it had issued official tax receipts on behalf of six organizations that were not registered charities—covering C\$307,841 in charitable gifts—in violation of the requirement that registered charities maintain direction and control over their own resources.<sup>653</sup> The

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<sup>648</sup> “About,” Muslim Students’ Association, University of Toronto, <https://www.uoftmsa.com/about.html>.

<sup>649</sup> Mohamed Akram, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” May 22, 1991, Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex.) [hereinafter, “Explanatory Memorandum”], available at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf>. For a discussion of the *tamkeen* strategy, see Chapter 1.

<sup>650</sup> “Financial Reports,” University of Toronto Muslim Students’ Association, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.uoftmsa.com/financialreports.html>.

<sup>651</sup> Ibid.

<sup>652</sup> See MSA financial reports for 2013–2014 and 2020–2021, “Financial Reports,” University of Toronto Muslim Students’ Association, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.uoftmsa.com/financialreports.html>. In 2013–2014, HCI received C\$41,040 against C\$19,080 for ICNA and C\$4,440 for Islamic Relief; in 2020–2021, HCI received C\$25,380 against C\$10,440 for ICNA and C\$5,940 for Islamic Relief.

<sup>653</sup> “Notice of Penalty and Suspension of Receipting Privileges—Human Concern International,” letter from Canada Revenue Agency to Human Concern International, July 7, 2021, <https://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Human-Concern-International-Penalty-and-Suspension-Redacted.pdf>.

MSA's own financial reports acknowledge the resulting suspension, noting that OSP funds destined for HCI were withheld pending resolution with donors and transferred once HCI's tax-receipting privileges were restored in July 2022.<sup>654</sup> MSA's relationship with HCI does not implicate the MSA in wrongdoing; rather it illustrates the opacity of the charitable transfer architecture through which MSA-collected funds flow to external organizations—an architecture that Canadian disclosure frameworks and regulatory bodies have failed to adequately examine. This raises serious questions about the purpose, structure, and financial infrastructure of what is ostensibly a student group.

Beyond the OSP, the MSA's revenue base includes institutional funding from the University of Toronto Students' Union (UTSU), the Student Initiative Fund, and the Engineering Society, as well as corporate and organizational sponsorships from ISNA Canada, Penny Appeal Canada, Human Concern International, and others.<sup>655</sup> The MSA thus receives funding both from U of T's own institutional infrastructure and from certain organizations that might themselves be nodes in the Brotherhood-aligned ecosystem, as documented in Chapter 3. The financial relationship is bidirectional: U of T institutional funds flow into the MSA, and MSA-collected funds flow outward to external charitable organizations, including Islamic Relief Canada, an organization with documented ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on the above, the university's own mandatory student fee infrastructure also functions as link in this chain.

The MSA's operational role in the events documented elsewhere in this chapter is more direct. In February 2024, the U of T Mississauga campus hosted British political commentator Sami Hamdi for a student event. Ten days after the October 7 attacks, Hamdi was reported to have told an audience to “celebrate the victory” of Hamas, to have described the emotional response to the massacre as “euphoria,” and to have claimed that the accounts of Hamas sexual assaults were fabrications.<sup>656</sup> Hamdi's multi-campus tour was also sponsored by the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC), the political mobilization organization examined in Section II.<sup>657</sup>

In January 2025, U of T's MSA branch was also behind a planned lecture by Shadi Shurada, a member of the terror-designated PFLP, who planned and provided the

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<sup>654</sup> *Annual Report 2020–2021*, available at “Financial Reports,” University of Toronto Muslim Students' Association, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.uoftmsa.com/financialreports.html>.

<sup>655</sup> *Annual Report: May 1st 2023–April 30th 2024*, available at “Financial Reports,” University of Toronto Muslim Students' Association, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.uoftmsa.com/financialreports.html>.

<sup>656</sup> Ari David Blaff, “Canadian Universities Cancel Speeches over Speaker's Hamas Atrocities ‘Celebration,’” *National Post*, February 9, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/universities-cancel-speeches-over-hamas-atrocities-celebration>.

<sup>657</sup> *Ibid.*

improvised explosive device for a failed attack on an Israeli civilian bus in 2001 for which he was subsequently tried and imprisoned.<sup>658</sup>

According to the since-deleted description of the event, which was co-organized by the Watermelon Coalition, U of T O4P, and TSSP, the lecture was described as addressing “the rationale behind prisons in the occupied territories and their connection to the security forces in Israel and the Palestinian Authority.”<sup>659</sup> Originally slated for the university’s St. George campus,<sup>660</sup> the physical event was ultimately cancelled by the MSA, but its organizers claimed it would still go ahead virtually, with the university being able to state that the “event is not taking place at the University of Toronto.”<sup>661</sup>

The programming choices of U of T’s MSA extend beyond campus politics to the active platforming of figures with documented records of antisemitic and extremist rhetoric. For example, alongside other Toronto-area MSA chapters, it partnered with the Miftaah Institute on the “Pearls of Faith” conference held in Brampton on June 20, 2026.<sup>662</sup> This event featured several clerics with documented histories of antisemitic and extremist speech. Tom Facchine, an imam affiliated with the Yaqeen Institute, has publicly called for the abolition of the state of Israel, declaring at a May 2025 Muslim American Society event that “the nation of Israel must be abolished” and that the movement must not “settle for anything less” and urging Muslim audiences to arm themselves and act “by any means necessary.”<sup>663</sup>

The fact that U of T’s MSA, which describes itself as the university’s largest student club with over 1,500 members,<sup>664</sup> has served as the organizational vehicle for such events is

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<sup>658</sup> Bruce R. Butterworth, Shalom Dolev, and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Security Awareness for Public Bus Transportation: Case Studies of Attacks Against the Israeli Public Bus System* (Mineta Transportation Institute, March 2012), <https://transweb.sjsu.edu/sites/default/files/2978-israeli-bus-public-transportation-attacks.pdf>.

<sup>659</sup> Ari David Blaff, “Muslim Student Group at U of T Cancels Talk by Convicted Terrorist,” *National Post*, January 30, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/muslim-student-group-at-u-of-t-cancels-talk-by-convicted-terrorist>.

<sup>660</sup> Ibid.

<sup>661</sup> Ibid.

<sup>662</sup> “Pearls of Faith,” event announcement, Miftaah Institute, accessed June 26, 2026, <https://www.miftaahcircles.org>.

<sup>663</sup> “Imam Tom Facchine at Staten Island Islamic Center: The Nation of Israel Must Be Abolished—We Cannot Settle for Anything Less; Allah Will Topple the Zionist Regime within a Decade,” Middle East Media Research Institute, May 21, 2025, <https://www.memri.org/tv/nyc-imam-tom-facchine-nation-of-israel-must-be-abolished>; Sam Westrop, “What’s Next for Wealthy Texas Islamism?,” Middle East Forum, June 24, 2026, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/articles/whats-next-for-wealthy-texas-islamism>; Joe Adam George, “Islamist Provocateur to Speak near Toronto,” Middle East Forum, February 18, 2025, <https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news-islamist-provocateur-to-speak-near-toronto>.

<sup>664</sup> “About,” Muslim Students’ Association, University of Toronto, accessed July 13, 2026, <https://uoftmsa.com/about>.

not incidental. As shown above, it is institutionally funded, administratively recognized, and embedded within the university's own financial infrastructure. This is entirely consistent with its place in the Muslim Brotherhood's strategic architecture.

## 7.4 Faculty Networks, Divestment, and Institutional Legitimization

What distinguishes the U of T activist ecosystem from those examined at Waterloo and TMU is the degree to which faculty networks have provided institutional legitimization to student-led activism. For example, a joint statement in support of the pro-Palestinian encampment at U of T was issued by the Jewish Faculty Network, Faculty for Palestine, and the Health Workers Alliance for Palestine.<sup>665</sup> The inclusion of Jewish faculty members in this coalition had the effect of insulating from institutional accountability positions that might otherwise have attracted charges of antisemitism.

Professor Deborah Cowen, a geography professor at U of T and a member of the Jewish Faculty Network, declared that faculty would physically protect students from police intervention and described the encampment as “one of the most precious learning spaces” she had experienced—characterizing sustained political advocacy, including the aforementioned exclusion of Jewish students, as a legitimate educational activity. Such faculty legitimization is what the institutional embedding strategy (Domain 2) identifies as the consolidation phase: once student-level activism has established the narrative framework, faculty networks provide the institutional credibility that makes it resistant to administrative challenge.

In May 2025, the U of T Faculty Association voted 52 percent in favor of divestment from Israel, explicitly comparing it to the university's existing divestment from Russia.<sup>666</sup> The motion called on the University Pension Plan (UPP) to screen new investments and divest from entities manufacturing or distributing weapons where there were reasonable grounds to suspect use by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and from entities supporting or sustaining Israel's occupation, with Russia's occupation of Crimea named as a parallel case. It passed with 714 in favour, 585 opposed, and 66 abstentions, on a turnout of 1,365 from a membership of roughly 3,500. The campaign behind the motion kept all pledge signatories anonymous, publishing rank and constituency only, on the stated ground that public anti-occupation positions can carry professional penalties and a risk of doxxing.<sup>667</sup> The divestment vote represents the aforementioned policy capture

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<sup>665</sup> “JFN Statement in Support of Student Protest,” Jewish Faculty Network, May 2, 2024, <https://www.jewishfaculty.ca/posts/jfn-statement-in-support-of-student-protest>.

<sup>666</sup> Mathilda Heller, “University of Toronto Faculty Association Votes for Divestment from Israel,” *Jerusalem Post*, May 2025, <https://www.jpost.com/bds-threat/article-853577>.

<sup>667</sup> “Results of May 8th General Membership Meeting and Vote,” University of Toronto Faculty Association, May 13, 2025, <https://www.utfa.org/content/results-may-8th-general-membership-meeting-and-vote>.

strategy (Domain 3) operating at the level of faculty governance—the installation, through the Faculty Association’s own democratic machinery, of an investment policy that translates the Palestinianization of Islam framework documented in Chapter 1 into enforceable institutional financial commitments.<sup>668</sup>

The shared opposition to investment in Israel—demonstrated in the Faculty Association divestment vote examined above—and the simultaneous promotion of alternative Middle Eastern relationships that benefit Qatar’s regional positioning, economy, and military—as examined at the end of this chapter—are indicative of a convergence that makes U of T’s campus ecosystem analytically distinct. It is not merely a site of Muslim Brotherhood-aligned activism but an institutional environment in which that activism and Qatari state influence operate in the same direction, reinforcing each other without any visible coordination.

## 7.5 Institutional Double Standards, Antisemitism, and Administrative Capitulation

In November 2024, following repeated incidents and the continuous lack of action by U of T administrators, U of T’s Governing Council was accused of “abandoning Jews on campus” by Doctors against Racism and Antisemitism (DARA).<sup>669</sup> DARA alleged that the council had turned down a motion aimed at condemning antisemitism on campus and that the council’s chair and vice chair, Anna Kennedy and Sandra Hanington, had refused to allow a vote on whether to add the antisemitism motion to the council’s agenda, “quashing the opportunity to even consider the antisemitism motion.”<sup>670</sup> Dr. Philip Berger, DARA spokesperson and U of T Professor Emeritus, noted that the university’s governing council had not just been silent when it came to protecting Jewish people at the university, “worse, the council is now deliberately excluding Jews from the safeguards extended to all other ethnic groups at the university.”<sup>671</sup>

In the same month, U of T scheduled two events involving notable anti-Israel figures on its campus. The first was an appearance by Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, who has repeatedly legitimized terror and violence against Israeli civilians.<sup>672</sup> The other event, called the “Anti-Zionist

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<sup>668</sup> See section 1.4.3 (Domain 3: Policy Impact and Political Mobilization).

<sup>669</sup> Stewart Lewis, “U of T Governing Council Accused of Abandoning Jews on Campus by Doctors’ Advocacy Group,” *National Post*, November 21, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/u-of-t-governing-council-accused-of-abandoning-jews-on-campus-by-doctors-advocacy-group>.

<sup>670</sup> Ibid.

<sup>671</sup> Ibid.

<sup>672</sup> “B’nai Brith Astounded after U of T Dismisses Jewish Community’s Concerns,” B’nai Brith Canada, October 31, 2024, <https://www.bnaibrith.ca/bnai-brith-astounded-after-u-of-t-dismisses-jewish-communitys-concerns/>.

Ideas Conference,” included Nasser Abourahme, who has described Zionism as “colonialism,” and Daniel Boyarin, who argues for a no-state solution to the conflict in Israel, effectively calling for the destruction of the Jewish state.<sup>673</sup> As the general counsel for the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA), Richard Marceau, told the *National Post*, “Earlier this week, we raised serious concerns about Francesca Albanese’s visit to Canada, given her history of troubling statements and associations with individuals who glorify violence against Israelis and incite hatred toward Jews.”<sup>674</sup> B’nai Brith Canada sent the university a letter expressing its concerns, but they were dismissed. A spokesman for university president Meric Gertler merely responded that the school “does not take positions on contentious social, political or other issues apart from those directly pertaining to higher education and academic research.”<sup>675</sup>

In an apparent recognition of the state of antisemitic activity on U of T’s campus, Gertler released a letter in November 2024, “reaffirming our commitment to fighting antisemitism.”<sup>676</sup> In his letter, President Gertler acknowledged the upsurge of antisemitism “in our society, our city, and our university,” and committed to clarifying what constitutes antisemitism on campuses, redefining the mandate and scope of the Institutional Equity Office to include antisemitism, and developing new training modules for managers at the university to more appropriately respond to antisemitic language and actions.<sup>677</sup>

In January 2025, U of T unveiled a draft of its “Guide to Law and Policy Regarding Antisemitism and Anti-Israeli Discrimination.” The guide was subsequently removed from the university’s website, following a brief consultative process.<sup>678</sup> Initially, the guide stressed that discrimination based on Israeli nationality or Jewish identity would be treated the same as other forms of discrimination, noting that its policy aligns with national legal standards.<sup>679</sup>

However, various campus groups claimed the guide failed to address issues such as APR and that it would suppress pro-Palestinian activism.<sup>680</sup> Student groups like U of T’s

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<sup>673</sup> Ibid.

<sup>674</sup> Ari David Blaff, “UN Official Withdraws from Montreal Conference Featuring Canadian Leader of Samidoun Terror Group,” *National Post*, November 1, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/un-official-withdraws-from-montreal-conference-featuring-canadian-leader-of-samidoun-terror-group>.

<sup>675</sup> Ibid.

<sup>676</sup> Meric S. Gertler, “Reaffirming Our Commitment to Fighting Antisemitism,” Office of the President, University of Toronto, November 22, 2024, <https://president.utoronto.ca/reaffirming-our-commitment-to-fighting-antisemitism/>.

<sup>677</sup> Ibid.

<sup>678</sup> “U of T’s Antisemitism and anti-Israeli Discrimination Guide Sparks Debate amid Consultation,” *The J*, February 12, 2025, <https://thej.ca/2025/02/12/u-of-ts-antisemitism-and-anti-israeli-discrimination-guide-sparks-debate-amid-consultation/>.

<sup>679</sup> Ibid.

<sup>680</sup> Ibid.

student-led chapter of Independent Jewish Voices (IJV) released a joint statement with U of T Occupy for Palestine (O4P)—the group that led the 63-day encampment—and the MSA. The statement expressed concern over the “guide’s conflation of Jewishness with the State of Israel, as well as with Israeli nationality.”<sup>681</sup> The withdrawal of the guide under pressure from a coalition that included the organization that had run the encampment is a demonstration of the narrative framework’s effectiveness in protecting anti-Israel activism. The primary institutional instrument for addressing antisemitism at Canada’s largest university was neutralized by the same organizations whose conduct had made it necessary.

## 7.6 Platforming Extremism: The Academic Legitimation Layer

In February 2025, the U of T Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies hosted a seminar entitled “Silenced Voices: The Impact of Terrorism Designations on Palestinian Advocacy in Canada.”<sup>682</sup> Presented by the Centre’s Research Cluster for the Study of Racism and Inequality and co-sponsored by Hearing Palestine, the event featured a talk by U of T law doctoral candidate Basema al-Alami followed by a moderated panel.<sup>683</sup> The seminar abstract described al-Alami’s project as examining how the Canadian media landscape and institutional narratives employ “framing techniques that align with criminalizing narratives, often using labels such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘violence’ to delegitimize Palestinian voices.”<sup>684</sup> Al-Alami’s research focuses on “the intersection of counterterrorism entrapment law and anti-Muslim bias in Canada’s legal system” and argues that there are “systemic issues in national security practices, particularly the litigation and over-policing of Muslims in post-9/11 Canada.”<sup>685</sup>

Terrorism and international security expert Casey Babb and foreign policy and national security analyst Joe Adam George have characterized this pattern as “ideological jihad aimed at infiltrating educational institutions, weakening our legal foundations, distorting our security interests and disrupting our cultural, social and political stability from within.”<sup>686</sup> They further note that Islamists, empowered by the

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<sup>681</sup> “U of T Drafts Guide to Define Antisemitism on Campus,” *The Varsity*, February 11, 2025, <https://thevarsity.ca/2025/02/11/u-of-t-drafts-guide-to-define-antisemitism-on-campus/>.

<sup>682</sup> “Silenced Voices: The Impact of Terrorism Designations on Palestinian Advocacy in Canada,” event announcement, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, February 2025, <https://www.crimsl.utoronto.ca/events/silenced-voices-impact-terrorism-designations-palestinian-advocacy-canada-basema-al-alamy>.

<sup>683</sup> Ibid.

<sup>684</sup> Ibid.

<sup>685</sup> Ibid.

<sup>686</sup> Casey Babb and Joe Adam George, “Canadian Universities Have an Islamist Problem,” *National Post*, May 6, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadian-universities-have-an-islamist-problem>.

cover of progressive activism on campuses, are “waging a calculated campaign to erode the core values of western democracy.”<sup>687</sup> Furthermore, so long as universities continue to allow such extremist ideologies to fester on campus, they risk an even greater threat of shaping a generation of graduates who view terrorism not as a crime but as a justifiable form of resistance.<sup>688</sup>

The seminar on terrorism designations is not an isolated academic exercise. It is part and parcel of the research and legitimization layer of the narrative strategy outlined in Domain 1: producing scholarly output that characterizes the designation of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PFLP as terrorist organizations as manifestations of systemic Islamophobia.<sup>689</sup> This mechanism mirrors the aforementioned case of the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies,<sup>690</sup> where Muslim Brotherhood-aligned narratives were introduced through media coverage, laundered through academic conferences and publications, and recirculated as credentialed expert opinion, with the distance between the news platform and the research arm providing the appearance of independent corroboration that neither could supply alone. At U of T, the campus seminar room performs a similar function by converting ideological positions into scholarly authority and scholarly authority into institutional policy.

## 7.7 Foreign Interference: The Singham Network and Designated Terrorist Entities on Campus

Beyond the domestic organizational ecosystem, evidence documented by the Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI)—an independent body that identifies cyber threats to civil society—connected the promotion of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, including the U of T protests and encampment, to external funding networks operating well beyond the campus.<sup>691</sup> The NCRI report found that the protests at U of T were in fact linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through party associates Neville Roy Singham and his wife Jodie Evans.<sup>692</sup>

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<sup>687</sup> Ibid.

<sup>688</sup> Ibid.

<sup>689</sup> See section 1.4.1 (Domain 1: Narrative Control and the Red-Green Alliance).

<sup>690</sup> See section 2.3 (Al Jazeera as Strategic Media Infrastructure).

