

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S STRATEGIC ENTRYISM INTO THE UNITED STATES: A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS



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Introductory Note: Islamism vs. Islam

This study offers a critique of Islamism, focusing particularly on the ideology and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the outset, it is necessary to draw a distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a contemporary political project. Islam is one of the world's major faiths, embraced by approximately 1.9 billion adherents across the globe. For more than fourteen centuries it has guided the spiritual, ethical, and communal lives of Muslims in a wide range of cultural, social, and political contexts. Muslims continue to practice their faith in diverse ways, and for the vast majority of them Islam provides a framework for devotion and moral living that is fully compatible with democratic values, pluralism, and modern life.

Islamism by contrast is not Islam. It is a political ideology that arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to the decline of Muslim empires, the dislocations of colonialism, and the encounter with modernity. Islamism reframes Islam not primarily as a faith but as a totalizing political program. Its advocates insist that Islam is not merely a spiritual religion but an all-encompassing system governing politics, law, and society. By transforming elements of religion into ideological tools, Islamism seeks to redefine Islam itself in the service of political ends.

The most significant promoter of Islamism is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna.¹ Al-Banna created a movement that combined religious devotion with structured activism, teaching that Islam must govern every sphere of life and that Muslims must organize collectively to achieve this goal. His model became the prototype for Islamist organizations worldwide. The Brotherhood's ideology was sharpened and radicalized further by Sayyid Qutb, who argued in *Milestones*, his 1964 Islamist manifesto,² that Muslim societies had fallen into *jahiliyyah*—a condition of ignorance and corruption akin to the pre-Islamic age. Qutb declared that only a revolutionary vanguard could restore divine sovereignty, and he provided an ideological justification for coercion and violence by reframing jihadism as a political struggle. Parallel thinkers such as Abul A'la Maududi in South Asia and Yusuf al-Qaradawi in the Middle East³ extended these ideas, ensuring that the Brotherhood's project reached across the wider Muslim world.

The Brotherhood's reach has extended well beyond the Middle East. In regions where Muslims formed a minority, such as Europe and North America, affiliates and sympathizers adapted their methods. Direct confrontation was replaced with gradualism. Brotherhood-inspired actors established community organizations, schools, charities, and advocacy networks that allowed them to present themselves as the authentic representatives of Muslim communities. They cultivated relationships with policymakers, interfaith bodies, and media outlets, embedding themselves in civic life while advancing a long-term strategy of entrenchment known as *tamkeen*.

Tamkeen is one of the Brotherhood's most important doctrines. It refers to a deliberate process of institutional entrenchment and empowerment. Rather than seeking immediate revolution, it calls for embedding Islamist influence within civil society, consolidating authority inside Muslim communities, and normalizing Islamist discourse in the wider public arena. *Tamkeen* is not simply a tactic of survival; it is a long-term program of transformation in which Islamist movements position themselves to shape the environment around them until they are sufficiently entrenched to advance their wider ideological objectives.

¹ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1993), available online at: <https://archive.org/details/societyofmuslimb0000mitc>.

² Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* [first published in Arabic in 1964] (Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), available online at: <https://www.kalamullah.com/Books/Milestones%20Special%20Edition.pdf>.

³ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase* first published in Arabic in 1992 (Awakening Publications, 2000), available online at: <https://archive.org/details/priorities-of-islamic-movement>.

In the United States, *tamkeen* has guided the tactics of Brotherhood-aligned organizations and activists. They have asserted their authority to speak for all American Muslims, despite the diversity of Muslim communities, thus positioning themselves as key interlocutors in policy, legal, academic, and media spaces. The objective has been to normalize Islamist discourse, marginalize alternative Muslim voices, and influence public perception and policy in ways that advance the Brotherhood's ideological project.

It is also significant that opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood is not confined to Western governments or analysts. Several Muslim-majority states have taken decisive steps against the organization. Egypt, the Brotherhood's birthplace, has banned the movement and designated it a terrorist organization after decades of political confrontation and violence. Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Islam's two holiest cities, has likewise outlawed the Brotherhood, describing it as a source of division and extremism. The United Arab Emirates has gone even further by proscribing the Brotherhood and related groups as threats to national security and social cohesion. These actions clearly demonstrate that criticism of the Brotherhood does not stem from hostility to Islam itself. On the contrary, they reflect the recognition by Muslim governments and scholars that the Brotherhood distorts religion for ideological purposes, undermines legitimate religious authority, and destabilizes societies.

This preface highlights two central realities. First, Islamism is a deliberate ideological movement with a defined history, strategy, and set of objectives. It cannot be dismissed as incidental, nor confused with Islam itself. Second, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism has a global reach, with networks and influence extending into Western contexts, including the United States, where the doctrine of *tamkeen* provides the blueprint for embedding, normalizing, and expanding Islamist influence.

Many of the most consistent critiques of Islamism come from Muslims themselves. Reformist thinkers, classical scholars, and ordinary believers alike have challenged the Brotherhood's attempt to monopolize Islamic identity. Muslim communities have also been among the first to suffer from Islamist authoritarianism, sectarianism, and violence. This demonstrates that Islamism is not a defense of Islam but an imposition upon it.

This preface therefore presents the following frame of analysis. Islam is a religion of faith and spirituality. Muslim Brotherhood Islamism is a political ideology, and *tamkeen* is its operational doctrine. The focus of this study is not Islam but the ideological and tactical project of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States. By clarifying this distinction at the outset, the study provides the foundation for a critical examination of the Brotherhood's strategies and their implications for democratic society.

Abstract

This study investigates the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy of "civilizational struggle" (jihad) in Western society, with a specific focus on the United States. By analyzing primary documents, including the "Explanatory Memorandum" (1991) and "The Project" (1982), along with comparative historical analysis, it traces the development of the Brotherhood's doctrine of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) from its theoretical roots in early twentieth-century Egypt to its more advanced practical application in the United States.

The study identifies and thoroughly analyzes four strategic domains of influence: policy impact through government entryism and coalition-building; manipulation of the legal framework via lawfare and the redefinition of core concepts; institutional infiltration across educational and civil society organizations; and the establishment of narrative control through media influence and discourse shaping. Multiple detailed case studies within each domain show how Brotherhood-aligned groups have executed these strategies across different countries and historical periods.

The analysis in this study, supported by extensive documentary evidence and organizational network assessments, demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood's long-term strategy is a deliberate, multigenerational effort that closely aligns with its founders' vision of gradually transforming Western society from within, primarily through nonviolent means. Ideologically speaking, it is also fundamentally opposed to Western democratic values and governance systems. This study offers an important assessment of the key strategic objectives of Islamist extremism and ideological entryism within democratic systems by the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the intersection of Islamist extremism with religious identity politics that exploit democratic principles, multicultural respect for diversity, and transnational movements in an era of globalization and information warfare.

The study concludes with an assessment of the challenges faced by policymakers, security professionals, and civil society leaders who aim to protect democratic values while respecting religious freedoms. In a nutshell, it states that effective responses need to balance security concerns with civil liberties, differentiate between genuine religious practice and ideological extremism, and create more sophisticated frameworks for understanding and addressing radical Islamism.

Executive Summary

This comprehensive study exposes and examines the Muslim Brotherhood's comprehensive, multigenerational strategic campaign to transform Western society (especially in the United States) from within, through what its own internal documents describe as "civilizational struggle" (jihad). Unlike conventional terrorist threats, this strategy exploits democratic freedoms and institutions to advance fundamentally anti-democratic objectives, representing a sophisticated form of nonviolent extremism targeting Western democracies.

The study demonstrates that what has often been dismissed as a conspiracy theory or misunderstood as legitimate religious advocacy actually constitutes a coherent, strategically sophisticated program of civilizational transformation operating simultaneously across political, legal, institutional, and cultural domains.

The Doctrine of *Tamkeen*

The operations of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe and North America are guided by the doctrine of *tamkeen*, a theological idea that has been repurposed into a strategic political program for the gradual establishment of Islamic governance. Over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this doctrine has developed in four discernible phases, each contributing distinct intellectual and operational elements to a broader strategy of institutional entrenchment.

The earliest phase, associated with Hassan al-Banna in the 1930s and 1940s, was characterized by a deliberate, long-term gradualism. Al-Banna elaborated a seven-stage progression that begins with individual spiritual renewal and culminates in the reconstitution of a comprehensive Islamic social order. In this phase, classical Islamic concepts were combined with modern organizational methods, and strategic patience and institutional development were presented as prerequisites to any overt political exercise of power.

The second phase is represented by Sayyid Qutb's mid-twentieth century thought, which reframed the intellectual terrain. Qutb expanded the Qur'anic juridical concept of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance) to encompass contemporary secular societies and therefore cast secular governance as fundamentally illegitimate. Politically, Qutb's work emphasized a vanguardist model that required ideological purification and the formation of an uncompromising cadre prior to political action, thereby privileging revolutionary rupture over procedural accommodation.

A third, institutional phase emerged in the late twentieth century, most prominently in the writings and praxis of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, whose approach accommodated strategic participation in democratic systems while maintaining doctrinal opposition to secularism. This period saw the development of a body of "minority jurisprudence" designed to govern the behavior of Muslims living as minorities in Western polities, and an insistence on Palestine as a focal mobilizing cause for Western Muslim communities—an emotive issue that could be leveraged to sustain activism and cross-community solidarity without necessarily foregrounding political demands for state power.

The most recent phase, identifiable in the early twenty-first century and associated with thinkers who synthesized revolutionary and institutional techniques, consolidated a more assertive posture. This synthesis incorporated the language of "comprehensive jihad" across social, political, and—in some articulations—military domains. It also reprioritized state formation as a strategic goal, even while preserving techniques of incremental institutional influence.

Two strategic blueprints have been particularly influential in operationalizing the doctrine of *tamkeen* in Western polities. "The Project" (1982) established a long-range, multi-decadal framework for expanding Islamist influence in Western society through institutional penetration,

coalition building, and the cultivation of parallel social structures. The document recommended the tactical use of democratic freedoms—freedom of association, speech, and civic participation—as mechanisms to advance objectives that are at odds with liberal democratic norms. A second internal document, the “Explanatory Memorandum” (1991), which focused on North America, articulated a concept described as “civilizational struggle” (jihad), identifying the long-term objective of diluting and/or displacing Western cultural and political influence from within and mapping out an organizational network operating across social, religious, and professional sectors.

Operational Implementation: Four Domains of Influence

The practical application of *tamkeen* operates through four interrelated domains: policy impact, legal framework manipulation, institutional infiltration, and narrative control. Each of which reinforces the others and together produces influence across civic life.

1. Policy Impact

The policy impact stage involves the cultivation of access to governmental structures and influence over public policy. Brotherhood-aligned actors have, in multiple national contexts, achieved advisory and consultative positions within government agencies and ministries, thereby shaping the language and priorities of counter-extremism and foreign policy programs. These engagements have at times resulted in the removal of explicitly Islamist terminology from training materials and policy documents and have allowed Brotherhood-aligned perspectives to inform diplomatic approaches to Muslim-majority states. Notably, episodic crises have revealed the capacity of aligned organizational networks to co-ordinate pressure across executive offices, legislative committees, and grassroots constituencies in ways that produce measurable policy shifts.

2. Legal Framework Manipulation

A second strand of institutional entrenchment has involved the instrumentalization of legal and regulatory systems. Concepts such as “Islamophobia” have been developed and institutionalized by actors sympathetic to Brotherhood thought in order to shift the discourse from ideological criticism to allegations of discrimination. The effect has been to convert certain forms of legitimate public scrutiny into legally actionable claims, thereby chilling critical debate and constraining investigative and academic inquiry. Anti-discrimination frameworks have been deployed selectively to shield aligned organizations and individuals, while at the same time litigation and professional censure have been used to marginalize dissenting Muslim voices. In some instances, parallel religious or communal dispute-resolution norms have been cultivated to operate alongside, and sometimes in tension with, Western legal frameworks.

3. Institutional Infiltration

Institutional infiltration (entryism) describes the deliberate construction of a parallel civil-society infrastructure capable of social reproduction and political mobilization. This infrastructure comprises religious centers, schools, charities, advocacy groups, and campus organizations that together provide channels for ideological transmission, community organizing, and leadership development. Brotherhood-aligned organizations have prioritized long-term investment in education and youth engagement through formal schools, after-school programs and student societies—to create generational continuity of outlook and networks. Within higher education, there has been a strategic effort to shape academic fields such as Middle East studies and Islamic studies through endowments, visiting fellowships, and the placement of sympathetic scholars and administrators, thereby influencing curricula, research agendas, and institutional priorities.

A complementary dimension of institutional infiltration is financial: Brotherhood-aligned networks have used investment vehicles, ownership partnerships, and philanthropic channels to build or acquire capacity in sectors that influence public opinion and civic life. This financial strategy intentionally targets institutions with structural leverage, such as think tanks, foundations, grant-making bodies and social service providers, in order to normalize aligned perspectives and to create durable allies that are embedded within institutions.

4. Narrative Control

Control over public discourse is the final and most consequential domain of influence. Brotherhood-aligned actors have established themselves as authoritative voices within mainstream and sectoral media ecosystems, exert influence on curricular content in educational settings, and shape public debate through academic publishing and cultural production. An additional element of this strategy has been the use of financial resources to influence media environments. Investments, ownership stakes, and formal partnerships with media outlets and production companies have created channels for editorial influence, agenda setting, and the promotion of aligned spokespersons. Through a combination of direct investment, funding of content, and partnerships, aligned financiers and organizations have embedded preferred framings in both mass and niche media. By positioning trained representatives in visible news and commentary roles and by supporting content that presents political conflicts, most notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as moral and religious obligations, the network has advanced its own conceptual vocabulary while limiting space for alternative perspectives. The resulting environment favors specific interpretations of Islam, conflict, and civic obligation that persist across political cycles.

Strategic Milestones and Campaigns

Three milestone periods illustrate the consolidation of the *tamkeen* approach. In the period following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Brotherhood-aligned organizations moved to establish consultative relationships with government agencies and to shift public discussion from doctrinal analysis to concerns about anti-Muslim prejudice. This repositioning gave them greater access at a time when security institutions were seeking community engagement partners.

Between 2007 and 2017, campus campaigns, most notably the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, were developed as vehicles for advancing aligned narratives on university campuses. The BDS strategy encouraged coalition building with progressive student groups and advocacy organizations, which expanded influence beyond Muslim constituencies and created durable infrastructures for activism and pressure campaigns.

In more recent years, regional conflicts have highlighted the ability of these long-standing networks to mobilize quickly. Large campus demonstrations have employed coordinated media strategies that emphasized Palestinian victimhood while minimizing the actions of militant groups, while lobbying efforts directed at legislative and administrative bodies revealed the integration of long-term institution building with short-term mobilization capacity.

Strategic Assessment

The cumulative effect of these efforts is visible across several areas: access to policy circles, use of legal protections that limit scrutiny, the creation of an institutional network able to reproduce ideology, and influence over public debate. These outcomes have been enabled by structural features within Western democracies. Frameworks designed to counter violent extremism, which focus mainly on immediate security threats, have been less effective when dealing with gradual ideological influence. Anti-discrimination laws and human rights institutions, originally intended to

protect minority groups, can be used in ways that discourage investigation and criticism. Democratic institutions, which rely on openness, pluralism, and procedural fairness, often lack effective safeguards against persistent entryism that exploits those same democratic liberties.

Addressing the challenge posed by *tamkeen* requires institutional and policy adjustments. Instruments that are designed to counter violent radicalization are not suited to resisting ideological penetration. Legal systems must be strengthened against misuse without reducing legitimate civil rights. Educational and media institutions should adopt greater transparency in funding, partnerships and editorial governance. Democratic processes also need reinforcement against manipulation while maintaining their fundamental openness.

Implications for Western Democratic Societies

Brotherhood-aligned movements present both immediate and long-term challenges to Western democratic societies. In the short term, they exploit democratic procedures while rejecting the principles that underpin them, which enables them to participate in political systems without adhering to those systems' underlying values. This has a direct effect on social cohesion, as parallel societies and identity-based politics are promoted in place of civic integration, undermining the basis of shared citizenship. Brotherhood-aligned movements also affect education by seeking to shape how Islam and related issues are presented to younger generations, a development that carries lasting implications for public understanding of Islam and Islamism and the differences between them.⁴ At the same time, security agencies remain constrained in their ability to address the ideological aspects of extremism, limiting their capacity for prevention and comprehensive response.

Over the longer term, these activities create institutional precedents that favor concessions to extremist demands through sustained pressure, establishing decision-making patterns that are difficult to reverse. They reshape the boundaries of public discourse on Islam, terrorism, and relations between Western societies and Muslim majority states in ways that persist beyond political cycles. They also create durable coalition infrastructures capable of coordinated mobilization across a wide range of issues, and they secure generational continuity through educational and cultural mechanisms that transmit ideas over time regardless of leadership change or political context.

Taken together, these developments represent a form of nonviolent extremism that differs from conventional threats. Instead of acting outside the law, this strategy exploits legal freedoms and democratic institutions to advance objectives that are incompatible with democratic governance. The result is a form of asymmetric conflict that targets the ideological foundations of Western systems. Its operational effectiveness is demonstrated by long-term planning and coordinated implementation, as described in authenticated internal documents, and by observable outcomes such as access to policymaking, legal protections against scrutiny, institutional embedding, and influence over public debate. These outcomes, which have persisted despite evidence of association with extremist networks in court proceedings, highlight significant deficiencies in the ability of democratic societies to identify and counter influence campaigns operating within legal boundaries.

The cumulative effect is a sustained challenge to democratic resilience. Unless democratic institutions strengthen analytical frameworks, adjust legal instruments, enhance transparency in education and media, and reinforce safeguards against systematic manipulation, they will remain vulnerable to movements that exploit democratic openness to achieve anti-democratic objectives.

⁴ Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West: Evolution and Western Policies* (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King's College London, March 2011), <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/1300106834ICSRTheNewMBintheWest.pdf>.

Recommendations

Immediate priorities include the development of clearer and more appropriate definitions of nonviolent extremism and analytical frameworks that separate ideological movements hostile to democracy from legitimate political dissent. Intelligence and security agencies should adopt national strategies that address nonviolent extremist influence operations within legal constraints.

Legislatures should reform anti-discrimination laws to prevent exploitation while maintaining protections for individuals. Institutions, both governmental and civil-society, need to strengthen their resilience against systematic influence. Security agencies must also restore their capacity to analyze the ideological dimensions of extremist movements.

Long-term priorities require executive branches to develop joined-up government strategies that coordinate agency responses while establishing precise definitions of extremism that cover ideological as well as violent threats. Legislatures must adopt legal reforms that address the misuse of democratic protections. Educational institutions, together with governments, should implement programs that support credible moderate Muslim voices while exposing claims of representation advanced by extremist organizations. Governments should also expand international cooperation to respond to the transnational scope of Brotherhood operations. Finally, educational systems and civil society organizations should develop initiatives that promote cultural resilience, strengthen democratic values, and deepen public understanding.

Conclusion

The Brotherhood's influence strategy in Western societies poses a significant challenge to the resilience of democratic institutions. Addressing this challenge requires responses that match the scale and sophistication of the movement's long-term planning and multigenerational approach. Although democratic society in the United States and elsewhere possess analytical, institutional, and legal resources capable of countering nonviolent extremist influence operations, there is a gap between these capacities and their systematic application to ideological movements that operate within legal frameworks while pursuing objectives that weaken democratic systems. The record of Brotherhood activity across the policy, legal, institutional, and narrative domains suggest two possible trajectories. Democratic institutions may develop effective safeguards that limit sustained ideological influence, or they may experience continuing compromise as movements exploit democratic vulnerabilities to achieve systemic transformation. The outcome will depend on whether governments and civil society are able to establish comprehensive analytical frameworks, enforce appropriate legal measures, boost institutional resilience, and coordinate responses across multiple sectors.

Glossary

Al-Ghalaba: In Islamist terminology, this refers to the concept of Muslims achieving dominance or prevalence in society; the state of having sufficient power and influence to implement Islamic rule and overcome opposing forces or secular governance.

Al-Marhaliyyah: A strategy of temporary adaptation to protect Islamist movements until full institutional entrenchment is achieved.

Civilizational Struggle (Jihad): A nonviolent strategy employed by Islamist movements to erode Western society from within by exploiting democratic systems.

Da'wa: Arabic term meaning “call” or “invitation to Islam” that refers to Islamic missionary work or religious outreach to spread Islamic teachings.

Fiqh al-Marhala: The body of Islamic jurisprudence governing temporary ideological and tactical adaptation to survive and progress through different phases.

Fiqh al-Tamkeen: The body of Islamic jurisprudence dedicated to the strategies and stages of achieving societal and political entrenchment.

Islam: A faith followed by approximately 1.9 billion people worldwide, centered on the belief in one God and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, guiding individuals in their spiritual, ethical, and personal lives—not as a political ideology but as a religion.

Islamism: A political ideology that seeks to impose a version of Islam as a system of governance, law, and societal control, often using religious narratives to justify anti-democratic, anti-pluralistic, and sometimes violent objectives.

Red–Green Alliance: The tactical partnership between radical Islamists (Green) and radical leftist movements (Red) to undermine Western institutions.

Tadarruj: Arabic term meaning “gradual progression” or “step-by-step approach.” In Islamist strategy, it refers to the methodical, incremental implementation of Islamic governance and law, often involving a phased process of societal transformation rather than immediate revolutionary change.

Tamkeen: Arabic term meaning “settlement.” In Islamist political thought, it refers to the concept of Muslims gaining sufficient power, authority, or control to impose Islamic governance and law on society through a process of institutional entrenchment.

The “Explanatory Memorandum”: An internal Muslim Brotherhood document from 1991 detailing the group’s strategy for “sabotaging Western civilization from within” in North America. Its full title is “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.”

“The Project”: An internal Muslim Brotherhood document from 1982 outlining the group’s strategy for global Islamist expansion through gradualism and infiltration. Its full title is “The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy.”

Abbreviations

AMP	American Muslims for Palestine
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement
CAIR	Council on American-Islamic Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISNA	Council of Islamic Schools based in North America
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism (DOJ program)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
FARA	Foreign Agent Registration Act
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIOE	Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe
FJP	Faculty & Staff for Justice in Palestine
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
IAP	Islamic Association for Palestine
IBN	Islamic Broadcasting Network
ICNA	Islamic Circle of North America
IHRA	International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
IIIT	International Institute of Islamic Thought
IMAM	Imam Mahdi Association of Marjaeya
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISLA	Islamic Schools League of America
ISNA	Islamic Society of North America
ISPU	Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
IUMS	International Union of Muslim Scholars
JVP	Jewish Voice for Peace
MAS	Muslim American Society
MAYA	Muslim Arab Youth Association
MPAC	Muslim Public Affairs Council
MSA	Muslim Students Association
NAIT	North American Islamic Trust
NAML	National Association of Muslim Lawyers
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMLSA	National Muslim Law Students Association
NSJP	National Students for Justice in Palestine
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACBI	Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
SJP	Students for Justice in Palestine
SLAPP	Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation
SPLC	Southern Poverty Law Center
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UASR	United Association for Studies and Research
USCIRF	US Commission on International Religious Freedom

1. Introduction: Understanding the Islamist “Civilizational Struggle” (Jihad) Paradigm

1.1 Research Context and Significance

“Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” —Muslim Brotherhood motto¹

The Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimeen*), founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, was the first modern Islamist movement. It marked the formal beginning of *Islamism*—a political ideology that seeks to instrumentalize Islam as a vehicle for power, control, and the imposition of a single interpretation of faith on society. Unlike Islam, which is a religion followed by approximately 1.9 billion people of varying traditions, Islamism is a rigid ideology that subordinates spirituality to politics.

Initially presenting itself as a reformist movement, the Brotherhood soon embraced militant jihad in the 1930s, targeting colonialism, Western modernity, and the Jewish presence in Palestine. Al-Banna himself was conspiratorial, antisemitic, and an admirer of Nazi Germany, overseeing the Arabic translation of *Mein Kampf* as *My Jihad* and aligning the Brotherhood with fascist currents.

Today, the Brotherhood serves as the intellectual and ideological parent of Islamist and jihadist groups such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, and ISIS. The doctrines pioneered by its ideologues in the twentieth century continue to underpin extremist narratives worldwide, making the Brotherhood the foundation of contemporary Islamism.²

The Muslim Brotherhood represents a significant ideological challenge to Western democratic systems, operating through what internal documents describe as a “civilizational struggle” (jihad)—a systematic, multigenerational effort to transform Western society from within. While violent jihadist organizations have attracted more attention from security services and dominated public discourse on extremism, the Brotherhood’s ideological strategy of entryism has enabled it to embed itself within Western civil society, educational institutions, and political structures through methods that fall outside the scope of traditional counterterrorism frameworks.

This phenomenon raises questions about the resilience of the United States’ liberal democratic systems against ideological movements that utilize democratic freedoms to advance anti-democratic objectives. As Bassam Tibi, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the University of Göttingen, former Visiting Professor of Government and Islamic Civilization at Harvard University, and author of numerous works on Islam, Islamism, and political order, including *Islamism and Islam*, argues, “Political Islam constitutes a distinctive form of totalitarianism that operates within democratic frameworks, while rejecting their foundational values.”³ The Brotherhood’s Western strategy thus provides a critical case study for understanding the vulnerabilities of open societies to what Dr. Lorenzo Vidino, Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, terms “nonviolent extremism,”⁴ as practiced by extremist ideological movements that defer violence as a tactic while maintaining goals incompatible with liberal democracy.

This study presents a systematic analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic framework for influencing Western society, particularly that of the United States, through rigorous examination of primary sources, organizational networks, historical development patterns, and contemporary case

¹ *The Qatari Regime, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood: The Globalisation of Antisemitism and Anti-Democracy* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/QATAR-REGIME_HAMAS_MB_FINAL.pdf.

² Ibid.

³ Bassam Tibi, “The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and Its Challenge to Europe and to Islam,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 1 (2007): 35–54, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14690760601121630>.