<sup>691</sup> NCRI, *Contagious Disruption: How CCP Influence and Radical Ideologies Threaten Critical Infrastructure and Campuses Across the United States* (Network Contagion Research Institute, May 2024), <https://networkcontagion.us/reports/ccp-influence-and-radical-ideologies/>.

<sup>692</sup> Ibid.; “Evidence,” House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI), 44th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting no. 115, House of Commons of Canada, May 2, 2024, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/ETHI/meeting-115/evidence> (testimony of Ben Nimmo, Threat Investigator, OpenAI; Joel Finkelstein, Founder and Chief Science Officer, Network Contagion Research Institute; and Sanjay Khanna, Strategic Adviser and Foresight Expert); NCRI, *Contagious Disruption*; John Ivison, “China’s Alleged Links to Canadian anti-Israel Protests Fit a Subversive Pattern,” *National Post*, May 16, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/china-canadian-anti-israel-protests>.

The NCRI report further notes that the organizations behind the protests united under the banner “Shut it Down for Palestine” (SID4P), which first emerged the day after the October 7 attacks, were all part of the “Singham network” donor program, which has been characterized as a conduit for CCP-aligned interests.<sup>693</sup> A *New York Times* investigation in August 2024 describes Singham as “a socialist benefactor of far-left causes” and tracked the funneling of hundreds of millions of dollars to Singham-linked groups engaging in pro-China advocacy.<sup>694</sup>

Singham was previously the subject of an FBI investigation into his ties to “groups engaged in activities inimical to US [interests].”<sup>695</sup> For this reason, too, it is alarming that on October 8, 2023, only a day after the Hamas attacks, a number of the SID4P coalition members already released a statement in which they emphasized their “unique role” in combating “material support for Zionism and weakening the handmaiden of US global imperialism.”<sup>696</sup> In this context, it is important to note that, while NCRI researchers found that the increase in direct action targeting infrastructure and public spaces was “nominally focused on Israel, the current protests can be better understood as a well-funded initiative driving a revolutionary, anti-government, and anti-capitalist agenda.”<sup>697</sup>

As for the apparent implementors of this strategy on the ground in Canada, the NCRI report specifically highlights the involvement of the Palestinian Youth Movement, which is listed as one of the seven SID4P “convenors” and has been “highly visible” at protests in Montreal and Toronto, alongside Samidoun.<sup>698</sup>

The Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), which has helped organize campus protests since the events of October 7, operates with no financial transparency and is reportedly funded entirely by the Westchester Peace Action Committee Foundation (WESPAC), which is based in New York State.<sup>699</sup> As of June 2024, PYM reportedly began soliciting donations via Honor the Earth, which refers to itself as an “indigenous-led organization fighting to dismantle settler-colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy, and

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<sup>693</sup> Ivison, “China’s Alleged Links.”

<sup>694</sup> Mara Hvistendahl et al., “A Global Web of Chinese Propaganda Leads to a U.S. Tech Mogul,” *New York Times*, August 10, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/europe/neville-roy-singham-china-propaganda.html>.

<sup>695</sup> NCRI, *Contagious Disruption*.

<sup>696</sup> Ibid.

<sup>697</sup> Ibid.

<sup>698</sup> Ivison, “China’s Alleged Links.”

<sup>699</sup> Tristan Hopper, “U.S. Probes Provide Clues to Where Canada’s anti-Israel Money Is Coming From,” *National Post*, June 5, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/u-s-probes-provide-clues-to-where-canadas-anti-israel-money-is-coming-from>.

imperialism.”<sup>700</sup> Honor the Earth provides no details of donors or amounts distributed to PYM for activities, though PYM organizer Nadya Tannous serves as deputy director of Honor the Earth and PYM lead organizer Lenna Zahran Nasr serves as a member of its board.<sup>701</sup>

Beyond its extremist rhetoric, PYM’s connections to terrorist organizations have also been documented. In a report from 2024, for example, the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism states that of PYM’s fourteen chapters in North America, four are in Canada, with the most “prominent activity” taking place in the Toronto chapter.<sup>702</sup> The report also states that PYM has “close ties with the Popular Front [For the Liberation of Palestine] and its affiliates, as well as the SJP organization linked to Hamas.”<sup>703</sup> These assessments were also reflected by a French court in 2019, citing a 2015 report from the French Directorate for Internal Security, which claimed that PYM is “affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.”<sup>704</sup> The PFLP has been a listed terror organization in Canada since 2003.<sup>705</sup>

Samidoun Toronto was also active in the U of T encampment, where it was seen handing out booklets with Hamas logos outlining the terror group’s version of events of the so-called Al-Aqsa Flood operation.<sup>706</sup> Samidoun was officially designated as a terrorist entity in Canada under the Criminal Code on October 15, 2024, in conjunction with the US Department of the Treasury’s announcement of Samidoun’s designation as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT).<sup>707</sup> The government of Canada further acknowledged that “Samidoun has close links with and advances the interests of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is a listed terrorist entity in Canada, the United States, and the European Union.”<sup>708</sup> The presence of a now-

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<sup>700</sup> “Palestinian Youth Movement,” profile, NGO Monitor, August 11, 2025, <https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/palestinian-youth-movement/>.

<sup>701</sup> Ibid.

<sup>702</sup> Research and Foreign Relations Division, *Special Overview: PYM—Palestinian Youth Movement* (Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, January 30, 2024), [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/pym\\_palestinian\\_youth\\_movement/en/Research\\_Reports\\_PYM%20Report%20eng.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/pym_palestinian_youth_movement/en/Research_Reports_PYM%20Report%20eng.pdf).

<sup>703</sup> Ibid.

<sup>704</sup> “Palestinian Youth Movement,” profile, NGO Monitor, August 11, 2025, <https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/palestinian-youth-movement/>.

<sup>705</sup> “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),” profile, Public Safety Canada, last updated June 4, 2026, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrtr/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#51>.

<sup>706</sup> Michael Starr, “PFLP-affiliated NGO Samidoun Accounts Removed from Instagram, YouTube,” *Jerusalem Post*, July 11, 2024, <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/article-809982>.

<sup>707</sup> Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada Lists Samidoun As a Terrorist Entity,” Government of Canada, October 25, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/10/government-of-canada-lists-samidoun-as-a-terrorist-entity.html>.

<sup>708</sup> Ibid.

designated terrorist entity distributing Hamas propaganda at an encampment on the campus of Canada’s largest university—while that university took no action—is the most direct illustration in this chapter of the institutional capture that Domain 2’s embedding strategy is designed to produce.

## 7.8 Qatari Research Funding

### 7.8.1 Qatari Research Funding

The Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) has funded at least six research projects involving U of T faculty, with an estimated total portfolio value of between C\$2.7 million and C\$4.2 million, though precise amounts are not publicly disclosed for most projects.

Funded research areas include solar cell technology, cryptography and communications security, geobiological processes, stress corrosion, carbon sequestration, and programming language development. Most of these areas fall within sensitive technology research areas identified by the Canadian government as requiring safeguarding.<sup>709</sup> The scientific merit of the research is not in question; what warrants scrutiny is not the existence of the grants alone but the absence of a disclosure framework comparable to the United States’ Section 117 regime, under which universities must report significant foreign gifts and contracts. In the Canadian context, there appears to be no equivalent mechanism requiring universities to show how the knowledge produced through these grants might serve Qatar’s national energy and resource interests, what intellectual property rights, if any, were conveyed to QNRF under the terms of the grant agreements, and what Canadian institutions received beyond the grant funding itself. These questions are not unique to U of T.

For example, ISGAP’s investigation into Qatar Foundation–funded research at Texas A&M University, which operates under the same institutional umbrella as QNRF, found that Qatar had acquired contractual ownership of more than 500 research projects in exchange for over one billion dollars in funding, with the agreement granting Qatar Foundation broad access to faculty, curriculum, budgets, and sensitive student educational records.<sup>710</sup> A subsequent ISGAP analysis identified that approximately fifty-

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<sup>709</sup> “Sensitive Technology List,” Government of Canada, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/services/defence/nationalsecurity/sensitive-technology-list.html>.

<sup>710</sup> ISGAP, *Hijacking Higher Education: Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Texas A&M: Buying Nuclear Research and Student Information* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Texas\\_AM\\_Qatar.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Texas_AM_Qatar.pdf).

eight of those contractually owned projects possessed potential for dual use or military application, covering fields directly comparable to those funded by QNRF at the University of Toronto, including cybersecurity, advanced materials, and energy technology.<sup>711</sup> On February 8, 2024, the Texas A&M University System Board of Regents voted 7–1 to terminate its contract with the Qatar Foundation and close its Doha campus by 2028, a decision taken without public discussion and reached in the months following ISGAP’s November 2023 disclosures.<sup>712</sup>

Whether the grant agreements signed by U of T faculty contain analogous provisions remains unknown. QNRF does not publish its contractual terms, and Canadian law imposes no equivalent disclosure requirement. The question is therefore not whether the U of T’s researchers acted improperly. It is whether Canadian institutions and oversight bodies possess the information necessary to determine what, beyond the research grant itself, was conveyed to a Qatari state entity.

Qatar University’s own published strategic documentation—co-authored by a scholar now managing international agreements at the University of Waterloo—confirms that its College of Engineering prioritizes artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and big data; that its research agenda is aligned with Qatar National Vision 2030; and that its alumni routinely move into senior state positions. The relevance of the six QNRF-funded projects at U of T is therefore not that their alignment with Qatar’s priorities is hidden or coincidental. It is that Canada lacks a transparent disclosure and review framework capable of assessing whether such collaborations carry national-security implications, including dual-use research applications, intellectual-property transfer, institutional dependency, or strategic benefit to a foreign state. Nor does there appear to be a comparable mechanism for assessing whether Qatari research funding also serves a broader political purpose: drawing Western academic institutions deeper into Qatar’s orbit while creating permissive institutional space for Brotherhood-aligned narrative frameworks.

A QNRF-funded project awarded under National Priorities Research Program (NPRP) Cycle 8 to the Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute (QEERI)—a research institute operating under Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU), itself a node of Qatar’s soft -power apparatus as discussed in Chapter 2—in collaboration with the U of T

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<sup>711</sup> ISGAP, *Hijacking Higher Education, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood and Texas A&M, Volume Two* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/TAMUQ\\_Report\\_Volume\\_Two-1.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/TAMUQ_Report_Volume_Two-1.pdf).

<sup>712</sup> “Texas A&M Qatar Campus to Close by 2028,” Texas A&M University, February 8, 2024, <https://stories.tamu.edu/news/2024/02/08/texas-am-qatar-campus-to-close-by-2028/>.

investigated advanced solar-energy harvesting materials. The project is listed in the University of Sharjah profile of Professor Nouar Tabet under “Selected Research Projects” as “CRANN-QEERI initiative for Solar Energy Harvesting Materials: CRAQSolar,” with the grant reference NPRP 8-090-2-047, a listed budget of US\$809,402, and project dates from January 2016 to January 2019.<sup>713</sup> The project description confirms that Canadian research capacity was incorporated into a QNRF-funded research program aligned with Qatar’s stated science and energy priorities, while leaving unanswered the same disclosure questions identified above concerning grant terms, intellectual property rights, institutional benefits, and strategic implications.

A QNRF-funded project, identified by grant reference NPRP 7-443-1-083, brought together researchers from U of T, ETH Zurich, Qatar University, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and ExxonMobil Research Qatar to investigate microbial community composition and dolomite formation in Qatar’s Khor Al-Adaid sabkhas (salt-encrusted coastal flats).<sup>714</sup> The project description lists U of T’s Professor Maria Dittrich as one the researchers associated with the project. The project’s significance lies in the applied relevance of sabkha dolomite research to Qatar’s hydrocarbon geology, with ExxonMobil Research Qatar’s participation underscoring the commercial and energy-sector context of the collaboration. The project therefore offers a concrete technical example of the disclosure concerns identified above.

A QNRF-funded project awarded to the Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute (QEERI), identified by grant reference NPRP 13S-0205-200268, involved U of T and the Qatar Shell Research & Technology Center in research on chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steels.<sup>715</sup> The project description lists Dr Hanan Farhat and U of T Professor Roger Newman among the principal investigators, with an effective project period of June 15, 2021, to January 31, 2025. It situates the work directly within the oil and gas sector, noting that metals represent around 60 percent of total industry spending and that corrosion costs Qatar nearly US\$8 billion annually. The description further states that SCC testing was to be carried out at QEERI and Shell; that U of T’s role included impurity analysis using advanced facilities such as TOF-SIMS; and that the final work package envisaged science-based

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<sup>713</sup> “Selected Research Projects,” profile of Prof. Nouar Tabet, College of Sciences, Department of Applied Physics, University of Sharjah, accessed April 15, 2026,

[https://old.sharjah.ac.ae/en/academics/Colleges/Sciences/dept/ap/Pages/ppl\\_detail.aspx?mcid=44](https://old.sharjah.ac.ae/en/academics/Colleges/Sciences/dept/ap/Pages/ppl_detail.aspx?mcid=44).

<sup>714</sup> “Geobiological Processes in the Sabkhas of Qatar,” Project no. NPRP 7-443-1-083, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed April 14, 2026,

<https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/14817>.

<sup>715</sup> “Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic Stainless Steels,” Project no. NPRP 13S-0205-200268, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/projects/34704>.

SCC threshold maps being incorporated into an industrially useful format, with potential commercialization through licensed software led by Shell's materials, corrosion, data science, and visualization teams. The project therefore offers another concrete technical example of the disclosure concerns identified above.

A QNRF-funded project awarded to Qatar University in collaboration with the University of Toronto investigated carbon biogeochemistry in Qatar's *sabkha* environments, with a focus on organic carbon mineralization, CO<sub>2</sub> and methane flux dynamics, and the microbial mechanisms driving dolomite formation—research with direct applications to carbon accounting in hydrocarbon-producing regions and, as the project documentation notes, to the spectroscopic identification of biosignatures on other planets.<sup>716</sup> Led by U of T professor Maria Dittrich as a follow-on to her earlier NPRP Cycle 7 *sabkha* study, the project carried a disclosed grant of C\$71,075—anomalously low by QNRF standards, suggesting either supplementary or partial-year funding rather than a standalone award. The modest grant value does not diminish the applied significance: understanding carbon sequestration dynamics in Qatar's coastal ecosystems is directly relevant to Qatar's blue carbon accounting under international climate frameworks, with implications for how Qatar reports and manages its emissions obligations alongside its hydrocarbon production.

Significantly, the hydrocarbon sector whose technical challenges animate these research collaborations is part of the revenue base through which Qatar finances its global influence architecture—including the Al Jazeera media network, the Qatar Foundation's Western university partnerships, and, through documented intermediary channels, organizations designated as terrorist entities by multiple allied states. The US Treasury Department's Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence stated publicly in 2014 that Qatar had been financing Hamas "for years," and the US State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism have repeatedly identified Qatar as a jurisdiction where entities and individuals continue to serve as sources of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups.<sup>717</sup> Canadian university research

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<sup>716</sup> "Carbon Biogeochemistry in Microbial Mats and Sediments in the Sabkhas of Qatar," Project no. NPRP 12S-0313-190349, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/projects/33452>; Office of the Vice-Principal Research & Innovation, *Annual Report 2019–20* (University of Toronto Scarborough, 2020), <https://www.uts.utoronto.ca/research/sites/uts.utoronto.ca.research/files/docs/UTSC%20ResearchReport-2020-AODA-pages.pdf>.

<sup>717</sup> David Cohen, quoted in Lori Plotkin Boghardt, "The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/terrorist-funding-disconnect-qatar-and-kuwait>; "Qatar: Extremism and Terrorism," Counter Extremism Project, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/qatar-extremism-and-terrorism>.

partnerships that deepen institutional dependency on Qatari state funding are therefore not separable, in principle, from the broader question of what Qatar's hydrocarbon revenues ultimately underwrite.<sup>718</sup>

Researchers at U of T, including Md Arif Hasan and Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, co-authored a study with Firoj Alam of the Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI) on automated Bangla hate speech detection.<sup>719</sup> QCRI is described by HBKU as a national research institute established by Qatar Foundation that operates under the university, with a focus on applied computing research that addresses national priorities.<sup>720</sup> The study introduced BanglaMultiHate, a 50,746-comment dataset for classifying Bangla hate speech by type, severity, and target, and benchmarked classical, pretrained, and LLM-based approaches.<sup>721</sup> Its relevance lies not in any claim of improper research, but in the fact that Canadian university expertise is being connected to Qatar-based applied computing infrastructure in an area—large-scale classification of political, religious, and community-targeted speech—where transparency, governance, and downstream-use safeguards are especially important.

Two QNRF-supported U of T research outputs involving Professor Ashish Khisti addressed foundational questions in information-theoretic security. One examined secure broadcasting with independent secret keys, and the other examined secrecy - capacity bounds in a relay-assisted diamond-wiretap channel in the presence of an eavesdropper. Both papers acknowledge support from QNRF under grant references NPRP 5-603-2-243 and NPRP 5-401-2-161, respectively. Although theoretical in orientation, the work is relevant to the concerns explored in this report because information-theoretic security sits at the boundary between civilian communications protection and dual-use communications resilience. These projects therefore offer another technical example of Qatari funding supporting Canadian research activity in fields where the strategic value may extend beyond the academic aspects of the work.<sup>722</sup>

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<sup>718</sup> Ibid.

<sup>719</sup> Md Arif Hasan et al., "LLM-Based Multi-Task Bangla Hate Speech Detection: Type, Severity, and Target," arXiv, October 2, 2025, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.01995>.

<sup>720</sup> "Qatar Computing Research Institute," Hamad Bin Khalifa University, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://elmi.hbku.edu.qa/en/organisations/qatar-computing-research-institute/>; "About the Qatar Computing Research Institute," Qatar Computing Research Institute, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.hbku.edu.qa/en/qcri/about>.

<sup>721</sup> Hasan et al., "Multi-Task Bangla Hate Speech Detection."

<sup>722</sup> Rafael F. Schaefer and Ashish Khisti, "Secure Broadcasting of a Common Message with Independent Secret Keys," paper presented at the 48th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), Princeton, NJ, March 19–21, 2014, <https://www.comm.utoronto.ca/~akhisti/ciss14.pdf>; Si-Hyeon Lee and Ashish Khisti, "The Degraded Gaussian Diamond-Wiretap Channel," draft paper, Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, May 17, 2015, [https://www.comm.utoronto.ca/~akhisti/diamond\\_WTC.pdf](https://www.comm.utoronto.ca/~akhisti/diamond_WTC.pdf).

### 7.8.2 Note on Estimates of Qatari Research Funding

The University of Toronto-linked QNRF projects examined in the previous section present a recurring problem of financial visibility. Public records generally identify the project's title and grant reference, its program cycle, its institutional participants, its research scope, and an acknowledgement of QNRF support. In some cases, however, they do not disclose the monetary value of the support. This does not mean that U of T's exposure to Qatari funding is negligible. It means that Canada's public disclosure environment does not allow for a complete grant-by-grant accounting from public records alone.

For that reason, ISGAP's forensic accounting team conducted a structured assessment of estimated funding exposure. Unless stated otherwise, the following figures should be read as forensic estimates of likely project exposure rather than publicly disclosed grant totals. The assessment draws on QNRF program benchmarks, funding cycle characteristics, project duration, discipline-specific cost profiles, the technical requirements of each project, and the nature of participating institutions and facilities. Equipment-intensive projects involving advanced materials, laboratory infrastructure, industrial testing, fieldwork, specialized characterization, or high-cost experimental systems are weighted toward higher exposure bands. Theoretical, computational, or programming language projects are assessed within lower exposure bands, while still accounting for multi-year durations and the strategic relevance of the research field.

Applied to the University of Toronto-linked projects examined above, ISGAP's forensic accounting assessment identifies the following estimated funding exposure:

- NPRP 8-090-2-047 / CRAQSolar hybrid quantum dot-perovskite solar-cell project: US\$800,000–1.2 million (public records list a disclosed value of US\$809,402, which sits within ISGAP's estimated exposure range).
- NPRP 7-443-1-083 / Sabkha geobiology and dolomite-formation project: US\$400,000–600,000.
- NPRP 13S-0205-200268 / Chloride-induced stress-corrosion project involving QEERI, Qatar Shell Research & Technology Center, and the University of Toronto: US\$600,000–900,000.
- NPRP 5-603-2-243 / Secure broadcasting with independent secret keys: US\$300,000–500,000.
- NPRP 5-401-2-161 / Degraded Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel: US\$300,000–500,000.
- YSREP 1-033-1-006 / Type-safe web-development and secure programming-language project: US\$200,000–300,000.

- NPRP 12S-0313-190349 / Carbon-biogeochemistry project in Qatar’s sabkha environments: US\$71,075 (disclosed value listed in public records). ISGAP treats this as a minimum value and an apparent outlier when compared to the other NPRP projects examined in the previous section.

Taken together, these projects indicate an estimated University of Toronto-linked QNRF funding exposure of approximately US\$2.7 million to US\$4.1 million, depending on whether the disclosed or estimated value of the carbon-biogeochemistry project is included. The estimated total funding exposure should not be read as a complete accounting of all Qatar-linked funding connected to U of T or its researchers, as it represents the identifiable exposure reconstructed from public project records, disclosed award values, QNRF program characteristics, published acknowledgements, project duration, research cost profiles, and ISGAP’s forensic accounting methodology.

The significance of this exposure lies not only in its monetary value but in its distribution across strategically relevant research domains: advanced energy materials, environmental and carbon systems, corrosion and oil-and-gas infrastructure, secure communications, and secure computing. The available record is sufficient to show a pattern of Qatar-linked research support involving Canadian university capacity across these domains. It is not possible, in the absence of a Canadian disclosure regime comparable to the United States’ Section 117 framework, to show the full terms, institutional benefits, intellectual-property arrangements, publication conditions, partner contributions, or downstream-use restrictions attached to those relationships.

### 7.8.3 Partnerships and Academic Conferences

U of T faculty have participated directly in Hamad Bin Khalifa University programming. Dr. Titilayo Soremi, Assistant Professor in the Teaching Stream in the Department of Political Science at U of T Scarborough, participated in two HBKU Hadaba Initiative events in 2024: a conference entitled “Factors Influencing NGOs’ Decisions to Refuse Funding” in October 2024 and the “Summit of the Future: Hadaba Edition” in September 2024, which ran parallel to the UN Summit of the Future in New York and focused on global governance and what HBKU described as “Inner Development Goals.”<sup>723</sup> Both events were organized by HBKU’s College of Public

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<sup>723</sup> “Factors Influencing NGOs’ Decisions to Refuse Funding,” event announcement, Hadaba Initiative of the College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://www.hbku.edu.qa/en/academic-events/CPP-FINGO>.

Policy—the same institutional node through which Qatar shapes policy research agendas in alignment with its own foreign policy objectives.

In 2017, Mohammad Zebian, then a PhD candidate in Innovation Policy at U of T, was a featured speaker at HBKU's Fifth Law and Public Policy Colloquium on the regulation of cryptocurrencies—an event organized by HBKU's College of Law and Public Policy that focused on FinTech, blockchain, and the new financial order with specific a focus on the Middle East.<sup>724</sup> Zebian subsequently became Program Manager for Acceleration at the Qatar Science and Technology Park, a member of the Qatar Foundation. The trajectory—U of T doctoral candidate to Qatar Foundation employment—illustrates the personnel pipeline that Qatari academic engagement cultivates, as a primary mechanism for long-term institutional influence, as previously documented at Georgetown and Northwestern.<sup>725</sup>

In July 2020, the Qatar Computing Research Institute at HBKU concluded its annual online summer internship program, drawing participants from institutions including Princeton, Georgia Institute of Technology, New York University, and the University of Toronto, across twenty-six projects overseen by thirty-four QCRI scientists and engineers.<sup>726</sup> The program explicitly frames its objective as “building Qatar’s innovation and technology capacity”—a national development priority that positions Canadian student participation as a direct input into Qatari state capability-building.

#### 7.8.4 Financial Dependency and Structural Vulnerability

The significance of these Qatari funding and partnership relationships is amplified by U of T's financial structure, which creates the same institutional incentives documented in Chapter 2—a structural dependency on international tuition revenue that makes the university reluctant to examine or constrain relationships with Gulf state academic partners whose student and funding pipelines are financially indispensable.

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<sup>724</sup> Ibid.

<sup>725</sup> “Follow the Money: Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood Funding of Higher Education,” Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://isgap.org/follow-the-money/>; ISGAP, *Foreign Infiltration: Georgetown University, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FTM-GEORGETOWN-REPORT-2025-05-23-1.pdf>; “Qatar’s Multidimensional Takeover of Georgetown University,” Middle East Forum, January 20, 2026, <https://www.meforum.org/mef-reports/qatars-multidimensional-takeover-of-georgetown-university>; Gregg Roman, “Qatar’s Elite Pipeline at Northwestern,” Middle East Forum, January 7, 2026, <https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/qatars-elite-pipeline-at-northwestern>.

<sup>726</sup> “HBKU’s Qatar Computing Research Institute Concludes Summer Internship Program Online,” Hamad Bin Khalifa University, July 20, 2020, <https://www.hbku.edu.qa/en/news/qcri-concludes-summer-internship>.

U of T serves over 99,000 students across its St. George, Scarborough, and Mississauga campuses and has grown by 7.6 percent over the past five years.<sup>727</sup> The province cut domestic tuition by 10 percent in 2019–2020 and has frozen fees at those reduced levels until at least 2026–2027; the limited increases permitted for out-of-province domestic students have minimal aggregate effect.<sup>728</sup> International student tuition is entirely unregulated by the province, set by the university to cover full program costs and benchmarked against peer institutions.<sup>729</sup> Student fees overall increased by C\$90 million in the year ending April 30, 2025, reaching C\$2.4 billion—growth driven primarily by increased international fees and enrollment.<sup>730</sup>

This has created an imbalance: international students comprise 31.1 percent of U of T’s student body but contribute approximately 42 percent of the university’s total revenue—a proportion that has risen steadily from 39 percent in 2020.<sup>731</sup> U of T’s own financial reporting states explicitly that “meeting international student intake targets is crucial to fund undergraduate programs,” and that “neither government grants nor regulated tuition fees have kept pace with inflation over time.”<sup>732</sup>

The university’s financial sustainability is structurally dependent on maintaining access to international students, including students from Qatar, where educational soft power is a key tool and Muslim Brotherhood-aligned institutional networks are active.

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<sup>727</sup> *Financial Report 2025* (University of Toronto Financial Services, April 30, 2025), <https://finance.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/April-30-2025-Financial-Report.pdf>.

<sup>728</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>729</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>730</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>731</sup> Nina Uzunović, “International Students at U of T Pay Nearly \$60,000 in Tuition Every Year,” *The Varsity*, March 5, 2023, <https://thevarsity.ca/2023/03/05/international-students-at-u-of-t-pay-nearly-60000-in-tuition-every-year-why/>

<sup>732</sup> *Financial Report 2025* (University of Toronto Financial Services, April 30, 2025).

## Chapter 8: University of Waterloo

The June 2025 convocation ceremonies at the University of Waterloo (UW) opened with a scene that encapsulates the institutional dynamics documented in this report. Wearing a keffiyeh, valedictorian Salahuddin Said said in his remarks that he felt a responsibility to draw attention to what he described as “the ethical catastrophe in [sic] Israel’s genocide in Gaza,”<sup>733</sup> claiming that technologies developed by engineers had been used by Israel to target civilians and calling directly on UW to sever its institutional ties with the Israel Institute of Technology, also known as the Technion. The fact that he was allowed to use a university convocation ceremony to repeat highly contested political accusations and demand an academic boycott of one of the world’s leading technical universities is the operational signature of the narrative framework examined and documented in this report.<sup>734</sup>

The interinstitutional partnership he was calling to sever was established in 2014, funded by a C\$1.6 million gift from the Gerald Schwartz and Heather Reisman Foundation. It has since produced collaborative research in quantum computing, nanotechnology, and water filtration, representing precisely the kind of scientific cooperation between leading research universities that generates measurable public benefit.<sup>735</sup> What the valedictorian did not address—and what the institution has not been asked to examine—is that during the same period the Technion partnership was already being dismantled under activist pressure, while the university was deepening a parallel set of research relationships with Qatari state institutions, as documented in detail in section 8.1 below.

Although the valedictorian’s address was not the version approved by the convocation committee, university administrators noted that “at Waterloo, freedom of expression is foundational” while declining to issue a formal condemnation.<sup>736</sup> The address followed a 2024 referendum conducted by the University of Waterloo Undergraduate Students’ Association (WUSA), which similarly called for the severing of ties with the Technion and passed with 83.9 percent support.<sup>737</sup>

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<sup>733</sup> Mitchell Consky, “Jewish Students Grapple with Convocations Becoming Political Battlegrounds,” *Canadian Jewish News*, June 27, 2025, <https://thecjn.ca/news/jewish-students-grapple-with-convocations-becoming-political-battlegrounds/>.

<sup>734</sup> Ibid.

<sup>735</sup> “Waterloo, Technion Partner to Advance Research, Commercialization,” University of Waterloo, March 18, 2014. <https://uwaterloo.ca/news/news/waterloo-technion-partner-advance-research-commercialization>.

<sup>736</sup> Mitchell Consky, “Jewish Students Grapple with Convocations Becoming Political Battlegrounds,” *Canadian Jewish News*, June 27, 2025, <https://thecjn.ca/news/jewish-students-grapple-with-convocations-becoming-political-battlegrounds/>.

<sup>737</sup> Mariam Naim, “Eight Years Later: Two Referendums and Two Different Results,” *Imprint*, November 12, 2024, <https://uwimprint.ca/eight-years-later-two-referendums-and-two-different-results/>.

These events are consistent with a broader pattern in which academic platforms are utilized to advance politicized narratives. Complex geopolitical issues are presented in absolutist terms, without scope for scrutiny or evidentiary challenge, from institutional stages that are not designed for this. At Waterloo, the pattern had a concrete trajectory: a years-long campaign in which encampments, student referenda, academic institutes, visiting speakers, and coordinated international activist networks converged on a single institutional outcome—the dismantling of UW’s research relationship with Israel’s leading technical university and the further entrenchment of a prevailing narrative of Palestinian victimhood.

## 8.1 Qatar’s Financial and Academic Footprint at UW

UW has received over C\$3.8 million in documented research funding from Qatari state entities—primarily the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) and Qatar University—through at least five directly funded projects, with additional financial flows arriving via Qatari government student scholarships.<sup>738</sup>

UW ranks ninth among Canadian institutions on QatarEnergy’s 2025 University Priority List,<sup>739</sup> which identifies UW as a preferred source of recruits, research collaboration, and strategic partnership development. This list can be regarded as a state document given that QatarEnergy is wholly owned by the government of Qatar.<sup>740</sup> In addition, Qatari educational advisory sources writing for Qatari student audiences explicitly identify Waterloo’s “co-op” (i.e. work-study) engineering and computer science programs as a preferred Canadian pipeline for roles in QatarEnergy’s AI-driven energy projects, government cybersecurity, and smart city initiatives in the framework of TASMU’s Smart Qatar program.<sup>741</sup>

Qatari law requires that foreign degrees be recognized as equivalent by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education before graduates can enter state employment.<sup>742</sup> UW

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<sup>738</sup> “First-Year Tuition Fees,” University of Waterloo, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/future-students/financing/tuition>; “Scholarship Portal,” Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://scholarship.edu.gov.qa/>

<sup>739</sup> “QatarEnergy’s University Priority List 2025,” QatarEnergy, November 12, 2024, <https://www.qatarenergy.qa/en/Careers/UniversityProgramApplication/Documents/University%20Priority%20List%202025.pdf>.

<sup>740</sup> “QatarEnergy,” DBpedia, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://dbpedia.org/resource/QatarEnergy>; “Qatar Energy (QE),” profile, IPP Journal, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://ippjournal.com/company/qatar-petroleum>.

<sup>741</sup> “Computer Science & Information Technology,” Global Education Board, accessed April 15, 2026, <https://geb.qa/computer-science-information-technology/>

<sup>742</sup> Ministry of Education and Higher Education, “Authentication of a University Degree Issued Abroad,” Sharek (Qatar government services platform), accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.sharek.gov.qa/en/articles/>

is considered one of Qatar’s preferred institutions for student recruitment and strategic partnership, as apparent from QatarEnergy’s 2025 University Priority List.<sup>743</sup> Graduates with a UW degree enter Qatar’s labor market pre-qualified for jobs in key technology domains the state is actively developing.<sup>744</sup>

The recognition of UW degrees by Qatar’s Ministry of Education and Higher Education and the university’s ranking in key disciplines have turned it into a coveted destination for Qatari government scholarships, which cover tuition fees, living expenses, monthly stipends, travel allowances, and pre-travel preparation grants.<sup>745</sup> At least thirty-five Qatari students are currently enrolled at or have graduated from UW, where tuition for international engineering students runs to approximately C\$76,500 per student per year—producing an estimated total Qatari government investment of C\$10.71 million.<sup>746</sup>

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[ministry-of-education-and-higher-education/authentication-of-a-university-degree-issued-abroad/679b29dc22938a05a01e5655](https://www.education.gov.qa/en/Content/UniversityDegreeEquivalency); “University Degree Equivalency/Validation Service,” Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.education.gov.qa/en/Content/UniversityDegreeEquivalency>; “About the Equivalency of Certificates,” Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://www.education.gov.qa/en/Content/AboutEquivalencyCertificates>.

<sup>743</sup> “QatarEnergy’s University Priority List 2025”; “Approved Universities – External Scholarship Programme,” Scholarship Portal, Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://scholarship.education.gov.qa/en/Content/approvedUniversities>.

<sup>744</sup> “National Cybersecurity Training Program,” Qatar National Cyber Security Agency, accessed June 25, 2026, <https://academy.ncsa.gov.qa/en/initiatives/national-cyber-training-program>; International Trade Administration, “Qatar Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Technology Developments,” US Department of Commerce, January 5, 2025, <https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/qatar-artificial-intelligence-ai-and-technology-developments>.

<sup>745</sup> “Scholarship Portal,” Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://scholarship.education.gov.qa/>.

<sup>746</sup> Note: The figures presented in this section are approximations only, compiled by forensic accountants on the basis of publicly available information. Tuition calculations draw on UW’s published fee schedule for international engineering students commencing in September 2026, cf. “First-Year Tuition Fees,” University of Waterloo, accessed June 15, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/future-students/financing/tuition>. The number of Qatari students is derived from publicly visible LinkedIn profiles indicating current enrollment or graduation from UW. This figure cannot be independently verified and is almost certainly an undercount, as many students maintain private profiles or do not disclose their nationality or institutional affiliation online. The estimated Qatari investment in tuition therefore represents a conservative lower bound. Calculations assume full-program enrollment across eight academic terms at the current rate for first-year international engineering students and do not account for program transfers, early withdrawal, part-time enrollment, or variations in tuition across academic years. Actual disbursements by the Qatari government—which may also include living stipends, travel allowances, and pre-departure grants under the Qatar’s foreign scholarship program—exceed tuition costs alone and are not included in the estimated investment presented above. These figures are offered for illustrative purposes only and should not be treated as audited financial data or as a precise accounting of Qatari government expenditure.

### 8.1.1 Research Funding

One of the primary channels for Qatari research collaboration at UW is the university's Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, which focuses on electrical insulation systems, condition monitoring technologies, and the application of machine learning and drone technology to power infrastructure assessment. The group's research directly addresses operational challenges in Qatar's energy infrastructure—a connection made explicit by the group's institutional collaborator, Dr. Khaled Shaban, who is a professor in the Computer Science and Engineering Department at Qatar University, holds a doctorate from UW and served as adjunct professor there until 2024.<sup>747</sup> Dr. Shaban has led multiple QNRF-funded projects under the NPRP that name UW faculty as collaborating investigators, including Magdy Salama and Ramadan ElShatshat, and has co-authored joint US patent filings on smart grid fault-detection technology with the same UW researchers—evidence of a sustained, funded research relationship between the two institutions rather than an isolated academic exchange.<sup>748</sup>

One QNRF-funded project, “Optimized and Secured Demand Response Using Smart Meters and Blockchain for the Qatari Grid” (NPRP 11S-1202-170052, US\$600,000), awarded to UW's Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, investigated the application of blockchain technology to secure demand response systems in Qatar's electricity grid—research aimed at optimizing real-time energy consumption management while protecting grid communications infrastructure from manipulation and unauthorized access.<sup>749</sup> The applied objective is explicit in the project title: the research is designed for the Qatari grid specifically, advancing Qatar's capacity to manage energy demand across its smart meter network while hardening that infrastructure against the cybersecurity vulnerabilities that accompany digital grid modernization. Critical infrastructure security of this kind falls within the sensitive

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<sup>747</sup> “Dr. Khaled Shaban,” profile, Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, University of Waterloo, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/outdoor-insulation-condition-monitoring-research-group/contacts/dr-khaled-shaban>.

<sup>748</sup> “Research,” profile of Professor Khaled Shaban, Qatar University, accessed July 7, 2026, <http://qufaculty.qu.edu.qa/khaled-shaban/research/>; Ahmed Gaouda, Khaled Bashir Shaban, Magdy Salama, Atef Abdrabou, Ramadan Elshatshat, Mutaz Mohamed Elhassan Elsawi Khairalla, and Ahmed Abdrabou, “Smart Fault Detection Device to Anticipate Impending Faults in Power Transformers,” US Patent 10,613,157, filed April 12, 2019, and issued April 7, 2020, assigned to Qatar University, University of Waterloo, and United Arab Emirates University, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://patents.justia.com/patent/10613157>.

<sup>749</sup> “Optimized and Secured Demand Response Using Smart Meters and Blockchain for the Qatari Grid,” Project no. NPRP 11S-1202-170052, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/29430>; “Research Grants,” Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, University of Waterloo, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/outdoor-insulation-condition-monitoring-research-group/research-grants>.

technology research domains that the Canadian government has identified as requiring oversight in foreign research partnerships.

Another QNRF-funded project awarded to UW's Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, "Development of Nano-based Silicone Rubber Composites for High Voltage Insulation in Qatar Environment" (NPRP 12S-0227-190168, US\$600,000), investigated advanced polymer materials engineered to perform under the specific climatic conditions of Qatar's environment—extreme heat, humidity, and airborne particulates—that accelerate the degradation of conventional high-voltage insulation systems.<sup>750</sup> As with the transformer and smart grid projects examined above, the knowledge produced is calibrated to Qatar's specific operational environment and serves Qatar's energy infrastructure directly. The contractual terms governing IP ownership and technology transfer remain undisclosed.

Two other QNRF-funded projects—"Asset Management for Power Transformers in Smart Grid" (NPRP 5-044-2-016, US\$960,000) and "Enabling Self-Healing for Smart Grids with Renewable Energy Resources" (NPRP 6-711-2-295)<sup>751</sup>—were undertaken jointly by Qatar University, UW, and various other institutions between 2012 and 2016, with Dr. Mohamed Ahmed serving as a collaborator in his capacity as adjunct assistant professor in Waterloo's Electrical and Computer Engineering Department.<sup>752</sup> Ahmed's research contributions to these projects—transformer health index estimation, decentralized distribution system restoration, autonomous voltage and reactive power control, and the integration of inverter-based distributed generators—address the precise engineering challenges confronting Qatar's state energy infrastructure as it manages an aging grid while integrating renewable sources under its national diversification agenda.