⁴ Lorenzo Vidino, “The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Europe,” *CTC Sentinel* 3, nos. 11–12 (2010): 9–11, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-role-of-non-violent-islamists-in-europe>.

studies. The study focuses on the concept of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) as the central organizing principle behind the Brotherhood's Western activities, tracing its doctrinal evolution from Hassan al-Banna through Sayyid Qutb and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to contemporary ideologues, including Ali al-Sallabi.

1.2 Scope and Structure

This study examines the Muslim Brotherhood's Western influence strategy through multiple analytical lenses and is structured to provide a comprehensive understanding both of its theoretical foundations and its practical implementation.

The study proceeds as follows:

- Chapter 2 examines the theoretical foundations of the Brotherhood's US strategy through an analysis of the concept of *tamkeen* as developed by key ideologues, from Hassan al-Banna to contemporary figures.
- Chapter 3 analyzes the Brotherhood's strategic blueprints as articulated in two of its key internal documents, "The Project" (1982) and the "Explanatory Memorandum" (1991), identifying key objectives and tactical approaches.
- Chapter 4 investigates the practical implementation of these strategies across four "domains" of influence: policy impact, legal framework manipulation, institutional infiltration, and narrative control.
- Chapter 5 analyzes three critical historical moments that facilitated Brotherhood infiltration: the post-9/11 security environment, the rise of the BDS movement (2007–2017), and the aftermath of Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
- Chapter 6 concludes with an assessment of the future trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood's US strategy and recommends potential countermeasures based on the research findings.

Through this structured analysis, the study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how the Brotherhood's ideology has been operationalized in the United States and the challenges this poses to the country's democratic systems and national security.

1.3 The Struggle within America: The Conceptual Framework of the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist Entryism into US Civil Society

The Muslim Brotherhood's approach to Western society extends beyond religious advocacy to a comprehensive strategy of social, cultural, and political transformation. According to "The Project," an internal Muslim Brotherhood document discovered during a 2001 police raid on the residence of a key Brotherhood figure in Switzerland,⁵ and the "Explanatory Memorandum,"⁶ an internal Brotherhood document discovered during the Holy Land Foundation trial in 2008—the largest terrorism financing prosecution in US history,⁷ the organization's objective is to carry out a civilizational struggle (jihad) designed to eliminate and destroy Western civilization from within.

⁵ "The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982)," translated by Scott Burgess (based on the French text published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–205), first published serially in *The Daily Ablution* in December 2005, available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter "The Project"].

⁶ "An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America" (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter "Explanatory Memorandum"].

⁷ "Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case," press release, US Department of Justice, May 27, 2009, <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences-holy-land-foundation-case>.

This conceptualization of the Brotherhood's struggle (jihad) represents a significant innovation in Islamist thought. Traditional Islamic jurisprudence divides struggle into several categories, including the "greater jihad" of spiritual self-improvement and the "lesser jihad" of armed struggle against external enemies.⁸ The Brotherhood's "civilizational jihad" introduces a third—institutional—paradigm that focuses on gradually transforming social and political institutions rather than violently overthrowing them.

This approach builds upon the theoretical framework developed by Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. Often regarded as the movement's chief intellectual architect, he argued, in works such as *Milestones*, that modern societies, including Muslim-majority countries, had reverted to a state of *jahiliyyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance), a condition that required comprehensive Islamic reform.⁹ However, while groups like al-Qaeda have used Qutb's framework to justify violent revolution, the Brotherhood's Western strategy represents a more sophisticated application that prioritizes gradual infiltration (*tadarruj*) over armed confrontation.

Unlike violent jihadist organizations, the Brotherhood's strategy leverages democratic freedoms and social openness as vehicles for advancing its ideological agenda. This approach, which weaponizes democratic principles against the democratic system itself, has proven difficult for Western governments to counteract through traditional security frameworks. As Paul Kenny demonstrates in his research on populist rule, democratic systems face particular challenges from movements that exploit democratic freedoms while systematically undermining press freedom and democratic institutions from within.¹⁰

1.4 Islamist Theoretical Foundations of "Civilizational Struggle" (Jihad)

The concept of "civilizational struggle" represents a synthesis of classical Islamic concepts with modern political theory and organizational methodology. Its intellectual genealogy can be traced through several key developments:

- (a) The **reform movement of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh** (1870s–1900s) sought to reconcile Islam with modernity by reinterpreting Islamic principles in light of contemporary challenges.¹¹
- (b) **Rashid Rida's Salafist turn** (1910s–1930s) rejected many modernist accommodations and argued for a return to the practices of the early Muslim community (*Salaf*) as a foundation for Islamic revival.¹²
- (c) **Hassan al-Banna's practical activism** (1930s–1940s) transformed theoretical debates into a structured organizational model focused on comprehensive social and political transformation.¹³

⁸ "Jihad," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last updated October 4, 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad>.

⁹ William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of 'Jāhiliyya,'" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003): 521–45, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3879862>.

¹⁰ Paul D. Kenny, "'The Enemy of the People': Populists and Press Freedom," *Political Research Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (2020): 261–75, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912918824038>.

¹¹ Sami Abdullah Kaloti, "Islamic Reformation and the Impact of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh on Islamic Education" (dissertation, Marquette University, 1974), Marquette University ePublications, https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/1510/ (accessed July 2, 2025); "Salafi movement," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, last updated December 2, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Salafi-movement>.

¹² For a short history of Salafism, see Aaron Rock-Singer, "Praying in Shoes," *Aeon*, October 16, 2023, <https://aeon.co/essays/a-history-of-the-modern-islamic-movement-that-is-salafism>.

¹³ Khalil al-Anani, "The Power of the Jama'ā: The Role of Hasan Al-Banna in Constructing the Muslim Brotherhood's Collective Identity," *Sociology of Islam* 1, nos. 1–2 (2013): 41–63, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274100549>. Camille Mulcaire, "Hasan al-Banna and the Political Ideologisation of Islam in the 20th Century," *E-International Relations*, February 2, 2016, <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/02/hasan-al-banna-and-the-political-ideologisation-of-islam-in-the-20th-century/>.

- (d) **Sayyid Qutb’s revolutionary framework** (1950s–1960s) provided the ideological justification for confronting secular systems deemed to be in a state of *jahiliyyah*.¹⁴
- (e) **Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s minority jurisprudence** (1990s–2000s) adopted the Brotherhood’s strategy for Muslim communities living as minorities in Western countries.¹⁵
- (f) **Muhammad Shahrur’s ideological framing** (2000s–2010s), which emphasized the concept of “civilizational conflict” as a long-term, values-based struggle between Islam and Western liberalism, reframed the Brotherhood strategy within a global ideological confrontation while avoiding overt militancy.¹⁶

This intellectual evolution demonstrates how the Brotherhood’s approach is not merely a tactical maneuver but a sophisticated theoretical response to the challenges of advancing Islamist objectives in pluralistic Western contexts. The civilizational struggle framework provides ideological justification, strategic direction, and tactical flexibility within a coherent long-term vision.

1.5 The Challenge of Effective Countermeasures

The Muslim Brotherhood, along with the individuals and organizations aligned with it, exploits structural and legal blind spots in Western security systems. By maintaining ideological alignment with its global movement while avoiding operational violence in Western contexts, it has positioned itself beyond the reach of existing counterterrorism frameworks. Unless those frameworks are reconceptualized to address ideological infiltration as well as violent extremism, the Brotherhood will continue to advance its project largely unchallenged.

Despite evidence linking the Muslim Brotherhood to extremist ideology and terrorist organizations such as Hamas (a chapter of the Brotherhood),¹⁷ Western governments struggle to implement effective countermeasures against the Brotherhood’s strategy of “civilizational jihad.”¹⁸ In January 2017, a CIA report cautioned against designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, arguing that such action could have negative diplomatic consequences and harm relations with key US allies,¹⁹ including Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey, where Brotherhood-affiliated political parties operate legally within the political system.

Ultimately, the Trump administration did not approve the designation. While the White House remained rhetorically critical of the Brotherhood, it deferred to intelligence and diplomatic advice that the legal and political costs outweighed the benefits. Instead, the administration focused on

¹⁴ Mark A. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah,” *Leadership and the Humanities* 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80, <https://www.elgaronline.com/view/journals/lath/2-1/lath.2014.01.04.xml>. “Qutb, Sayyid,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, n.d., <https://iep.utm.edu/qutb/> (accessed July 2, 2025).

¹⁵ Samuel Helfont, “Islam and Islamism Today: The Case of Yusuf al-Qaradawi,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 8, 2020, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2010/01/islam-and-islamism-today-the-case-of-yusuf-al-qaradawi/>; David H Warren and Christine Gilmore, “One Nation under God? Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Changing Fiqh of Citizenship,” *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 3 (2013), <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259636183>.

¹⁶ Loay Mudhoon, “The Reformist Islamic Thinker Muhammad Shahrur: In the Footsteps of Averroes,” Qantara.de, September 14, 2009, <https://qantara.de/en/article/reformist-islamic-thinker-muhammad-shahrur-footsteps-averroes-0>; Carool Kersten, “Syrian Muslim Intellectual and Critic Muhammad Shahrur (Shahrour) (1938–2019),” *Critical Muslims* (blog), December 22, 2019, <https://caroolkersten.blogspot.com/2019/12/muhammad-shahrur-shahrour-1938-2019.html>.

¹⁷ Kali Robinson and Will Merrow, “What Is Hamas?,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 6, 2025, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas>.

¹⁸ *Shariah: The Threat to America* (Center for Security Policy, 2010), <https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/shariah-the-threat-to-america/>.

¹⁹ Bryan Bender, “CIA Memo Designating Muslim Brotherhood Could Fuel Extremism,” *Politico*, February 8, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/cia-memo-designating-muslim-brotherhood-could-fuel-extremism-214757/>.

targeted sanctions against specific individuals and entities connected to the Brotherhood, rather than seeking a blanket designation of the movement as a whole.²⁰

This hesitation reflects the complex nature of the Muslim Brotherhood's operations and highlights the conceptual challenges facing Western security frameworks designed primarily to counter violent extremism rather than systematic ideological infiltration. Unlike traditional terrorist organizations with clear hierarchical structures, the Muslim Brotherhood operates as a decentralized movement with numerous semi-autonomous affiliates that function under various guises within civil society.²¹ This organizational model has thus far enabled it to avoid formal designation while maintaining ideological cohesion and strategic alignment across multiple platforms.

So far, the primary legal obstacle to countering the Brotherhood's influence stems from definitional issues. US terrorist designation criteria require clear evidence linking an organization to specific acts of violence that threaten national security or American citizens.²² The Brotherhood's strategy deliberately avoids direct involvement in violence within Western contexts, creating a "firewall" between its Western operations and its violent affiliates in the Middle East.

This separation of ideology from operations is tactical rather than ideological in nature. Brotherhood-aligned organizations in the West maintain a philosophical alignment with the global movement while carefully avoiding operational connections that would trigger legal consequences. This approach exploits a significant gap in counterterrorism frameworks, which are predicated on demonstrable ties to violent activity.

The Brotherhood further intentionally complicates designation efforts due to its complex organizational structure. Rather than operating as a unified entity with formal membership, it functions as what Leiken and Brooke describe as a "network of networks"²³—a loose confederation of aligned organizations that share the same ideological orientation without a centralized command.²⁴ This structure provides both plausible deniability for individual organizations and resilience in the face of action targeting any single component.

Western governments, and the US government in particular, face significant diplomatic challenges in addressing the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is because key regional "allies," including Qatar and Turkey, continue to sponsor, host, and legitimize Brotherhood-linked institutions, creating a persistent contradiction between counterterrorism objectives and strategic partnerships.²⁵

Additionally, as we will highlight, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have strategically positioned themselves as interlocutors between Western governments and Muslim communities, presenting

²⁰ Jonathan Schanzer, "Options for Designating the Muslim Brotherhood As a Terrorist Organization," Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 13, 2025, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/options-for-designating-the-muslim-brotherhood-as-a-terrorist-organization/>; Michele Dunne and Andrew Miller, "Nine Reasons Why Declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization Would Be a Mistake," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/05/nine-reasons-why-declaring-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization-would-be-a-mistake?lang=en>.

²¹ Zeyno Baran, "The Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. Network," Hudson Institute, February 27, 2008, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-muslim-brotherhood-s-u-s-network>.

²² "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," US Department of State, n.d., <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/> (accessed May 5, 2025).

²³ Paul Stott and Tommaso Virgili, "Network of Networks: The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe," European Conservatives and Reformists Group, October 2021, <https://www.ecrgroup.eu/files/MuslimBrotherhood.pdf>.

²⁴ Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2007), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/moderate-muslim-brotherhood>.

²⁵ Ito Mashino, "The Bipolar Conflict in the Middle East over the Muslim Brotherhood," *Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute Monthly Report* (June 2021), https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/en/report/detail/_icsFiles/afildfile/2021/08/03/2106e_mashino_e.pdf.

themselves as “moderate” alternatives to violent extremism.²⁶ This self-presentation, though contradicted by internal documents, has previously been accepted by government agencies seeking community partners for counterterrorism initiatives.²⁷

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to effective countermeasures stems from the inherent vulnerabilities of democratic systems to ideological subversion and manipulation. Liberal democracies are structured around the protection of individual freedoms, including freedom of speech, association, and religion—precisely the freedoms that the Brotherhood’s strategy leverages to advance its agenda.²⁸

Democratic systems also maintain a strong separation between government oversight and civil society, creating spaces where ideological movements can develop with minimal scrutiny. As Dahl observes in his analysis of democratic polyarchy, this institutional separation creates inherent vulnerabilities in liberal democratic systems.²⁹

This creates what political theorists call the “paradox of tolerance,” namely the question whether a tolerant society must tolerate intolerance that, if empowered, would undermine its own tolerance. Western democracies have generally resolved this paradox in favor of expansive freedoms, creating space for movements that openly reject democratic values to operate legally within democratic frameworks.³⁰

²⁶ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press, 2010).

²⁷ Zeyno Baran, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network,” Hudson Institute, February 27, 2008, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-muslim-brotherhood-s-u-s-network>.

²⁸ William A. Galston, “The Enduring Vulnerability of Liberal Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 32, no. 1 (2021): 8–24, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-enduring-vulnerability-of-liberal-democracy/>.

²⁹ Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (Yale University Press, 1971).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

2. Theoretical Foundation: The Doctrine of *Tamkeen*

This chapter traces the Muslim Brotherhood's doctrine of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) from its Qur'anic-theological origins to its modern application in Western contexts, where it remains central to Brotherhood thought and practice. It maps the evolution of this doctrine through the writings of four key Brotherhood ideologues: (1) Hassan al-Banna's seven-stage gradualism, organizational synthesis, and prioritization of building cadres; (2) Sayyid Qutb's revolutionary turn, shaped by the impact of the communist era on his political perspective and his US experience and imprisonment, which universalized *jahiliyyah* (ignorance), elevated the vanguard, rejected gradualism, and depicted the West and Zionism in antisemitic terms; (3) Yusuf al-Qaradawi's institutional model, as explained in his milestone teachings on *fiqh al-awlawiyyat* (jurisprudence of priorities), *fiqh al-aqalliyyat* (jurisprudence of minorities), and *tadarruj* (gradualism), which was mainly directed at Muslim minorities in Western countries, and thus incorporated democratic procedures, expanded legal rights, and provided public guidance (e.g. through his "Sharia and Life" TV program on Al Jazeera), while elevating "Palestine" or the Palestinian cause, including by legitimizing suicide-bombing; and (4) Ali al-Sallabi's militant synthesis, integrating Salafi literalism and Brotherhood methodology into a state-first, full-spectrum jihad framework, articulated through a four-stage model culminating in *al-ghalaba* (dominance) and reinforced by the IUMS fatwa in April 2025 that framed jihad against Israel as a duty on all Muslims.

The chapter then introduces *marhaliyyah* (phase adaptation) as *tamkeen's* tactical twin, based on *fiqh al-waqi'* (jurisprudence of reality), *maslaha* (public interest), *darura* (necessity), and *tadarruj* (gradualism), and operationalized through strategic ambiguity, contextual policy shifts, tactical coalitions, dual messaging, and selective acculturation. These doctrines materialize in practice through parallel institutions, rights-based advocacy, and narrative control, creating a democratic paradox (instrumental participation with anti-secular aims), distorting representation, and mobilizing religious identity in Muslim-minority settings. Politically, socially, and culturally, the outcome is a long-term Brotherhood project that challenges Western sovereignty, knowledge systems, and moral frameworks while maintaining Islamic separatism. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of understanding the Brotherhood's strategic patience and adaptability, paving the way for subsequent sections that explore operational plans and case studies of practical application in the United States.

2.1 Conceptual Origins and Development of *Tamkeen*

The Muslim Brotherhood's Western strategy is grounded in the doctrine of *tamkeen*, which can be translated as "institutional entrenchment," "empowerment," or "settlement."³¹ This doctrine provides both the theoretical justification and practical framework for the organization's long-term approach to transforming non-Muslim societies. Understanding the theological and ideological underpinnings of *tamkeen* is essential for analyzing how this concept has been operationalized in Western contexts.

The term *tamkeen* derives from the Arabic word *makkana* (meaning "to empower or establish firmly"). It appears in the Qur'an numerous times, particularly in verses that describe how Allah grants power and authority to the faithful. For example, Surah Al-Hajj (22:41) states: "Those who, when We give them power [*makkannahum*] in the land, establish prayer, give charity, enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong."

The Muslim Brotherhood's innovation was to transform this theological concept into a comprehensive sociopolitical doctrine applicable to contemporary contexts, including Western

³¹ "An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America" (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter "Explanatory Memorandum"].

societies where Muslims constitute a minority. This reinterpretation is an example of “theological innovation through selective traditionalism”—the use of traditional religious concepts to justify novel political approaches while maintaining claims to authenticity.³²

The doctrine of *tamkeen* occupies a central position in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, extending far beyond mere political strategy to encompass a comprehensive vision of Islamic revivalism. As Carrie Wickham demonstrates in her authoritative study, it represents the Brotherhood’s fundamental understanding of Islam’s role in society and its methodical approach to achieving what it views as comprehensive Islamic reform.³³

When examining the Brotherhood’s application of *tamkeen* in Western contexts, it is crucial to understand that this represents not merely an adaptation of Islamic concepts to new environments but a sophisticated extension of the movement’s core theological understanding of its historical mission. The Brotherhood’s founders and subsequent ideologues saw themselves not as innovators but as revivers, restoring Islam to what they considered its rightful position of global dominance that had been usurped by Western civilization. This perceived historical grievance lends emotional resonance to the *tamkeen* doctrine, imbuing it with a sense of historical justice that extends beyond mere power acquisition.

2.2 The Ideological Evolution of *Tamkeen* Doctrine

The doctrine of *tamkeen* has evolved significantly since the Brotherhood’s founding in 1928, reflecting adaptations to changing political contexts and different strategic priorities. This evolution can be traced through the writings of key Brotherhood ideologues, each of whom contributed distinct elements to the contemporary understanding of *tamkeen* in Western contexts.

2.2.1 Hassan al-Banna: Foundational *Tamkeen*

Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, conceptualized *tamkeen* as a gradual, layered process of Islamization beginning with individual spiritual transformation and culminating in global Islamic leadership.³⁴ Born in Mahmudiyya, Egypt, al-Banna was influenced by both traditional Islamic education and the sociopolitical upheaval of the early 20th-century Egypt under British occupation.³⁵ This dual influence shaped his understanding of Islam as both a spiritual system and a framework for political and social organization.³⁶

Al-Banna’s life experiences shaped his conceptualization of *tamkeen*. He received a rigorous traditional Islamic education from an early age. He witnessed firsthand the political turmoil of Egypt under British colonial rule, as well as the social dislocations caused by rapid modernization. After completing his education at Dar al-Ulum in Cairo, he worked as a schoolteacher in Ismailia,³⁷ where the stark contrast between the wealthy European quarters and the impoverished Egyptian

³² Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory* (Princeton University Press, 1999), chaps. 3–4, available online at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rjmc>.

³³ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2013), chap. 4.

³⁴ Hassan Al-Banna, *Risalat Al-Ta’alim* [The Message of Teaching] (1938), available online at: <https://theguranblog.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/3-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf> (accessed July 10, 2025).

³⁵ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 1–34.

³⁶ Khalil al-Anani, “The Power of the Jama’a: The Role of Hasan Al-Banna in Constructing the Muslim Brotherhood’s Collective Identity,” *Sociology of Islam* 1, nos. 1–2 (2013): 41–65, https://brill.com/view/journals/soi/1/1-2/article-p41_5.xml.

³⁷ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 1–34.

neighborhoods reinforced his belief that an Islamic revival was necessary to restore both spiritual values and sociopolitical dignity to Muslim societies.³⁸

Al-Banna's seven-stage model of *tamkeen*, articulated primarily in his epistle *Risalat al-Ta'alim* (The Message of Teaching) (1930s), progressed from reforming individuals to families, society, government, and ultimately establishing global Islamic dominance. This model reflected his understanding of Islam as a comprehensive system (*nizam shamil*) that should govern all aspects of human existence.³⁹ In short, al-Banna's purpose was not just religious revival but to create a vanguard movement that would patiently and tactically advance through society until it achieved state power and, eventually, an Islamic world order.

2.2.1.1 The Seven Stages of al-Banna's *Tamkeen*

Al-Banna's approach to *tamkeen* emphasized seven interconnected stages, each building upon the previous one:

1. **Empowerment of faith in the soul:** This first stage focuses on instilling correct Islamic belief so that faith becomes a self-guiding force shaping character and behavior. Al-Banna emphasized personal spiritual reform as foundational, writing: "We seek the Muslim individual—one who understands Islam correctly ... and strives to please Him." To achieve this, he implemented rigorous religious training, including study circles, nightly prayers, and accountability practices, intended to produce devout activists motivated by faith.⁴⁰
2. **Consolidation of the Muslim family and community within society:** Al-Banna's next step was to build strong Muslim families and cohesive community groups to spread Islamic values. He envisioned a "Muslim family" rooted in Islamic teachings, supporting this vision with structured Brotherhood cells, hierarchical leadership, and specialized departments designed for societal outreach and ideological continuity.⁴¹
3. **Empowerment of the Islamic project in the targeted state:** This stage aimed to embed Islamic norms across public life, fostering cultural dominance rooted in religion. Al-Banna promoted schools, clinics, and social services to meet unmet societal needs—demonstrating Islam's practical relevance and gaining grassroots support.⁴²
4. **Gradual pursuit of Islamic governance (peacefully if possible):** Al-Banna supported achieving Islamic governance through gradual, context-sensitive means. In this context, he stated, "We seek the Muslim government that ... rules among them by its laws" but also encouraged pragmatic engagement with existing structures where possible, thus reflecting a flexible yet principled approach.⁴³
5. **Prioritizing education to advance the goals over politics:** Al-Banna warned against political empowerment without ethical foundations, stating, "Build men, and they will build the

³⁸ Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942* (Ithaca Press, 1998), 27–33.

³⁹ Hassan Al-Banna, *Risalat Al-Ta'alim* [The Message of Teaching] (1938), available online at: <https://theguranblog.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/3-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf> (accessed July 10, 2025).

⁴⁰ Barbara H.E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (Routledge, 2009), chaps. 1–2.

⁴¹ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 1–34.

⁴² Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2013), chap. 5.

⁴³ Charles Wendell, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949): A Selection from the Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid* (University of California Press, 1978), 101–18.

state.” He prioritized education through Brotherhood-run schools and training centers, promoting an alternative Islamic knowledge system to challenge secular dominance.⁴⁴

6. **Assertion of Islam’s comprehensive framework:** For al-Banna, Islam was an all-encompassing system—religious, political, legal, social, and economic. In this context, he declared, “Islam is a comprehensive system that deals with all spheres of life” and rejected secular compartmentalization, advocating for the complete reintegration of Islamic values across society.⁴⁵
7. **Achieving empowerment through tactical alliances if necessary:** Al-Banna endorsed selective alliances to advance Islamic goals, stating, “We cooperate in that which we agree upon.” This allowed the Brotherhood to collaborate pragmatically with non-Islamic actors when tactically beneficial, while maintaining ideological independence.⁴⁶

2.2.1.2 Theoretical Innovations in al-Banna’s *Tamkeen*

Al-Banna’s formulation of *tamkeen* introduced several theoretical innovations that would shape the Brotherhood’s subsequent development:

Integration of traditional and modern elements: Al-Banna synthesized traditional Islamic concepts with modern organizational methods, creating what scholars describe as a movement pursuing traditional religious goals through contemporary organizational means.⁴⁷ This synthesis enabled the Brotherhood to present itself as authentically Islamic while operating effectively within contemporary social structures.

His model merged Sufi networks, political party structures, and social services into a hybrid system. The Brotherhood’s hierarchy, functional departments, and tiered membership reflected modern efficiency adapted for Islamic objectives.⁴⁸

Gradualism as a strategic principle: Al-Banna emphasized that Islamic revival would occur through stages rather than immediate revolution. In his collected letters, he wrote, “The Muslim Brotherhood will go through phases: the phase of understanding, the phase of formation, and the phase of implementation. We must be patient and not seek to harvest before planting.”⁴⁹ This gradualist approach provided ideological justification for long-term planning and strategic patience.

Al-Banna’s gradualism distinguished the Brotherhood from revolutionary movements that sought immediate transformation through violence or a coup d’état. In this context, he stated, “We know that our work is long and that we must advance step-by-step, stage-by-stage, and prepare the believing generation that understands Islam properly... The Brotherhood does not believe in sudden movements or reckless revolutions. Our methodology is gradual, wise, and calculated.”⁵⁰ This gradualist perspective reflects what strategic theorists call “strategic continuity with tactical patience”—maintaining consistent long-term objectives while adapting short-term tactics to circumstances.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Ibid., 101–18.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 120–36.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 120–36.

⁴⁷ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2013), chap. 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Charles Wendell, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949): A Selection from the Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid* (University of California Press, 1978).

⁵⁰ Hassan Al-Banna, *Majmu’at al-Rasa’il* [Collected Letters] (Dar al-Da’wa, 1949).