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<sup>750</sup> "Development of Nano-based Silicone Rubber Composites for High Voltage Insulation in Qatar Environment," Project no. NPRP 12S-0227-190168, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/33215>. "Research Grants," Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, University of Waterloo, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/outdoor-insulation-condition-monitoring-research-group/research-grants>.

<sup>751</sup> "Asset Management for Power Transformers in Smart Grid," Project no. NPRP 5-044-2-016, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed June 25, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/5316>; "Research Grants," Outdoor Insulation Condition Monitoring Research Group, University of Waterloo, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/outdoor-insulation-condition-monitoring-research-group/research-grants>. "Enabling Self-Healing for Smart Grid with Renewable Energy Resources," Project no. NPRP 6-711-2-295, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed June 25, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/10708>.

<sup>752</sup> Resume of Mohamed Ahmed, PhD, PEng, last updated August 2016, Power and Energy Systems Group, University of Waterloo, accessed July 7, 2026, [https://uwaterloo.ca/power-energy-systems-group/sites/default/files/uploads/files/mohamed\\_ahmed\\_resume\\_-\\_aug\\_2016.pdf](https://uwaterloo.ca/power-energy-systems-group/sites/default/files/uploads/files/mohamed_ahmed_resume_-_aug_2016.pdf).

The significance of these projects lies in their applied focus on smart-grid resilience, transformer asset management, distribution system restoration, renewable energy integration, and power system control. These are not abstract research areas; they relate directly to the operation, reliability, and modernization of electricity infrastructure. This practical orientation is underscored by Ahmed's parallel work involving Hydro-One, IESO, IBM/SOSCIP, and Ontario distribution system modelling.<sup>753</sup> This overlap does not establish wrongdoing, but it does raise a questions of research-related governance that Canadian disclosure frameworks are unequipped to address. How should universities manage foreign-funded smart-grid research when the same researcher is also engaged in applied work in the domestic electricity infrastructure? This case illustrates how QNRF partnerships can become embedded within ordinary academic and industry research portfolios, while the public record provides limited visibility into project boundaries, data access, conflict management, intellectual property terms, or downstream use.

This mirrors what was documented in the case of U of T's QNRF collaborations and educational partnerships with Qatar. Academics and engineers, sometimes with cross-institutional affiliations or adjunct appointments, become the institutional bridge through which Qatari state research priorities are advanced using Canadian university infrastructure, Canadian academic credibility, and—in the case of Dr Ahmed specifically—expertise developed in parallel with applied research in Ontario's electricity infrastructure. The fact that the knowledge produced explicitly addressed Qatar's grid modernization needs—a strategic priority for a state whose hydrocarbon revenues fund the influence architecture documented throughout this report—is not incidental to the collaboration; it is central to the way these projects were framed and funded.

A fifth QNRF-funded project, "Groundwater Pollution by Petroleum-derived Contaminants in Coastal (Semi)-Arid Environment" (NPRP 9-093-1-021, US\$672,000), ran from 2017 to 2020. The project involved Qatar University, the University of Waterloo, United Arab Emirates University, Utrecht University, the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research, and Université Libre de Bruxelles, with UW researchers participating through the university's Ecohydrology Research Group.<sup>754</sup> The project studied the fate and transport of petroleum-derived contaminants in groundwater

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<sup>753</sup> Ibid.

<sup>754</sup> "Groundwater Pollution by Petroleum-derived Contaminants in Coastal (Semi)-Arid Environment," Project no. NPRP9-093-1-021, InnoLight database, Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation Council, accessed April 14, 2026, <https://innolight.qrdi.org.qa/en/projects/21617>; "Qatar University and United Arab Emirates University Partner with University of Waterloo to Study Fate and Transport of Petroleum Pollutants in Groundwater," Water Institute, University of Waterloo, February 17, 2017, <https://uwaterloo.ca/water-institute/news/qatar-university-and-united-arab-emirates-university-partner>.

under arid and semi-arid coastal conditions. Its strategic relevance to Qatar was stated explicitly by Qatar University principal investigator Riyadh I. Al-Raoush, who noted that Qatar has little rainfall and no surface water, that hydrocarbon pollutants place groundwater at risk, and that the project was “of strategic relevance to Qatar whose economy relies largely on the exploration of hydrocarbons.”<sup>755</sup> UW’s contribution included experimental column systems designed to model how hydrocarbons behave in soils experiencing high evaporation and high salinity, conditions identified as typical of Qatar’s coastal aquifers.<sup>756</sup>

Taken together, these UW projects mirror the pattern documented in U of T’s QNRF collaborations and wider educational partnerships with Qatar. Across multiple projects, Canadian university researchers and Qatar-linked academics appear as institutional bridges through which Qatari state research priorities are advanced using Canadian university infrastructure, Canadian academic credibility, and technical expertise developed in fields directly relevant to power systems, grid resilience, environmental remediation, and energy-infrastructure management. The significance is not that the scientific work itself is improper, but that the knowledge produced was repeatedly calibrated to Qatar’s specific infrastructure, energy, and environmental-management needs—strategic priorities for a state whose hydrocarbon revenues fund the influence architecture documented throughout this report.

What warrants scrutiny, therefore, is the recurring structure—QNRF-backed research, Qatar University or Qatar-linked institutional participation, Canadian university expertise, and outputs tailored to Qatar’s national infrastructure requirements. The contractual terms governing intellectual property ownership, publication rights, technology transfer, data access, partner contributions, and downstream use were not recoverable through ISGAP’s investigation and do not appear in the publicly accessible institutional records reviewed. Where comparable arrangements have been examined, including ISGAP’s prior research on Qatari relations with Texas A&M, the actual contractual terms governing dual-appointment researchers and state-funded applied research demonstrate how such collaborations can operate in ways that favor Qatari institutional interests. The UW record raises similar issues without actually establishing misconduct.

### **8.1.2 The Qatar Foundation and the Management of International Agreements at UW**

Before assuming his current role in international recruitment and market development at the Northern College of Applied Arts and Technology in Ontario in 2025, Ahmed

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<sup>755</sup> Ibid.

<sup>756</sup> Ibid.

Baghdady led UW's International Agreements team.<sup>757</sup> Before moving to Canada, he spent roughly fifteen years within the Qatar Foundation and its ecosystem, serving as Research Manager at the World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE), a flagship Qatar Foundation education diplomacy initiative, and as an adjunct faculty member at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, with prior positions at the RAND Corporation's Qatar office, the Institute of International Education in Qatar, and AMIDEAST.<sup>758</sup>

Baghdady's institutional role within the Qatar Foundation extended to operational program management. In his capacity as program officer for QNRF, he publicly articulated the fund's governing philosophy as promoting "learning-by-doing" and "hands-on" research activities as a vehicle for building Qatar's knowledge-based economy—research programming explicitly oriented toward Qatar's national development agenda rather than the interests of partner institutions.<sup>759</sup> The Qatar Foundation functions as one of Qatar's primary instruments for soft power projection in higher education, cultivating relationships between Qatari institutions and Western academic systems. Baghdady thus arrived at UW steeped in knowledge and experience of Qatar's strategic priorities, research architecture, and funding philosophy. In 2025, he co-authored a scholarly exposition on Qatar University revealing that the university's strategic plan was developed in concert with Qatar National Vision 2030 at the personal direction of the Emir, that its Engineering College is explicitly oriented toward AI, cybersecurity, and big data as state priorities, and that its graduates staff the Qatari government.<sup>760</sup> The five QNRF-funded projects at UW described above sit exactly at the intersection of these priorities.

## 8.2 University of Waterloo Anti-Israel Activism: Staff, Students, and Administration

At UW, anti-Israel activism operates through a combination of formally recognized student groups, informal protest coalitions, and faculty-affiliated initiatives. Relevant student organizations include University of Waterloo Students for Palestinian Rights

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<sup>757</sup> "Ahmed Baghdady, EdD," Leadership, Northern College, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://www.northerncollege.ca/about/leadership/>.

<sup>758</sup> "Ahmed M. Baghdady," profile, The Wellbeing Project, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://wellbeing-project.org/ahmed-m-baghdady/>.

<sup>759</sup> Wajeeha Malik and Neha Rashid, "Spotlight: QNRF's Undergraduate Research Experience Program," NU-Q Views [Northwestern University in Qatar], February 18, 2015, <https://qviews.qatar.northwestern.edu/4479/uncategorized/spotlight-qnrfs-undergraduate-research-experience-program/>.

<sup>760</sup> Matthew Hartley, Alan Ruby, and Ahmed Baghdady, "Qatar University: Local Identity and Global Opportunities," in *Pursuing Institutional Purpose: Profiles of Excellence*, ed. M. Hartley and A. Ruby, 90–104 (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

(UW SFPR),<sup>761</sup> Voices for Palestine, and the Public Interest Research Group-Waterloo Chapter.<sup>762</sup> As of this writing, only Voices for Palestine is listed in the Waterloo Undergraduate Student Association (WUSA) club registry. As at other Canadian universities, a significant portion of mobilization occurs outside official student union structures.

Groups such as Occupy UW, which organized the May–June 2024 “Gaza House” encampment, and UW Voices for Palestine, which continued coordinated protest activity into the Fall 2024 semester, function as key organizing bodies despite lacking formal club status.<sup>763</sup> These activities have also involved frequent coordination with external networks, including the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), a transnational Palestinian activist network.<sup>764</sup> On May 23, 2024, for example, Occupy UW co-posted a joint statement with Palestine Solidarity KW (Kitchener-Waterloo), UW’s Indigenous Student Association, PYM Toronto, and two Wilfrid Laurier University groups, announcing that Laurier students had formally joined the UW encampment.<sup>765</sup> This indicates that Occupy UW operated not as an isolated campus group but as one node within a coordinated regional network spanning multiple universities and organizations.

At the faculty level, institutional engagement is reflected in bodies such as Waterloo’s Renison Association of Academic Staff (RAAS)<sup>766</sup> and the Faculty for Palestine-Southwestern Chapter,<sup>767</sup> which promote BDS initiatives. The Foundation for Palestine Studies Fund, established in 2022 within the Faculty of Arts to host programming and academic discourse related to Palestinian issues, has featured several prominent academics and academic tie-ins aligned with the Red-Green alliance outlined in

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<sup>761</sup> Website of Students for Palestinian Rights (University of Waterloo), archived on May 20, 2025, at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20250520053003/http://www.sfpr.ca/>; “Who Supports BDS in Canada?,” Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), last updated October 10, 2025, [https://www.cjpme.org/who\\_supports\\_bds](https://www.cjpme.org/who_supports_bds).

<sup>762</sup> “Who Supports BDS in Canada?,” CJPME, last updated October 10, 2025, [https://www.cjpme.org/who\\_supports\\_bds](https://www.cjpme.org/who_supports_bds).

<sup>763</sup> Hari Adnani, “OccupyUW Calls for University to Take Direct Action,” *The Cord*, July 4, 2024, <https://thecord.ca/occupyuw-calls-for-university-to-take-direct-action/>; “Voices for Palestine,” club profile, Waterloo Undergraduate Student Association (WUSA), <https://clubs.wusa.ca/clubs/182>; UWaterloo Voices for Palestine (@uwvfp), Instagram profile, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://www.instagram.com/uwvfp/>.

<sup>764</sup> “Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM): Five Things to Know,” Anti-Defamation League, July 21, 2025, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/palestinian-youth-movement-pym-five-things-know>.

<sup>765</sup> Umaymah Suhail, “UW Launches Legal Action against Students in Occupy UW Encampment,” *The Community Edition*, July 8, 2024, <https://www.communityedition.ca/uw-launches-legal-action-against-students-in-occupy-uw-encampment/>.

<sup>766</sup> Faculty for Palestine, Southwestern Ontario (@f4p\_swon), “Third BDS victory this month! This one at Renison University College...,” Instagram, May 2024, <https://www.instagram.com/p/C6JvuISAcot/>; “Who Supports BDS in Canada?,” CJPME, last updated October 10, 2025, [https://www.cjpme.org/who\\_supports\\_bds](https://www.cjpme.org/who_supports_bds).

<sup>767</sup> “Renison Association of Academic Staff passes BDS motion,” Faculty for Palestine, accessed April 16, 2026, <https://faculty4palestine.ca/resoultion/renison-association-of-academic-staff-passes-bds-motion/>

Chapter 1.<sup>768</sup> Several of these organizations are listed by Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME) as supporting BDS initiatives, while overlapping governance connections, such as the presence of a CJPME board member on UW's Board of Governors, illustrate the intersection of student activism, faculty engagement, and institutional governance.<sup>769</sup>

The climate for Jewish students at Waterloo has been documented repeatedly—not just as a series of isolated incidents but as a pattern acknowledged by UW's own administration, in faculty testimony, and in the parliamentary record. In November 2023, following meetings with Hillel Waterloo and the Rohr Chabad Centre for Jewish Life, as well as Voices for Palestine and the Muslim Students' Association, UW President Vivek Goel stated publicly that Jewish students and their colleagues “continue to face antisemitism, anti-Palestinian racism and Islamophobia on our campuses.”<sup>770</sup> This observation is corroborated below in Dr. James A. Diamond's parliamentary testimony, describing systemic professional discrimination against Jewish academics, and Dr. Elena Neiterman's account of Jewish faculty concerns being “dismissed or ignored” by UW's own administration and oversight bodies. Other concrete examples include a Jewish student being approached on campus by another student who reportedly said “I wish Hitler was still alive.”<sup>771</sup> In addition, in the days before the first anniversary of October 7, campus authorities were required to remove antisemitic posters from university property.<sup>772</sup> Students have also reported feeling unsafe when appearing visibly Jewish on campus, such as wearing a kippah.<sup>773</sup>

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<sup>768</sup> Peter Larson, “A Canadian First: University of Waterloo Launches a ‘Foundation for Palestinian Studies,’” *Canada Talks Israel Palestine*, July 15, 2022, <https://canadatalksisraelpalestine.ca/2022/07/15/a-canadian-first-university-of-waterloo-launches-a-foundation-for-palestinian-studies/>; “Donation Establishes Foundation for Palestinian Studies Fund,” *Faculty of Arts, University of Waterloo*, December 22, 2021, <https://uwaterloo.ca/arts/news/donation-establishes-foundation-palestinian-studies-fund>.

<sup>769</sup> “Who Supports BDS in Canada?,” CJPME, last updated October 10, 2025, [https://www.cjpme.org/who\\_supports\\_bds](https://www.cjpme.org/who_supports_bds) (listing the Renison Association of Academic Staff (RAAS), which represents faculty at Renison University College, affiliated with the University of Waterloo, as having passed a BDS motion in April 2024); “Our Leadership,” *Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East*, accessed June 14, 2026, [https://www.cjpme.org/our\\_leadership](https://www.cjpme.org/our_leadership) (identifying a CJPME board member, described as a chemical engineering academic, as simultaneously serving on the University of Waterloo's Board of Governors).

<sup>770</sup> Vivek Goel, “Addressing Reports of Hate on Our Campuses: A Message from President Goel,” *University of Waterloo*, November 29, 2023, <https://uwaterloo.ca/news/presidents-news/addressing-reports-hate-our-campuses>.

<sup>771</sup> Luisa D'Amato, “Anger over Israel Is No Excuse for Hate Speech on Campus,” *Waterloo Region Record*, October 3, 2024, [https://www.therecord.com/opinion/columnists/anger-over-israel-is-no-excuse-for-hate-speech-on-campus/article\\_31cd1495-1847-53dd-9664-614e0f1842f7.html](https://www.therecord.com/opinion/columnists/anger-over-israel-is-no-excuse-for-hate-speech-on-campus/article_31cd1495-1847-53dd-9664-614e0f1842f7.html).

<sup>772</sup> “Antisemitic Posters Being Removed from Campus,” *University of Waterloo*, October 2, 2024, <https://uwaterloo.ca/freedom-of-expression/news/antisemitic-posters-being-removed-campus>.

<sup>773</sup> Colton Wiens, “Jewish Students Want UW to Do More to Combat Anti-Semitism,” *CTV News*, March 21, 2024, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/kitchener/article/jewish-students-want-uw-to-do-more-to-combat-anti-semitism/>.

In July 2023, the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center issued a news release in response to UW allowing “an antisemitic, anti-LGBTQ2S+ Imam” to speak at the university ahead of his scheduled speech at Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU).<sup>774</sup> The Imam, Abu Taymiyyah, has an extensive history of antisemitism and homophobia, and has claimed there is a correlation between homosexuality and pedophilia.<sup>775</sup> He has also advanced the conspiracy theory that Jewish people seek to convert Muslims to another faith due to Jewish “envy” of other communities.<sup>776</sup>

In May 2024, Dr. James A. Diamond, Joseph and Wolf Lebovic Chair of Jewish Studies at UW, testified before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights that Jewish academics had faced discrimination including “termination of scientific collaborations, cancellation of conference invitations, refusal to consider scholarly submissions to journals, rejections of promotion evaluations and withdrawals of offers for academic appointments, among many other instances.”<sup>777</sup>

In an interview published in September 2024, Dr. Elena Neiterman, an associate professor at UW’s Faculty of Health, described how Jewish faculty at UW had fought a motion put forward by the Faculty Association to reject the IHRA definition of antisemitism, noting that the only occasion on which the association had engaged with antisemitism had been “in order to reject any attempt to define it.” She further note that, after October 7, she and her Jewish colleagues had reached out to the UW administration, the Faculty Association, Human Resources, and the EDI office with their concerns which “were either dismissed or ignored.”<sup>778</sup>

Responding to these events ahead of the 2024 school year, Liberal MP Anthony Housefather and former federal Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance

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<sup>774</sup> “FSWC Condemns Platforming of Hateful Imam at Ontario Universities,” Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center, July 12, 2023, <https://www.fswc.ca/news/fswc-condemns-platforming-of-hateful-imam-at-ontario-universities>.

<sup>775</sup> Ibid.

<sup>776</sup> “Response to Louis Smith Olympic Medalist Mocking Islam Imran Ibn Mansur & Abu Taymiyyah Comment!,” posted on July 11, 2023, by Bnai Brith Canada, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a1AzGMiPsBs&t=500s>; “B’nai Brith Urges Universities to Stop Antisemitic Islamist’s Speaking Tour,” B’nai Brith Canada, July 11, 2023, <https://www.bnaibrith.ca/bnai-brith-urges-universities-to-stop-antisemitic-islamists-speaking-tour/>.

<sup>777</sup> “Evidence,” House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting no. 105, House of Commons of Canada, May 23, 2024, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/JUST/meeting-105/evidence> (testimony of Dr. James A. Diamond, Joseph and Wolf Lebovic Chair of Jewish Studies, University of Waterloo).

<sup>778</sup> Elena Nieterman, “Gearing Up for Another Year of Antisemitism on Campus,” *Hamilton Jewish News*, September 15, 2024, <https://www.hamiltonjewishnews.com/home-page/voices/gearing-up-for-another-year-of-antisemitism-on-campus>.

and Combating Antisemitism Deborah Lyons sent a letter to university presidents outlining demands for the upcoming school year.<sup>779</sup> These included clearly communicating and enforcing campus rules, supporting Jewish students and faculty, reaffirming faculty responsibilities, anticipating and mitigating disruptions on the one-year anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel, and ensuring that all university DEI programs include the mainstream Jewish community, with DEI officers acting as champions of Jewish inclusion.<sup>780</sup> In response, UW stated that it was taking several steps to prevent antisemitism on its campus, acknowledging the lack of safety felt by the Jewish community on campus.<sup>781</sup> On the ground, however, things remained largely unchanged.

### 8.2.1 Occupy UW: Encampment and Antisemitism

Like other Canadian universities, UW has experienced an increase in anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric and activity, including activity organized by student groups calling for the dismantling of Israel and actions directed at Jewish students and faculty. On June 21, 2024, the university issued a legal trespass notice to members of the Occupy UW encampment, which had been in place since May 13. The university stated that it could not tolerate “actions like the intimidation and harassment of people” and that the conduct of encampment participants had become “untenable.”<sup>782</sup> UW subsequently initiated legal proceedings against participants and organizers of the encampment, seeking C\$1.5 million in damages, including for “trespass, damage to property, intimidation, and ejectment.”<sup>783</sup> Court filings indicate that the defendants included students, alumni, staff, faculty, employees, and individuals with no affiliation to the university.<sup>784</sup> On July 8, the university withdrew its lawsuit following the dismantling of the encampment.<sup>785</sup>

It is worth noting that the university only acted after the protesters, organized by Occupy UW, “crossed a line” by disrupting a Board of Governors meeting “which

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<sup>779</sup> Anthony Housefather (@AHousefather), “A safe return to campus for Jewish students & faculty has been a huge priority...,” X, August 14, 2024, <https://x.com/AHousefather/status/1823758452751262086>.

<sup>780</sup> Élie Cantin-Nantel, “We Asked Canada’s Largest Universities How They Plan to Deal with Antisemitism This School Year,” *The Hub*, September 5, 2024, <https://thehub.ca/2024/09/05/we-asked-canadas-largest-universities-how-they-plan-to-deal-with-antisemitism-this-school-year/>.

<sup>781</sup> Ibid.

<sup>782</sup> “University Issues Legal Trespass Notice,” University of Waterloo, June 21, 2024, <https://uwaterloo.ca/freedom-of-expression/news/university-issues-legal-trespass-notice>.

<sup>783</sup> Mark Douglas, “University of Waterloo Sues Pro-Palestinian Encampment for \$1.5M,” *City News* (Kitchener), June 27, 2024, <https://kitchener.citynews.ca/2024/06/27/university-of-waterloo-sues-pro-palestinian-encampment-for-1-5m/>.

<sup>784</sup> Ibid.

<sup>785</sup> Kevin Nielsen, “University of Waterloo Dropping Lawsuit after Protesters Dismantle Encampment,” *Global News*, July 8, 2024, <https://globalnews.ca/news/10610315/university-of-waterloo-drop-lawsuit-protesters-dismantle-encampment/>.

included bodily prevention of people entering buildings.”<sup>786</sup> According to reports, the anti-Israel protests in university buildings were so aggressive while the board meeting was in progress that police needed to be called to get board members out safely.<sup>787</sup> While declaring its opposition to violence and hate speech, the university nevertheless stated that it would review its investment and partnership policies in response to the protestors’ demands.<sup>788</sup>

Occupy UW has also coordinated and co-organized anti-Israel protests and marches with the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), which according to Honest Reporting Canada “openly calls for the total destruction of the Jewish state through violent terrorism.”<sup>789</sup> In the hours following the October 7 attacks, for example, PYM advertised an “All Out for Palestine” event “which invited followers to ‘celebrate our steps closer to liberation’ and to ‘uplift and honour our resistance and our martyrs.’”<sup>790</sup>

### 8.2.2 UW Voices for Palestine: More Than a Dedicated Group of Students

Despite dismantling the encampment and UW’s subsequent dropping of the lawsuit, protests started up again in the Fall 2024 semester, this time under the banner of “UW Voices for Palestine,” which is reportedly part of a much larger, national movement that “aims to end the war in Gaza.”<sup>791</sup> Jewish students on UW campus who have complained of rising antisemitism and a diminished sense of safety in the period following the October 7 attacks specifically note that UW Voices of Palestine has shared information on campus on the war in Gaza that is not only inaccurate but also incendiary.<sup>792</sup>

UW Voices for Palestine media liaison Nick Joseph, who also performs the same role for Occupy UW, stated on 570 NewsRadio Kitchener that “the encampment was a great

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<sup>786</sup> Ibid.

<sup>787</sup> Dvir Zagury, “Anger over Israel Is No Excuse for Hate Speech on Campus,” *The Record*, October 3, 2024, [https://www.therecord.com/opinion/columnists/anger-over-israel-is-no-excuse-for-hate-speech-on-campus/article\\_31cd1495-1847-53dd-9664-614e0f1842f7.html](https://www.therecord.com/opinion/columnists/anger-over-israel-is-no-excuse-for-hate-speech-on-campus/article_31cd1495-1847-53dd-9664-614e0f1842f7.html).

<sup>788</sup> “Update on Protest Encampment,” University of Waterloo, May 21, 2024, <https://uwaterloo.ca/freedom-of-expression/news/update-protest-encampment>.

<sup>789</sup> “CTV News Kitchener Whitewashes Terrorist-Supporting Groups, Gives Them Free Publicity Instead,” Honest Reporting Canada, June 9, 2024, <https://honestreporting.ca/petitions/ctv-news-kitchener-whitewashes-terrorist-supporting-groups-gives-them-free-publicity-instead/>.

<sup>790</sup> Mike Fegelman, “Toronto Star Article Whitewashes & Downplays Violent Anti-Israel Protests,” Honest Reporting Canada, April 2, 2024, <https://honestreporting.ca/petitions/toronto-star-article-whitewashes-downplays-violent-anti-israel-protests/>.

<sup>791</sup> Justine Fraser, “Pro-Palestinian Protest Starts Up at UW Again, Despite Previous Lawsuit,” *City News* (Kitchener), September 12, 2024, <https://kitchener.citynews.ca/2024/09/12/pro-palestinian-protest-starts-up-at-uw-again-despite-previous-lawsuit/>.

<sup>792</sup> Wiens, “Jewish Students Want UW to Do More.”

segue into the future because it allowed us to begin more coordinated international actions. We are now connected with liberation groups for Palestine across the world.”<sup>793</sup> Asked whether the group feared further legal reprisals, Joseph was candid about the scale of support behind these campus movements, stating: “well let me make it plain, they aren’t fighting one dedicated group of students.”<sup>794</sup>

Joseph’s remarks confirm what the ideological, strategic, organizational, and financial analysis in earlier chapters has already indicated. These are not spontaneous student movements but nodes in a coordinated transnational network sustained by external funding and strategic direction.

### 8.3 Activist Faculty and Radical Ties in Academic Partnerships

A further area of analysis concerns the role of faculty engagement and academic partnerships in shaping institutional environments within Canadian universities. The evidence shows a pattern of hosting and collaborating with individuals and entities associated with anti-Israel positions, including some with affiliations that have been drawn scrutiny for ties to extremist-linked networks.

This section examines how such engagements are operationalized within formal academic structures, including visiting appointments, research collaborations, and institutional partnerships. It considers the extent to which existing governance and due diligence mechanisms are able to successfully identify, assess, and respond to potential risks associated with these relationships.

The examples that follow illustrate how these engagements manifest in practice across different institutional contexts. Taken together, they demonstrate that such relationships are facilitated through established academic processes and are embedded within existing institutional frameworks. This section accordingly analyses faculty engagement and academic partnerships as points of interaction through which external networks intersect with university environments.

#### 8.3.1 Sofyan Taya and the Islamic University of Gaza

In 2021–2022, Sofyan Taya served as a visiting professor at UW in the fields of electromagnetics and optics. In December 2023, he was killed in an Israeli airstrike in

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<sup>793</sup> Fraser, “Pro-Palestinian Protest Starts Up.”

<sup>794</sup> Ibid.

Gaza.<sup>795</sup> Following his death, UW announced the creation of the Professor Sofyan Taya Memorial Fund, in honor of a “renowned researcher” who lost his life during the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.<sup>796</sup> Professor Taya was also the president of the Islamic University of Gaza, an institution whose entanglement with Hamas extends well beyond mere affiliation.

The Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) was founded in 1978 by the future founder and leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.<sup>797</sup> Other notable alumni include Ismail Haniyeh—former head of Hamas’s political bureau—who served as secretary of the university’s board of trustees and chairman of its student council, and Yahya Sinwar, who succeeded Haniyeh as Hamas’s overall leader in Gaza in 2017 and was the principal architect of the October 7 massacre.<sup>798</sup> Muhammad Deif, the second most senior Hamas leader and commander of the group’s military wing, who was killed by Israeli forces in July 2024, also studied at IUG.<sup>799</sup>

In *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (1994), Palestinian academic, author, and politician Ziad Abu-Amr notes that IUG “is considered the principal Muslim Brotherhood stronghold. The University’s administration, most of the employees who work there and the majority of the students are Brotherhood supporters.”<sup>800</sup> Joe Truzman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies has similarly noted that

“The Islamic University in Gaza, among other institutions, has historical ties to Hamas. In 1993, Hamas member Muin Shabib publicly acknowledged these affiliations, describing the Islamic University as one of ‘our institutions.’ Given this background, it should not be surprising

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<sup>795</sup> James Chaarani, “‘It’s a Major Loss’: Death of Palestinian Scholar Mourned by University of Waterloo Colleagues,” *CBC News*, December 18, 2023, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/kitchener-waterloo/sofyan-taya-university-of-waterloo-israel-hamas-1.7056981>.

<sup>796</sup> “The Professor Sofyan Taya Memorial Fund,” University of Waterloo, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://imodules.uwaterloo.ca/s/1802/cf20/interior.aspx?sid=1802&gid=2&pgid=1969>.

<sup>797</sup> “Swisspeace: Terror Partners, Palestinian Universities and the Facade of Child Rights,” NGO Monitor, June 26, 2025, <https://ngo-monitor.org/reports/swisspeace/>.

<sup>798</sup> “Profile of the Hamas Movement,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (now Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute), February 12, 2006, [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/analysis-of-the-1988-hamas-charter/en/English\\_SiteTransfer\\_DOCUMENTS\\_Profile-of-the-Hamas-movement\\_ITIC.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/analysis-of-the-1988-hamas-charter/en/English_SiteTransfer_DOCUMENTS_Profile-of-the-Hamas-movement_ITIC.pdf).

<sup>799</sup> Ibid.

<sup>800</sup> Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Indiana University Press, 1994), available at: <https://yplus.ps/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Abu-Amr-Ziad-Islamic-Fundamentalism-in-the-West-Bank-and-Gaza.pdf>.

that Hamas operatives would utilize the Islamic University and other educational institutions to wage war against Israel.”<sup>801</sup>

These assessments have similarly been reflected upon by the European Parliament, where a 2022 question on IUG funding noted that the university had received 1.75 million euros from the European Union between 2014 and 2019, despite “the intrinsic relationship between the Islamic University of Gaza and Hamas, an EU-listed terrorist organization.”<sup>802</sup> In the same year, a US State Department report also acknowledged that IUG was Hamas-affiliated.<sup>803</sup> Years earlier, in 1996, then NY congressman Charles Schumer similarly noted that IUG was a recipient of funds from the Holy Land Foundation, which would later be convicted of funneling millions of dollars to Hamas,<sup>804</sup> calling the university “a Hamas bastion.”<sup>805</sup>

A report by the Information and Terrorism Information Center (now the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute) describes how Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, made extensive use of IUG facilities.<sup>806</sup> Hamas exploited its laboratories for developing and manufacturing weapons, including long-range rockets, supported by students and lecturers who were used as sources of knowhow.<sup>807</sup> The *Boston Globe* similarly reported that the IUG was the “brain trust and engine room of Hamas” and that “thinkers here generate the big ideas that have driven Hamas to power.”<sup>808</sup> It also noted that “its founders were members of the militant Muslim Brotherhood.”<sup>809</sup>

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<sup>801</sup> “IDF Strikes Gaza’s Islamic University after Hamas Uses It to Launch Missiles,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 25, 2024, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/06/25/idf-strikes-gazas-islamic-university-after-hamas-uses-it-to-launch-missiles/>.

<sup>802</sup> Charlie Weimers, “EU Funding for the Islamic University of Gaza,” question for written answer to the Commission, European Parliament, July 20, 2022, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002677\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002677_EN.html).

<sup>803</sup> Office of International Religious Freedom, “West Bank and Gaza,” *2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Israel, West Bank and Gaza* (US Department of State, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/west-bank-and-gaza/>.

<sup>804</sup> “Federal Jury in Dallas Convicts Holy Land Foundation and Its Leaders for Providing Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization,” press release, US Department of Justice, November 24, 2008, <https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/November/08-nsd-1046.html>.

<sup>805</sup> Congressional Record, vol. 142, no. 87, Thursday, June 13, 1996, pp. E1081–3, in which Schumer draws attention to Gayle Reaves and Steve McGonigle, “Paper Trail Leads to Hamas; Two Organizations Based in Richardson Deny They Promote Agenda of Anti-Israeli Terrorists,” *Dallas Morning News*, April 8, 1996, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-1996-06-13/html/CREC-1996-06-13-pt1-PgE1081-4.htm>.

<sup>806</sup> “Profile of the Hamas Movement,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (now Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute), February 12, 2006, [https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/analysis-of-the-1988-hamas-charter/en/English\\_SiteTransfer\\_DOCUMENTS\\_Profile-of-the-Hamas-movement\\_ITIC.pdf](https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/analysis-of-the-1988-hamas-charter/en/English_SiteTransfer_DOCUMENTS_Profile-of-the-Hamas-movement_ITIC.pdf).

<sup>807</sup> Ibid.

<sup>808</sup> Thanassis Cambanis, “Hamas U.,” *Boston Globe*, February 28, 2010, archived on March 5, 2020, at: [http://web.archive.org/web/20100305104528/http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/28/hamas\\_u/](http://web.archive.org/web/20100305104528/http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/28/hamas_u/).

<sup>809</sup> Ibid.

In the current war in Gaza, IUG has continued to play a critical role in the tactical and strategic operations of Hamas, which cynically shelters fighters and launches attacks against Israeli soldiers from within the university, knowing that any strike against the site would be portrayed to the world as another egregious example of Israeli aggression. Following an Israeli airstrike on IUG in the days following the October 7 attacks, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) emphasized that the university was “an important center of political and military power” for Hamas and a “training institution for the development and production of weapons.”<sup>810</sup> In June 2024, the IDF also struck Hamas terrorists who gathered in a building at IUG to launch anti-tank missiles at Israeli troops, referring to the use of the university as a staging ground to launch attacks as “another example of the systematic exploitation by Hamas of civilian infrastructure and the population as a human shield for its terrorist activities.”<sup>811</sup>

In this context, UW’s collaboration with and memorialization of the former IUG president reflects a troubling reality in which problematic institutional affiliations such as Sofyan Taya’s are missed, misunderstood, or deliberately ignored, allowing dangerous associations to take root at Canadian universities.

### 8.3.2 Mohamed Elmasry and the Canadian Islamic Congress

Another troubling example of a senior faculty member with extramural affiliations with extremist organizations is Mohamed Elmasry, a professor emeritus at UW who previously served as the founder and president of the now-defunct Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC).<sup>812</sup> As founding director of UW’s Very Large-Scale Integration (VLSI) Research Group and a Fellow of the Engineering Institute of Canada, Elmasry has been credited with placing Canada on the “global map of digital semiconductor and VLSI research.”<sup>813</sup>

A notable example of Elmasry’s extremist rhetoric occurred in 2004, during an appearance on *The Michael Coren Show*, where he stated that, because all Israelis over the age of eighteen must serve in the Israeli army, they can all be considered legitimate

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<sup>810</sup> Emanuel Fabian, “IAF Bombs Islamic University of Gaza, a Training Center for Hamas Engineers,” *Times of Israel*, October 11, 2023, [https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog\\_entry/iaf-bombs-islamic-university-of-gaza-a-training-center-for-hamas-engineers/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/iaf-bombs-islamic-university-of-gaza-a-training-center-for-hamas-engineers/).

<sup>811</sup> “IDF Strikes Gaza’s Islamic University after Hamas Uses It to Launch Missiles,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 25, 2024, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/06/25/idf-strikes-gazas-islamic-university-after-hamas-uses-it-to-launch-missiles/>.

<sup>812</sup> “Mohamed Elmasry,” profile, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, accessed June 14, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/electrical-computer-engineering/contacts/mohamed-elmasry>; Wikipedia, “Canadian Islamic Congress,” accessed April 14, 2026, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian\\_Islamic\\_Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Islamic_Congress).

<sup>813</sup> “Mohamed Elmasry,” citation, Awards Gala, Engineering Institute of Canada, March 1, 2008, [https://eic-ici.ca/honours\\_award/cit08/Elmasry.pdf](https://eic-ici.ca/honours_award/cit08/Elmasry.pdf).

targets for Palestinian suicide bombers,<sup>814</sup> adding that this was the case “even if they have civilian clothes.”<sup>815</sup> Later, when recanting his statement, Elmasry reportedly claimed that this was “a widely held view among Palestinians.”<sup>816</sup> He subsequently released an apology, but refused to step aside from his position at the CIC despite increasing calls for his resignation.<sup>817</sup>

Following a public outcry, the CIC issued a press release stating that it accepted Elmasry’s apology, calling his statements an “unintentional mistake.”<sup>818</sup> The police decided not to charge Elmasry under Canada’s hate crime laws, with investigators noting that, while Elmasry’s comments “were described by many as a hate crime,” they did not meet the relevant legal definition.<sup>819</sup>

In 2005, Elmasry published an article in the weekly bulletin of the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) naming prominent Muslim Canadian Tarek Fatah and others as enemies of Islam.<sup>820</sup> A lawyer representing the Muslim Canadian Congress subsequently sent a letter to Elmasry demanding that he apologize for his “false” accusation that those who criticize sharia law are “smearing Islam, ridiculing the Koran [and] badmouthing Muhammad.”<sup>821</sup> Fatah also wrote to the RCMP, describing the labelling as “as close as one can get to issuing a death threat, as it places me as an apostate and blasphemer,” and subsequently resigned his position citing fears for his and his family’s safety.<sup>822</sup>

In 2006, Elmasry filed a human right’s complaint against *MacLean’s*, Canada’s largest weekly current-affairs magazine, following its publication of a book excerpt from Mark

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<sup>814</sup> Marina Jiménez, “Islamic Leader Apologizes But Won’t Quit,” *Globe and Mail*, October 28, 2004, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/islamic-leader-apologizes-but-wont-quit/article1142918/?login=true>.

<sup>815</sup> “Canadian Muslim Leader Under Fire for Calling Every Adult Israeli ‘a Legitimate Target,’” World Jewish Congress, October 29, 2004, <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/canadian-muslim-leader-under-fire-for-calling-every-adult-israeli-quot-a-legitimate-target-quot>.

<sup>816</sup> Jiménez, “Islamic Leader Apologizes.”

<sup>817</sup> Ibid.

<sup>818</sup> Ibid.

<sup>819</sup> “Muslim Professor in Canada Not to Be Charged over Controversial Comments,” World Jewish Congress, March 15, 2005, <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/muslim-professor-in-canada-not-to-be-charged-over-controversial-comments>.

<sup>820</sup> Marina Jiménez, “Sharia Opponents Demand Apology for Elmasry’s Critical Remarks,” *Globe and Mail*, October 26, 2005, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/sharia-opponents-demand-apology-for-elmasrys-critical-remarks/article988714/>.

<sup>821</sup> Ibid.

<sup>822</sup> Sonya Fatah, “Fearing for Safety, Muslim Official Quits,” *Globe and Mail*, August 3, 2006, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/fearing-for-safety-muslim-official-quits/article966954/>.