⁵¹ Sgt. 1st Class Jimmie Allan Gilchrist, “Winning in Transition,” *NCO Journal* (October 2024), <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/nco-journal/images/2024/October/Winning-in-Transition-UA.pdf>.

Flexible tactics within a consistent strategy: Although critical of Western systems, al-Banna supported engaging with them tactically when beneficial. His approach reflected a pragmatic methodology that allowed the Brotherhood to participate politically, economically, and transnationally, while remaining committed to its long-term Islamic objectives.⁵²

Comprehensive vision of Islam: Al-Banna's comprehensive vision directly challenged "Western" conceptions of modernity, which he believed had segregated religion from politics, economics, and social organization. By insisting on Islam as a complete system encompassing all aspects of life, al-Banna provided a theological justification for the Brotherhood's expansive agenda. Al-Banna viewed Islam as a comprehensive system encompassing governance, law, ethics, economics, and other aspects. Rejecting the secular separation of religion from public life, he stated, "Islam is a comprehensive system that encompasses all aspects of life. It is both state and homeland, or government and nation. It is morality and power, or mercy and justice. It is a combination of culture and law, or knowledge and jurisprudence. It is material and wealth, or earnings and prosperity. It is jihad and *da'wa*, or army and idea. And finally, it is true belief and correct worship." This holistic view justified the Brotherhood's broad engagement across all domains of society.⁵³

Al-Banna's formulation of *tamkeen* provided the theoretical foundation upon which later Brotherhood ideologues would build. While subsequent thinkers would modify aspects of his approach, the basic framework of graduated transformation from individual to global levels has remained constant in Brotherhood thought.

2.2.2 Sayyid Qutb: Revolutionary *Tamkeen*

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) presented a significant departure from al-Banna's gradualist approach, transforming the concept of *tamkeen* into a revolutionary doctrine that rejected accommodation with existing systems. Born in Musha, Egypt, Qutb began his career as a literary critic and educational administrator before joining the Muslim Brotherhood in 1951. His thinking was profoundly influenced by two key experiences: his two-year stay in the United States (1948–1950), which cemented his rejection of Western modernity, and his imprisonment and torture under Nasser's regime (1954–1964), which radicalized his opposition to secular nationalist governments.⁵⁴

Qutb's personal journey from literary modernist to revolutionary Islamist theologian illustrates the transformative impact of direct engagement with Western society and subsequent political persecution. During his time in the United States, Qutb studied at the Colorado State College of Education (now the University of Northern Colorado), where he observed American society. His observations, recorded in works such as "The America I Have Seen" (1951), expressed profound disgust with what he perceived as the moral decadence, materialistic obsession, and spiritual emptiness in American culture. Qutb wrote, "The American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, in expressive eyes, and in thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs—and she shows all this and does not hide it."⁵⁵ Qutb's disdain extended to modern cultural expressions such as jazz music, cinema, and dance, which he regarded as emblematic of America's moral corruption and spiritual void.

⁵² Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2013), chap. 7–8.

⁵³ Charles Wendell, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949): A Selection from the Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid* (University of California Press, 1978), 120–36.

⁵⁴ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (Columbia University Press, 2010), 136–56.

⁵⁵ Sayyid Qutb, "The America I Have Seen": *In the Scale of Human Values* (1951), trans. Tarek Masoud and Ammar Fakeeh (Kashf ul Shubuhah Publications, n.d.), available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/3F/3F56ACA473044436B4C1740F65D5C3B6_Sayyid_Qutb_-_The_America_I_Have_Seen.pdf (accessed July 2, 2025).

After returning to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood and rose quickly in its ranks. Arrested during Nasser's 1954 crackdown, he endured imprisonment and torture—an experience that hardened his views. As Musallam notes, prison turned Qutb from a theorist into a revolutionary, providing religious grounds for rejecting and overthrowing secular regimes.⁵⁶

2.2.2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Qutb's *Tamkeen*

Qutb's revolutionary reconceptualization of *tamkeen* was built upon several key theoretical innovations:

The concept of *jahiliyyah*: Qutb expanded the traditional idea of *jahiliyyah*, which was once limited to pre-Islamic ignorance, to encompass a present-day global condition. In *Milestones* (1964), he argued that modern societies, including Muslim ones, rebel against God's sovereignty, making them un-Islamic and illegitimate in his view.⁵⁷

His expansion of *jahiliyyah* to encompass contemporary Muslim societies represented a radical break with traditional Islamic theology, which generally restricted the term to the pre-Islamic Arabian period. By labelling all current systems as *jahili*, he delegitimized political structures across the Muslim world and rejected al-Banna's gradualist, engagement-based approach.⁵⁸

The vanguard concept: Qutb argued that Islamic revival required a dedicated vanguard (*tali'ah*) that was ideologically separated from *jahili* society. In this context, he wrote, "There must be a vanguard which sets out with determination and then keeps walking on the path... I have written *Milestones* for this vanguard." This elitist conception replaced al-Banna's broad-based social movement approach with a revolutionary cadre model.⁵⁹

Qutb's vanguard drew from early Islamic models and modern revolutionary theory (Lenin's professional revolutionaries). He envisioned a purified group, entirely separated from *jahili* society in belief and lifestyle: "There must be a distance ... though they may live within the same society."⁶⁰

Rejection of gradualism: Unlike al-Banna, Qutb rejected gradual reform as insufficient, arguing, "The establishment of God's sovereignty on earth, the elimination of the rule of man, the abrogation of laws devised by humans, and the implementation of Divine Law (Sharia) and the abolition of the prevailing system ... cannot be achieved only through preaching."⁶¹ This position represented a fundamental break with al-Banna's strategic patience.

Qutb's rejection of gradualism stemmed from his assessment that secular systems were fundamentally incompatible with Islamic principles rather than merely requiring reform. In this context, he stated, "The implementation of Allah's law on earth, the abolition of human laws, and the establishment of the Islamic system cannot be achieved through mere preaching (*da'wa*). Rather, power (*quwwa*) and jihad are necessary to abolish the systems of *jahiliyyah* and replace them with the Islamic system."⁶² This Manichean worldview left no space for the incremental approach advocated by al-Banna, replacing it with an all-or-nothing revolutionary vision.

⁵⁶ Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism* (Praeger Publishers, 2005), 112–15.

⁵⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim Fi Al-Tariq* [Milestones] (Dar al-Shuruq, 1979), 8–10, 88–93.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 105–23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 173–86.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 173–86.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 55–60.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 136–45.

Ideological purification before political action: Qutb insisted that true Islamic belief must be firmly established before any political action. He warned that without this foundation, efforts to build an Islamic society would be “distorted.” This emphasis on purity over pragmatism later influenced more radical offshoots of the Brotherhood.⁶³

Qutb believed earlier Islamic movements failed due to ideological compromise, not tactical mistakes. He urged reviving belief and purging *jahili* influences before building institutions—a stance aligned with “restorationist fundamentalism,” which calls for an uncompromising return to core principles.

2.2.2.2 Qutb’s Conceptualization of *Tamkeen*

Building on these theoretical foundations, Qutb’s conceptualization of *tamkeen* emphasized four key elements that distinguished it from al-Banna’s approach:

Rejection of secular governance as fundamentally un-Islamic: Qutb categorically rejected man-made legal systems as usurpation of divine sovereignty (*hakimiyya*). In this context, he wrote, “The right to legislate belongs to God alone... Any system in which the final decisions are referred to humans ... deifies human beings by designating others than God as lords over men.”⁶⁴ This position undermined any theoretical justification for participating in secular democratic systems.

Qutb’s absolutist position on divine sovereignty left no room for the strategic flexibility advocated by al-Banna. Where al-Banna had permitted participation in secular political systems as a means of advancing Islamic objectives, Qutb saw such participation as theological compromise: “There is no ‘Islam’ in a land where Islam is not dominant and where Islamic Sharia is not established... Islam has a right to take the initiative ... this is its duty, to annihilate all systems that operate on the principle of human servitude to other than God.”⁶⁵

The necessity of complete ideological separation from Western values: Qutb advocated for defining Islamic identity in explicit opposition to Western values. In this context, he wrote, “We must free ourselves from the clutches of *jahili* society ... we must become independent and distinct from the *jahili* society. Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we may later change society.”⁶⁶ This separationist approach contrasted with al-Banna’s more integrationist tactics.

Qutb’s separationism extended to culture, education, and society. He rejected the adoption of Western methods, even in science or organization, arguing that they carried hidden *jahili* values. “Even Islamic principles,” he warned, “have been distorted within a *jahili* framework.”⁶⁷

The need for a vanguard to purify society and establish divine sovereignty: Qutb envisioned a pure, committed vanguard to lead Islamic transformation through the “ocean of *jahiliyyah*.” Unlike al-Banna’s mass mobilization, Qutb adopted a “conscious minority” model, emphasizing sacrifice and perseverance over popularity: the vanguard must endure hardship while remaining ideologically uncompromising.⁶⁸

Framing Western civilization and Zionism as existential threats to Islam: Qutb portrayed the confrontation between Islam and the West not as a political conflict but as an existential struggle. In this context, he wrote, “The struggle between Islam and the West is neither economic nor political... It is in fact a struggle between two sets of values, a struggle between two ways of life, a struggle of

⁶³ Ibid., 105–22.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 105–22.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 123–30.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 173–80.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 105–16.

⁶⁸ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, trans. Ahmad Zaki Hammad (American Trust Publications, 1990).

belief against disbelief.”⁶⁹ This Manichean worldview left little room for compromise or coexistence.⁷⁰

Qutb’s construction of Jews as the hidden architects of Western immorality drew directly on antisemitic motifs popularized by Nazi propaganda and the widely circulated antisemitic forgery known as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. By integrating these conspiratorial tropes with Qur’anic references, Qutb reframed European racial antisemitism in Islamic terms, transforming political opposition to Zionism into a totalizing theological struggle against the Jews as a people. This synthesis not only radicalized the Brotherhood’s rhetoric beyond al-Banna’s anti-Zionism but also established a template later adopted by movements such as Hamas. Qutb particularly emphasized Zionism as a manifestation of Western imperialism and an existential threat to Islam. In this context, he stated, “Behind the materialistic, atheistic, and morally corrupt Western civilization stands the Jews, who have been its driving force.”

This antisemitic framing aligned with broader Brotherhood narratives, positioning Palestine as a central Islamic cause. Qutb wrote, “The battle against the Jews is a battle against those who oppose God’s will on earth.” Similarly, “The Zionist entity in the heart of the Muslim world is not merely an invader but a spearhead of Western imperialism, planted to prevent the resurgence of Islam.”⁷¹

2.2.2.3 Qutb’s Impact on Brotherhood Strategy

While Qutb’s revolutionary conceptualization of *tamkeen* had a profound intellectual influence on the Brotherhood, its practical impact on the organization’s operations was more complex. After Qutb’s execution in 1966, the Brotherhood split between those advocating his more confrontational approach and those maintaining al-Banna’s gradualism. This tension produced what Mitchell calls the “dual character” of Brotherhood strategy—maintaining revolutionary goals while employing gradualist methods.⁷²

In the West, Qutb’s main impact was ideological. He framed Western civilization as inherently hostile to Islam, justifying cultural and ideological separation even during pragmatic engagement. As Calvert notes, Qutb offered a way to reject Western values while still using its systems.⁷³

The Brotherhood’s strategy and actions in Western contexts reflect a blend of Qutb and al-Banna. While operationally gradualist, it has adopted Qutb’s framing of the West and Zionism, creating a balance between ideological rigidity and tactical flexibility.

Qutb’s ideas also shaped jihadist groups like al-Qaeda, which embraced his call for ideological confrontation and, at times, armed resistance. These groups cite Qutb as a foundational thinker but dismiss the Brotherhood’s gradualism as inadequate.⁷⁴

2.2.3 Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Institutional *Tamkeen*

Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–2022) was born in Saft Turab (also spelled Sift Turab), a small village in the Nile Delta in Egypt’s Gharbia Governorate. His works marked a turning point in the Brotherhood’s strategic thinking, especially in Western contexts. A scholar trained at Al-Azhar and later based in Qatar, he utilized platforms such as Al Jazeera and the International Union of Muslim Scholars

⁶⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Fi Zilal al-Qur’an* [In the Shade of the Qur’an] (Dar al-Shuruq, 1964).

⁷⁰ Sayyid Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur’an*, trans. M.A. Salahi and A.A. Shamis (The Islamic Foundation, 1999).

⁷¹ Sayyid Qutb, *Fi Zilal al-Qur’an* [In the Shade of the Qur’an] (Dar al-Shuruq, 1964).

⁷² Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 209–38, 295–329.

⁷³ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (Columbia University Press, 2010), 290–320.

⁷⁴ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), chaps. 2–3.

(IUMS) to advocate for a *tamkeen* model rooted in gradual institutional infiltration and leveraging Western democratic freedoms to further Islamic governance.⁷⁵

A life of activism shaped his approach. A longtime Brotherhood member, al-Qaradawi was imprisoned under Nasser and was released in 1961, when he left Egypt for Qatar. He did not return to Egypt until 2011, following the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak.⁷⁶

When Mohamed Morsi was deposed in July 2013, Yusuf al-Qaradawi was effectively expelled from Egypt. The new government revoked his citizenship, froze his assets, and barred his return.⁷⁷

Al-Qaradawi's exile left him dependent on Qatar, which had granted him citizenship as early as the 1960s and provided him with a permanent base. In Doha, the Al Thani ruling family not only sheltered him but also invested in expanding his influence, giving him unparalleled media reach through Al Jazeera Arabic, where his program "Sharia and Life" drew millions of viewers across the Muslim world.⁷⁸

From Qatar, al-Qaradawi condemned Egypt's post-Morsi government, legitimized the Muslim Brotherhood's opposition, and framed regional rivals such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia as hostile to Islam. His presence in Doha allowed Qatar to project itself as a patron of Islamist scholarship while simultaneously using his rhetoric to advance its foreign policy—particularly during the Arab uprisings, when al-Qaradawi's support for Brotherhood-aligned movements aligned with Qatari regional ambitions.

In this way, al-Qaradawi's post-2013 relationship with Qatar symbolized both his personal survival and the strategic role of Doha as the principal safe haven for Brotherhood leaders exiled from Egypt and beyond. His continued prominence highlighted the contradiction between Qatar's formal alliance with Western states and its sponsorship of Islamist ideologues who actively destabilized the regional order.⁷⁹

Al-Qaradawi's influence lay in linking ideological rigidity to tactical adaptation. His model guided Brotherhood affiliates in Europe and North America to operate within liberal systems while pursuing long-term Islamist objectives—a strategy that continues to shape Brotherhood outreach today.⁸⁰

2.2.3.1 Theoretical Foundations of al-Qaradawi's *Tamkeen*

Al-Qaradawi's reconceptualization of *tamkeen* built upon several theoretical innovations:

***Fiqh al-awlawiyyat* (jurisprudence of priorities):** This framework provided a methodology for determining which Islamic objectives should be prioritized in different contexts. Al-Qaradawi argued, "The jurist should know the priorities of his time, so that he can give each matter its proper position... This is how priorities become organized according to their true import in the scale of Islamic law." This prioritization framework facilitated the strategic allocation of resources and efforts.⁸¹

⁷⁵ Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds., *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (Columbia University Press, 2009), Introduction and chap. 1.

⁷⁶ Aaron-Rock Singer, "Qaradawi's Return and Islamic Leadership in Egypt," Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 3, 2011, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/03/qaradawis-return-and-islamic-leadership-in-egypt>.

⁷⁷ "Morsi, Qaradawi and Aboutrika Back on Egypt's Terror Watchlist," *Enterprise*, May 2, 2018, <https://enterprise.press/stories/2018/05/02/morsi-qaradawi-and-aboutrika-back-on-egypts-terror-watchlist>.

⁷⁸ "Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Scholar Who Influenced Millions," *Al Jazeera*, September 27, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/27/yusuf-al-qaradawi-the-muslim-scholar-who-influenced-millions>.

⁷⁹ Alberto M. Fernandez, "Al-Qaradawi: Qatar's Islamist Empire Builder," Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), October 3, 2022, <https://www.memri.org/reports/al-qaradawi-qatars-islamist-empire-builder>.

⁸⁰ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (Routledge, 2007), 267–85.

⁸¹ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Awlawiyyat: Fiqh Jadid li-Marhala Jadida* [Jurisprudence of Priorities: A New Jurisprudence for a New Phase] (Cairo: Dar Al-Shuruq, 1995).

Al-Qaradawi's prioritization methodology represented a significant innovation in Islamic jurisprudence, adapting classical legal theory to contemporary strategic challenges. He categorized priorities into three levels: necessities (*daruriyyat*), needs (*hajiyyat*), and improvements (*tahsiniyyat*). This hierarchical approach exemplified what decision theorists call "strategic triage" — differentiating between essential, necessary, and desirable objectives to optimize resource allocation under constraints.⁸²

Wasatiyyah (moderation): Al-Qaradawi positioned himself as representing a "middle way" between rigid traditionalism and excessive liberalism. In this context, he wrote, "Islamic moderation means adhering to Islamic fundamentals without rigidity, and openness to the age without dissolution." This self-positioning as "moderate" facilitated al-Qaradawi's acceptance by Western institutions while maintaining fundamentally conservative positions.⁸³

Al-Qaradawi's "moderation" was "strategic positioning" rather than substantive ideological moderation. His *wasatiyyah* maintained core Brotherhood commitments to Islamic governance while adopting more flexible tactical approaches. In this context, he stated, "Moderation does not mean compromising on principles but finding the wisest path to implementing them." This approach allowed Brotherhood organizations to present itself as a reasonable partner for Western institutions while maintaining long-term commitments to fundamental transformation.⁸⁴

Fiqh al-aqalliyat (jurisprudence of minorities): Perhaps al-Qaradawi's most significant innovation was developing a specialized legal framework for Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim societies. He argued, "Muslims in the West have special circumstances and face unique challenges that require specific jurisprudential treatment." This specialized jurisprudence provided a theological justification for strategic adaptations in Western contexts.⁸⁵

Al-Qaradawi's minority jurisprudence represented a sophisticated response to the challenges of maintaining Islamic identity within secular Western environments. In this context, he wrote, "The Muslim who lives in the West is facing unprecedented situations that require special jurisprudence to guide him... The traditional jurisprudence [*fiqh*] that was developed for Muslim-majority societies cannot simply be transported to these new contexts." This approach allows adaptation while maintaining core legal principles, adjusting their application according to environmental constraints.⁸⁶

Tadarruj (gradualism): Al-Qaradawi advocated for the phased implementation of Islamic goals. He noted that even the Qu'ran and its legal rulings were revealed gradually, referring to gradualism as divine law.⁸⁷ This principle legitimizes the Brotherhood's long-term, generational strategy in Western contexts. It sanctifies a patient, multi-generational approach that characterizes the Brotherhood strategy in the West.

⁸² Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds., *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (Columbia University Press, 2009), chap. 8.

⁸³ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Wasatiyya al-Islamiyya wa al-Tasamuh* [Islamic Moderation and Tolerance] (Dar Al-Shuruq, 2000).

⁸⁴ Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds., *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (Columbia University Press, 2009), chap. 8.

⁸⁵ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Aqalliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin fi Mujtama' Ghayr Muslimin* [Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: Life of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies] (Dar Al-Shuruq, 2001).

⁸⁶ Alexandre Caeiro, "The Power of European Fatwas: The Minority Fiqh Project and the Making of an Islamic Counterpublic," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 3 (2010): 435–49, available online at: <https://elmi.hbku.edu.qa/en/publications/the-power-of-european-fatwas-the-minority-fiqh-project-and-the-ma>.

⁸⁷ "Muslim Brotherhood Cleric Calls for 'Gradualism' in Applying Shari'ah," Investigative Project on Terrorism, December 9, 2011, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/3336/muslim-brotherhood-cleric-calls-for-gradualism-in>.

Al-Qaradawi's gradualism extended beyond tactical patience to encompass a comprehensive understanding of historical change. In this context, he wrote, "Allah did not create the heavens and earth in an instant but in six periods... The Qur'an was not revealed all at once, but over a period of twenty-three years... Even legal rulings were implemented gradually, as in the prohibition of alcohol."⁸⁸ By anchoring gradualism in divine precedent, al-Qaradawi provided theological legitimation for the Brotherhood's long-term approach to societal transformation.

2.2.3.2 Al-Qaradawi's Reconceptualization of *Tamkeen*

Based on these theoretical foundations, al-Qaradawi developed a sophisticated approach to *tamkeen* that emphasized:

Strategic participation in democratic systems while maintaining ideological opposition: Al-Qaradawi justified participation in secular democratic systems as a means to advance Islamic objectives. In this context, he argued, "Democracy is not in itself the ultimate goal, but it is a tool, a mechanism through which the will of the people can be realized, and through which *shura* (consultation) can be implemented in our time."⁸⁹ Elsewhere he wrote, "We ought to adopt the procedures of democracy, its mechanisms and its guarantees as they suit us, retaining the right to make alterations and modifications. But we are not to adopt its [underlying] philosophy, which can turn the forbidden (*al-haram*) into the permissible (*al-halal*) and vice versa, or invalidate things made obligatory by religion."⁹⁰ This position provided a theological justification for Brotherhood-aligned political parties in the West.

Al-Qaradawi's instrumental approach to democracy relied on what political theorists call "strategic proceduralism"—utilizing democratic procedures while rejecting the philosophical foundations of democracy. In this context, he stated, "Democracy gives us the freedom to express our message, to organize our ranks, to establish our institutions. We should use these advantages while maintaining our ideological distinctiveness." This approach enabled Brotherhood organizations to participate in Western political systems while maintaining a commitment to eventually replacing them with Islamic governance.

Utilizing Western legal frameworks to protect and expand Islamic institutions: Al-Qaradawi emphasized the use of Western legal protections to establish and strengthen Islamic institutions. In this context, he wrote, "Muslims should use the freedoms guaranteed in Western societies to build their religious institutions and protect their identity, while working to expand the scope of these freedoms to encompass more Islamic practices."⁹¹ This approach transformed constraints into opportunities.

Al-Qaradawi's legal strategy implemented what constitutional theorists call "rights expansion"—the practice of utilizing existing legal protections to establish precedents that gradually expand the scope of protected activities. He advised, "It is incumbent upon Muslims living as minorities to know the laws of their countries of residence, to use these laws to protect themselves, and to exercise their civil rights to secure their religious freedoms... Muslims should understand the legal systems they live under and use all legitimate avenues to protect their religion, institutions, and

⁸⁸ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Min Fiqh al-Dawla fi al-Islam: Makanat al-Dawla wa Ma'alimuha wa Tabi'atuha* [Jurisprudence of the State in Islam: Its Status, Features, and Nature] (Dar al-Shuruq, 1996).

⁸⁹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Min Fiqh al-Dawla fi'l-Islam* (Dar El Shorouk, 1997), translated and reprinted in *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*, ed. Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁹⁰ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "Islam and Democracy," in *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden*, ed. Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton University Press, 2009), available online at: https://www.academia.edu/38175408/Yusuf_al_Qaradawi_on_Democracy.

⁹¹ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Aqalliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin fi Mujtama' Ghayr Muslimin* [Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: Life of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies] (Dar Al-Shuruq, 2001).

community.”⁹² This approach has been successful in areas such as religious accommodation, educational autonomy, and financial practices.

Developing specialized guidance for Muslims in Western contexts: Through his influential program “Sharia and Life” on Al Jazeera, al-Qaradawi provided specific guidance for Muslims navigating Western societies. In this context, he stated, “Muslims in the West must preserve their religious identity but not isolate themselves. They must participate in public life and defend their rights through the law and institutions. This is the way to change the reality around them in favor of Islam gradually.”⁹³

Al-Qaradawi’s guidance strikes a balance between integration and distinctiveness, advocating what sociologists refer to as “selective acculturation,” adopting elements of the host society that facilitate functional participation while maintaining core identity markers. He advised, “Integration without assimilation is our goal. Muslims should be active citizens, but Islam should remain their reference. They must seek to influence, not be influenced.” This approach enabled Muslim communities to engage effectively with Western institutions while maintaining ideological separation.

Positioning the Palestinian cause as a central mobilizing issue: Al-Qaradawi strategically elevated the Palestinian issue as a unifying cause for Muslims in the West. In this context, he declared, “Palestine is the first and foremost Islamic cause, and its liberation is the first and foremost duty... Hamas is an embodiment of the Palestinian people’s belief in its Muslim and Arab origins.”⁹⁴ This positioning served both ideological and strategic purposes, creating a common cause around which diverse Muslim communities could unite.

Al-Qaradawi’s emphasis on Palestine provided diagnostic framing by identifying a specific grievance that emotionally resonates with potential supporters. In this context, he stated, “What unites the Muslims today is not race, nor culture, but causes, chief among them is Palestine. It should remain the compass of Islamic consciousness until al-Aqsa is liberated.”⁹⁵ This framing transformed a territorial conflict into a religious obligation, creating a “moral imperative for action”—a cause so fundamental that participation becomes a test of authentic spiritual identity.

2.2.3.3 Al-Qaradawi’s Impact on Brotherhood Strategy in the West

Al-Qaradawi’s approach has been particularly influential in shaping the Brotherhood’s Western strategy. His concepts provide the theoretical framework, which can be summarized as “operational pluralism combined with ideological consistency”—the ability to engage with Western institutions while maintaining Islamic distinctiveness.⁹⁶ In practical terms, al-Qaradawi’s influence can be seen in:

The proliferation of Brotherhood-aligned political and civic organizations in the West: These organizations implement al-Qaradawi’s strategy of gradual integration into Western institutional structures while maintaining their core ideological commitments. Organizations like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) exemplify this approach, engaging with Western political systems while promoting Brotherhood ideology within Muslim communities.⁹⁷

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Recorded episodes of Al-Qaradawi’s TV shows on Al Jazeera, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/@alqaradawy/playlists> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁹⁴ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Al-Quds Hiya Qadiyyat Kull Muslim* [Jerusalem is the Cause of Each Muslim] (Maktabat Wahba, 1998).