Steyn's *America Alone*, which argued that demographic trends posed an existential threat to Western civilization. The complaint alleged that the article exposed Muslims to hatred and contempt on the basis of religion. The litigation cost the magazine an estimated C\$2 million in legal fees<sup>823</sup> before the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint in October 2008, finding that the article did not rise to the level of hatred and contempt as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada.<sup>824</sup>

It is also worth looking beyond Elmasry's rhetoric to the CIC itself. As noted in an earlier ISGAP report on the Muslim Brotherhood's influence in Canada,<sup>825</sup> the CIC has referred to itself as "Canada's largest national non-profit and wholly independent Islamic organization," while the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) describes it as "a prominent example" of the infiltration of Canadian Islamic community organizations by radical extremists.<sup>826</sup> The AFPC has also accused the CIC of "demonizing Israel, fabricating lies about opponents, and apologizing for hardline Islamist groups, including by inciting antisemitism and justifying violence committed by Islamist groups against Israel."<sup>827</sup>

Finally, the CIC has also been condemned by the federal government for its support of radicalism and antisemitism.<sup>828</sup> Its leadership denounced the Canadian government's decision to designate Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist groups, calling it an "unconscionable act of hypocrisy and a mockery of justice."<sup>829</sup> Based on a report by the *Ottawa Citizen*, the CIC also supported the introduction of sharia law in Canada and protested the arrest of three suspects in the 2010 Ottawa Terror Plot.<sup>830</sup> The CIC ceased operations in 2014.<sup>831</sup>

However, despite Elmasry's history of problematic statements and actions, both as an individual and in his role as founder and president of the CIC, UW has seen no reason

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<sup>823</sup> David Solway, "Islamic Thugismo at Work," Middle East Forum, November 9, 2013, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/islamic-thugismo-at-work>.

<sup>824</sup> *Elmasry and Habib v. Roger's Publishing and MacQueen (No. 4)*, 2008 BCHRT 378, October 10, 2008, <https://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2008-BCCLA-Argument-Elmasry-Decision.pdf>.

<sup>825</sup> ISGAP, *We Stand on Guard for Thee?*

<sup>826</sup> American Foreign Policy Council, "Canada," in *World Almanac of Islamism* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), <https://almanac.afpc.org/uploads/documents/Canada%202017%20Update.pdf>.

<sup>827</sup> Ibid.

<sup>828</sup> Marc Lebus, "Islamism and the Infiltration Challenge," notes for remarks to the 2009 CIVITAS Annual Conference, Toronto, May 2, 2009 (Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, July 2009), <https://www.aims.ca/site/media/aims/InfiltrationChallenge.pdf>.

<sup>829</sup> American Foreign Policy Council, "Canada."

<sup>830</sup> Tarek Fatah and Salma Siddiqui, "The Struggle against Jihad," *Ottawa Citizen*, August 30, 2010, <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/the-struggle-against-jihad>.

<sup>831</sup> American Foreign Policy Council, "Canada."

to end its long-standing association with him, which dates back five decades. This case differs from the funding-based examples examined elsewhere in this chapter because it focuses on institutional issues rather than external financial influence. The issue is not that Elmasry's academic work is in question but that UW's continuing public association with an individual who spent decades leading an Islamist advocacy organization illustrates how reputational and governance risks can persist once a figure is embedded within a university's faculty structure. This raises serious concerns about institutional inertia, risk assessment, and the absence of a visible mechanism for addressing politically extreme public activism when it is attached to longstanding academic prestige.

### 8.3.3 UW's Foundation for Palestine Studies

Another problematic development at UW is the establishment of its Foundation for Palestine Studies, whose inaugural lecture drew over 500 attendees in person and online.<sup>832</sup> The foundation was launched by the UW Faculty of Arts in May 2022 and is the first educational institute in Canada dedicated to the study of Palestine.<sup>833</sup> Annual public lectures hosted by the foundation have included prominent anti-Israel academics such as Rashid Khalidi, who told the audience at the foundation's inaugural lecture that "the creation of Israel has been a settler colonial project since 1917."<sup>834</sup>

Rashid Khalidi, the Edward Said Professor Emeritus of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, is a prime example of the infiltration of the Palestinianization framework within elite academic institutions. In August 2025, Khalidi publicly refused to teach at Columbia on the grounds that the university's adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism made honest instruction impossible—characterizing the definition as deliberately conflating Jewish identity with Israel and describing events in Gaza as genocide perpetrated with American and European complicity.<sup>835</sup>

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<sup>832</sup> "New Report Details Concerted Efforts To Suppress Rising pro-Palestinian Voices on Canadian Campuses," Canada Talks Israel Palestine, October 18, 2022, <https://canadatalksisraelpalestine.ca/2022/10/18/new-report-details-concerted-efforts-to-suppress-rising-pro-palestinian-voices-on-canadian-campuses/>.

<sup>833</sup> "'The Creation of Israel Has Been a Settler Colonial Project since 1917,' Rashid Khalidi Tells University of Waterloo Crowd," Canada Talks Israel Palestine, December 28, 2022, <https://canadatalksisraelpalestine.ca/2022/12/28/the-creation-of-israel-has-been-a-settler-colonial-project-since-1917-rashid-khalidi-tells-university-of-waterloo-crowd/>.

<sup>834</sup> "The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A Lecture by Rashid Khalidi," posted on December 16, 2022, by University of Waterloo Faculty of Arts, YouTube, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jZ-\\_BsXCTc&list=PLE2p6NlgDDsbPp\\_\\_hfc-AhpXu0RJe5ITP&index=2](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jZ-_BsXCTc&list=PLE2p6NlgDDsbPp__hfc-AhpXu0RJe5ITP&index=2).

<sup>835</sup> Rashid Khalidi, "I Spent Decades at Columbia. I'm Withdrawing My Fall Course Due to Its Deal with Trump," *The Guardian*, August 1, 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/aug/01/columbia-historian-rashid-khalidi-open-letter>.

Congressional representatives Elise Stefanik and Tim Walberg jointly wrote to Columbia’s acting president Claire Shipman, identifying Khalidi as an individual who had “consistently supported and excused terrorist violence.”<sup>836</sup> He has also been repeatedly cited in media reports as a spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1970s and 1980s<sup>837</sup>—an affiliation Khalidi denies. The episode is instructive less for its individual details than for the structural problems it reveals: the characterization of the IHRA definition—the primary institutional instrument for identifying antisemitism—as a censorship mechanism by a senior academic at one of North America’s most influential universities at a moment when that university’s Qatari funding relationships and campus antisemitism record were under federal investigation.<sup>838</sup>

Beyond giving a platform to individuals such as Khalidi, the Foundation for Palestine Studies was established in partnership with its founding donor, Palestinian-Canadian businessman Shawky Fahel. In addition to being the foundation’s principal donor, Fahel is also the founder of JG Group and the chair of the Canadian International Development Organization (CIDO), an NGO active in the Middle East.<sup>839</sup> On October 18, 2023, just eleven days after the Hamas’s October 7 attacks, Fahel co-authored an article in the *Globe and Mail* urging Canada to “demand that we call upon Israel to stand back,” and that “we need to say no again to ethnic cleansing, the deaths of tens of thousands and a war that cannot end well.”<sup>840</sup>

In March 2024, Fahel also wrote an op-ed in *The Record* criticizing the Trudeau government’s decision to oppose a New Democratic Party (NDP) motion to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state.<sup>841</sup> In a response to Fahel’s article, Robert Walker,

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<sup>836</sup> Andrew Bernard, “House ed Panel Demands Columbia Answer for Its President Seeming to Mock Jew-Hatred on Campus,” *JNS*, July 1, 2025, <https://www.jns.org/u.s.-news/house-ed-panel-demands-answers-from-columbia-over-its-president-seeming-to-mock-pervasive-jew-hatred-on-campus>.

<sup>837</sup> Martin Kramer, “Rashid Khalidi,” Martin Kramer on the Middle East, <https://martinkramer.org/2008/10/30/khalidi-of-the-plo>.

<sup>838</sup> ISGAP, *Columbia University: From the Classroom to Campus Politics: The Normalization of Antisemitism, Anti-Democratic Politics, Marginalization and Intimidation* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), [https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Columbia\\_University\\_Report\\_2024\\_.pdf](https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Columbia_University_Report_2024_.pdf); “Stefanik Secures Columbia President’s Commitment to Remove Antisemitic Professor from Leadership,” posted on April 17, 2024, by Rep. Elise Stefanik, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eT5ozFtcjBE>.

<sup>839</sup> In’am Carere and Shawky Fahel, “Canada Can Do More to Stop the Humanitarian Disaster in Gaza,” *Globe and Mail*, October 20, 2023, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-can-do-more-to-stop-the-humanitarian-disaster-in-gaza/?login=true>.

<sup>840</sup> Ibid.

<sup>841</sup> Shawky Fahel, “On Gaza, a Disappointing Resolution, But Canada Moves Forward,” *The Record*, March 30, 2024, [https://www.therecord.com/opinion/contributors/on-gaza-a-disappointing-resolution-but-canada-moves-forward/article\\_d51af851-c6be-5c0f-bec6-14d02efd4114.html](https://www.therecord.com/opinion/contributors/on-gaza-a-disappointing-resolution-but-canada-moves-forward/article_d51af851-c6be-5c0f-bec6-14d02efd4114.html).

assistant director of Honest Reporting Canada, wrote a piece in *The Record* highlighting Fahel's praise of Canada's resumption of funding to UNRWA, while noting that he had remained "strikingly quiet on the group's ties to terrorism, including workers of the agency involved in the Oct. 7 Hamas massacres in Israel."<sup>842</sup>

The foundation's faculty administrator, Jasmin Habib, also has a known history of anti-Israel rhetoric. Habib, a UW professor and chair of the Department of Political Science,<sup>843</sup> was one of the signatories to a May 2021 open letter from Canada's Jewish Faculty Network opposing the adoption of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism on campuses.<sup>844</sup>

In 2009, Habib was a speaker at a conference at York University, entitled "Israel/Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace," that also featured notable anti-Israel speakers such as Ali Abuminah, Omar Barghouti, and George Bisharat.<sup>845</sup> The conference also featured speakers connected to the BDS network and Israel Apartheid Week events that demonize Israel.<sup>846</sup> Reflecting on the event, Dr. Na'ama Carmi, who gave a lecture at the conference, said that "anyone who challenged the Palestinian perspective was intimidated or even labeled a racist.... At times, those presenting a different view were subject to abuse and ridicule."<sup>847</sup>

A month following the event, responding to the controversy surrounding the conference, York University President Mahmoud Shoukri reached out to Frank Iacobucci, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and a York alumnus, to review the incident. As part of his review, Iacobucci spoke of the "strong political bias" and "intimidating environment" reported by both presenters and attendees from whom he received submissions.<sup>848</sup> He also noted that feedback regarding the

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<sup>842</sup> Robert Walker, "Recent Commentary on Israel and Palestine Ignores Depth of Hamas Terrorism," *The Record*, April 4, 2024, [https://www.therecord.com/opinion/contributors/recent-commentary-on-israel-and-palestine-ignores-depth-of-hamas-terrorism/article\\_f005a618-8c32-5fc3-aa50-f9383d07f0f0.html](https://www.therecord.com/opinion/contributors/recent-commentary-on-israel-and-palestine-ignores-depth-of-hamas-terrorism/article_f005a618-8c32-5fc3-aa50-f9383d07f0f0.html).

<sup>843</sup> "Jasmin Habib," profile, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://uwaterloo.ca/political-science/contacts/jasmin-habib>.

<sup>844</sup> "Jewish Faculty against IHRA," Jewish Faculty Network, May 1, 2021, <https://www.jewishfaculty.ca/posts/jewish-faculty-against-the-ihra-defn>.

<sup>845</sup> "York University's Israel/Palestine Conference: Speaker Political Profiles—Behind the Academic Façade," NGO Monitor, June 8, 2009, [https://ngo-monitor.org/reports/york\\_university\\_s\\_israel\\_palestine\\_conference\\_speaker\\_political\\_profiles\\_behind\\_the\\_academic\\_facade/](https://ngo-monitor.org/reports/york_university_s_israel_palestine_conference_speaker_political_profiles_behind_the_academic_facade/).

<sup>846</sup> Manfred Gerstenfeld, "How to Fight the Campus Battle against Old and New Anti-Semites: Motifs, Strategies, and Methods," Middle East Forum, November 24, 2009, <https://www.meforum.org/campus-watch/how-to-fight-the-campus-battle-against-old>.

<sup>847</sup> Ibid.

<sup>848</sup> Frank Iacobucci, "The Mapping Conference and Academic Freedom," York University, March 2010, p. 27, [http://www.yorku.ca/acreview/iacobucci\\_report.pdf](http://www.yorku.ca/acreview/iacobucci_report.pdf).

conference’s agenda varied from general statements of its “anti-Israel” nature, to more specific allegations of calls for the formation of a single Palestinian state at the expense of Israel.<sup>849</sup> The review documented specific comments overheard at the event, including calls for the “execution” of certain pro-Israel scholars, “and another in which the speaker allegedly stated that he was inclined to wish that a catastrophe would befall Israel, but was concerned that Arabs might also be hurt.”<sup>850</sup>

Habib also participated in the MESA 2023 Annual Meeting sponsored by the Palestinian American Research Center in November 2023, where she was part of a session on “Resisting Occupation in Palestine.”<sup>851</sup> The event took place less than a month after the October 7 Hamas attack.

Two further episodes illustrate the institutional pattern at UW. In February 2024, UW optometry students raised funds for UNRWA at a moment when over a dozen countries had frozen their contributions to the agency following reports that at least twelve of its staffers had directly participated in the October 7 attacks.<sup>852</sup> In fact, Israeli intelligence assessments estimated that as much as ten percent of UNRWA’s workforce were members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad,<sup>853</sup> while the IDF published details of a network of Hamas tunnels running directly beneath UNRWA’s Gaza headquarters.<sup>854</sup> The fundraising proceeded without any apparent institutional acknowledgment of these documented concerns.

In December 2024, the university published and subsequently deleted a bereavement notice stating as fact that two prospective PhD students from Gaza “had their lives taken in an Israeli airstrike”—a claim for which the university had no direct evidence beyond what “the family shared with the girls’ supervisor,” as UW’s own director of media relations subsequently confirmed to Honest Reporting Canada.<sup>855</sup> Before the

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<sup>849</sup> Ibid., at 28.

<sup>850</sup> Ibid.

<sup>851</sup> MESA 2023 Annual Meeting: Highlights on Palestine, November 2–5, 2023, Palestinian American Research Center, <https://www.parc-us-pal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/MESA-roundup-2023.pdf>.

<sup>852</sup> Ari Blaff, “University of Waterloo Optometry Students Ran Charity Fundraiser for UNRWA,” *National Post*, February 18, 2024, <https://nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/university-of-waterloo-optometry-students-ran-charity-fundraiser-for-unrwa>.

<sup>853</sup> Ibid.

<sup>854</sup> Ibid.

<sup>855</sup> Mike Fegelman, “Exposed: University of Waterloo Fails to Substantiate Claim That Israeli Airstrike Killed Twin Palestinian Sisters in Gaza Headed to School for PhD Program,” *Honest Reporting Canada*, January 9, 2025, <https://honestreporting.ca/exposed-university-of-waterloo-fails-to-substantiate-claim-that-israeli-airstrike-killed-twin-palestinian-sisters-in-gaza-headed-to-school-for-phd-program/>.

deletion, the claim was amplified by multiple Canadian mainstream outlets.<sup>856</sup> The episode is significant because it demonstrates an eroding standard of institutional neutrality: a major Canadian research university was prepared to formally attribute a killing to a named state actor, publish that attribution as verified fact, and delete the record when its evidentiary basis was challenged. Both episodes reflect the same pattern: the normalization of unverified Palestinian conflict narratives within university institutional communications and the absence of the scrutiny that would be applied to comparable claims in any other context.

### 8.3.4 The CJPME and UW Board Connection

A further dimension of the institutional picture at UW is the presence of Nasser Abukhdeir on the university's Board of Governors. Abukhdeir simultaneously serves on the board of the Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME), an organization that officially supports the BDS movement and has been active in opposing institutional designations of Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, as documented in Chapter 3. The appearance of a BDS-aligned board member at the governance level of a university whose student organizations are listed in CJPME's own directory of BDS-supporting groups is the administrative dimension of the *tamkeen* (entrenchment) strategy: the exercise of influence not only through student activism but through formal institutional governance.

## 8.4 From Pressure Campaign to Institutional Outcome: The Technion Termination

The termination of UW's academic partnership with the Israel Institute of Technology, also known as the Technion, in 2025 brings the dynamics documented throughout this chapter into sharp institutional focus.

At a September 2025 senate meeting, UW's Vice-President of Research confirmed there were "no plans to renew" the Technion partnership—a decision the university attributed publicly to the federal government's travel advisory discouraging non-essential travel to Israel.<sup>857</sup> Voices for Palestine immediately claimed the outcome as "a huge win" attributable to student community pressure, describing the Technion

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<sup>856</sup> Ibid.; Karis Mapp, "Twin Sisters from Gaza Killed after Being Accepted into University of Waterloo PhD Program in Ontario," *CBC News*, December 18, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/kitchener-waterloo/university-waterloo-gaza-twins-killed-war-1.7412330>.

<sup>857</sup> Alicia Wang, "UW Will Not Renew Partnership with Technion," *Imprint*, September 22, 2025, <https://uwimprint.ca/breaking-uw-will-not-renew-partnership-with-technion/>.

partnership as “one pillar of complicity” and calling explicitly for the university divest from companies working alongside the IDF—the stated “second half” of the aforementioned 2024 WUSA referendum agenda.<sup>858</sup>

The referendum result that preceded the termination of the partnership did not emerge from a neutral civic process. It was the culmination of the campaign discussed throughout this chapter, in which Occupy UW, UW Voices for Palestine, PYM, the Foundation for Palestine Studies, and a variety of academics each contributed a distinct layer of street activism, transnational coordination, and academic legitimation to a pressure campaign whose stated objectives extend well beyond any single institutional partnership. What the administration characterized as responsiveness to student democratic expression was in practice the institutional ratification of a broader anti-Israel campaign.

The episode illustrates with precision the mechanisms outlined in “The Project” and the “Explanatory Memorandum” and used by the Red-Green alliance. Through sustained narrative investment and organizational pressure, an interpretive framework has been installed in which any collaboration with Israeli universities becomes an ethical violation requiring an institutional remedy, while organizational affiliations, funding flows, and documented ties between those applying this pressure and designated terrorist entities attract no equivalent institutional scrutiny.

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<sup>858</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 9: Toronto Metropolitan University

The developments observed at Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU) are indicative of the convergence of multiple domains of *tamkeen* (entrenchment), as discussed above in section 1.4, within a single institutional environment. The scale and consistency of antisemitic incidents on campus are directly related to the interaction of narrative formation, institutional embedding, and legal framing mechanisms.

The narrative infrastructure outlined in Domain 1 (narrative development, proliferation, and the Red-Green alliance)—including the anti-Palestinian racism (APR) construct—is reflected not only in student activism but also in elements of faculty governance, administrative communications, and institutional processes. Domain 2 (institutional embedding) is observable in the organizational ecosystem operating on and around the campus, including the external partnerships, funding relationships, and research collaborations documented in this chapter. Finally, Domain 4 (legal framework manipulation) is reflected in the use of legal and quasi-legal frameworks, including the application of APR-related arguments in ways that affect institutional responses and accountability.

Taken together, these dynamics have contributed to an environment in which incidents involving Jewish students, including physical confrontation, have met with an inadequate institutional response. This chapter examines how the interaction of these domains contributes to the conditions observed and how institutional processes have intersected with the broader frameworks identified in earlier sections.

### 9.1 Student Experience and Escalating Campus Conditions

The human cost of TMU's institutional failures is documented in the testimony of Jewish students before the Canadian Parliament, national media, and the courts. A March 2025 *National Post* investigation, entitled “You Can’t Be Openly Jewish at TMU,” compiled accounts from students describing a campus environment replete with repeated incidents of extreme anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric, intimidation, and harassment within days of October 7, 2023.<sup>859</sup> Students reported being removed from student group chats, being spat on, and being stalked in public by an anti-Israel activist

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<sup>859</sup> Ari David Blaff, “‘You Can’t Be Openly Jewish at TMU’: Jewish Students at Toronto Metropolitan University Say They’re Now Isolated, Harassed,” *National Post*, May 6, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/you-cant-be-openly-jewish-at-tmu-jewish-students-at-toronto-metropolitan-university-say-theyre-now-isolated-harassed>.

who shouted “shame on you, you TMU Jews, you commit genocide!”<sup>860</sup> One student noted that a professor laughed at her when being corrected about the number of people killed in the Holocaust.<sup>861</sup>

Another TMU student, Vicky Sirkovich, described the hostile atmosphere on TMU campus and the inability of Jewish students on campus to feel safe to the *Jerusalem Post*, noting that any comment she posted on course group chats was met “with a chant that Israel commits genocide,” with some “even going so far as to write; ‘anyone who supports Israel should kill themselves.’”<sup>862</sup> Another TMU student told the *Jerusalem Post* that TMU’s Associate Dean had given students permission to bring flags and wear keffiyehs on stage during the university’s graduation ceremony.<sup>863</sup>

The most detailed testimony was provided by Laura Barkel to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, which in December 2024 published a report entitled *Heightened Antisemitism in Canada and How to Confront It*. In the evidence provided to the committee, Barkel noted that at the first anti-Israel protest following October 7, she was identified as a Jew by a fellow TMU student who grabbed her arm, pulled her back “and launched into an outburst of vile antisemitic slurs. He said to me, ‘it’s too bad Hitler didn’t finish his job, or you and your family would all be dead.’”<sup>864</sup>

Barkel added that she was also approached shortly afterwards by a woman who spat in her face and yelled “get out of here, your dirty Jew,” before striking her on the face with a book and pushing her off the sidewalk.<sup>865</sup> Barkel further stated that she received no follow up from student support services after she reported the incident and that the perpetrator remained on campus.<sup>866</sup> She also reported that a subsequent wave of online harassment from classmates began, including “death threats, graphic images, and derogatory comments flooding my social media and email inboxes daily,” to the point where her anxiety became so severe that that she feared leaving her apartment or being alone in public.<sup>867</sup>

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<sup>860</sup> Ibid.

<sup>861</sup> Ibid.

<sup>862</sup> Vicky Sirkovich, “Jewish Students No Longer Feel Safe at Toronto Metropolitan University—Opinion,” *Jerusalem Post*, June 16, 2024, <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-806328>.

<sup>863</sup> Ibid.

<sup>864</sup> Lena Metlege Diab (Chair), *Heightened Antisemitism in Canada and How to Confront It: Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights* (House of Commons, December 2024), <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/JUST/Reports/RP13248912/justrp27/justrp27-e.pdf>.

<sup>865</sup> Ibid.

<sup>866</sup> Ibid.

<sup>867</sup> Ibid.

In November 2022, the *National Post* reported that an event called “Triggered: From Combat to Campus,” featuring IDF reservists sharing firsthand experiences from the period since October 7 as part of a peaceful speaking tour, was stormed by activists aligned with Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP).<sup>868</sup>

According to report, a mob attacked Jewish students in attendance, “screamed, threatened them and illegally entered the building. Some of the Jewish students ended up in the hospital.”<sup>869</sup> Five people were immediately arrested and charged for forcible entry following the incident, and one of the suspects reportedly assaulted an officer in the process of making an arrest.<sup>870</sup> A sixth suspect was subsequently arrested for breaking an interior glass door and assaulting a person who tried to intervene and currently faces five charges, including forcible entry, assault, and “being a member of an unlawful assembly while masked.”<sup>871</sup>

The event was organized by TMU student group Students Supporting Israel (SSI), whose president, Liat Schwartz, said she was horrified by the incident that was “not protest” but rather “intimidation and violence.”<sup>872</sup> SJP TMU had earlier called for an “emergency rally” to prevent the hosting of “Zionist murderers” at SSI’s event.<sup>873</sup> Disturbingly, the *National Post* report also notes that Toronto’s mayor, Olivia Chow, who has herself falsely accused Israel of committing a “genocide” in Gaza, said nothing when Jewish students were attacked on a university campus in Toronto.<sup>874</sup>

This was not the first SSI event to face such threatening activity. Another notable incident occurred in March 2025, when SSI planned to bring Israeli military reservists to speak about their experiences fighting Hamas in Gaza. The proposal was ultimately rejected by TMU and the event was relocated to a Hillel Ontario space off campus.<sup>875</sup> Members of SJP arrived at the event and created a blockade around the entrance, forcing participants to enter through the back door. Following the event, it was discovered that a group photo taken by SSI at the event had been edited to show

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<sup>868</sup> Matthew Taub, “Mob That Attacked Jewish Students Must Be Held Accountable,” *National Post*, November 11, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/mob-that-attacked-jewish-students-must-be-held-accountable>.

<sup>869</sup> Ibid.

<sup>870</sup> Michael Starr, “Anti-Israel Activists Storm Toronto Student Event with IDF Veterans, One Wounded,” *Jerusalem Post*, November 6, 2025, <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-872886>.

<sup>871</sup> “6th Person Charged after Protesters Forced Way into TMU Student Group Event with IDF Soldiers: Police,” *CBC News*, November 13, 2025, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/6th-arrest-tmu-event-idf-soldiers-9.6977249>.

<sup>872</sup> Starr, “Anti-Israel Activists.”

<sup>873</sup> Ibid.

<sup>874</sup> Taub, “Mob That Attacked Jewish Students.”

<sup>875</sup> Blaff, “You Can’t Be Openly Jewish.”

inverted red triangles above the speakers' heads and shared on Instagram, provoking comments such as “maybe sjp tmu can bring in Hamas fighters to rape students! That would be a fitting rejoinder.”<sup>876</sup>

## 9.2 Institutional Processes and the Normalization of Antisemitism at TMU

### 9.2.1 Academic Freedom and Antisemitic Discourse: The TMU Law Letter

Just two weeks after the October 7 attacks, a group of TMU law students signed and released a (since deleted) open letter condoning the Hamas terror attacks stating that “We, the undersigned, recognize that the apartheid state referred to as ‘Israel’ is a product of settler colonialism. We stand in solidarity with Palestine and all forms of Palestinian resistance and efforts towards liberation,” adding that “Israel is not a country, it is the brand of a settler colony” and that “Hamas’ attack was a direct result of Israel’s 75-year-long systematic campaign to eradicate Palestinians, and that Israel is therefore responsible for *all* loss of life in Palestine”<sup>877</sup>

They further wrote that “there would be no death if not for Israel’s apartheid regime.”<sup>878</sup> TMU’s Lincoln Alexander School of Law (LASL) condemned the letter, which it said was rooted in “sentiments of antisemitism and intolerance.”<sup>879</sup> Despite this, the Law Society of Ontario, the regulatory body for Ontario lawyers and paralegals, declined to comment on the letter.<sup>880</sup>

Following an external review, it was determined that signatories of the letter should not face any disciplinary measures. Instead, the review committee, headed by the Honorable J. Michael MacDonald, called the letter “a valid exercise of student expression.”<sup>881</sup> It further concluded that the intent of the letter was not antisemitic, despite observing that the letter “could be seen as justifying the October 7 attacks and

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<sup>876</sup> Ibid.

<sup>877</sup> Peter Lilley, “TMU Law Students Put Their Names to Letter Endorsing Terrorism,” *Toronto Sun*, October 23, 2023, <https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/tmu-law-students-put-their-names-to-letter-endorsing-terrorism>.

<sup>878</sup> Élie Cantin-Nante, “Law Society of Ontario Refuses to Comment on anti-Israel Letter from TMU Law Students,” *True North*, October 25, 2023, <https://tnc.news/2023/10/25/law-society-of-ontario-refuses/>.

<sup>879</sup> Ibid.

<sup>880</sup> Ibid.

<sup>881</sup> J. Michael MacDonald, Katharine Mack, and Jennifer Taylor, *Strengthening the Pillars: Report of the TMU External Review* (Toronto Metropolitan University, May 31, 2024), <https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/report-release/TMU%20External%20Review%20Report%20dated%20May%2031,%202024.pdf>.

the concluding paragraph could reasonably be read as minimizing the role of Hamas and its counterparts in orchestrating and perpetrating the attacks of October 7.”<sup>882</sup>

Despite the shocking content of the letter, in an interview with CBC in September 2024, Amira Elghawaby, Canada’s Special Envoy on Combatting Islamophobia, claimed that the letter, which denies Israel’s very right to exist, was “hurtful but not antisemitic,” and further argued that the “from the river to the sea” chant that openly calls for the elimination of Israel is “in and of itself not a hateful chant.”<sup>883</sup> Furthermore, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (CJPME) claimed that calling the open letter “antisemitic” and “intolerant” was “unfair and inaccurate” and attributed criticism of the letter to anti-Palestinian Racism (APR).<sup>884</sup> CJPME further added that “the LASL’s characterization of the Open Letter as a promotion of violence based on the students’ support for Palestinian resistance or their explanation of the Hamas attack is baseless and another form of APR.”<sup>885</sup>

Jonathan Rosenthal, a Toronto criminal lawyer and adjunct professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, wrote that he was “shocked, disturbed and aghast that Justice MacDonald did not find the students’ letter to be antisemitic,” adding that “the words in the letter can only reasonably be interpreted as support for the Oct. 7 terrorist massacre ... and can only be interpreted as support for the repetition of such acts of resistance as promised by Hamas.”<sup>886</sup> Meanwhile, Joshua Sealy-Harrington, an assistant professor at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law (LASL) expressed his relief that “these brave students will face no formal sanctions and that their support for Palestinian resistance and opposition to Israel apartheid was properly characterized as not antisemitic.”<sup>887</sup> The Arab Canadian Lawyers Association, which participated in the external review of the letter, also celebrated the report’s findings, commending it for “recognizing anti-Palestinian racism in the report, including in describing the experiences and impacts on students and in its recommendations for administration.”<sup>888</sup>

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<sup>882</sup> Ibid.

<sup>883</sup> Robert Walker, “Amira Elghawaby, Canada’s Special Representative on Combating Islamophobia, Sanitizes Hateful Anti-Israel and Anti-Jewish Rhetoric during Recent CBC Interview,” Honest Reporting Canada, September 20, 2024, <https://honestreporting.ca/amira-elghawaby-canadas-special-representative-on-combating-islamophobia-sanitizes-hateful-anti-israel-and-anti-jewish-rhetoric-during-recent-cbc-interview/>.

<sup>884</sup> “Sanctioning pro-Palestine Law Students at TMU,” CJPME Foundation, March 20, 2024, [https://www.cjpmefoundation.org/apr\\_2023\\_10\\_20\\_sanctioning\\_pro\\_palestine\\_law\\_students\\_at\\_tmu](https://www.cjpmefoundation.org/apr_2023_10_20_sanctioning_pro_palestine_law_students_at_tmu).

<sup>885</sup> Ibid.

<sup>886</sup> Janet Hurley, “TMU Law Students’ pro-Palestinian Letter ‘Greatly Flawed’ But Didn’t Breach School’s Code of Conduct, External Review Finds,” *Toronto Star*, May 31, 2024, [https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/tmu-law-students-pro-palestinian-letter-greatly-flawed-but-didnt-breach-schools-code-of-conduct/article\\_b58b357a-1dec-11ef-8bdc-6fd9ebd2689c.html](https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/tmu-law-students-pro-palestinian-letter-greatly-flawed-but-didnt-breach-schools-code-of-conduct/article_b58b357a-1dec-11ef-8bdc-6fd9ebd2689c.html).

<sup>887</sup> Ibid.

<sup>888</sup> Ibid.

Sarah Morgenthau, a Jewish law professor, subsequently brought a case to the Ontario Superior Court following the external review's findings that no disciplinary measures were needed. She complained that those who signed the letter "condoning, if not outrightly encouraging the Hamas terror attacks" had breached TMU's student code of conduct.<sup>889</sup> In September 2025, the *National Post* reported that Morgenthau lost her bid to have TMU's decision quashed, with the court concluding that it was not appropriate for it "to intervene in the process undertaken by TMU to resolve an issue that affected the entire university community."<sup>890</sup> Morgenthau was an adjunct professor at TMU's Lincoln Alexander School of Law when the letter was signed and released.

## 9.2.2 Narrative Alignment at the Faculty Level

The student-level dynamics documented above have been accompanied by a parallel process of narrative capture at the faculty and administrative level—the kind of institutional embedding that Domain 2 of the *tamkeen* strategy describes as the consolidation phase following initial organizational penetration.

In June 2025, the *National Post* reported that Hillel Ontario called on TMU to investigate the university's recently appointed interim assistant dean, Maher El-Masri, stating that he had "repeatedly engaged with and spread extreme, antisemitic, and deeply polarizing context on his social media account."<sup>891</sup> Examples include a June 2025 post on X stating that "Israel is a baby killer state. It always has been," with other posts comparing Israel to Nazi Germany, and claiming that "this is NOT a war against Hamas. This is a genocidal war against the very existence of the Palestinian people."<sup>892</sup>

Terrorism and international security expert Casey Babb and foreign policy and national security analyst Joe Adam George, commented on the situation in an opinion piece in the *National Post* in May 2025.<sup>893</sup> Among other things, the piece, entitled "Opinion: Canadian Universities Have an Islamist Problem," discusses how TMU's arts faculty recently funded a research paper<sup>894</sup> that argues that the process of designating

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<sup>889</sup> Chris Lambie, "Jewish Law Prof Loses Bid to Quash TMU's Decision Not to Discipline Students Who Signed 'Antisemitic' Letter," *National Post*, September 18, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/news/toronto/toronto-metropolitan-university-october-7-letter-law-students>.

<sup>890</sup> Ibid.

<sup>891</sup> Ari David Blaff, "Jewish Student Group Calls on TMU to Discipline Incoming Interim Assistant Dean over anti-Israel Social Posts," *National Post*, June 12, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/news/toronto/jewish-student-group-calls-on-tmu-to-discipline-incoming-interim-dean-over-anti-israel-social-posts>.

<sup>892</sup> Ibid.

<sup>893</sup> Casey Babb and Joe Adam George, "Canadian Universities Have an Islamist Problem," *National Post*, May 6, 2025, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadian-universities-have-an-islamist-problem>.

<sup>894</sup> Sadiya Ali-Mohammed and Fahad Ahmad, "Racialized Knowledges: Understanding the Construction of Counterterrorism Policy," *Critical Policy Studies* 19, no. 4 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2025.2462599>.

groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS as terrorist organizations in Canada “is deeply flawed because of ‘systemic Islamophobia’ and racism.”<sup>895</sup> The paper further discusses how “policymakers rely on white logic to depict state institutions as neutral, obscuring their inherent anti-Muslim orientation.”<sup>896</sup> The authors further note that influential faculty, student unions, and DEI offices are not only excusing extremist ideologies that include radical Islam and support for terrorism but are “actively promoting” them.<sup>897</sup> Through the lens of academic freedom, social justice, and human rights, these groups are “jointly funding studies and platforming individuals who condone terrorism as a legitimate act of resistance and undermining the critical work performed by Canada’s national security agencies with accusation of bigotry.”<sup>898</sup>

Also in May 2025, at a special General Membership Meeting, the TMU Faculty Association passed a motion affirming that APR “is a serious and specific kind of violence/oppression.”<sup>899</sup> Following the vote, the Alliance of Canadians Combating Antisemitism published an article commenting on the toxic environment for the small Jewish population on TMU’s campus, “especially those who support Israel’s right to exist,” while noting that “the motion’s preamble describes, as a given, the existence of ‘unprecedented levels of anti-Palestinian racism’—an absurd inversion of the reality on the ground at TMU.”<sup>900</sup> The motion’s framing—that APR “is a serious and specific kind of violence/oppression”—deploys the APR definition examined in section 4.3 as a governance instrument, using faculty association machinery to embed an interpretive framework that pre-emptively designates criticism of Hamas-aligned positions as an enforceable form of discrimination.

### 9.2.3 Institutional Responses and Patterns of Inaction and Deflection

Jewish students have reported that TMU administrators routinely disregard complaints about the rising antisemitism and hostility toward Jews on campus, noting that “the response from TMU’s “leadership has been painfully quiet” and that “the administration has functioned as a bystander” in the face of persistent antisemitic

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<sup>895</sup> Babb and George, “Canadian Universities Have an Islamist Problem.”

<sup>896</sup> Ibid.

<sup>897</sup> Ibid.

<sup>898</sup> Ibid.

<sup>899</sup> “TFA Adopts Motion Recognizing and Addressing anti-Palestinian Racism at TMU,” Toronto Metropolitan Faculty Association, accessed June 24, 2026, [https://www.tfanet.ca/tfa-adopts-motion-recognizing-and-addressing-anti-palestinian-racism-at-tmu/?utm\\_source=rss&utm\\_medium=rss&utm\\_campaign=tfa-adopts-motion-recognizing-and-addressing-anti-palestinian-racism-at-tmu/](https://www.tfanet.ca/tfa-adopts-motion-recognizing-and-addressing-anti-palestinian-racism-at-tmu/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=tfa-adopts-motion-recognizing-and-addressing-anti-palestinian-racism-at-tmu/).

<sup>900</sup> Mark Sandler, “Academic Freedom for Some: Hypocrisy at TMU’s Faculty Association,” Alliance of Canadians Combatting Antisemitism, May 18, 2025, <https://www.alcca.ca/post/academic-freedom-for-some-hypocrisy-at-tmu-faculty-association>.

harassment and intimidation on campus.<sup>901</sup> and that “TMU is one of the worst antisemitic campuses in Canada.”<sup>902</sup> TMU administrators have defended their inaction by clarifying that many groups at TMU—such as SJP—are not sanctioned by the university and are instead reviewed and approved by the TMU student union (TMSU),<sup>903</sup> conveniently skirting their explicit use of Hamas imagery and calls for violence and rape.<sup>904</sup> In addition, administrators were quick to point out that the SSI event involving SJP-TMU activists attacking attendees was not held on campus.<sup>905</sup>

In response to TMU’s obfuscation, a student commenced an action before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The accompanying statement referred to “TMU’s actions and inactions with respect to ongoing and pervasive antisemitism and intimidating, offensive, demeaning, threatening, disruptive, unwelcome, and unwanted conduct towards the Plaintiff and other Jewish students, staff, and faculty at the Toronto Metropolitan University.”<sup>906</sup> The action seeks C\$1.3 million in damages against the university, claiming it breached its duty of care by violating its own policies with respect to “ongoing and pervasive antisemitism.”<sup>907</sup>

The action further notes that on October 12, 2023, TMU published a “Statement on the Conflict in the Middle East” that made no mention of Hamas, the October 7 massacre that had just occurred, “or the blameworthiness of any such actions.”<sup>908</sup> Instead, the statement states that TMU “will not tolerate anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim rhetoric or racism of any kind.”<sup>909</sup> A similar statement was published by the president of TMU, Mohamed Lachemi, days later on October 16.<sup>910</sup> The complaint noted that, while Lachemi appeared to confirm before members of parliament in January 2024 that the types of slogans heard on campus were contrary to the TMU Code of Conduct, TMU had not taken adequate steps to enforce its own rules.<sup>911</sup>

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<sup>901</sup> Liat Schwartz, “Why I’m Suing Toronto Metropolitan University after Repeated Incidents of Antisemitic Harassment,” *The Hub*, May 7, 2026, <https://thehub.ca/2026/05/07/why-im-suing-toronto-metropolitan-university-after-repeated-incidents-of-antisemitic-harassment/>.