⁹⁵ “Al-Quds Conference—Min Ajl al-Haqq (In Support of the Truth),” conference proceedings, 2002, available online at: <https://aja.me/7fhyr> (accessed November 7, 2025).

⁹⁶ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2014), chaps. 7–8.

⁹⁷ Zeyno Baran, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network,” Hudson Institute, February 27, 2008, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-muslim-brotherhood-s-u-s-network>.

Al-Qaradawi personally endorsed many of these organizations and guided their development. In a 1995 address to the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), he stated, “The duty of the Islamic Movement is not limited to preaching and explanation. It includes establishing institutions that can support Muslims in maintaining their identity and advancing their causes.”⁹⁸ This institutional strategy creates formal organizations that institutionalize ideological influence beyond individual leaders or generations through structural embedding within host societies.

The emphasis on minority identity politics: Brotherhood organizations increasingly frame their advocacy in terms of minority rights and religious freedom, rather than explicit Islamic governance, reflecting al-Qaradawi’s tactical flexibility—utilizing the language and legal frameworks of liberal democracy to advance goals that are potentially at odds with liberal democratic values.

Al-Qaradawi explicitly endorsed this approach, stating, “Muslims must make use of the laws guaranteeing freedom of religion and expression to protect their rights and practice their religion freely. They should act wisely, presenting their demands within the frameworks that these societies accept and respect.” He also wrote, “We must present our requests and rights in ways that are consistent with the concepts respected by these societies, such as rights, freedoms, and justice.”⁹⁹ This strategic framing has proven particularly effective in securing legal accommodation and institutional influence within Western contexts.¹⁰⁰

The centrality of the Palestinian cause in Brotherhood messaging: As al-Qaradawi recommended, the Palestinian issue has become the primary mobilizing cause for Brotherhood organizations in the West, serving as both a recruitment tool and a means of building coalitions with non-Muslim groups. This is a classic example of “frame bridging”—connecting different ideological perspectives through shared concern about a specific issue.

Al-Qaradawi’s framing of Palestine as an Islamic religious obligation rather than merely a political cause has been particularly influential. He issued numerous fatwas supporting the Palestinian “resistance,” including his notorious 2001 fatwa legitimizing suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. In this context, he stated, “The Palestinian suicide operations are a form of jihad that is legitimate and among the greatest forms of jihad... Israeli women are not like women in our society because Israeli women are militarized.”¹⁰¹ This religious legitimation transformed a territorial conflict into a religious duty, which had a powerful emotional resonance for Muslims living in the West.

The development of parallel Islamic institutions: Following al-Qaradawi’s guidance, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have established comprehensive networks of schools, financial institutions, social services, and media platforms that function as parallel structures within Western societies. This approach implements the concept of “institutional completeness”—the idea that creating a comprehensive community infrastructure that reduces dependence on mainstream institutions.

Al-Qaradawi explicitly endorsed this institutional strategy, stating, “Muslims in the West must build a complete Islamic life ... schools to educate their children, centers to gather for worship and activities, organizations to defend their rights, media to express their perspectives, and financial institutions

⁹⁸ Steven Merley, “Extremism and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA),” Global Muslim Brotherhood Research Center, February 2007, https://www.globalmbresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISNA_Extremism-FINAL.pdf (accessed November 7, 2025).

⁹⁹ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Aqalliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin fi Mujtama’ Ghayr Muslimin* [Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: Life of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies] (Dar Al-Shuruq, 2001), 34–38.

¹⁰⁰ Alexandre Caeiro, “The Power of European Fatwas: The Minority Fiqh Project and the Making of an Islamic Counterpublic,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 3 (2010): 435–49, <https://elmi.hbku.edu.qa/en/publications/the-power-of-european-fatwas-the-minority-fiqh-project-and-the-ma>.

¹⁰¹ Mark Gardner and Dave Rich, “Fatawa on Palestine by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (Al-Falah Foundation, 2007), 92 pp.,” *Democratiya* 13 (Summer 2008), available online at: <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/wp-content/files/mf/1390340895d13GardnerRich.pdf>.

that operate according to Islamic principles.”¹⁰² This comprehensive institutional development fosters self-sufficient communities that can maintain their ideological distinctiveness despite immersion in Western societies.

Al-Qaradawi’s approach represents what Mandaville calls “strategic orthodoxy”—maintaining conservative religious commitments while adapting operational methods to local contexts.¹⁰³ This approach has proven particularly effective in Western democratic systems that prioritize procedural conformity over ideological alignment.

2.2.4 Ali al-Sallabi: Militant *Tamkeen*

More recently, Ali al-Sallabi (b. 1963) has developed a version of *tamkeen* that more explicitly incorporates jihad in its various forms. Born in Libya and educated in Saudi Arabia and Sudan, al-Sallabi’s experiences during the Libyan civil war and his close ties to Qatar have shaped his more confrontational approach to *tamkeen*.

Al-Sallabi’s background in both Muslim Brotherhood activism and Salafist education created a distinctive synthesis that has significantly influenced contemporary Brotherhood strategy, particularly regarding attitudes toward resistance movements. His early persecution by Gaddafi’s regime in Libya and subsequent education in Saudi Arabia exposed him to both Brotherhood organizational methodology and Wahhabi doctrinal rigidity. His later role as Qatar’s representative for distributing aid to Libyan rebels¹⁰⁴ during the 2011 civil war demonstrated his ability to combine his ideological orientation with practical political engagement.

2.2.4.1 Theoretical Foundations of al-Sallabi’s *Tamkeen*

Al-Sallabi’s reconceptualization of *tamkeen* builds upon several key innovations:

Synthesis of Salafist and Brotherhood methodologies: Al-Sallabi integrates the traditional Salafist emphasis on textual literalism with the Brotherhood’s organizational methodology. This integration reflects his educational background in Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabi interpretations of Islam influenced him. This synthesis fosters a “methodological hybridization,” combining diverse Islamic traditions to create innovative approaches to contemporary challenges.

Al-Sallabi’s methodological synthesis is particularly evident in his approach to religious texts. While maintaining the Salafist emphasis on literal adherence to textual sources, he incorporates the Brotherhood’s contextual application and organizational implementation. His approach is based on understanding texts according to traditional Salafist methodology while applying them through contemporary organizational frameworks that account for modern realities.¹⁰⁵ This hybridization enables him to maintain doctrinal conservatism while advocating sophisticated strategic approaches.

Explicit incorporation of jihad: Unlike his predecessors, who were often ambiguous about the role of physical struggle, al-Sallabi explicitly incorporates various forms of jihad into his *tamkeen* model. He writes about pursuing “jihad in all its forms: jihad of the tongue, jihad of action in all its forms, jihad of fighting the enemies of Allah, jihad of guarding in the way of Allah, jihad of preparing for every battle in the way of Allah.”

¹⁰² Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Aqalliyat al-Muslima: Hayat al-Muslimin fi Mujtama’ Ghayr Muslimin* [Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities: Life of Muslims in Non-Muslim Societies] (Dar Al-Shuruq, 2001).

¹⁰³ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2014), 238–46.

¹⁰⁴ Sam Dagher, Charles Levinson, and Margaret Coker, “Tiny Kingdom’s Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 17, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204002304576627000922764650>.

¹⁰⁵ Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition* (Saqi Books, 2010), 182–86.

Al-Sallabi's expansive conception of jihad forms a significant departure from al-Qaradawi's more cautious approach regarding physical confrontation. While al-Qaradawi generally limited endorsement of armed struggle to specific contexts like Palestine, al-Sallabi presents jihad as a fundamental component of the *tamkeen* process applicable across multiple contexts. This approach reflects "full-spectrum operations"—synchronized activities across various domains to achieve systemic transformation.

Prioritization of state formation over long-term *da'wa*: Al-Sallabi reverses the traditional Brotherhood prioritization by arguing that establishing Islamic governance should precede comprehensive *da'wa*. His approach emphasizes that political authority must be established first as a foundation for extending Islamic influence, representing a departure from the Brotherhood's traditional emphasis on grassroots education and gradual social transformation.¹⁰⁶

This reversal of traditional Brotherhood sequencing reflects what political scientists call "state-centric Islamization"¹⁰⁷—the belief that controlling political institutions should precede social transformation rather than following it. Al-Sallabi argues, "The state was the protective fortress for Islam, its teachings, and its mission. Without it, Muslims would have remained scattered, weak, and threatened by surrounding powers." Similarly, "Establishing the state is the foundation for any comprehensive Islamic project... It is the incubator for *da'wa*, education, and the implementation of sharia."¹⁰⁸ This prioritization of political power acquisition represents a significant departure from al-Banna's emphasis on building social foundations before seeking political control.

Integration of revolutionary and institutional approaches: Al-Sallabi attempts to bridge the gap between Qutb's revolutionary perspective and al-Qaradawi's institutional approach by emphasizing what he calls "comprehensive jihad," which operates across multiple domains simultaneously. This integration creates a "strategic synthesis," combining seemingly contradictory approaches into a coherent operational framework.¹⁰⁹

Al-Sallabi's synthetic approach is particularly evident in his attitude toward political participation. Unlike Qutb, who categorically rejected participation in secular political systems, al-Sallabi endorses such participation when it serves strategic objectives. However, unlike al-Qaradawi, he frames such participation explicitly as a form of jihad rather than merely as pragmatic engagement. He states, "Among the means of political jihad is participation in parliaments and legislative councils to achieve the interests of the *ummah*, repel harm from it, and establish the law of God to the extent possible."¹¹⁰ This framing transforms institutional engagement from tactical compromise to religious obligation.

2.2.4.2 Al-Sallabi's Four-Stage Model of *Tamkeen*

Based on these theoretical foundations, al-Sallabi developed a four-stage model of *tamkeen*:

Stage 1: Strategic recruitment of committed individuals: Unlike the traditional Brotherhood's emphasis on broad-based *da'wa*, al-Sallabi's approach focuses on identifying and recruiting individuals with specific qualifications for immediate political action. His methodology prioritizes selective recruitment of committed activists over the Brotherhood's traditional gradual approach to social transformation, emphasizing quality of commitment over quantity of followers.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 162–79.

¹⁰⁷ Raja M. Ali Saleem, *State, Nationalism, and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), chaps. 2 and 5.

¹⁰⁸ Ali Muhammad Al-Sallabi, *Al-Fiqh al-Siyasi lil-Dawla al-Islamiyya* [The Political Jurisprudence of the Islamic State] (Dar al-Ma'rifa, 2003).

¹⁰⁹ Ali Muhammad al-Sallabi, *Fiqh al-Nasr wa al-Tamkin fi al-Qur'an al-Karim* [The Jurisprudence of Victory and Empowerment in the Noble Qur'an] (Dar al-Ma'rifa, 2005).

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Al-Sallabi argues, “A group of sincere supporters is more effective than armies of conquerors if their intentions are not pure.” Similarly, “A society only achieves its goals through an elite working with sincerity and dedication, not a large mass without program or devotion.”¹¹¹ This elitist approach contrasts with al-Banna’s emphasis on mass mobilization and resembles Qutb’s vanguard concept, though with greater emphasis on practical capabilities rather than mere ideological purity.

Stage 2: Preparation and training of selected elements: The second stage emphasizes the comprehensive preparation of recruited individuals. In this stage, Al-Sallabi is clearly speaking about choosing the best individuals who responded to the call in the first stage and then turning them into potential jihadists through indoctrination and physical training, which may also include combat skills.

This preparation builds capacities across multiple domains, including ideological, organizational, and operational skills. Al-Sallabi emphasizes, “Preparation must encompass intellectual understanding, spiritual commitment, physical capability, and practical skills relevant to the individual’s role in the Islamic project.”¹¹² This comprehensive development contrasts with the traditional Brotherhood emphasis on intellectual and organizational training.

Stage 3: *Al-ghalaba* (overcoming)—seizing political power: The third stage explicitly focuses on power acquisition. Al-Sallabi explains, “The stage of *al-ghalaba* (overcoming) aims to seize political power from the authority or government that does not apply Islam. Jihad is the main instrument to achieve *al-ghalaba*.”

Al-Sallabi’s explicit focus on seizing power represents a significant departure from the traditional Brotherhood’s more cautious language regarding political objectives. He states, “The nature of this stage lies in one word: jihad, and we mean by it jihad in all its forms.”¹¹³ This expansive conception of jihad as the primary mechanism for political transformation reflects the strategic diversification that characterizes contemporary Islamist movements, which employ multiple tactics simultaneously to challenge existing power structures.

Stage 4: Establishing and expanding Islamic governance: The final stage involves consolidating and expanding Islamic governance. Al-Sallabi describes this as “the stage of *tamkeen* that actually involves seizing power and establishing the desired Islamic state, then working through jihad to extend its impact all over the globe and protect it against potential threats.”¹¹⁴

Al-Sallabi states, “The empowerment stage is the pinnacle of organized Islamic action and represents the ripe fruit. The empowerment stage in calling to Allah means that Allah, the Blessed and Exalted, has empowered His religion on Earth among the believers who perform righteous deeds. This empowerment is preceded by succession, kingship, and [political] authority, and shall bring [to Muslims] security after fear.”¹¹⁵

2.2.4.3 Al-Sallabi’s Impact on Brotherhood Strategy

Al-Sallabi’s approach, explicit incorporation of jihad, and prioritization of state formation over *da’wa* signal a potential shift in Brotherhood strategy, particularly in contexts where institutional paths to power have been blocked.

Al-Sallabi’s influence is most evident in the Brotherhood’s relationships with resistance movements, such as Hamas. As Secretary General of the Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

(IUMS) following al-Qaradawi's death, al-Sallabi has issued numerous statements supporting armed resistance against Israel. In April 2025, under his leadership, IUMS issued a fatwa declaring that "armed jihad against the occupation in Palestine is incumbent upon every able Muslim in the Islamic world" and calling for "immediate military intervention by Arab and Islamic countries." This explicit endorsement of armed confrontation represents a significant escalation compared to al-Qaradawi's more qualified support.

In Western contexts, al-Sallabi's influence is most evident in:

Increased emphasis on supporting Islamic "resistance" movements: Brotherhood organizations in the West have increasingly framed support for groups like Hamas not merely as a humanitarian concern but as a religious obligation. By elevating support for resistance movements to a religious obligation, al-Sallabi's approach transforms political positions into tests of religious authenticity.

The concept of "comprehensive jihad": Many Brotherhood-aligned organizations have adopted al-Sallabi's framework of multiple, simultaneous forms of jihad operating across different domains. This conceptualization enables the integration of diverse activities—from media campaigns to financial support to political advocacy—within a coherent theological framework. Al-Sallabi states, "Jihad encompasses all efforts that serve the Islamic project, each according to the individual's capacity and position." This expansive definition transforms ordinary professional and civic activities into religious warfare when carried out in support of Islamic objectives.

The blurring of boundaries between institutional engagement and confrontational approaches: Where previous Brotherhood strategy maintained a clearer separation between these approaches, al-Sallabi's synthesis encourages their integration. By framing institutional participation as a form of jihad, al-Sallabi's approach resolves the tension between Qutb's revolutionary purism and al-Qaradawi's institutional pragmatism.

The explicit framing of Western policies as aggression requiring resistance: Based on al-Sallabi's framework, Brotherhood messaging increasingly portrays Muslim communities in the West as under attack, justifying more confrontational responses (defensive mobilization). By positioning Western policies toward Islam as a form of warfare, this approach legitimizes activism as defensive resistance rather than political advocacy.

Al-Sallabi's approach represents a synthesis of previous *tamkeen* theories, combining al-Banna's gradualism, Qutb's revolutionary fervor, and al-Qaradawi's political pragmatism within a framework that more explicitly acknowledges the role of various forms of jihad in achieving Islamic empowerment.

2.3 *Tamkeen* and *Marhaliyyah*: Complementary Strategic Approaches

The Brotherhood's Western strategy operates through two complementary approaches: *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) and *marhaliyyah* (phase adaptation). While *tamkeen* represents the long-term goal of establishing Islamic dominance, *marhaliyyah* provides tactical flexibility, allowing the Brotherhood to temporarily adjust its positions and discourse in response to the prevailing circumstances.

2.3.1 Theoretical Foundations of *Marhaliyyah*

The concept of *marhaliyyah* derives from the Arabic word *marhala* (phase or stage) and refers to the Brotherhood's doctrine of phase-appropriate adjustment.¹¹⁶ This concept provides a theological justification for temporary tactical compromises that might otherwise appear to contradict

¹¹⁶ Muhammad Bin Ghalib al-'Umary, *Al-Marhaliyya 'inda al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin—Fiqh al-Marhala* [Gradualism among the Muslim Brotherhood—Jurisprudence of Staging] (Dar Al-Mirath al-Nabawi, 1998).

fundamental principles. The Brotherhood theorist Yusuf al-Qaradawi's concept of *marhaliyyah* emphasizes the importance of recognizing current realities and working within existing constraints while maintaining long-term Islamic objectives. This approach represents a sophisticated balance between pragmatic adaptation and ideological consistency.

Marhaliyyah represents a strategic approach that favors tactical flexibility—temporarily adjusting political and social positions in response to unfavorable circumstances while maintaining a long-term commitment to fundamental objectives until conditions become more favorable for advancing the *tamkeen* process. This strategic duality is central to the Brotherhood's ability to operate effectively within Western liberal democracies while maintaining ideological commitments fundamentally at odds with liberal democratic principles. *Marhaliyyah* draws theological legitimacy from several Islamic concepts:

Fiqh al-waqi' (jurisprudence of reality): This concept holds that Islamic rulings must align with real-world conditions, not just abstract ideals. Al-Qaradawi emphasized that jurists must understand both the text and its context. This principle legitimizes adapting Islamic practices to Western settings, even when they appear to conflict with stricter interpretations.¹¹⁷

Maslaha (public interest): This principle permits setting aside strict rules when they conflict with the community's broader interests. Brotherhood theorists justify tactical adjustments as long as they advance long-term goals. As al-Qaradawi explained, it may be necessary and even obligatory to suspend a rule to protect the greater good of the Muslim community.¹¹⁸

Meaning "public interest" or "welfare," *maslaha* is a principle in Islamic legal theory traditionally used to promote the common good in cases where explicit texts are silent. Its classic usage by scholars like al-Ghazali¹¹⁹ and al-Shatibi¹²⁰ was broad and inclusive, referring to the well-being of all people in society, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

However, Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and Yusuf al-Qaradawi have reinterpreted *maslaha* narrowly, applying it almost exclusively to the interests of the Muslim community (*ummah*) as they define it.¹²¹ According to this view, "public interest" means strategic benefit for the Islamic movement, not society as a whole.

- **Traditional Islamic law:** *Maslaha* can include all of society (Muslims and non-Muslims).¹²²
- **Islamist interpretation:** *Maslaha* is often restricted to the goals and interests of Muslims or the Islamist project.

Darura (necessity): Islamic law allows prohibited actions in cases of necessity, based on the maxim *al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat* (necessities permit the prohibited). Brotherhood scholars use this to justify engaging with secular Western systems when such participation serves the survival or interests of Muslim minorities. Brotherhood scholars apply this principle to justify engagement with Western political systems despite their secular foundations.

¹¹⁷ Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds., *Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi* (Columbia University Press, 2009), chap. 4.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. 8.

¹¹⁹ Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *Al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-Usul* [On Legal Theory of Muslim Jurisprudence], vol. 1 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2024) [originally written in the 12th century, English translation published by Dar ul-Thaqafah in 2017].

¹²⁰ Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari'a* [The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law], vol. 2 (Dar Ibn 'Affan, 1997) [originally written and published in 1884].

¹²¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Jihad* [Jurisprudence of the Struggle], vol. 2 (Maktabat Wahba, 2009), 87–94; Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Awlawiyyat* [Jurisprudence of Priorities] (Dar al-Shuruq, 1991).

¹²² Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, 3rd ed. (Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 271–74.

Tadarruj (gradualism): This concept advocates for the gradual, phased implementation of Islamic goals. Al-Qaradawi notes that even the Qur'an and subsequent legal rulings were revealed gradually, referring to gradualism as "divine law." This principle legitimizes the Brotherhood's long-term, generational strategy in Western contexts. It sanctifies the patient, a multigenerational approach that characterizes the Brotherhood strategy in the West.

These theological concepts transform what might otherwise appear as ideological inconsistency into a strategically flexible approach, as sanctioned by religion. By providing religious legitimation for tactical adaptation, the doctrine of *marhaliyyah* enables Brotherhood organizations to operate effectively within Western contexts while maintaining a commitment to long-term Islamic governance objectives.

2.3.2 Operational Implementation of *Marhaliyyah*

In practical terms, *marhaliyyah* manifests in several ways:

Strategic ambiguity in public communications: Brotherhood-aligned organizations maintain strategic ambiguity in their public messaging, allowing different audiences to interpret statements according to their expectations. This approach is aligned with "constructive ambiguity"—the deliberate use of language that permits multiple interpretations.

This communication strategy is particularly evident in how Brotherhood organizations frame controversial issues like sharia implementation, gender relations, or attitudes toward non-Muslims. Public statements typically employ vague terminology, emphasize shared values with Western audiences, and avoid specific commitments. Internal communications and Arabic-language materials often present more explicit positions aligned with traditional Brotherhood ideology. This dual messaging represents what communication theorists call "audience-adapted framing"¹²³—the act of tailoring messages to specific audiences based on their existing beliefs and values.

Contextual adaptation of political positions: Brotherhood organizations adjust their political positions in accordance with local contexts while maintaining consistent long-term objectives. This flexibility enables what Roy describes as "operational integration coupled with value conservation."¹²⁴

This adaptive approach is particularly evident in how Brotherhood-aligned organizations engage with different political systems. In countries where Muslims constitute a significant electoral bloc, Brotherhood organizations typically advocate direct political participation and Islamization of legislation. In countries where Muslims form a small minority, the emphasis shifts to securing religious accommodations, establishing autonomous community institutions, and gaining influence within existing political structures. This differentiated approach implements what political scientists call a "context-sensitive strategy"¹²⁵—the practice of adapting tactical methods to specific political environments while maintaining consistent strategic objectives.

Tactical alliance-building with non-Islamic groups: Despite fundamental ideological differences, Brotherhood organizations form tactical alliances with various groups, including secular leftist organizations, when such alliances serve strategic objectives. These alliances implement al-Banna's

¹²³ Elina Lindgren et al., "Trusting the Facts: The Role of Framing, News Media as a (Trusted) Source, and Opinion Resonance for Perceived Truth in Statistical Statements," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2024), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10776990221117117>.

¹²⁴ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (Columbia University Press, 2004), 104–6.

¹²⁵ Paul Donowitz, "Using a Context-Sensitive Approach to Enhance Development," *Development Asia*, November 15, 2016, <https://development.asia/explainer/using-context-sensitive-approach-enhance-development>.

principle that “we cooperate in that which we agree upon, and excuse each other in that which we disagree upon.”

This coalition-building approach is particularly evident in how Brotherhood organizations align with progressive causes in Western contexts. Despite fundamental disagreements on issues like gender equality, sexual autonomy, and secularism, Brotherhood organizations frequently coordinate with progressive groups on topics such as immigration, foreign policy, and anti-discrimination measures.

Variable emphasis on different aspects of Islamic practice: Brotherhood organizations strategically emphasize different elements of Islamic practice depending on the social context. In environments where full implementation of sharia (as state law) is impractical, they focus on individual piety, family values, and communal identity maintenance rather than explicit political goals.

This variable emphasis is particularly evident in how Brotherhood organizations present Islam to Western audiences. Public messaging typically highlights universal values, such as justice, compassion, and social welfare, while downplaying or reinterpreting aspects of Islamic law that conflict with Western norms, such as misogyny and homophobia. Internal educational materials typically present more comprehensive and traditional interpretations.

2.3.3 The Dialectical Relationship between *Tamkeen* and *Marhaliyyah*

The relationship between *tamkeen* and *marhaliyyah* is dialectical rather than sequential. *Marhaliyyah* provides the tactical flexibility necessary for advancing toward *tamkeen*'s strategic goal in complex and often hostile environments. This relationship combines strategic consistency with tactical adaptability, maintaining consistent long-term objectives while adjusting short-term methods according to the circumstances.

This strategic duality enables Brotherhood-aligned organizations to advocate Western democratic values when expedient, despite the organization's fundamental ideological rejection of secular governance. Such flexibility has been particularly evident in how Brotherhood representatives present themselves to Western audiences versus their messaging to Muslim communities.

In Western contexts, Brotherhood organizations typically emphasize values like religious freedom, civil liberties, and pluralism when addressing general audiences. When addressing Muslim audiences, however, the emphasis shifts to Islamic distinctiveness, resistance to assimilation, and the eventual implementation of Islamist governance.

The interplay between *tamkeen* and *marhaliyyah* creates a strategic ambidexterity—the ability to simultaneously pursue long-term transformation (*tamkeen*) while adapting to immediate environmental constraints (*marhaliyyah*). This ambidexterity enables the Brotherhood to maintain its ideological commitments while operating effectively within diverse and often hostile contexts.

2.4 Implications for Western Societies

The Brotherhood's doctrine of *tamkeen*, as developed through these theoretical evolutions and implemented in tandem with the complementary strategy of *marhaliyyah*, has significant implications for Western societies. These implications extend across political, social, and cultural domains.

2.4.1 Political Implications

The Brotherhood's long-term political objective of establishing Islamic governance fundamentally conflicts with Western democratic principles of popular sovereignty and secular governance. While

Brotherhood organizations may participate in democratic processes, they do so instrumentally rather than on principle, using democracy as a means to an end while rejecting its philosophical foundations.

This instrumental approach creates a democratic paradox—the use of democratic mechanisms to advance fundamentally anti-democratic objectives. As Tibi argues, “Islamists seek not to reform democracy but to use it as a one-way ticket to power, after which democratic mechanisms would be subordinated to religious authority.”¹²⁶

The Brotherhood’s political strategy in the West typically operates through a “two-track approach,”¹²⁷ presenting moderate public positions while maintaining more radical private goals. This approach complicates policy responses, as government agencies may engage with Brotherhood organizations based on their public positions without awareness of their private objectives.

2.4.2 Social Implications

The Brotherhood’s social strategy emphasizes the building of parallel structures that enable Muslims to maintain distinctiveness within Western societies rather than fully integrating.

This parallel society model has several implications:

Community isolation: By emphasizing Islamic distinctiveness and discouraging full integration, Brotherhood organizations may contribute to the social isolation of Muslim communities from wider society.

Distortion of representation: Brotherhood organizations often present themselves as representing “the Muslim community” despite the significant diversity of opinion among Muslims. This representation claim may marginalize all other Muslim voices.

Instrumentalization of minority protection frameworks: Brotherhood organizations strategically use Western legal protections for minorities to shield their activities from scrutiny, creating what Fourest calls “minorities within minorities”¹²⁸—situations where conservative religious authorities gain disproportionate control over community members.

Identity politics mobilization: The Brotherhood’s emphasis on Muslim identity as primarily religious rather than cultural also facilitates what Kepel refers to as “identity mobilization”¹²⁹—the activation of religious identity as a basis for political action.

2.4.3 Cultural Implications

The Brotherhood’s cultural strategy focuses on resisting what it perceives as Western cultural corruption while promoting Islamic alternatives.

This cultural strategy manifests in:

- **Epistemological challenges to Western knowledge frameworks:** Brotherhood educational institutions often present Islamic and Western knowledge systems as being fundamentally in competition rather than complementary.

¹²⁶ Bassam Tibi, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: Why They Can’t Be Democratic,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008), <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/islamist-parties-and-democracy-why-they-cant-be-democratic>.

¹²⁷ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press, 2010), chaps. 2 and 6.

¹²⁸ Caroline Fourest, *Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan* (London Center for Policy Research, 2009), 101–110, also chaps. 4 and 6.

¹²⁹ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Belknap Press, 2004), 62–67, 115–22.

- **Moral particularism:** The Brotherhood promotes the view that Islamic moral standards should take precedence over Western secular ethics for Muslims, creating what philosophers call “moral exceptionalism”¹³⁰—the claim that certain groups should be exempt from generally applicable ethical frameworks.
- **Narrative competition:** Brotherhood media and cultural productions compete with mainstream Western narratives, particularly regarding historical and contemporary relations between Islamic and Western civilizations.
- **Symbolic boundary maintenance:** Brotherhood cultural messaging emphasizes maintaining clear boundaries between Islamic and Western identities through visible markers, such as distinctive dress, dietary practices, and social segregation.

Collectively, these political, social, and cultural implications demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* strategy. Rather than merely seeking religious accommodation within Western frameworks, the Brotherhood aims to fundamentally transform Western societies according to its theological and ideological vision.

2.5 Conclusion: Theoretical Foundations and Contemporary Implementation

The Brotherhood’s evolving doctrine of *tamkeen*, implemented in tandem with the complementary doctrine of *marhaliyyah*, provides the theoretical foundation for its Western operations. From Hassan al-Banna’s original conception of graduated transformation to Sayyid Qutb’s revolutionary vision, Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s institutional approach, and Ali al-Sallabi’s militant synthesis, the doctrine has maintained consistency in its ultimate objectives while demonstrating significant tactical flexibility.

This theoretical evolution reflects what organizational theorists call “adaptive persistence”¹³¹—the act of maintaining a fundamental strategic direction while modifying tactical approaches in response to environmental challenges and opportunities. Despite significant differences in emphasis and methodology, all four theorists share the ultimate objective of establishing their version of Islamic governance and civilizational dominance, differing primarily in their assessment of the appropriate methods and timeframes.

The complementary relationship between *tamkeen* and *marhaliyyah* enables Brotherhood organizations to operate effectively within Western democratic contexts despite fundamental ideological opposition to secular governance principles. By maintaining strategic ambiguity, adapting tactical approaches to specific contexts, building diverse coalitions, and emphasizing different aspects of Islamic practice according to its audience, the Brotherhood has established a significant presence and built up influence within Western societies while maintaining its long-term transformative objectives.

Understanding this sophisticated ideological framework is crucial for analyzing how abstract concepts are manifested into concrete strategic plans and operational activities, which will be examined in subsequent chapters. The theoretical sophistication of the Brotherhood’s doctrine challenges simplistic portrayals of Islamist movements as reactionary or unsophisticated, revealing instead a complex, adaptive, and multidimensional strategic approach that operates across political, social, and cultural domains.

¹³⁰ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (Basic Books, 1977), chaps. 3 and 16.

¹³¹ Richard T. Pascale, “Perspectives on Strategy: The Real Story Behind Honda’s Success,” *California Management Review* 26, no. 3 (1984): 47–72.

3. Strategic Blueprints: the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project”

This chapter analyzes the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic blueprints for implementing *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment): “The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy” (1982),¹³² a 100-year strategic framework for expanding Islamist influence in Western society, and “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Brotherhood in North America” (1991),¹³³ a strategic plan for achieving this goal in North America. Both documents portray Islamism as a civilizational and political alternative to Western liberal democracy, outlining a gradualist, multi-domain approach that encompasses institutional infiltration, influence in media and education, financial independence, coalition building (including with ideologically distinct leftist and socialist groups), identity politics, and the creation of parallel societies. While “The Project” provides a broad doctrinal foundation in the form of a secretive 100-year plan, the “Explanatory Memorandum” translates these principles into tangible actions, explicitly naming 29 affiliated civil society groups in the United States. The complementary nature of these two documents reflects a centralized vision with decentralized execution. Research reveals that, after four decades, the Muslim Brotherhood’s efforts have yielded dense institutional networks, media influence, youth engagement, coalition capital, and legal protections, although political representation and financial independence remain relatively limited. The implications of the Brotherhood’s strategic resilience go beyond exploiting the paradox of tolerance in Western societies. In practice, Brotherhood-aligned actors in the West are exploiting democratic protections to advance an Islamist agenda that rejects nation-states and democratic principles and overlaps ideologically with violent jihadism. The two blueprints seek to transform Western society through nonviolent yet civilizational confrontation, raising urgent questions about how democracies can protect freedom while resisting ideological subversion disguised as activism in support of minority rights, diversity, and pluralism.

3.1 Historical Context of the Strategic Documents

Before examining the documents themselves, it is essential to understand the historical context in which they emerged. The late 1970s and early 1980s were a pivotal moment for the Muslim Brotherhood’s international strategy. Several developments during this period shaped the organization’s approach to Western society and created the conditions for the formulation of this strategy.

3.1.1 The Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979)

The successful establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran demonstrated the possibility of transforming a modernizing, Western-aligned country into an Islamic state. While the Shiite orientation of the Iranian revolution differed from the Brotherhood’s Sunni mindset, the practical demonstration of Islamic governance replacing a secular system had a profound psychological impact. As Kepel notes, “The Iranian revolution served as proof-of-concept for Islamist movements worldwide, showing that Islamic governance was not merely theoretical but achievable in modern contexts.”¹³⁴

¹³² “The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982),” translated by Scott Burgess (based on the French text published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–205), first published serially in *The Daily Ablution* in December 2005, available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter “The Project”].

¹³³ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter “Explanatory Memorandum”].

¹³⁴ Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World* (Polity Press, 1994), 17–21, 80–86.

The Iranian revolution provided several lessons that influenced the Brotherhood's strategic thinking:

- **Revolutionary success despite overwhelming opposition:** The fall of the Shah, despite military strength and Western support, showed that entrenched secular regimes could be toppled by ideologically driven mass movements, undermining the belief that modernization must follow Western political models.
- **Religious leadership of political transformation:** Ayatollah Khomeini showed that religious leaders could lead political revolutions, not just endorse them. His role illustrated how *ulama* (Muslim scholars) could drive political change directly, rather than just legitimizing secular rulers.
- **Institutional capture strategy:** The revolutionaries' method of taking control of key institutions before seizing power offered a model for gradual change. This mirrored the Brotherhood's strategy of building parallel structures before pursuing political authority.
- **International impact beyond national boundaries:** The Iranian revolution inspired Islamist movements globally, challenging the nation-state model and showing that Islamic activism could transcend borders through international solidarity networks.

While the Brotherhood maintained significant theological differences with Iran's Shiite revolutionary model and often competed with Iranian influence, the demonstration effect of the successful Islamic revolution provided a powerful inspiration for developing more comprehensive strategic planning.

3.1.2 The Assassination of Anwar Sadat (1981)

The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by Islamic Jihad,¹³⁵ a group ideologically influenced by Sayyid Qutb's writings, led to increased repression of Islamist groups in Egypt. This crackdown accelerated the emigration of Brotherhood members to Western countries, particularly Europe and North America. With their organizational expertise and ideological commitment, these emigrants formed the nucleus of the Brotherhood's Western networks.

The Sadat assassination and subsequent crackdown had several significant effects on Brotherhood strategy:

- **Leadership diaspora and skill transfer:** Crackdowns in Egypt forced Brotherhood leaders into exile, creating a diaspora of skilled professionals who established branches across Western countries with strong organizational capacity.
- **Shift from confrontation to gradualism:** The failure of violent tactics in Egypt reaffirmed the Brotherhood's preference for gradual change, strengthening support for al-Banna's approach over Qutb's.
- **Western operational focus:** Repression in the Arab world pushed the Brotherhood to prioritize Western societies, adapting strategies to leverage civil liberties rather than transplanting Middle Eastern models.
- **Global coordination needs:** As leadership dispersed globally, the Brotherhood developed more advanced coordination tools to balance its core goals with the need for local adaptation.

¹³⁵ "The Assassination of Anwar Sadat, Part II," Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, September 2013, <https://adst.org/2013/09/the-assassination-of-anwar-sadat-part-ii/> (accessed November 8, 2025).

These developments created conditions in which strategic planning for Western contexts became an urgent priority rather than a theoretical exercise. The combination of experienced leadership, relative freedom of operation, and new opportunities for influence made Western societies increasingly central to Brotherhood planning.

3.1.3 The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent jihad mobilized international Islamic solidarity and created networks connecting Islamist movements across national boundaries.¹³⁶ The conflict established precedents for transnational Islamist activism and introduced organizational models that would later influence Brotherhood operations in the West. Afghanistan served as an incubator for transnational Islamist networks that would later deploy both violent and nonviolent strategies across multiple theaters.

The Afghan jihad influenced Brotherhood strategic thinking in several ways:

- **International mobilization capability:** The Afghan jihad showed that transnational Islamic networks could mobilize fighters, funds, and support beyond state systems, laying a foundation for later activism among Muslims in the West.
- **Western support for Islamist causes:** US backing of the Afghan mujahideen set a precedent for temporary alliances between Islamists and Western powers, revealing space for tactical cooperation despite deep ideological divides.
- **The creation of transnational activist networks:** The conflict forged cross-border ties among Islamist activists, forming durable networks that later supported both militant and nonviolent activities, including advocacy in Western societies.
- **Media and narrative expertise:** To globalize the Afghan cause, Islamists refined their narrative strategies and media outreach skills, later applying them to Brotherhood messaging and engagement in the West.

While the Brotherhood remained organizationally distinct from the more militant Salafi-jihadist networks that emerged from Afghanistan, the broader phenomenon of transnational Islamist activism provided models and inspiration for developing more comprehensive international strategies.

3.1.4 The Growing Muslim Presence in Western Countries

By the early 1980s, Muslim communities in Western countries had grown sufficiently in size to support the development of institutions beyond basic religious needs. This demographic growth created opportunities for establishing more comprehensive organizational structures that addressed the educational, social, and political dimensions of Muslim life in the West. By 1980, according to demographic studies by Nielsen, Western European countries were hosting approximately 5 million Muslims, while North America’s Muslim population approached 1.5 million—numbers sufficient to support institutional complexity beyond prayer spaces.¹³⁷

This demographic development facilitated the Brotherhood’s strategy in several ways:

¹³⁶ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qa’ida* (Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 1.

¹³⁷ Jørgen S. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 1–8; see also Ceri Peach and Günther Glebe, “Muslim Minorities in Western Europe,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 2 (1995): 239–52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1995.9993852>.

- **Critical mass for institution building:** The growth of Muslim communities enabled the creation of mosques, schools, and advocacy groups, supporting the Brotherhood’s strategy of parallel institution building.
- **Generational transition:** By the 1980s, second-generation Muslims in the West formed a new audience. Their identity struggles created an opportunity for Brotherhood outreach through youth and educational programs.
- **Electoral potential:** Muslim population clusters enabled bloc voting, particularly in local elections, providing political leverage despite being a national minority.
- **Professional diversity:** The presence of more Muslims in sectors such as media, academia, and government enabled the Brotherhood to advance al-Banna’s vision of influencing key institutions.

Within this historical context, Brotherhood strategists recognized both the challenge and the opportunity presented by Western societies. The challenge arose from the West’s cultural influence on Muslim communities, which Brotherhood ideologues perceived as a threat to Islamic identity. The opportunity stemmed from Western freedoms that enabled Islamist organizations to engage in activism without the repression they faced in many Muslim-majority countries. The strategic documents examined below represent the Brotherhood’s response to this context.

3.2 The “Explanatory Memorandum”: *Tamkeen* in North America

An internal Brotherhood strategy document entitled “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (1991) provides the most detailed blueprint for the Brotherhood’s operations in the United States and Canada. This document was written by Mohammed Akram, a senior member of the Brotherhood, and was approved by the Brotherhood’s Shura Council in 1991. It came to public attention during the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing trial in 2008, where it was introduced as evidence of the Brotherhood’s long-term strategy in North America.¹³⁸

3.2.1 Document Authentication and Significance

Before analyzing its content, it is important to establish the document’s authenticity and representativeness. Federal prosecutors in the Holy Land Foundation trial authenticated the document through expert testimony and supporting evidence. According to court records, the document was seized during an FBI raid of Ismail Elbarasse’s residence in Virginia in 2004. Elbarasse served as a financial officer for the Brotherhood’s operations in the United States and maintained an extensive archive of Brotherhood documents.

The document’s significance has been debated among scholars. Critics argue that it represents the views of a single author rather than official Brotherhood policy. However, several factors suggest it has broader significance:

- The document explicitly claims to be based on a previous strategy approved by the Brotherhood’s Shura Council in 1987, indicating organizational endorsement rather than individual opinion. The text states, “In 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood developed a strategic

¹³⁸ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study.

framework... The Memorandum you have before you is an attempt to explain and elaborate on that strategy.”

- The strategic approach outlined in the document aligns closely with the Brotherhood’s operations as observed in practice, suggesting the implementation of the strategies it describes. Organizational patterns, institutional development, and tactical approaches documented by researchers studying Brotherhood operations in North America closely match those outlined in the Memorandum.
- The document’s conceptual framework and terminology are consistent with Brotherhood ideological literature, particularly in regard to the concepts of *tamkeen* and civilizational jihad. The language and concepts used in the Memorandum directly parallel those found in the writings of Brotherhood ideologues, including Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
- The document lists specific organizations as part of the Brotherhood’s network in North America, many of which have demonstrated operational patterns consistent with the outlined strategy. The organizational network described in the Memorandum’s appendix matches known connections between Islamic organizations in North America during that period.

Based on these factors, the document appears to represent an authentic articulation of Brotherhood strategy rather than merely an individual proposal, and the document’s authenticity was established during the Holy Land Foundation trial, where it was admitted as evidence after FBI analysis and expert testimony confirmed its legitimacy.¹³⁹

3.2.2 Core Strategic Vision: Civilizational Jihad

The central concept articulated in the “Explanatory Memorandum” is “civilizational struggle” (which is referred to as jihad)—a comprehensive, multigenerational effort to transform Western societies from within. The document explicitly frames this approach as a jihad (struggle), though not of the military variety:

“The process of settlement [*tamkeen*] is a ‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ with all the word means. The Ikhwan [Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.”

This passage reveals several key elements of the Brotherhood’s strategic vision:

- **Redefinition of jihad (struggle) beyond the military realm:** The document expands the concept of jihad to encompass comprehensive societal transformation through nonviolent means. This reconceptualization enables the Brotherhood to maintain the religious obligation of jihad while adapting to environments where military struggle is impractical.

This expanded definition builds on precedents in Brotherhood theology going back to al-Banna, who identified multiple forms of jihad, including struggle through words, education, and social action. By applying the concept of jihad, a religiously charged term, to nonviolent

¹³⁹ *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008); “USA v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development: Case Summary,” Charity and Security Network, August 24, 2020, <https://charityandsecurity.org/litigation/holy-land-foundation>.

activities, the document elevates institutional work, educational efforts, and political activism to the status of religious duties, rather than merely tactical choices. This framing has a significant motivational impact, as it transforms ordinary organizational activities into sacred obligations.

- **Long-term strategic horizon:** The civilizational jihad framework envisions a multigenerational effort rather than immediate results. This temporal scope reflects what organizational theorists call “strategic patience”—the willingness to pursue objectives over extended timeframes when immediate achievement is impossible.

The document places this long-term perspective within a religious understanding of historical change, describing the Brotherhood’s work in America as “a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers.” This civilizational framing establishes the settlement process not as mere community building or political advocacy but as a fundamental confrontation between Islamic and Western civilizations that will unfold across generations. The Memorandum’s comprehensive organizational framework, spanning religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media institutions, reflects an understanding that civilizational transformation requires patient, systematic work across multiple domains rather than immediate confrontation. This extended timeframe allows Brotherhood organizations to work toward transformative objectives while pragmatically engaging with existing political realities, resolving the tension between revolutionary goals and gradualist methods. By framing the mission in generational rather than immediate terms, the Memorandum enables tactical flexibility and strategic patience while maintaining ideological consistency regarding ultimate objectives.

- **A comprehensive approach across multiple domains:** The concept of civilizational jihad encompasses all aspects of society, rather than focusing narrowly on the political or religious dimension. This comprehensive approach implements the Brotherhood’s understanding of Islam as a complete system (*nizam shamil*) governing all aspects of life.

The document explicitly identifies multiple operational domains: “The settlement process consists of establishing organizations in all areas, scientific, educational, cultural and arts, media, economic, social, political, and others.” This multi-domain approach aligns with al-Banna’s vision of Islam as a comprehensive system addressing all aspects of human existence. By operating across multiple sectors simultaneously, Brotherhood organizations create synergistic effects that enhance overall influence beyond what could be achieved by focusing on a single domain.

- **Utilization of existing systems against themselves:** The strategy explicitly aims to use Western institutions and freedoms against Western civilization itself—a concept military strategists refer to as “asymmetric warfare,” where the target’s strengths are transformed into vulnerabilities.

The document states this explicitly: “‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers.” This approach exploits what political scientists call the “tolerance paradox”—the challenge liberal democracies face in protecting themselves against movements that use guaranteed freedoms to advance their anti-democratic agendas. By operating within legal boundaries while rejecting the philosophical foundations of liberal democracy, Brotherhood organizations present particular challenges to Western counterterrorism frameworks designed primarily to address violent threats.

- **Religious framing of political objectives:** The ultimate goal is framed in explicitly religious terms—making “God’s religion victorious over all religions”—reflecting the Brotherhood’s fusion of religious and political objectives.

This religious framing transforms political activities from a mere power struggle to a sacred duty, providing powerful motivation for sustained commitment in the face of obstacles and setbacks. In this context, the document states as follows: “It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who choose to slack.” By situating political activism within an eschatological framework of ultimate divine victory, the document provides a theological justification for maintaining a commitment across multiple generations, despite limited immediate results.

3.2.3 The Seven Stages of *Tamkeen* in North America

The “Explanatory Memorandum” outlines a flexible multi-stage plan for *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) in North America, in accordance with the concept of *tadarruj* (gradualism) articulated by al-Qaradawi. The document identified seven stages to realize this goal:

3.2.3.1 Understanding *Tamkeen* as a Civilizational Struggle (Jihad)

The first stage involves establishing conceptual clarity regarding the nature of the Brotherhood’s mission in North America. The Memorandum explicitly frames the settlement process as a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” and states that “the Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers.” This foundational articulation establishes that the Brotherhood’s activities in North America are not merely about community building, religious practice, or civil rights advocacy, but rather constitute a civilizational confrontation aimed at fundamentally transforming Western society according to Islamic principles as interpreted by the Brotherhood. By framing the mission in these explicit terms, the Memorandum ensures that Brotherhood activists understand their work within this larger strategic context, even when specific tactics require presenting organizational activities in more moderate or benign terms to external audiences.

This stage emphasizes ideological preparation, ensuring that Brotherhood members understand their activities not merely as religious practice or community service but as part of a comprehensive strategy to transform Western civilization. This ideological framing provides what organizational psychologists call “purpose alignment”—ensuring that all members understand how their individual actions contribute to broader strategic objectives.

The Memorandum emphasizes that this conceptual understanding must precede and guide organizational action, stating that “the Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad” and calling for organizations to “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts” according to this civilizational vision. This prioritization of ideological clarity reflects the influence of Sayyid Qutb’s emphasis on conceptual understanding before political action. By ensuring that members and affiliated organizations share the same transformative vision of the settlement process as fundamentally aimed at replacing Western civilization with Islamic institutional dominance, the Brotherhood creates the foundation for coordinated action across multiple domains and organizational structures. The Memorandum’s comprehensive framework, spanning religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media institutions, only achieves strategic coherence when all components understand their work as contributing to this larger civilizational project rather than merely providing community services or advocating for narrow interests.

3.2.3.2 Establishing a Stable and Effective Islamic Movement

The second stage focuses on building organizational infrastructure under Brotherhood leadership. The Memorandum emphasizes the importance of “establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic state wherever it is.”

The document emphasizes the importance of forming a “movement” rather than merely an organization, reflecting what organizational theorists describe as “values-based mobilization” — creating a self-sustaining social movement driven by a shared ideology rather than one based merely organizational membership.

The Memorandum outlines specific organizational characteristics necessary for this stage, calling for organizations to “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation,’” while maintaining the flexibility to adapt tactics according to circumstances. Its comprehensive framework, spanning religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media institutions, reflects an understanding that effective settlement requires sophisticated organizational capacity across multiple domains, careful selection of leadership, strategic patience across multiple phases of development, and the ability to adjust specific approaches while maintaining consistent long-term objectives.

The emphasis on leadership by the Muslim Brotherhood specifically, rather than by Islamic organizations generally, reflects the document’s concern with maintaining ideological coherence across the movement. By positioning the Brotherhood as the guiding force behind diverse Islamic organizations, the strategy seeks to prevent ideological fragmentation while presenting different organizational faces for different tactical purposes.

3.2.3.3 Expanding the Base of Practicing Muslims

The third stage focuses on expanding the number of observant Muslims committed to Islamic values, sharia, and the Brotherhood’s vision. The Memorandum explicitly identifies this objective, calling for organizations to “expand the observant Muslim base” and to “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts” toward the settlement mission. This stage involves systematic outreach through mosques, Islamic schools, university campus organizations such as the Muslim Students Association, and community programming designed to deepen religious commitment and align Muslims with Brotherhood interpretations of Islamic practice and civilizational objectives.

The Memorandum emphasizes that this expanded base must be ideologically aligned rather than merely nominally Muslim. Its call to “expand the observant Muslim base” and to “present Islam as a civilization alternative” implies the comprehensive practice of Islam across all domains of life rather than merely cultural identification or ritual observance. This emphasis on comprehensive religious practice aligns with Hassan al-Banna’s focus on transforming individuals as the first stage of broader societal transformation. By creating a critical mass of individuals committed to the Brotherhood’s comprehensive vision of Islam encompassing personal behavior, family life, economic activity, political engagement, and social relationships, the organization establishes the human foundation necessary for institutional development and political influence.

3.2.3.4 Unifying and Directing Muslim Efforts

The fourth stage involves coordinating various Islamic centers, organizations, and student groups under a single strategic vision. The Memorandum explicitly emphasizes this objective, calling for organizations to “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts” and “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’

the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” This directive aims to create coherence among diverse organizations through a shared strategic vision and coordinated action rather than through formal hierarchical control that would expose the network’s centralized direction. By establishing the comprehensive organizational infrastructure detailed in the Memorandum’s appendix—which lists 29 Brotherhood-affiliated organizations across the religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media domains—while simultaneously calling for unified strategic direction, the document creates a framework for what political scientists call “force multiplication”¹⁴⁰—the act of achieving an impact disproportionate to actual numbers through coordinated action across seemingly independent organizations that are actually aligned through a shared ideology, an overlapping leadership, common funding sources, and a commitment to the civilizational settlement mission.

The Memorandum explicitly identifies the sectors that these organizations should target, including education, professional associations, politics, economics, media, culture, civil society, charitable work, administration (infiltration of government agencies), security, and legal affairs. It emphasizes the importance of coordinating action across these diverse sectors. Yet it simultaneously stresses that each organization should maintain distinct public identities and operational profiles, obscuring their shared strategic objectives and common ideological foundation.

The Memorandum acknowledges the inherent tension in this approach, namely how to maintain strategic unity across dozens of organizations while avoiding the appearance of centralized control that would expose the coordinated nature of the network. It addresses this challenge by establishing a model in which organizations operate with tactical autonomy in their specific domains while remaining aligned through shared ideology, common funding sources, overlapping leadership, and the foundational commitment to the “Civilization-Jihadist Process” of settlement. This decentralized-but-coordinated structure reflects what intelligence analysts refer to as a “cell structure with strategic direction,” which enables the network to function as a unified movement while presenting itself to the public as a diverse collection of independent community organizations.

3.2.3.5 Adopting Muslim Causes Domestically and Globally

The fifth stage involves positioning Brotherhood organizations as champions of Muslim causes, both within Western societies and internationally. The Memorandum frames this as central to the settlement process, emphasizing the importance of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and presenting these organizations as the primary advocates for Muslim interests across all policy domains. This positioning serves multiple strategic functions: it legitimizes Brotherhood organizations as authentic representatives of Muslim communities, creates emotional and religious obligations for Muslims to support these organizations, and establishes a framework in which criticism of Brotherhood-aligned groups can be reframed as opposition to Muslim welfare more broadly.