<sup>902</sup> Sandler, “Academic Freedom for Some.”

<sup>903</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>904</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>905</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>906</sup> *Nicole Szwera v. Toronto Metropolitan University*, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, April 23, 2024, [https://assets.nationbuilder.com/cija/pages/77/attachments/original/1714056018/2024\\_04\\_23\\_-\\_Statement\\_of\\_Claim\\_%28TMU%29.pdf?1714056018](https://assets.nationbuilder.com/cija/pages/77/attachments/original/1714056018/2024_04_23_-_Statement_of_Claim_%28TMU%29.pdf?1714056018).

<sup>907</sup> John Marchesan, “Jewish Student Sues over ‘Toxic, Antisemitic Working Environment’ at Toronto Metropolitan University,” *City News* (Toronto), April 25, 2024, <https://toronto.citynews.ca/2024/04/25/jewish-student-sues-toronto-metropolitan-university/>.

<sup>908</sup> *Nicole Szwera v. Toronto Metropolitan University*.

<sup>909</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>910</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>911</sup> *Ibid.*

TMU was also named alongside Queen's University, York University, and the University of British Columbia in a C\$15 million class action lawsuit filed by law firm Diamond & Diamond in November 2023, which alleged that the universities had failed to take substantial action to address antisemitic incidents on campus, despite receiving numerous complaints, and instead had only offered "superficial statements without meaningful resolution."<sup>912</sup>

### 9.3 Qatar's Financial and Academic Footprint at TMU

From a financial perspective, there are three main vectors of exposure to Qatari influence at TMU: the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) has funded several research projects involving TMU faculty; the university has formalized its Qatari ties through a memorandum of understanding with a Qatari institution; and TMU's structural dependency on international student tuition. The latter, in particular, makes the university particularly susceptible to the reputational and financial leverage that Qatari-linked funding networks have demonstrated elsewhere. The total scope of this funding remains unknown. This is a direct consequence of the disclosure gap examined in Chapter 2, and the fact that Canada's leading research universities have actively resisted the transparency requirements that would close it.

In February 2023, TMU signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the University of Doha for Science and Technology (UDST) during the latter's Research and Innovation Week.<sup>913</sup> This event also produced an MoU with the College of the North Atlantic (CNA). CNA's former Qatar campus was the largest Canadian university presence in the Gulf for two decades.<sup>914</sup> In 2022, it was replaced by UDST, Qatar's first national applied university—now fully owned and controlled by the Qatari state.<sup>915</sup> The

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<sup>912</sup> Michael Talbot, "3 Canadian Universities Face \$15M Lawsuits for Allegedly Failing to Address anti-Semitic Incidents," *City News* (Toronto), November 2, 2023, <https://toronto.citynews.ca/2023/11/02/3-canadian-universities-face-15m-lawsuits-for-allegedly-failing-to-address-anti-semitic-incidents/>.

<sup>913</sup> "University of Doha for Science and Technology Concludes the Third Day of Research and Innovation Week with ITAS Arab Youth Competition and Many MoU's," University of Doha for Science and Technology, February 28, 2023, archived on March 18, 2023, at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20230318114941/https://www.udst.edu.qa/about-udst/media/news/university-doha-science-and-technology-concludes-third-day-research-and->

<sup>914</sup> Matt Reeder, "From Doha to Dal: Partnership Paves New Path for Qatari Students," *Dal News* (Dalhousie University), July 30, 2019, <https://www.dal.ca/news/2019/07/30/from-doha-to-dal-partnership-paves-new-path-for-qatari-students.html>; "CNA's Association with Qatar Campus Coming to an End," *VOCM*, November 12, 2021, <https://vocm.com/2021/11/12/cna-qatar-campus-end/>.

<sup>915</sup> Ayeni Olusegun, "UDST Launched, to Meet National and Industry Needs," *The Peninsula*, March 1, 2022, <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/01/03/2022/udst-launched-to-meet-national-and-industry-needs>; Hatem Abdulhameed, "Qatar's University of Doha for Science and Technology Graduates Its First Class," *Al-Fanar Media*, August 25, 2022, <https://al-fanarmedia.org/2022/07/qatars-university-of-doha-for-science-and-technology-graduates-its-first-class/>; "About Us," University of Doha for Science and Technology, accessed June 24, 2026, <https://www.udst.edu.qa/about-udst>.

MoU between TMU and UDST formalizes cooperation across joint academic programs, staff and student exchanges, research collaborations, and joint conferences—the full architecture of institutional embedding.

In early 2024, UDST launched UHUB, a business incubator operated in collaboration with TMU’s Digital Media Zone (DMZ) that is explicitly designed to commercialize applied research, monetize intellectual property, and connect Qatari entrepreneurs with Western mentors, investors, and alumni networks.<sup>916</sup> DMZ’s executive director framed the collaboration in terms of combining UDST’s access to Qatari talent with DMZ’s “world-renowned expertise in startup support,” while UDST’s president emphasized delivering “international expertise” to Qatar’s innovators.<sup>917</sup> The infrastructure being built—commercialization pipelines, IP transfer mechanisms, investor networks—is precisely the kind of institutional embedding identified in Chapter 2 as the operational architecture through which Qatari-linked partnerships extend beyond academic exchange into durable economic and technological relationships.

Taken together, the MoU, the UHUB incubator, and the aforementioned defense-adjacent cybersecurity research collaboration form a layered pattern of Qatari institutional access, one that has deepened incrementally, with each new agreement extending the relationship into domains further removed from ordinary academic exchange and closer to the commercial and security interests of the Qatari state.

TMU’s pursuit of the UDST partnership and the UHUB incubator did not happen in a vacuum: it occurred inside a university that had spent five years deliberately building its finances around international enrollment growth, reaching roughly C\$122 million in international tuition revenue by 2023–2024, or 28 percent of total student fee revenue.<sup>918</sup> Qatar is not incidental to that recruitment architecture either—TMU maintains a “guaranteed progression” pathway agreement with Doha’s University Foundation College, an institution licensed by the Qatar Ministry of Education, feeding students directly into TMU degree programs.<sup>919</sup> TMU President Mohamed Lachemi has

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<sup>916</sup> “UDST Launches UHUB Business Incubator,” *Gulf Times*, January 21, 2024, archived on January 21, 2024, at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20240121220855/https://www.gulf-times.com/article/675912/business/udst-launches-uhub-business-incubator>.

<sup>917</sup> Ibid.

<sup>918</sup> “Consolidated Financial Statements: Year Ended April 30, 2024,” Toronto Metropolitan University, June 2024, <https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/financial-services/reporting/docs/tmu-consolidated-financial-statements-2024.pdf>. Revenue figure is an estimate based on 3,551 international undergraduate students (8.8 percent of total enrolment of 40,153) distributed across six faculty groupings, each assigned approximate 2023–2024 international tuition rates.

<sup>919</sup> “Toronto Metropolitan University (TMU),” Partner Universities, University Foundation College, accessed July 14, 2026, <https://ufc.edu.qa/partner-universities/toronto-metropolitan-university-tmu/>.

said that international research relationships, including partnerships like UDST, “are commonly handled by faculty members” rather than being subjected to central university oversight.<sup>920</sup> Taken on its own terms, that claim means that the UDST MoU, the UHUB incubator, and the QNRF-funded collaboration described above sit in a category that the university’s own president has placed outside the enrollment-driven oversight documented in this section. This is the same category, and the same absence of central scrutiny, described in this chapter’s findings regarding the disclosure gap.

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<sup>920</sup> Lynette George, “President Lachemi Expresses Uncertainty about the Impact of New International Student Policies,” *On the Record*, July 5, 2024, <https://ontherecordnews.ca/president-lachemi-expresses-uncertainty-about-the-impact-of-new-international-student-policies/>.

## Findings and Policy Recommendations

The evidence examined in this report points to the interaction of identifiable processes operating across multiple domains rather than a series of isolated incidents or organizations. Narrative framing, institutional embedding, organizational ecosystems, foreign-linked funding, and legal and governance mechanisms converge in ways that enable continuity, adaptation, and persistence within mainstream institutional environments.

At the doctrinal level, concepts associated with Muslim Brotherhood strategy, including gradual entrenchment, coalition building, narrative control, and legal positioning, are reflected in observable practices across civil society, public discourse, and higher education. These are not abstract ideas. They are expressed through institutional relationships, advocacy structures, educational activity, and administrative responses.

Universities emerge as a central operational environment within this structure. At the University of Toronto, the birthplace of Israeli Apartheid Week in Canada, long-standing narrative frameworks were shown to extend from campus activism into curricular design, faculty support structures, governance processes, and institutional responses to antisemitism. The encampment, the organizational ecosystem surrounding it, the role of faculty legitimization, and the withdrawal of draft antisemitism guidance under activist pressure illustrate how narrative, organizational, and governance dynamics can converge within a single institutional setting.

At the University of Waterloo, the evidence points to a similar convergence, but with particular significance in the relationship between campus mobilization and institutional outcomes. Student activism, encampments, external network linkages, and faculty-level engagement intersected with a sustained campaign against the Technion partnership, culminating in the termination of an Israeli academic relationship under pressure. At the same time, Qatari research partnerships and scholarship pathways continued without comparable scrutiny. This asymmetry is analytically significant. It illustrates how institutional pressure can be directed selectively within the same university environment.

At Toronto Metropolitan University, the scale and consistency of antisemitic incidents point to the interaction of multiple reinforcing domains within a single campus environment. Narrative constructs were reflected not only in student activity but in

faculty processes, administrative communications, and legal framing. Organizational ecosystems operated on and around campus, while institutional responses were marked by delay, inconsistency, and deflection. The result was an environment in which Jewish students experienced intimidation and physical confrontation, while the frameworks and actors associated with those conditions acquired further institutional legitimacy.

Across these cases, a recurring pattern is visible. Anti-Israel narrative frameworks are reproduced through student groups, faculty networks, academic programming, and governance processes. Organizational ecosystems sustain continuity of mobilization. Institutional responses are shaped not only by the incidents themselves but by the surrounding legal, political, and reputational environment. Universities therefore function not simply as sites of protest but as environments in which narratives are produced, legitimized, and reproduced through formal structures.

The university findings also raise broader questions relating to foreign-linked research partnerships, funding, and governance. Relationships involving Qatari state-linked entities intersect with research environments in advanced scientific and technical fields, including energy systems, smart grids, communications security, advanced materials, artificial intelligence, and other areas with potential dual-use relevance. In the absence of comprehensive transparency frameworks, it is difficult to assess the contractual terms governing intellectual property, research outputs, data access, and downstream application. The issue is therefore not limited to foreign funding as such. In practice, it also extends to the governance of research collaboration, the protection of intellectual property, and the management of sensitive knowledge domains.

Structural revenue dependence intensifies these vulnerabilities. In the cases examined, universities rely heavily on international student income and external funding relationships within a constrained domestic funding environment. That dependency creates incentives to preserve partnerships and revenue streams while reducing the likelihood of sustained scrutiny. Foreign-linked funding relationships, scholarship pathways, and research arrangements therefore operate within an environment shaped not only by ideology and governance but by institutional financial pressure.

These academic environments are not separate from wider organizational and civil society ecosystems. Continuity is observable across domains linking charities, advocacy groups, student organizations, academic actors, and policy frameworks. Individuals, organizations, and concepts recur across multiple contexts, connecting campus mobilization with broader networks of influence and institutional engagement.

Regulatory processes show the capacity to identify areas of concern but not necessarily resolve the conditions that give rise to them. The gap between findings and outcomes, particularly in cases involving governance, ideological alignment, and organizational risk, has implications for how compliance, enforcement, and institutional accountability function in practice.

Legal and quasi-legal constructs further shape the operational environment. Frameworks such as Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism, in the specific institutional contexts examined, affect administrative behavior, influence the interpretation of conduct, and alter the terms on which scrutiny and accountability are applied. Their significance lies not in abstract definition but in their practical interaction with broader narrative and organizational dynamics.

Taken together, these elements indicate a structural environment characterized by reinforcing domains rather than by a single causal factor. The cumulative effect is the normalization of specific narratives, practices, partnerships, and associations within institutional settings, alongside uneven scrutiny and variable response.

The implications are systemic. Effective responses require a framework capable of addressing the interdependence of narrative, institutional, financial, regulatory, and legal domains with consistency. Without that, individual interventions are unlikely to alter the underlying conditions identified across universities, civil society, and public life.

## Policy Recommendations

The analysis indicates that Canada's current legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks are not calibrated to identify, assess, or respond to the forms of influence observed across higher education, civil society, and policy environments. The measures below address structural gaps across these domains.

### **1. Align Canadian and US policy and coordinate investigations and designations**

Direct Public Safety Canada and the CSIS to investigate Muslim Brotherhood chapters and affiliated networks connected to Canada, starting with those that the United States has already examined under Executive Order 14362, namely the Lebanese, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Sudanese branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Establish formal intelligence-sharing and coordination channels with the US Department of the Treasury, the US Department of State, and the US Department of Homeland Security. List qualifying entities under Section 83.05 of the Canadian

Criminal Code in cases where Canadian investigations independently substantiate the findings underlying US designations.

**2. Introduce foreign funding disclosure for universities**

Require reporting of all foreign funding, partnerships, and in-kind contributions above a defined threshold. Disclosures should include contractual terms affecting curriculum, hiring, research, intellectual property, and data access. The regime should apply to universities, affiliated institutes, and foundations, with public access and enforceable compliance provisions.

**3. Expand foreign influence transparency requirements**

Extend transparency requirements to universities, charities, and civil society organizations. Require registration for individuals and entities acting on behalf of foreign state-linked actors across the academic, research, and advocacy environments, with clear reporting and enforcement mechanisms.

**4. Review international academic partnerships**

Establish a federal and provincial mechanism to assess partnerships with state-linked entities. Apply a risk-based framework with periodic reassessment. Criteria should include governance, funding sources, research sensitivity, intellectual property arrangements, and legal compliance.

**5. Require national security due diligence in research collaboration**

Introduce formal risk assessment procedures for international research collaboration. Federal guidance should define minimum standards for partner vetting, funding transparency, intellectual property protection, and data governance, including consideration of dual-use risk.

**6. Strengthen oversight of charities and non-profits**

Equip the Canada Revenue Agency to assess organizational networks, ideological alignment, and foreign linkages alongside financial compliance. Complex audits should incorporate financial intelligence and network analysis within defined timelines, with clear thresholds for enforcement outcomes.

**7. Tighten accreditation standards**

Accrediting bodies should apply enhanced due diligence in cases where institutions are linked to organizations that are subject to regulatory scrutiny. This should include assessment of governance structures, funding sources, institutional relationships,

and curricula. Accreditation should remain subject to review where new evidence emerges.

**8. Clarify the limits of anti-discrimination frameworks**

Issue guidance to ensure that protections against discrimination do not preclude scrutiny of ideology, funding relationships, or organizational networks. Application should be consistent across public institutions and aligned with existing legal standards.

**9. Improve campus transparency**

Require universities to disclose external partnerships, funding relationships, and formally supported student organizations. Establish mechanisms to identify coordinated activity across campus networks, including links to external entities.

**10. Support independent research and community voices**

Direct public funding toward pluralistic research and initiatives that are not linked to transnational ideological networks. Prioritize work on foreign influence, antisemitism, extremism, and institutional resilience.

**11. Establish a structured regulatory review of the Canadian Islamic College**

In light of findings relating to the Muslim Association of Canada, implement a coordinated review framework for the Canadian Islamic College. This should include a precautionary regulatory assessment of operations, with consideration of interim restrictions where risks are identified; evaluation of governance structures, institutional relationships, and curriculum against Canadian legal and educational standards; analysis of funding sources, pathways, and potential external influence; and the introduction of ongoing compliance review, including periodic reassessment of programs, partnerships, and external engagement.

## Abbreviations

|             |                                                           |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| ACLA        | Arab Canadian Lawyers Association                         |
| AJ+         | Al Jazeera Plus                                           |
| AJCS        | Al Jazeera Centre for Studies                             |
| AMP         | American Muslims for Palestine                            |
| APR         | anti-Palestinian racism                                   |
| BBC         | British Broadcasting Corporation                          |
| BDS         | Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions                        |
| CAF         | Canadian Arab Federation                                  |
| CAIR        | Council on American-Islamic Relations                     |
| CBC         | Canadian Broadcasting Corporation                         |
| CBSA        | Canada Border Services Agency                             |
| CCP         | Chinese Communist Party                                   |
| CEM         | Council of European Muslims                               |
| CJPME       | Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East        |
| CMPAC       | Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council                    |
| CNN         | Cable News Network                                        |
| CRA         | Canada Revenue Agency                                     |
| CSIS        | Canadian Security Intelligence Service                    |
| CUPE        | Canadian Union of Public Employees                        |
| ECFR        | European Council on Fatwa and Research                    |
| FIOE        | Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (now CEM)   |
| HBKU        | Hamad Bin Khalifa University                              |
| IAW         | Israeli Apartheid Week                                    |
| ICLMG       | International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group            |
| IESH        | Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines                   |
| IIIT        | International Institute of Islamic Thought                |
| IRW         | Islamic Relief Worldwide                                  |
| ISGAP       | Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy |
| ISNA Canada | Islamic Society of North America Canada                   |
| ISPU        | Institute for Social Policy and Understanding             |
| IUMS        | International Union of Muslim Scholars                    |
| JEFA        | Jewish Educators and Families Association                 |
| MAC         | Muslim Association of Canada                              |
| MAC-CIC     | Muslim Association of Canada – Canadian Islamic College   |
| MEMRI       | Middle East Media Research Institute                      |
| MF          | Musulmans de France                                       |

|            |                                                   |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| MFEN       | Muslim Federal Employees Network                  |
| MSA        | Muslim Students' Association                      |
| NAIT       | North American Islamic Trust                      |
| NCCM       | National Council of Canadian Muslims              |
| NDP        | New Democratic Party                              |
| NPRP       | National Priorities Research Program              |
| NSIRA      | National Security and Intelligence Review Agency  |
| NSJP       | National Students for Justice in Palestine        |
| O4P        | Occupy for Palestine                              |
| OFAC       | Office of Foreign Assets Control                  |
| OFL        | Ontario Federation of Labour                      |
| OPSEU      | Ontario Public Service Employees Union            |
| PCC        | Palestinian Culture Club                          |
| PEQAB      | Postsecondary Education Quality Assessment Board  |
| PYM        | Palestinian Youth Movement                        |
| QFI        | Qatar Foundation International                    |
| QNRf       | Qatar National Research Fund                      |
| RAD        | Review and Analysis Division (CRA)                |
| RCMP       | Royal Canadian Mounted Police                     |
| SID4P      | Shut it Down for Palestine                        |
| SJP        | Students for Justice in Palestine                 |
| TCMV       | The Canadian Muslim Vote                          |
| TMU        | Toronto Metropolitan University                   |
| TSSP       | Tkarón:to Students in Solidarity with Palestine   |
| U of T     | University of Toronto                             |
| U15 Canada | U15 Group of Canadian Research Universities       |
| UAE        | United Arab Emirates                              |
| UDST       | University of Doha for Science and Technology     |
| UNRWA      | United Nations Relief and Works Agency            |
| UOIF       | Union of Islamic Organizations of France (now MF) |
| UTFA       | University of Toronto Faculty Association         |
| UTMSU      | University of Toronto Mississauga Students' Union |
| UW         | University of Waterloo                            |