By championing causes that resonate emotionally with Muslim communities, the Brotherhood gains legitimacy and influence that can later be directed toward broader objectives. The Palestinian cause is explicitly listed as a top issue that the Brotherhood in North America should adopt to build influence and cohesion among Muslims. The Memorandum identifies Palestine as central to the settlement mission, framing support for the Palestinian cause as an essential component of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and as a vehicle for mobilizing Muslim communities, building organizational legitimacy, and establishing the Brotherhood network as the authoritative voice on this emotionally resonant issue. This strategic prioritization of the Palestinian cause serves to unify diverse Muslim populations around a common grievance, create ongoing

¹⁴⁰ W.J. Hurley, “A Clarification of the Concepts of Force Multiplier and Returns to Force Scale,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 16, no. 6 (2005): 463–69, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242690500167817>.

justification for organizational activism, and establish a framework through which the Brotherhood can position itself as defending Muslim interests against Western policies.

This emphasis on Palestine reflects the Brotherhood's historic prioritization of the Palestinian cause, dating back to Hassan al-Banna's era, when the Brotherhood was one of the first non-Palestinian groups to frame jihad for Palestine as a pan-Islamic religious duty. The emphasis mirrors Yusuf al-Qaradawi's position that the Palestinian cause should serve as the unifying axis for Muslim communities worldwide, especially Muslim minorities in the West. Al-Qaradawi framed Palestine not merely as a geopolitical issue but as a doctrinal and civilizational test for the global Muslim *ummah*.

As al-Qaradawi stated, "What unites the Muslims today is not race, nor culture, but causes—chief among them is Palestine. It should remain the compass of Islamic consciousness until al-Aqsa is liberated."¹⁴¹ This framing transforms a territorial conflict into a religious obligation, creating what social movement theorists call a "moral imperative for action"¹⁴²—a cause so fundamental that participation becomes a test of authentic religious identity.

Beyond Palestine, the Memorandum calls for Brotherhood-aligned organizations to champion a comprehensive range of Muslim causes and concerns across multiple domains. By establishing the extensive organizational infrastructure detailed in the document's appendix, including economic, social, educational, legal, and professional organizations, the Brotherhood created a framework for addressing diverse community needs while maintaining consistent ideological framing across all issues. This comprehensive issue portfolio enables Brotherhood organizations to appeal to diverse segments within Muslim communities, establish relevance across multiple policy areas, and position themselves as indispensable advocates for Muslim interests on any topic of concern to the community.

3.2.3.6 Presenting Islam as a Civilizational Alternative

The sixth stage involves promoting Islam not just as a religion but as a superior alternative to Western civilization. The Memorandum explicitly frames this objective, stating that the settlement process aims at "presenting Islam as a civilization alternative" and describing the Brotherhood's work in America as "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and 'sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers." This civilizational framing transforms the Brotherhood's activities from religious advocacy into a comprehensive project aimed at fundamentally reshaping Western societies according to Islamic principles as interpreted by the Brotherhood's ideology.

This stage reflects the Brotherhood's doctrine of Islamic supremacy, articulated through the concepts of *hakimiya* (sovereignty/governance) and *shumuliya* (comprehensiveness/inclusiveness). This supremacy is presented not as racial or ethnic superiority but as doctrinal and civilizational superiority, implying that secularism, liberalism, communism, and all man-made systems are inherently flawed compared to Islam.

Hassan al-Banna articulated this comprehensive vision: "Islam is a comprehensive system that governs all aspects of life. It is a state and a nation, a government and a community, a morality and a power, a mercy and a justice, a culture and a law, a science and a judiciary, a material and a resource, a struggle and a call, an army and an idea, as well as a true belief and a correct worship."

The intention is to position Islam as a comprehensive civilizational alternative rather than a matter of personal faith and to challenge the dominant secular framework by presenting a comprehensive alternative rather than merely seeking accommodation within it.

¹⁴¹ "Al-Quds Conference—Min Ajl al-Haqq (In Support of the Truth)," conference proceedings, 2002, available online at: <https://aja.me/7fhyr>.

¹⁴² Charles Frankel, "Empiricism and Moral Imperatives," *Journal of Philosophy* 50, no. 9 (1953): 241–50, available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2021225>.

The Memorandum emphasizes that this civilizational alternative must be presented in ways that are accessible to Western audiences while building the institutional capacity necessary for long-term transformation. The Memorandum’s comprehensive organizational strategy—detailed through its listing of 29 Brotherhood-affiliated organizations spanning the religious, educational, social, economic, political, professional, legal, and media domains—reflects a systematic approach to developing expertise and influence across all sectors of American society. This emphasis on building comprehensive institutional capabilities across multiple domains reflects a form of knowledge-based influence—the practice of gaining authority through demonstrated expertise and institutional presence rather than through explicit ideological assertions.

3.2.3.7 Supporting the Global Islamic State

The seventh stage involves supporting Islamist governance and Muslim causes wherever they emerge globally. The Memorandum frames the Brotherhood’s mission in transnational terms, emphasizing the importance of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and positioning the North American Brotherhood network as part of a worldwide movement transcending national boundaries. This objective connects local institutional development with international solidarity efforts, reflecting the Brotherhood’s understanding of the *ummah* as a unified community that transcends Western nation state frameworks. By establishing this transnational framework, the Brotherhood positions its American organizations not merely as domestic advocacy groups but as components of a global civilizational project, creating obligations for American Muslims to support Brotherhood-aligned causes and movements internationally while simultaneously building institutional power within the United States.

The Memorandum does not specify the form this support should take, maintaining strategic ambiguity that allows for adaptation to specific contexts. However, it clearly establishes solidarity with their concept of Islamic governance as an obligatory element of Brotherhood activity in the West. This support may include political advocacy to legitimize Islamist governments, media campaigns presenting them as authentic representatives of Muslim identity, and financial support through charitable and humanitarian channels.

The document’s vision of a “global Islamic state” reflects the Brotherhood’s ultimate objective of reestablishing the caliphate as a unified governance structure for the Muslim *ummah*. This transnational vision distinguishes the Brotherhood from nationalist Islamist movements focused solely on transforming individual nation states.

3.2.4 Organizational Infrastructure

Beyond outlining strategic stages, the “Explanatory Memorandum” provides insight into the organizational infrastructure developed to implement this strategy in North America. The document includes an appendix identifying 29 organizations as part of the Brotherhood’s network, including:

- the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA);
- the Muslim Students Association (MSA);
- the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT);
- the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR);
- the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT);
- the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP);
- the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA); and
- the Muslim American Society (MAS).

These organizations span multiple sectors, including education, youth development, research, finance, media, and political advocacy.

The Memorandum also outlines operational methodologies, emphasizing flexibility, coalition building, and balancing public and private activities. It states, “the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain ‘the keys’ and the tools of this process in carrying out this grand mission as a ‘Civilization Jihadist’ responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and—on top of them—the Muslim Brotherhood in this country.”

This emphasis on securing positions of institutional authority reflects a strategic understanding that specific roles within complex systems yield far-reaching influence. By deliberately placing ideologically aligned individuals in such roles—whether in education, policymaking, media, or civil society—the Brotherhood can exert influence that far exceeds its numerical representation. These targeted placements enable the movement to shape discourse, direct policy outcomes, and influence institutional behavior from within, while maintaining the appearance of legitimacy and procedural normalcy.

The Memorandum also emphasizes the importance of maintaining flexibility in the organizational approach while pursuing consistent long-term objectives. The document’s framework demonstrates this principle through its call for organizations to “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” and to adapt their tactics to local circumstances while remaining unified in their commitment to the “Civilization-Jihadist Process” of settlement. This adaptive approach implements what strategic theorists call “operational flexibility within strategic constancy”—the practice of maintaining consistent long-term objectives while varying tactical methods according to circumstances. The Memorandum thus establishes a framework in which Brotherhood organizations can adjust their public messaging, coalition partnerships, and institutional priorities based on political and social conditions without compromising their foundational commitment to establishing Islamic institutional dominance within Western societies.

3.3 “The Project”: Global *Tamkeen*

“The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards A Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy” offers a more comprehensive global perspective on the Brotherhood’s strategy for expanding its influence throughout Western society. Discovered during a 2001 police raid on the residence of Youssef Nada, a prominent Brotherhood financier, in Lugano, Switzerland, the document outlines a 100-year plan for advancing Islamic influence in Western countries.¹⁴³

3.3.1 Document Authentication and Significance

As in the case of the “Explanatory Memorandum,” it is important to establish the authenticity and representativeness of “The Project.” In practice, several factors suggest that it is both authentic and representative:

1. The document was recovered during an official investigation by Swiss authorities in which the chain of custody was maintained. According to FBI investigations, the document was found among Brotherhood materials held by Youssef Nada, a key figure in the Brotherhood’s international financial networks.¹⁴⁴ The discovery of the document among his papers was treated as authentic material evidence.

¹⁴³ “The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards A Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982),” translated by Scott Burgess (based on the French text published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–205), first published serially in *The Daily Ablution* in December 2005, available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter “The Project”].

¹⁴⁴ Sylvain Besson, *La Conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–95.

2. The document's content aligns with other Brotherhood literature and operational patterns observed in multiple countries. The strategies outlined in "The Project" mirror those articulated in authenticated Brotherhood materials, including the works of key ideologues like al-Banna, Qutb, and al-Qaradawi.
3. The strategies outlined in the document have been implemented consistently across various Western countries, suggesting that they represent more than a vague proposal. Organizational patterns documented by researchers studying Brotherhood operations in Europe and North America are a close match to those outlined in "The Project."

The uniqueness and significance of "The Project" lies in its global scope and long-term strategic horizon. While the "Explanatory Memorandum" focuses specifically on North America, "The Project" presents a framework that is applicable across all Western societies. The document provides the strategic backbone upon which region-specific plans, such as the "Explanatory Memorandum," are built—a global blueprint for the Brotherhood's civilizational struggle.

The document's broader significance stems from several factors:

- **Comprehensive scope:** "The Project" addresses a broader range of issues and contexts than the "Explanatory Memorandum," providing insight into the Brotherhood's global vision rather than its implementation in one specific region. This comprehensive approach reflects the Brotherhood's understanding of itself as a transnational movement rather than merely a collection of national organizations.
- **Strategic sophistication:** The document demonstrates remarkable strategic sophistication in its understanding of Western institutional vulnerabilities and opportunities for Islamist influence. This sophistication challenges simplistic portrayals of Islamist movements as merely reactionary or unsophisticated, revealing instead a complex, adaptive approach to challenging Western hegemony.
- **Operational precedent:** Many strategies outlined in "The Project" have been consistently implemented across multiple Western countries, suggesting its influence extends beyond theoretical planning to practical implementation. The document's strategic approach is evident in Brotherhood operations across Europe, North America, and Australia, indicating a broader organizational adoption rather than isolated implementation.

3.3.2 Core Strategic Vision: 100-Year Plan

The strategic vision articulated in "The Project" is rooted in a long-term, multigenerational plan to expand Islamist influence across Western societies over the span of a century. This approach prioritizes gradual and sustained advancement through the cultural, institutional, and ideological integration of Islamist actors and ideas. The extended timeline is not a tactical convenience but a core element of the Brotherhood's strategic architecture, which is designed to outlast electoral cycles, leadership changes, and policy shifts.

Rather than relying on rapid mobilization or revolutionary confrontation, the Brotherhood envisions societal transformation as the cumulative result of incremental influence across education, media, law, civil society, and political structures. This vision reflects the movement's historical orientation, dating back to Hassan al-Banna, that comprehensive change requires sustained effort across all domains of public life. The 100-year horizon embedded in "The Project" underscores the Brotherhood's belief that durable transformation occurs not through disruption but through the patient, deliberate reconfiguration of society from within.

Several key elements characterize this long-term strategic vision:

- **Religious framing of historical change:** The document frames the 100-year timeframe within the Islamic understanding of divine providence in history. By positioning the Brotherhood’s mission within sacred history, the document provides religious legitimation for maintaining commitment despite limited immediate results.
- **Institutional continuation across generations:** The 100-year timeframe necessitates institutional structures capable of transmitting ideology, expertise, and commitment across multiple generations. In this context, the document emphasizes the establishment of organizations that can maintain continuity despite changes in leadership and membership.
- **Adaptation to environmental changes:** The extended timeframe requires strategic adaptability to changing political, technological, and social conditions. In this context, the document emphasizes maintaining consistent objectives while adjusting tactical methods to suit the circumstances.
- **Incremental achievement metrics:** The 100-year vision is operationalized through incremental achievements rather than exclusively focusing on the ultimate objective. The document outlines specific priorities for each phase of implementation, ensuring that progress can be measured and tactical adjustments can be made when necessary.
- Within this century-long perspective, “The Project” emphasizes tactical flexibility, secrecy, and gradualism.

3.3.3 Key Elements of the Project’s Global Strategy

While “The Project” establishes a twelve-point framework for the Muslim Brotherhood’s global strategy for Islamist expansion, the “Explanatory Memorandum” represents a detailed implementation plan for the North American context. The Memorandum translates the Project’s twelve principal “points of departure” into a concrete organizational infrastructure and operational methodology specifically adapted to Western democratic societies.

The Project’s framework emphasizes the following points: (1) knowing the terrain and adopting scientific methodology for planning; (2) demonstrating the serious nature of the work through devotion of resources; (3) reconciling international engagement with local flexibility; (4) balancing political engagement with avoiding isolation while maintaining permanent education and institutional work; (5) establishing an Islamic state through parallel, progressive efforts at controlling local centers of power; (6) working loyally alongside Islamic groups on common ground; (7) accepting temporary cooperation with nationalist movements on issues like anti-colonialism and opposition to Israel; (8) mastering the art of the possible while avoiding disproportionate confrontations; (9) constructing a permanent force for Islamic *da’wa* and supporting jihad movements; (10) using diverse surveillance systems to gather information; (11) adopting the Palestinian cause as the keystone of worldwide Islamic strategy; and (12) engaging in self-criticism and permanent evaluation.

While “The Project” outlines a set of general strategic objectives, the Memorandum establishes the mechanisms, organizations, and methods through which they can be achieved in practice. The Memorandum thus represents the operationalization of the Project’s twelve-point strategy, adapting it to the North American context and setting out what it describes as a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” for establishing Brotherhood influence in every significant domain of American society. The key elements of this process can be organized into six strategic objectives.

3.3.3.1 Infiltration of Political and Social Institutions

The document emphasizes establishing a comprehensive organizational presence across all sectors of Western society while maintaining connections with Brotherhood-aligned movements internationally. The Memorandum's detailed organizational infrastructure, which spans the religious, educational, social, economic, political, professional, legal, and media domains, reflects a systematic strategy for embedding Brotherhood influence within existing institutional frameworks rather than operating solely through isolated Islamic organizations. This approach implements what political scientists call "institutional permeation"—the practice of gaining influence within existing structures through professional expertise, coalition building, and strategic positioning rather than creating entirely parallel institutions. By establishing Brotherhood-aligned organizations across every major societal domain, the Memorandum creates a framework for influencing Western institutional decision-making from within while presenting these organizations as legitimate stakeholders in their respective fields.

This institutional strategy aims to place Brotherhood-aligned individuals in positions of influence across multiple sectors. The Memorandum's comprehensive framework calls for establishing organizational presence in every significant domain of American society, from "political organizations" including "a central political party" and "local political offices," to "professional, vocational and trade union organizations" that would embed Brotherhood perspectives within professional associations, to "legal organizations" that would influence the application of law and policy. This approach implements what network theorists call "nodal infiltration"—the practice of targeting key positions that provide disproportionate influence within organizational networks. By systematically placing Brotherhood-aligned individuals in professional associations, policy advisory roles, legal organizations, and civic institutions, the Memorandum establishes a framework for shaping institutional decisions from within rather than relying solely on external advocacy or political pressure.

The institutional infiltration strategy operates at multiple levels:

- **International organizations:** The Brotherhood aims to secure roles in global bodies, such as the United Nations and financial institutions. In this context, the document emphasizes the importance of a "progressive" internal focus and coordinated external action to support long-term goals.
- **National government agencies:** The Brotherhood seeks to position allies in the security establishment, the education system, and social services. The Memorandum identifies the Palestinian cause as a central vehicle for this engagement, emphasizing the importance of "adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally" with Palestine serving as the primary mobilizing issue that creates entry points into policy debates, government consultations, and institutional decision-making processes. By positioning Brotherhood-aligned organizations as authoritative voices on the Palestinian issue, the network gains access to national security discussions, foreign policy deliberations, and civil rights frameworks, enabling influence over government agencies far beyond the immediate Palestinian context.
- **Civil society organizations:** The Brotherhood targets NGOs that focus on human rights and religious freedom, while mobilizing students to revive Islamic activism and utilizing campuses as gateways to broader social influence. The Memorandum emphasizes the importance of establishing comprehensive "youth organizations" and leveraging student networks like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is explicitly listed among the Brotherhood's organizations, to "expand the observant Muslim base" and "unify and direct Muslims' efforts" through systematic campus activism that creates pipelines for ideological transmission, leadership development, and long-term institutional influence across multiple generations.

- **Professional associations:** The Brotherhood promotes minority-focused jurisprudence to guide Muslim professionals in law, medicine, education, and media, thus establishing parallel associations that shape discourse and standards alongside mainstream bodies. The Memorandum calls for establishing comprehensive “professional, vocational and trade union organizations” and “legal organizations” that would embed Brotherhood perspectives within professional frameworks, while developing “a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.” This approach creates Brotherhood-aligned professional networks that can influence standards, ethics, and practices within their respective fields while maintaining the appearance of independent professional judgment.

This multi-level approach allows Brotherhood-aligned organizations to exert consistent influence across various layers of governance and social structure. By positioning ideologically aligned individuals in key roles within education, media, policy institutions, and civil society at both local and national levels, the movement can coordinate decision-making processes, public discourse, and institutional norms. This layered deployment enhances the Brotherhood’s capacity to promote and reinforce its objectives simultaneously across different domains, resulting in an outsized impact relative to its demographic size or formal political representation.

The document emphasizes that this infiltration should occur gradually and strategically, integrating Brotherhood-aligned individuals and perspectives into existing institutional structures without triggering defensive responses. The Memorandum’s *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) framework inherently emphasizes a long-term, incremental approach rather than confrontational tactics, calling for organizations to master “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to embed themselves within institutional frameworks. This deliberately patient strategy reflects the document’s recognition that institutional penetration requires time, relationship building, and the establishment of credibility within target organizations before Brotherhood perspectives can effectively shape institutional policies and priorities.

3.3.3.2 Gaining Influence over Education and Media

The Memorandum places particular emphasis on educational and media institutions as primary vectors for shaping social values and narratives. The document explicitly calls for establishing comprehensive “media and art organizations,” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” and extensive media infrastructure, alongside “cultural and intellectual organizations,” including “a center for studies and research,” “an organization for Islamic thought and culture,” and “a publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books.” This strategic priority reflects a recognition that influence over cultural and intellectual institutions is essential for long-term societal transformation. By seeking to shape the production and dissemination of knowledge through education, media, religious discourse, and academic scholarship, Brotherhood-aligned networks aim to embed their worldview within society’s normative frameworks. Control over these cultural arenas enables the movement to define acceptable discourse, marginalize dissenting views, and gradually normalize ideological positions that align with its broader objectives.

The educational strategy operates through multiple channels:

- **Establishing Islamic schools:** Creating independent educational institutions that transmit Brotherhood ideology to younger generations. The Memorandum explicitly calls for establishing “education organizations,” including “public and private schools,” “the Council of Islamic Schools in North America,” and a comprehensive Islamic educational infrastructure that would shape Muslim youth development from childhood through university. This institutional framework enables the Brotherhood to control the educational

environment, curriculum content, and ideological formation of subsequent generations while presenting these schools as serving legitimate community needs for Islamic education.

- **Influencing the curriculum in public schools:** Shaping how Islam and Islamic history are presented in mainstream educational systems.
- **Developing Islamic studies programs in universities:** Establishing academic centers that provide intellectual legitimation for Brotherhood perspectives. The Memorandum calls for the creation of “cultural and intellectual organizations,” including “a center for studies and research,” “an organization for Islamic thought and culture,” and “a publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books,” alongside infiltrating existing academic institutions through faculty placement and the development of Middle East studies programs. This dual approach of creating Brotherhood-aligned research centers while embedding sympathetic scholars within mainstream universities enables the movement to shape academic discourse and generate scholarly legitimacy for its ideological positions.
- **Training teachers and educational administrators:** Placing ideologically aligned individuals in positions to influence educational policy and practice. The Memorandum’s comprehensive organizational framework emphasizes developing leadership capacity across all domains, with a particular focus on educational institutions as vehicles for multigenerational influence. By systematically training and placing Brotherhood-aligned educators within both Islamic schools and mainstream educational institutions, the network creates sustained capability to shape how Islam is understood and how Muslim identity is formed among younger generations. This emphasis on educational professionals reflects recognition of their multiplier effect on subsequent generations and their ability to influence institutional policies beyond individual classroom instruction.

Similarly, the media strategy encompasses multiple dimensions:

- **Creating independent Islamic media platforms:** Establishing newspapers, websites, radio stations, and television channels that present news and commentary from Brotherhood perspectives. The Memorandum explicitly calls for establishing comprehensive “media and art organizations” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “audio and visual centers,” “a production office,” and “a marketing and art production office.” While this specific framework reflects the media environment of the 1980s and 1990s, the principle of establishing independent media platforms controlled by Brotherhood-aligned networks has been implemented across multiple formats as technology has evolved, from satellite television networks like Al Jazeera to digital platforms and social media operations.
- **Placing aligned journalists in mainstream media:** Influencing coverage of Islam and Muslim communities in major media outlets. The Memorandum’s emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” extends to media relations, with Brotherhood-aligned organizations systematically cultivating relationships with mainstream journalists, providing expert sources for stories about Islam and Muslim communities, and positioning Brotherhood representatives as authoritative voices on relevant issues. This approach reflects an understanding of the mainstream media’s agenda-setting function and the importance of influencing coverage from within through source relationships and expert positioning rather than merely criticizing media coverage from outside.
- **Developing compelling narrative frameworks:** Creating interpretive frameworks that shape how events are understood and contextualized. The Memorandum’s call to “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts” and to master “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the

principles of ‘cooperation’” extends to coordinated messaging across the organizational network. By establishing consistent interpretive frameworks across multiple Brotherhood-aligned media platforms, educational institutions, and advocacy organizations, the movement creates reinforcing narratives that shape public understanding of events related to Islam, Muslim communities, and Middle Eastern conflicts. This coordination ensures that diverse organizations present complementary messaging despite appearing to operate independently, creating the impression of a broad consensus around Brotherhood perspectives rather than the calculated promotion of a centrally directed narrative.

- **Exploiting political correctness concerns:** Using Western societies’ commitments to religious freedom, diversity, and anti-discrimination protections to shield Brotherhood activities from critical scrutiny. The Memorandum frames the Brotherhood’s work as operating within the parameters of democratic systems, positioning the movement to leverage legal protections, institutional norms, and cultural sensitivities about religious tolerance to create protected space for Islamist messaging while characterizing any criticism as discrimination or Islamophobia. This approach strategically uses the openness of democratic societies and their commitment to pluralism to advance an ideological agenda that ultimately seeks to transform those very societies according to Brotherhood objectives.

This comprehensive focus on shaping knowledge production and dissemination enables Brotherhood-aligned organizations to influence the interpretive frameworks through which key issues are understood. By embedding themselves within both educational and media institutions, these networks can affect how Islam is taught, how global events are contextualized, and how Western societies perceive their relationship with Islamist movements. Through sustained presence in these sectors, the Brotherhood can guide public discourse, define narrative boundaries, and promote ideological interpretations that support its strategic aims.

3.3.3.3 Legal and Political Manipulation

The Memorandum establishes a comprehensive framework for leveraging Western legal systems to advance Brotherhood objectives while shielding the movement from accountability. This approach reflects what legal scholars call “lawfare”—the strategic use of legal systems to achieve objectives that would be difficult to achieve through direct political action.

The legal strategy operates through several mechanisms:

- **Expanding the definition of religious freedom:** Advocating broad interpretations of religious liberty that encompass not merely private belief but public practice according to Brotherhood standards, including the implementation of Islamic legal principles in various contexts. The Memorandum calls for establishing comprehensive “legal organizations,” including a “Central Jurisprudence Council” and a “Central Islamic Court,” and developing “a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.” This approach uses religious freedom frameworks to legitimize political positions by framing them as religious obligations protected under constitutional law, thereby transforming ideological objectives into legally protected religious practices.
- **Exploiting anti-discrimination frameworks:** Using legal protections against discrimination to shield Brotherhood activities from scrutiny while simultaneously attacking critics through allegations of Islamophobia. The Memorandum’s call to establish “the Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights” and a “Muslim Attorneys Society” creates a dedicated legal infrastructure specifically designed to leverage anti-discrimination law as both a shield against criticism and a weapon against opponents. By framing ideological criticism as

religious discrimination, Brotherhood-aligned legal organizations transform legitimate scrutiny of Islamist ideology into actionable civil rights violations, effectively using Western legal protections to insulate the movement from accountability.

- **Establishing legitimacy through litigation:** Using courts to establish legal precedents favorable to Brotherhood objectives and to impose financial and reputational costs on critics. The Memorandum’s emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” extends to strategic litigation that shapes legal standards, establishes organizational legitimacy, and deters opponents through the threat of costly legal proceedings. By systematically pursuing litigation that advances Brotherhood interests while simultaneously defending against legal challenges to Brotherhood-aligned organizations, the network uses the judicial system to gradually normalize its positions and establish legal frameworks favorable to its long-term objectives.

The political strategy complements legal efforts through:

- **Supporting candidates sympathetic to Brotherhood positions:** Providing financial and organizational support to politicians who advance Brotherhood interests. The Memorandum explicitly calls for establishing comprehensive “political organizations” including “a central political party,” “local political offices,” “political symbols,” “relationships and alliances,” and the “American Organization for Islamic Political Action.” This emphasis on developing political infrastructure and leadership capacity reflects an understanding that elected officials and direct participation in political processes provide more effective influence than external lobbying alone. By systematically developing Muslim political candidates, supporting sympathetic non-Muslim politicians, and building organizational capacity for political mobilization, the Brotherhood network creates direct pathways to policy influence.
- **Creating coalition partnerships with other groups:** Forming alliances with non-Muslim organizations around shared tactical objectives, particularly with progressive movements. The Memorandum explicitly states that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work” and emphasizes the necessity of mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” This directive has been operationalized through systematic alliance building with progressive organizations around issues like civil rights, anti-discrimination, and foreign policy, enabling Brotherhood-aligned groups to amplify their influence through coalition partners while presenting their positions as part of broader progressive movements rather than as specifically Islamist objectives.
- **Framing Brotherhood objectives in progressive terminology:** Presenting Islamist positions using language familiar and acceptable to Western progressive audiences. While the Memorandum frames its objectives in explicitly Islamic terms—calling for “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative” and describing the work as “a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within”—Brotherhood-aligned organizations have in practice systematically adopted progressive terminology around social justice, minority rights, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism to present their positions. This rhetorical adaptation enables the movement to pursue fundamentally Islamist objectives while framing them in ways that resonate with progressive audiences and obscure the civilizational confrontation that the Memorandum explicitly articulates.

This legal-political strategy is designed to leverage the protections and procedural mechanisms of liberal democracies to advance objectives that may fundamentally conflict with those very systems. By operating within established legal frameworks and engaging with political processes, Brotherhood-aligned organizations are able to secure institutional legitimacy, access, and protection,

despite promoting an ideological vision that challenges core democratic values. This approach allows the movement to exploit systemic openness while remaining insulated from scrutiny, effectively using democratic norms to facilitate nondemocratic aims.

3.3.3.4 Creating Islamic Financial Networks

The Memorandum places significant emphasis on the creation of independent financial institutions, explicitly calling for the establishment of comprehensive “economic organizations” including “Islamic endowments,” “Islamic banks,” “investment projects,” and “companies, agencies and factories” that would operate according to Islamic principles. This focus reflects a deliberate effort to construct alternative economic frameworks governed by distinct religious and ideological principles while providing financial independence for the Brotherhood network. By establishing autonomous financial infrastructures—from the North American Islamic Trust’s property holdings to Islamic banking institutions and investment vehicles—Brotherhood-aligned actors aim to reduce dependency on mainstream economic systems while reinforcing communal cohesion and ideological consistency through financial self-sufficiency. These economic organizations serve multiple strategic functions: they provide revenue streams independent of external oversight, create employment opportunities for ideologically aligned individuals, establish financial services that reinforce Islamic identity and practice, and generate resources that can be directed toward advancing the settlement mission across multiple organizational domains.

The financial strategy operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Establishing Islamic banking institutions:** Creating financial services that operate according to sharia principles, particularly the prohibition on charging interest. The Memorandum explicitly calls for establishing “Islamic banks” as part of its comprehensive “economic organizations” framework, creating financial institutions that reinforce Islamic identity through everyday transactions while generating revenue streams independent of mainstream banking oversight. This emphasis on financial independence reflects an understanding that economic autonomy provides a foundation for political and cultural influence by ensuring that Brotherhood-aligned organizations are not dependent on external funding sources that might impose ideological or operational constraints.
- **Developing halal investment channels:** Creating investment vehicles that comply with Islamic restrictions on specific industries such as alcohol, gambling, and interest-bearing instruments. The Memorandum calls for establishing “investment projects” and “companies, agencies and factories” that would operate according to Islamic principles, creating economic opportunities for Muslims while building wealth that can be directed toward advancing the settlement mission. These investment channels serve both practical functions, by providing sharia-compliant financial products for observant Muslims, and strategic purposes, by creating self-sustaining revenue sources for Brotherhood organizational infrastructure.
- **Building *zakat* (charitable tax) networks:** Establishing systems for collecting and distributing religious philanthropic donations according to Islamic law. The Memorandum’s framework for “social and charitable organizations” creates infrastructure for collecting *zakat*—a religious obligation requiring Muslims to donate a percentage of their wealth annually—and directing these funds toward Brotherhood-aligned institutions and causes. This religious obligation creates substantial resource flows outside mainstream financial regulation and tax systems, providing funding that can be directed according to ideological priorities while reinforcing donors’ Islamic identity and commitment to the community.
- **Creating *waqf* (religious endowment) institutions:** Developing long-term financing through religious endowments that provide sustainable funding for Islamic institutions. The

Memorandum explicitly calls for establishing “Islamic endowments” as part of its economic infrastructure, creating permanent funding mechanisms that can support Brotherhood operations across generations. Organizations like the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) operationalize this directive by holding property titles for hundreds of mosques and Islamic centers, ensuring long-term institutional control and financial sustainability independent of annual fundraising or external donors.

The Brotherhood’s emphasis on financial independence reflects a strategic understanding that economic power underpins broader influence across the political, social, and cultural domains. The Memorandum’s comprehensive organizational framework positions economic institutions as foundational to the entire settlement mission, providing the resources necessary to sustain operations across the educational, media, legal, political, and social domains. By creating parallel financial systems governed by Islamic principles, Brotherhood-aligned networks protect their ideological integrity from external interference, whether from Western governments seeking financial transparency or from Muslim-majority states that oppose the Brotherhood’s ideology. This financial autonomy enables the movement to pursue long-term objectives without dependency on funding sources that might impose constraints or accountability mechanisms incompatible with Brotherhood goals.

This approach enables sustained funding for movement activities while reinforcing internal discipline and community cohesion. By insulating their economic operations from conventional market pressures or donor conditions, Brotherhood-aligned organizations can ensure that financial decision-making aligns with strategic objectives rather than external expectations. Financial autonomy, in this context, is not merely practical; it is ideological, allowing the Brotherhood to build resilient, self-sufficient institutions capable of advancing its long-term vision without compromise.

The Role of Qatar

Qatar has played a central role in sustaining and amplifying the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated movements. While maintaining close relations with Western states, particularly the United States, Qatar has simultaneously acted as a patron of Islamist organizations, hosting and protecting their leadership and providing extensive financial resources. For decades, Doha has given sanctuary to leading Brotherhood figures, most notably Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who was widely regarded as the movement’s spiritual guide. Banned from entering the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and several Middle Eastern states, al-Qaradawi lived in Qatar until his death, symbolizing the country’s willingness to offer safe haven to high-profile Islamist ideologues.

Qatar has also emerged as the leading foreign donor to US universities since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Billions of dollars in Qatari funds have been channeled into American higher education, much of it without proper disclosure as required under US law. This funding has been linked to a rise in antisemitism on campuses and the normalization of values that challenge democratic norms, illustrating how educational philanthropy has been used as an instrument of ideological influence.¹⁴⁵

3.3.3.5 Building Alliances with Non-Islamic Groups

The Memorandum explicitly emphasizes the strategic importance of alliance building, stating that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work” and calling for organizations to “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” This

¹⁴⁵ *Networks of Hate: Qatari Paymasters, Soft Power, and the Manipulation of Democracy* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Networks-of-Hate_5DEC.pdf.

directive reflects a calculated approach to alliance building grounded in tactical convergence rather than ideological alignment. By collaborating with groups that share their short-term goals—such as opposition to specific foreign policies, criticism of capitalism, or advocacy for minority rights—Brotherhood-aligned actors can expand their influence, access new platforms, and amplify their messaging within broader political coalitions. These partnerships, while temporary or issue-specific in nature, serve to legitimize Brotherhood narratives and embed them within mainstream activist and policy discourse. The Memorandum’s framework establishes coalition building not as a peripheral tactic but as a central strategic imperative, recognizing that Brotherhood objectives can be advanced through partnerships with organizations that would reject explicit Islamist ideology but share specific tactical objectives.

The alliance strategy targets several categories of potential partners:

- **Progressive leftist organizations:** The Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work” has been operationalized primarily through systematic engagement with progressive movements focused on social justice, anti-imperialism, and identity-based activism. This emphasis reveals a deliberate strategy of tactical coordination with external actors based on shared short-term interests, even where fundamental ideological differences remain. By aligning with movements that share specific policy aims or cultural criticism—particularly regarding Western foreign policy, systemic discrimination, and anti-colonial narratives—Brotherhood-aligned networks embed their agenda within broader activist coalitions, thereby gaining visibility, legitimacy, and influence in arenas that would otherwise be closed to explicitly Islamist organizations.
- **Minority rights organizations:** The Memorandum’s call to master “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” extends to forming alliances with organizations representing other minorities around shared concerns about discrimination and civil rights. By positioning Muslims as one minority group among many facing discrimination, Brotherhood-aligned organizations leverage broader anti-discrimination frameworks to create legal and institutional protections for specifically Islamic practices and institutions. This approach enables the movement to pursue distinctly Islamist objectives such as implementing Islamic legal principles or shielding Brotherhood ideology from criticism, while framing these goals in the universal language of minority rights and religious freedom that resonates across diverse communities and enjoys broad institutional support.
- **Anti-war and anti-Western movements:** The Memorandum’s emphasis on “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” has been implemented through systematic collaboration with organizations opposing Western military interventions in Muslim-majority countries. By framing American and European foreign policy as fundamentally hostile to Muslim populations and presenting conflicts through anti-imperialist frameworks, Brotherhood-aligned organizations create common cause with anti-war and anti-Western movements that share opposition to specific military actions despite having fundamentally different ideological foundations. This alliance strategy enables Brotherhood networks to position themselves within broader progressive coalitions while advancing specifically Islamist interpretations of these conflicts that serve Brotherhood strategic objectives.

By forming coalitions around shared tactical objectives, Brotherhood-aligned organizations can extend their influence beyond their core constituencies. These alliances enable them to borrow credibility from more established or widely accepted organizations, thereby gaining access to institutional networks and protection from public scrutiny. This dynamic allows for the Brotherhood to embed its agenda within mainstream activist movements while masking deeper ideological divergences.

The Memorandum's directive to master "the art of 'coalitions,' the art of 'absorption,' and the principles of 'cooperation'" frames these partnerships as strategically instrumental rather than a reflection of deep ideological convergence. The document's statement that "there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work" explicitly acknowledges that coalition partners need not share Brotherhood ideology but merely "agree in work" on specific tactical objectives. This candid framework highlights the movement's strategic approach: pursuing collaboration based on converging short-term interests while maintaining long-term ideological autonomy. In practice, this allows the Brotherhood to engage in coordinated campaigns with ideologically distinct partners without compromising its ultimate vision of "presenting Islam as a civilization alternative" and pursuing "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within." The movement leverages temporary convergence on specific issues, such as foreign policy, civil rights, or anti-discrimination, while avoiding complete alignment with partners' different ultimate goals, enabling Brotherhood networks to access progressive institutional platforms and amplify their messaging while remaining fundamentally committed to objectives that many coalition partners would reject if explicitly articulated.

3.3.3.6 Promoting Islamic Immigration, Identity Politics, and Parallel Societies

The Memorandum sets out a comprehensive strategy to preserve the distinct identity of Muslim minority communities in Western societies while simultaneously promoting their active engagement in public life. This dual orientation is not framed as a contradiction but as a deliberate effort to establish and maintain strong internal cohesion while positioning communities to influence the broader political and cultural environment. The document's extensive list of the required organizational infrastructure across the religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media domains creates what amounts to a parallel institutional ecosystem designed to ensure that Muslim communities in Western states are not absorbed into prevailing secular and liberal institutions but instead maintain an enduring religious and cultural distinctiveness. The Memorandum's framework encompasses "religious organizations" including mosques and Islamic centers, "education organizations" including Islamic schools, "social and charitable organizations" providing community services, and "cultural and intellectual organizations" producing Islamic content, all functioning to maintain Islamic identity and practice while operating within Western societies. This comprehensive institutional infrastructure enables Muslims to live according to Brotherhood interpretations of Islamic principles across all life domains while remaining physically present and increasingly influential within Western countries.

A key dimension of this strategy is resistance to assimilation. In this context, the document recommends elaborating a specialized body of jurisprudence for minority contexts in order to provide a theological justification for the maintenance of distinct religious and cultural practices in non-Muslim societies. By embedding religious authority into the everyday lives of minority communities, this jurisprudence supplies a framework for continuity that legitimizes separation from mainstream practices. The establishment of independent Islamic schools, cultural centers, and social organizations serves as the institutional expression of this approach. These institutions function not only as service providers but also as mechanisms for transmitting values, embedding a distinct worldview, and reducing reliance on the host state. Sociologists refer to this phenomenon as "institutional completeness," which describes a situation in which a community achieves the capacity to reproduce itself socially, culturally, and ideologically without dependence on external systems.

This strategy also makes use of the legal and political protections available within Western democratic systems. By framing Muslim identity as a category deserving of anti-discrimination safeguards, Brotherhood-aligned organizations can secure rights and privileges for distinct communal practices that might otherwise be contested. Islamic identity is thereby positioned not as

an optional expression of culture but as a protected dimension of diversity, alongside categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation. This move transforms cultural separation into a constitutionally defended form of pluralism and ensures that efforts to preserve doctrinal and cultural boundaries are legitimized and supported by the legal frameworks of liberal democracies.

Education and youth development are treated as crucial to this process. “The Project” highlights the importance of women in ensuring intergenerational transmission, identifying them as the educators of children and therefore the custodians of continuity. By prioritizing the education of women and girls in Islamic principles, the movement situates the family as the most important institution for sustaining identity and transmitting values. The household is therefore conceptualized not simply as a private space but as the core site for the reproduction of ideology and the preservation of communal distinctiveness.

The emphasis on identity preservation is complemented by an equally strong emphasis on building parallel societies. “The Project” calls for the development of autonomous institutions across all areas of life, including education, law, finance, media, and social services. Schools and universities transmit religious and cultural values; professional and scientific institutes produce cadres capable of serving both community needs and broader strategic aims; informal sharia-based frameworks provide alternative means of resolving family and commercial disputes; media outlets disseminate narratives rooted in Islamic perspectives; Islamic banks, businesses, and professional associations create financial independence; and welfare and healthcare programs deliver services that cultivate solidarity while minimizing reliance on the state. These institutions operate together to form a parallel infrastructure that mirrors the functions of the host society but reflects the ideological and cultural principles promoted by the Brotherhood.

Taken as a whole, this approach represents an attempt to build communities that are functionally autonomous, operating under their own internal principles while remaining formally within the geographic and legal boundaries of Western states. These infrastructures serve both practical and symbolic functions. They address everyday needs while also reinforcing the perception of Muslim communities as distinct bodies with their own norms, obligations, and governance systems. In this sense, community life is both materially sustained and ideologically framed in ways that reduce assimilation and maintain separation.

Importantly, “The Project” does not advocate isolation from wider society but rather encourages calibrated engagement. It explicitly instructs Muslims to spread Islamic concepts that reject submission to outside authority and to oppose what it refers to as the rulings of *jahiliyyah*—systems of ignorance associated with non-Islamic governance. This guidance reflects a dual strategy. On the one hand, Brotherhood-aligned networks are directed to engage outwardly with political and social systems in order to secure legitimacy, resources, and influence. On the other hand, they are instructed to maintain doctrinal separation and to resist full cultural integration. The model that emerges is one of selective adaptation. Communities are expected to embrace aspects of the host society that strengthen their operational effectiveness and provide access to power, while at the same time preserving ideological boundaries and ensuring the continuity of a distinct religious and cultural identity.

Through this comprehensive strategy, Brotherhood-aligned organizations seek to insulate Muslim communities from the assimilative pressures of liberal democracies, while simultaneously leveraging the protections and opportunities that those same democracies provide. The result is an enduring infrastructure capable of maintaining communal autonomy, transmitting values across generations, and exerting influence in wider society, all within the formal boundaries of Western legal and political systems.

3.3.4 The Project's Relationship to Traditional Brotherhood Doctrine

"The Project" represents a sophisticated adaptation of traditional Brotherhood doctrine to Western contexts. It maintains the fundamental objectives established by al-Banna—comprehensive Islamization ultimately leading to Islamic governance—while adapting its methods to the specific challenges and opportunities presented by Western democratic systems.

Several key adaptations are particularly of note:

- **Emphasis on nonviolent methods:** In contrast to the tactics of jihadist movements that share similar ideological foundations, "The Project" advocates for nonviolent methods of societal transformation, based on the Brotherhood's assessment that overt confrontation would be ineffective and potentially damaging in Western environments. The Memorandum's comprehensive framework for *tamkeen* (settlement) through institutional development across the religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media domains reflects a deliberate preference for institutional engagement, procedural participation, and strategic influence over coercive tactics. Rather than abandoning their ideological goals of "presenting Islam as a civilization alternative" and pursuing "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within," Brotherhood-aligned actors seek to achieve them through more adaptive and less confrontational means, leveraging existing democratic structures to advance their long-term objectives while minimizing the risk of exposure or legal sanction.
- **Long-term perspective:** The generational timeframe implicit in the Memorandum's comprehensive institutional framework reflects the Brotherhood's understanding that immediate transformation of Western societies is impossible, instead requiring a patient, multigenerational effort. The document's call to establish comprehensive "media and art organizations," including "a daily newspaper," "weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines," "radio stations," and "television programs," alongside "cultural and intellectual organizations," including research centers and publishing houses, reflects a recognition that cultural transformation requires sustained effort over extended periods rather than immediate revolutionary change. By establishing an institutional infrastructure that will persist across generations and systematically shape how Islam is understood and Muslim identity is formed, the Memorandum creates a framework for civilizational transformation that unfolds over decades rather than years.
- **Strategic ambiguity:** "The Project" is deliberately vague when it comes to certain sensitive topics, such as the Brotherhood's ultimate political objectives, allowing for tactical flexibility and protection from accusations of subversion. This ambiguity facilitates a state of "plausible deniability," enabling Brotherhood-aligned organizations to maintain sufficient opacity to avoid direct confrontation while providing direction to initiated members who understand the civilizational objectives articulated in internal documents such as the Memorandum.
- **Cultural rather than territorial focus:** Departing from classical models of Islamist expansion centered on territorial conquest, "The Project" prioritizes cultural transformation and institutional influence as the principal means of advancing Islamic governance in non-Muslim societies. The Memorandum's comprehensive list of the required organizational infrastructure, spanning religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media institutions, reflects a strategy focused on building ideological and communal authority through durable institutional presence rather than physical territorial control. By embedding influence in the cultural and social fabric of host societies through mosques, Islamic schools, professional associations, media platforms, and legal organizations, Brotherhood-aligned networks seek to exercise normative leadership, shaping identity, behavior, and public

discourse without the need for territorial sovereignty. This approach implements a civilizational strategy that transforms societies from within through institutional influence rather than through external conquest or overt political revolution.

These adaptations demonstrate the Brotherhood's ability to adapt its operational methods in response to varying political and cultural environments, while maintaining its overarching strategic objectives. Rather than altering its ideological end goals, "The Project" outlines a flexible approach that allows for variation in tactics based on local conditions, legal frameworks, and societal norms. This capacity for situational responsiveness enables the Brotherhood to embed itself effectively within Western systems, advancing its agenda incrementally without abandoning its foundational vision. The result is a model of ideological consistency paired with tactical pragmatism—the hallmark of the Brotherhood's long-term strategy.

3.4 Comparative Analysis of the Strategic Documents

The "Explanatory Memorandum" and "The Project" present complementary frameworks for implementing the Brotherhood's *tamkeen* strategy in Western countries. While they share many of the same fundamental objectives and methodological principles, they differ in scope, emphasis, and contextual application.

3.4.1 Shared Elements

The "Explanatory Memorandum" and "The Project" share several fundamental elements that reflect core Brotherhood doctrine:

- **Civilizational framing:** Both documents present the Brotherhood's mission in civilizational rather than merely religious terms, positioning Islam as a comprehensive alternative to Western civilization rather than simply a different faith. The "Explanatory Memorandum" explicitly states that "the process of settlement is a 'Civilization-Jihadist Process'" and describes the Brotherhood's work in America as "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and 'sabotaging' its miserable house," while calling for "presenting Islam as a civilization alternative." This civilizational framing indicates that Brotherhood activities are not merely aimed at protecting Muslim religious practice or advocating for community interests but at fundamentally transforming Western societies according to Islamic principles as interpreted by the Brotherhood. By framing the mission in civilizational terms, both documents position the Brotherhood's institutional development, coalition building, and political engagement as components of a comprehensive project aimed at replacing Western civilization's foundational principles with Islamic governance and social organization.

The Brotherhood's framing of its mission in civilizational rather than purely religious terms signals a deliberate effort to present Islamism as a comprehensive alternative to Western liberalism. This approach challenges prevailing narratives about history, governance, and human purpose by offering an all-encompassing ideological framework rooted in Islamic principles. In doing so, Brotherhood strategists elevate their objectives beyond issue-specific activism to a broader contest over societal direction and civilizational identity. This reframing transforms their engagement from a debate over policy into a fundamental confrontation between competing worldviews.

- **Gradualist methodology:** Both the "Explanatory Memorandum" and "The Project" advocate a strategy of gradual, patient advancement rather than abrupt or revolutionary change. This reflects the Brotherhood's assessment that immediate transformation is neither feasible nor sustainable in Western contexts. The "Explanatory Memorandum" refers to this as "a long

and painful” process, while “The Project” envisions a 100-year timeline for implementation. This measured approach enables the Brotherhood to pursue incremental gains across political, educational, cultural, and legal domains, each step calibrated to avoid provoking defensive institutional responses. Taken together, these small, seemingly benign advances accumulate into a broader transformation of societal norms and institutional practices, allowing the movement to realize its objectives through embedded influence rather than overt confrontation.

- **Institutional focus:** Both the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” place institutional development at the center of their strategy for societal transformation, recognizing that enduring influence depends not only on individual persuasion but also on the creation and control of lasting organizational structures. The “Explanatory Memorandum” provides a comprehensive list of 29 Brotherhood-affiliated organizations spanning the religious, educational, social, economic, political, legal, and media domains, creating a detailed blueprint for an institutional infrastructure that extends into all sectors of American society. This institutional focus reflects a deliberate effort to embed ideological influence within formal organizations that can operate independently of specific leaders or moments in time. By constructing a broad and durable network of institutions encompassing mosques, Islamic schools, professional associations, legal organizations, media platforms, and social service providers, the Brotherhood ensures continuity, legitimacy, and strategic depth, enabling it to achieve a long-term societal impact that surpasses the limits of individual leadership and survives changes in political climate or public opinion.
- **Multi-domain approach:** Both the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” advocate for coordinated activity across a wide range of domains—political, educational, social, economic, and cultural—demonstrating the Brotherhood’s comprehensive vision of societal transformation. The “Explanatory Memorandum” identifies specific sectors for engagement and influence, while “The Project” provides tailored strategies for each domain. This multifaceted approach enables Brotherhood-aligned organizations to generate reinforcing effects across institutions, policies, and cultural norms. By advancing their objectives through multiple channels simultaneously, they can amplify their overall impact, embedding ideological influence across the full spectrum of public life rather than relying on isolated points of entry.
- **Strategic flexibility:** Both the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” emphasize the importance of adapting tactics to specific local contexts while maintaining an unwavering commitment to long-term strategic goals. The “Explanatory Memorandum” calls for organizations to “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation,’” establishing a framework for tactical adaptation based on circumstances while remaining unified through shared commitment to the “Civilization-Jihadist Process” of settlement. The document’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work” reflects a recognition that coalition partners need not share the Brotherhood’s ideology but merely align with it on specific tactical objectives. This approach reflects a doctrine of strategic flexibility—the ability to shift operational methods, coalition partnerships, and public messaging in response to changing political, legal, and cultural environments without compromising core ideological aims. Such adaptability allows Brotherhood-aligned organizations to navigate constraints while steadily advancing their broader agenda of establishing Islamic institutional dominance within Western societies.

3.4.2 Variations in Strategic Priorities

Despite these shared fundamentals, the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” exhibit several unique emphases reflecting their different contexts and purposes:

- **Geographic scope:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” is tailored specifically to the North American context, addressing the unique institutional and societal conditions facing Muslim communities in the United States and Canada. It explicitly describes “the Ikhwan’s [Brotherhood’s] work in America” and frames its comprehensive list of organizations as an infrastructure for settlement within American society, offering a detailed roadmap for local organizational development adapted to the specific opportunities and constraints of the North American environment. In contrast, “The Project” presents a broader framework designed for implementation across all countries where Muslim populations reside, particularly in the West, without the same level of context-specific detail regarding particular national contexts. This variation in geographic focus reflects the differing purposes of the two documents. The Memorandum functions as a localized strategic plan for institutional execution within North American democratic and legal frameworks, while “The Project” articulates transnational strategic principles applicable across diverse Western contexts requiring adaptation to specific national circumstances.

Despite this divergence in scope, both documents reflect a shared set of long-term objectives. Their differences lie in the adaptation of the recommended methods to specific regional environments. By maintaining core strategic principles while tailoring operational tactics to local political, legal, and cultural conditions, Brotherhood-aligned actors demonstrate a deliberate capacity to regionalize their global ambitions. This ability to translate ideological commitments into context-sensitive practices enhances the movement’s effectiveness across varied democratic settings.

- **Organizational specificity:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” offers detailed insight into the Brotherhood’s North American network, including an appendix that lists 29 specific affiliated organizations. In contrast, “The Project” adopts a more general approach, referring to the creation of institutional types without naming specific entities. This variation in specificity is related to differing levels of intended circulation and operational utility. The Memorandum’s detailed disclosures suggest it was designed for internal use within the Brotherhood’s leadership in North America, where implementation requires precise organizational coordination. “The Project,” by contrast, appears to be intended for broader dissemination across diverse contexts, necessitating a degree of ambiguity that allows for contextual adaptation without exposing sensitive operational information.

This contrast reflects the strategic use of informational discretion, whereby detailed planning is compartmentalized and reserved for the local leadership, while broader frameworks guide parallel efforts at the global level. Such differentiation enhances operational security while ensuring consistency of vision across regions.

- **Temporal framing:** “The Project” posits an explicit century-long timeline, framing its objectives within a clearly defined 100-year plan. In contrast, the “Explanatory Memorandum” refers to a “long-term” process but refrains from specifying a precise temporal horizon. This divergence in temporal framing reflects the documents’ differing strategic functions. “The Project” serves as a high-level blueprint that emphasizes long-range vision and strategic patience, while the “Explanatory Memorandum” is geared toward more immediate, region-specific implementation that benefits from tactical flexibility.

The contrast suggests a deliberate calibration of temporal guidance. The clarity of the Project’s timeframe helps unify diverse actors around a shared long-term vision, while the Memorandum’s ambiguity allows local leaders to adapt timelines based on contextual variables. Together, they reflect a broader strategic design that balances centralized direction with decentralized execution across varying political and cultural environments.

- **Tactical detailing:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” operates at a more tactical level of planning, offering detailed implementation guidance, including lists of specific organizations and concrete actions tailored to the North American context. In contrast, “The Project” remains at the level of strategic doctrine, articulating general principles and long-term objectives without delving into operational specifics. This distinction reflects the documents’ different roles within the Brotherhood’s planning hierarchy.

The broader strategic orientation of “The Project” provides a flexible framework that is adaptable to a range of contexts, while the “Explanatory Memorandum” translates these overarching principles into actionable steps suited for a specific regional environment. This structure mirrors a tiered approach to planning in which central documents outline ideological direction and long-range goals and subordinate texts operationalize them according to local conditions. Such a model allows the Brotherhood to maintain consistency in its overall mission while granting regional actors the discretion needed for effective localized execution.

- **Security consciousness:** “The Project” demonstrates a higher degree of security consciousness, employing coded language, religious allegory, and abstract formulations, particularly when addressing sensitive topics. This contrasts with the “Explanatory Memorandum,” which is notably more explicit in outlining objectives, naming affiliated organizations, and describing operational methods. This divergence reflects differing levels of organizational entrenchment and perceived risk at the time of writing.

The cautious tone of “The Project” suggests that it was produced during an earlier phase of the Brotherhood’s activity in the West, when operational structures were less established and external scrutiny was more acute. By contrast, the relative candor of the “Explanatory Memorandum” indicates that it was drafted at a later stage, when Brotherhood networks in North America had already achieved greater institutional presence and felt more secure in articulating detailed implementation strategies.

Together, these documents illustrate an evolution in operational posture—from guarded foundational planning to more confident tactical execution.

These differences are characteristic of a hierarchical planning framework, maintaining general strategic coherence while providing more detailed tactical guidance for specific operational contexts. By maintaining consistent strategic principles while allowing for tactical adaptation, the Brotherhood creates what military strategists call “mission command”¹⁴⁶—a system based on centralized strategic direction with decentralized tactical execution.

3.4.3 Strategic Evolution

A comparison of the documents reveals a significant strategic evolution from “The Project” (1982) to the “Explanatory Memorandum” (1992), reflecting the Brotherhood’s adaptive learning and response to changing conditions. Several key developments are evident:

- **Increased organizational sophistication:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” reveals a more advanced stage of organizational development than “The Project,” offering evidence of

¹⁴⁶ “Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.” Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) no. 6-0: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, July 31, 2019), para. 1-14, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34403-ADP_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf.

institutional growth and operational expansion. While “The Project” outlines general directives to establish various types of Islamic institutions, the “Explanatory Memorandum” includes a detailed appendix listing 29 specific organizations operating in North America. This contrast reflects the transition from conceptual planning to tangible implementation.

The progression illustrates a process of structural elaboration, in which Brotherhood-aligned operations evolved from generalized institutional models to a differentiated network of specialized entities. These organizations were designed to address distinct functional areas, such as education, advocacy, youth engagement, and interfaith dialogue, enabling greater precision in strategy and execution. The emergence of such complexity suggests that the “Explanatory Memorandum” represents a later phase in the Brotherhood’s Western trajectory, in which the early vision had materialized into a robust and adaptive institutional infrastructure.

- **Greater tactical specificity:** The later document, the “Explanatory Memorandum,” provides detailed tactical guidance that is absent from “The Project.” While “The Project” sets out broad strategic principles and long-term objectives, the “Explanatory Memorandum” translates them into specific implementation steps and operational priorities tailored to the North American context. This shift from abstract design to concrete procedures demonstrates the Brotherhood’s growing confidence in its ability to communicate securely and operate effectively in Western environments. It reflects an evolution from conceptual frameworks to applied practice, rooted in accumulated experience and local adaptation.
- **Expanded institutional presence:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” identifies a greater number of organizations than would likely have existed at the time “The Project” was composed, suggesting that significant progress had been made in implementing the institutional development strategy outlined in the earlier document. The appendix of the “Explanatory Memorandum” lists organizations spanning the fields of education, advocacy, religious outreach, and civil society, demonstrating that the Project’s directive to establish a comprehensive institutional infrastructure had moved from principle to execution.

This organizational expansion illustrates a form of population growth within the Brotherhood’s institutional ecosystem, whereby general directives to build foundational structures gave rise to a diverse network of specialized entities. The emergence of distinct organizations to address different functional sectors reflects the success of the Project’s strategic vision and the Brotherhood’s capacity to translate long-term planning into operational reality across multiple domains.

- **More explicit civilizational framing:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” frames the Brotherhood’s mission in more explicitly civilizational terms than “The Project,” reflecting increased organizational confidence in articulating the movement’s long-term objectives. It states directly that “their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within,” whereas “The Project” relies on more cautious and allegorical language. This shift suggests a greater willingness to state the movement’s ideological ambitions plainly as its presence and infrastructure in the West became more entrenched.

This rhetorical progression suggests a process of frame amplification, where strategic messaging becomes more direct and assertive in proportion to an organization’s perceived security and institutional consolidation. As Brotherhood-aligned networks developed deeper roots in North America, their internal communications grew bolder in describing their ultimate aims, which were previously conveyed through more ambiguous or symbolic expressions.

- **Enhanced coalition strategy:** The “Explanatory Memorandum” places greater emphasis on coalition building with non-Muslim organizations than “The Project,” signaling the operational maturation of strategies initially outlined in broader terms. While “The Project” calls for temporary and tactical alliances, the “Explanatory Memorandum” elaborates specific methods for engaging with external groups, indicating that bridge-building efforts had moved from conceptual guidance to applied tactics.

This development reflects a process of strategic embeddedness, in which Brotherhood-aligned networks deliberately cultivate relationships with diverse organizations to expand influence, gain legitimacy, and insulate their operations from external scrutiny. As experience demonstrated the utility of coalition building in amplifying messaging and deflecting criticism, later documents placed increased emphasis on formalizing these tactics as a core component of the Brotherhood’s Western engagement strategy.

These developments reveal a process of strategic adaptation, whereby Brotherhood-aligned organizations refined their operational approaches based on practical experience while maintaining continuity in their core ideological objectives. The evolution from the general directives in “The Project” to the more detailed and context-specific guidance in the “Explanatory Memorandum” reflects the movement’s ability to adjust its methods without altering its foundational goals. This capacity to absorb lessons from implementation and integrate them into future planning demonstrates the adaptive resilience that has been a hallmark of the Brotherhood’s transnational strategy since its inception.

3.5 Implementation Effectiveness and Challenges

Analysis of “The Project” and the “Explanatory Memorandum” provides a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of Brotherhood operations in Western contexts. The documents outline ambitious objectives across multiple domains, with varying degrees of implementation success across different areas.

3.5.1 Areas of Significant Progress

The Brotherhood has achieved substantial progress in several key areas outlined in the documents:

- **Institutional development:** The Brotherhood has successfully established a comprehensive organizational infrastructure across Western societies, particularly in the realms of education, social services, and religious life. As noted by Vidino, Muslim Brotherhood networks in the West have “rapidly evolved into multifunctional and richly funded organizations” that serve as major representatives of Western Muslim communities.¹⁴⁷ This level of institutional development reflects the implementation of the Project’s directive to “create Islamic centers in every city,” as well as the Memorandum’s more detailed vision for an expansive, interconnected network of institutions.

The resulting landscape of Brotherhood-aligned entities demonstrates a high degree of institutional density—an environment in which sufficient organizational presence enables the formation of self-reinforcing networks. These networks not only provide services and ideological continuity for affiliated communities but also amplify the Brotherhood’s capacity for influence, coordination, and resilience across sectors and national contexts.

- **Media and narrative influence:** Brotherhood-aligned perspectives have gained a significant presence in both Islamic and mainstream media coverage of Muslim issues. Brotherhood-

¹⁴⁷ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press, 2010), 145–46.

aligned organizations have become primary sources for media organizations seeking “Muslim perspectives,” effectively positioning themselves as authoritative voices for communities with diverse viewpoints.¹⁴⁸

This media influence aligns with the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations,” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “audio and visual centers,” and extensive media infrastructure designed to shape public discourse and advance the strategic goal of “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative.” Brotherhood organizations have established multiple media platforms while placing representatives in mainstream media outlets as expert sources on Islam and Muslim communities, creating what communications theorists call “narrative leverage”—the ability to shape how events are framed and interpreted. By controlling independent media channels like Al Jazeera while simultaneously positioning Brotherhood-aligned individuals as authoritative voices within mainstream Western media, the network achieves influence over public understanding of conflicts, policies, and issues related to Islam and Muslim populations far exceeding what their actual organizational membership would suggest.

- **Coalition building:** The Brotherhood has effectively cultivated alliances with non-Muslim organizations around shared tactical objectives, particularly on issues such as “Islamophobia,” immigration policy, and foreign affairs. Brotherhood organizations have skillfully built coalitions with progressive groups by framing their concerns in terms of civil rights and social justice, which are familiar to Western audiences. These partnerships enable Brotherhood-aligned entities to integrate their agenda into broader activist ecosystems, gaining legitimacy and reach through alignment with more mainstream causes.

This coalition building reflects the implementation of the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” as well as its emphasis on organizations possessing “a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” Through sustained engagement with a wide range of progressive movements around issues like civil rights, foreign policy, and anti-discrimination, Brotherhood networks have cultivated what network theorists describe as “bridging social capital”—linkages that span otherwise distinct or disconnected social groups, facilitating the diffusion of influence and cross-sector coordination. By establishing these coalition relationships, Brotherhood-aligned organizations gain access to progressive institutional platforms, amplify their messaging through diverse voices, and embed their positions within broader activist movements, enabling them to influence policy debates and cultural discourse far beyond what their actual organizational capacity would independently achieve.

- **Youth recruitment:** Brotherhood-aligned student organizations, most notably the Muslim Students Association (MSA), maintain a widespread presence across hundreds of university campuses in North America. Originally shaped by individuals with direct and indirect ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, MSA chapters have evolved into key platforms for the cultivation of Islamic identity among younger generations. They facilitate ideological socialization by combining religious instruction with civic and political engagement, often advancing narratives and frameworks that align with Brotherhood-influenced thought.

This strategic focus on youth engagement reflects the implementation of the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” and its explicit

¹⁴⁸ Noha Mellor, *Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da’wa, Discourse, and Political Communication* (Routledge, 2017), chap. 6.

identification of the Muslim Students Association (MSA) as one of the Brotherhood's affiliated organizations in North America. The Memorandum's framework positions youth engagement as essential to "expand the observant Muslim base" and "unify and direct Muslims' efforts" toward the settlement mission. Through these campus-based entities, Brotherhood-aligned networks engage in what sociologists describe as "early adult socialization," shaping the identity, beliefs, and political orientation of young people during their formative developmental stages, thereby securing long-term ideological continuity. By establishing organizational presence on university campuses, the Brotherhood creates pipelines for leadership development, ideological transmission, and recruitment that will sustain the movement across multiple generations while positioning graduates to enter professional fields and institutional roles where they can advance Brotherhood objectives throughout their careers.

- **Legal infrastructure:** The Muslim Brotherhood has developed sophisticated legal strategies that leverage the normative and procedural protections of Western legal systems, particularly civil rights and anti-discrimination frameworks, to safeguard its operations and contest policies it regards as obstructive. This legal orientation reflects the implementation of the Memorandum's directive to establish comprehensive "legal organizations," including a "Central Jurisprudence Council," a "Central Islamic Court," a "Muslim Attorneys Society," and the "Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims' Rights," alongside its call to develop "a written 'jurisprudence' that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement." Through these efforts, Brotherhood-aligned networks have established what legal scholars refer to as "rights-based protection"—the use of universal rights frameworks to defend and legitimize group-based ideological activities. This approach not only offers legal insulation from scrutiny and accountability but also reinforces the Brotherhood's ability to operate within liberal democratic societies while advancing a long-term ideological agenda that fundamentally aims to transform those societies according to Islamic principles as interpreted by the Brotherhood.

These developments indicate a high degree of strategic alignment, wherein organizational activities across diverse sectors directly reinforce the Brotherhood's overarching ideological and institutional objectives. By embedding themselves in education, media, civil society, politics, and legal frameworks, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have established a comprehensive infrastructure that advances their core goals through mutually reinforcing channels.

This distributed structure has also generated a form of functional duplication, resulting in multiple overlapping avenues for influence that increase organizational resilience. Should one channel face regulatory, legal, or public resistance, others remain active and capable of advancing the same strategic objectives. This duplication enhances the adaptability and durability of the Brotherhood's presence in Western societies, ensuring continuity even in the face of external disruption.

3.5.2 Areas of Limited Progress

Despite these successes, the Brotherhood has faced significant challenges in other areas outlined in the strategic documents:

- **Political representation:** The Brotherhood has secured some localized political influence, particularly in areas with dense Muslim populations; however, it has fallen short of achieving the broader political dominance outlined in its strategic vision.

This limited political success reflects several challenges, including inter-Muslim political competition, effective counterstrategies by Western governments, and internal ideological

divisions regarding participation in politics. Brotherhood-aligned political movements have achieved modest representation in some local governance structures but have not gained significant national legislative or executive positions in most Western countries.

- **Financial independence:** The Brotherhood’s efforts to develop autonomous Islamic financial structures in the West have seen limited success. While Islamic banking has gained a foothold, it remains a niche component within broader Western economies, falling short of the comprehensive alternative envisioned in the Brotherhood’s long-term strategic plans.¹⁴⁹

This financial limitation stems from multiple factors, including regulatory constraints, competition from conventional financial institutions, and limited market demand. Islamic financial institutions have a well-established presence in most Western countries, but they typically serve niche markets rather than providing comprehensive alternatives to mainstream financial systems.

- **Ideological coherence:** The Brotherhood has faced growing challenges in terms of preserving ideological unity as its membership becomes more diverse and adapts to Western environments. Internal disagreements have emerged between factions that favor strict adherence to traditional doctrines and others that promote more flexible, context-driven strategies.¹⁵⁰

This ideological challenge stems from multiple factors, including generational transitions, exposure to Western values, and tactical disagreements.

- **Reformist competition:** In Western societies, the Brotherhood increasingly has to contend with reformist Muslim movements that promote interpretations of Islam more aligned with liberal democratic values. These progressive voices have gained some visibility and limited influence, challenging the Brotherhood’s position as the primary representative of Islamic authenticity.¹⁵¹

This competitive challenge stems from the emergence of Muslim intellectuals and organizations explicitly embracing liberal democratic values while maintaining Islamic identity. Reformist Muslim voices increasingly compete for the same audience as Brotherhood organizations, challenging their claim to represent authentic Islamic perspectives.

The Brotherhood has thus not yet achieved the comprehensive societal transformation outlined in its strategic documents, highlighting the resilience of Western democracies to ideological subversion.

3.5.3 Adaptation and Evolution

Facing these mixed results, the Brotherhood has demonstrated significant capacity for strategic adaptation. Several adaptations are particularly noteworthy:

¹⁴⁹ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press, 2010); Peter Mandaville et al., *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe* (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, September 2010). For recent localized assessments, see Christophe Ayad and Louise Couvelaire, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Influence in France: What the Controversial Report Reveals,” *Le Monde*, May 22, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2025/05/22/muslim-brotherhood-s-influence-in-france-what-the-controversial-report-reveals_6741529_7.html.

¹⁵⁰ Ibrahim Warde, *Islamic Finance in the Global Economy* (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), chap. 3.

¹⁵¹ Bosmat Yefet, “In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Discourse on Democracy and Human Rights in Post-2013 Egypt,” *Religions* 16, no. 4 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040528>.

- **Increased emphasis on identity politics:** In response to the resilience of Western political norms, the Brotherhood has increasingly shifted its public rhetoric from overt calls for Islamic governance to themes centered on minority rights and religious freedom. This strategic adjustment frames Muslims as a vulnerable community needing protection, aligning with the civil rights discourse and identity politics to gain broader legitimacy and political traction.¹⁵²

This rhetorical adaptation reflects the implementation of the Memorandum’s directive to master “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” and its emphasis on “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” as vehicles for institutional influence and political mobilization. By recasting theological positions and civilizational objectives as rights-based claims about religious freedom and minority protection, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have repositioned religious objectives within the legal and normative frameworks of Western constitutional democracies. This reframing allows doctrinal aims articulated internally as “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative” and pursuing “a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within” to be advanced publicly under the protection of civil liberties, thereby insulating them from critical scrutiny while maintaining the appearance of merely advocating for vulnerable minority communities rather than pursuing civilizational transformation.

Through this approach, Brotherhood-aligned networks appear to strategically engage with the expansive character of the rights-based discourse in liberal democracies. By framing religious and ideological objectives within the language of individual and collective rights, they seek to broaden the scope of constitutional protections to encompass culturally specific practices and communal preferences. This rhetorical positioning allows such objectives to be pursued under the normative shelter of universal legal principles, potentially enhancing the Brotherhood’s ability to operate within—and benefit from—the legal and institutional frameworks of democratic governance.

- **Diversification of organizational structures:** In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood’s operations in Western countries have evolved into more decentralized and informal networks. This shift has made it increasingly challenging for authorities to map connections and implement targeted measures. The movement’s activities now often rely on shared ideology and informal associations rather than formal structures, complicating efforts to define and address it effectively.¹⁵³

This structural adaptation implements the Memorandum’s framework of maintaining tactical autonomy across diverse organizations while ensuring strategic alignment through a shared ideology, common funding sources, an overlapping leadership, and a commitment to the settlement mission. The document’s call for organizations to “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” while maintaining distinct public identities enables what appears to be a diverse collection of independent organizations to function as a coordinated network advancing common objectives. By developing less hierarchical and more networked organizational forms that operate through ideological alignment rather than formal hierarchical control, Brotherhood

¹⁵² Serhan Tanriverdi, “Paths to Islamic Modernities: The Emergence of Reformist American Muslim Intellectuals and Their Dialectical Engagement with Modernity,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 41, no. 2 (2021): 299–316, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2021.1943885>; Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 8.

¹⁵³ Lorenzo Vidino, “Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in America: Goals, Ideologies, and Strategies,” The 15th Annual Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, May 19, 2011), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/150633/2011_12_muslimbrotherhood.pdf.

operations have become structurally resilient,¹⁵⁴ that is to say, resistant to disruption through the targeting of specific nodes or leaders. This networked approach provides both security advantages by obscuring centralized coordination and operational flexibility by enabling tactical adaptation to local circumstances while maintaining strategic coherence.

- **Strategic ambiguity on controversial issues:** The Brotherhood has increasingly employed strategic ambiguity when addressing sensitive topics such as the implementation of sharia, gender roles, and relations with non-Muslims. Its representatives often adapt their messaging to suit the expectations and sensitivities of different audiences, varying tone, emphasis, and content based on the political, cultural, or institutional context. This practice reflects the implementation of the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” and to master “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation,’” which enables Brotherhood-aligned spokespeople to present positions in ways that resonate with specific audiences while avoiding explicit articulation of the civilizational objectives articulated in internal documents. By maintaining strategic ambiguity about ultimate objectives while clearly communicating them in internal contexts—such as the Memorandum’s explicit framing of the work as “a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within”—the Brotherhood enables public representatives to deny extremist aims while initiated members understand the movement’s true civilizational agenda. This dual messaging strategy allows the movement to pursue gradual cultural transformation through institutional influence while avoiding the defensive responses that would be triggered by explicit articulation of its transformative objectives.

By maintaining a level of ambiguity, Brotherhood-aligned speakers are able to communicate simultaneously with diverse constituencies, emphasizing universal values or Islamic distinctiveness depending on the audience. This communications strategy allows them to build a broad appeal while limiting exposure to criticism. Such flexibility enables the Brotherhood to advance its long-term objectives incrementally while preserving ideological coherence within core constituencies.

- **Enhanced coalition building with progressive movements:** In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has increasingly sought alignment with progressive movements in Western societies by foregrounding shared concerns such as immigration, anti-discrimination, and foreign policy. This tactical engagement has involved adopting the discourse of civil rights and social justice in order to appeal to broader activist and policy networks. While the ideological foundations of these alliances may differ significantly, they offer mutual benefits in advancing specific issue-based agendas.

This coalition strategy reflects the implementation of the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work” and its guidance on organizations possessing “a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” By identifying areas of tactical convergence with progressive actors around issues like foreign policy, civil rights, and anti-discrimination, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have been able to enhance their visibility and policy influence in ways that exceed their demographic footprint. This mode of engagement can be viewed as a form of intersectional coalition building, which involves constructing alliances across distinct identity and advocacy groups based on shared narratives of marginalization and systemic criticism. The Memorandum’s framework explicitly recognizes that coalition partners need not share Brotherhood ideology but merely “agree in work” on specific tactical objectives,

¹⁵⁴ Imad Alsoos, “What Explains the Resilience of Muslim Brotherhood Movements? An Analysis of Hamas’ Organizing Strategies,” *Mediterranean Politics* 28, no. 2 (2021): 278–301, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2021.1904368>.

enabling the movement to advance its civilizational agenda through partnerships with organizations that would reject its ultimate objectives if explicitly articulated.

- **Generational leadership transition:** The Brotherhood has increasingly shifted its leadership to Western-born and Western-educated members who possess greater familiarity with local cultural and political environments. While these newer leaders demonstrate more nuanced and sophisticated engagement strategies, they continue to uphold the organization’s core ideological commitment to Islamic governance.¹⁵⁵

This leadership adaptation reflects the Memorandum’s emphasis on “expand[ing] the observant Muslim base” and “unify[ing] and direct[ing] Muslims’ efforts” through comprehensive organizational infrastructure that develops leadership capacity across multiple generations. The Memorandum’s framework for establishing “youth organizations” including the Muslim Students Association, alongside comprehensive educational institutions and professional organizations, creates systematic pipelines for identifying, training, and positioning Brotherhood-aligned leaders throughout Western societies. By developing leadership within Western Muslim communities rather than importing it from Muslim-majority countries, Brotherhood organizations enhance both their cultural authenticity and their political effectiveness. This approach reflects a strategy of cultivating leadership from within local communities, prioritizing individuals who understand and can navigate the cultural and political dynamics of their environment while remaining committed to the civilizational objectives articulated in the Memorandum. These Western-raised leaders can present Brotherhood positions using culturally familiar language and political frameworks while maintaining ideological alignment with the movement’s transformative agenda.¹⁵⁶

These adaptations reflect what organizational theorists such as Hamel and Välikangas call “strategic resilience”¹⁵⁷—the ability of organizations to shift tactics and reconfigure operations in response to changing conditions while preserving core strategic aims. The Brotherhood’s capacity to adjust its methods without altering its long-term objectives illustrates this concept, enabling it to sustain momentum despite political setbacks, legal restrictions, and increased scrutiny in Western contexts.

3.6 Implications for Western Society

The strategic blueprints outlined in the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” have significant implications for Western society. These implications extend across multiple domains:

3.6.1 Democratic Governance

The Brotherhood’s long-term objective of establishing Islamic governance fundamentally conflicts with Western democratic principles of popular sovereignty and secular governance. As the “Explanatory Memorandum” explicitly states, the goal is to “destroy Western civilization from within” and make “God’s religion victorious over all religions.” This objective illustrates what scholars call the “democratic dilemma”¹⁵⁸—the question whether tolerant societies should tolerate movements that seek to destroy tolerance itself.

¹⁵⁵ Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhood in the West: Characteristics, Aims and Policy Considerations,” CT-358, testimony presented before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, subcommittee on Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence on April 13, 2011 (RAND Corporation, April 2011), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT358.pdf.

¹⁵⁶ Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2018), chaps. 4–5.

¹⁵⁷ Gary Hamel and Liisa Välikangas, “The Quest for Resilience,” *Harvard Business Review* 81, no. 9 (2003): 52–63, <https://hbr.org/2003/09/the-quest-for-resilience>.

¹⁵⁸ Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (Crown, 2018), chaps. 1–2.

This poses several challenges:

- **Definitional ambiguity:** Western legal systems struggle to define and address nonviolent extremism that operates within legal boundaries while rejecting the philosophical foundations of liberal democracy. The “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” exploit definitional ambiguities by operating in what security analysts describe as a “grey zone”—the space between lawful political engagement and covert subversion. This deliberate ambiguity complicates policy responses, as activities that seem lawful on their own may collectively serve broader objectives that challenge democratic norms or national security.¹⁵⁹
- **Procedural exploitation:** The Brotherhood’s strategy involves utilizing democratic procedures, such as elections, civil rights frameworks, and institutional participation to advance objectives that may ultimately contradict liberal democratic values.¹⁶⁰ By mastering the language and mechanisms of democratic systems, Brotherhood-aligned groups secure legitimacy and influence while advancing agendas that challenge the foundational principles of these systems. This dynamic exposes a form of autoimmune vulnerability, where democratic institutions are ill-equipped to defend against actors who exploit their protections to undermine them from within.¹⁶¹
- **Representation claims:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations frequently present themselves as the authentic voice of the “Muslim community,” despite the wide ideological, theological, and cultural diversity that exists among Muslims.¹⁶² This tactic reflects a form of “representative monopolization,” which is the strategic assertion of exclusive authority to speak on behalf of an entire group. By positioning themselves as primary interlocutors in policy debates affecting Muslims, these organizations secure disproportionate access and influence in political and institutional spaces. This approach enables a process of “legitimacy transfer,” in which political authority is claimed not through formal endorsement or democratic representation but by asserting community leadership without broad-based consent.¹⁶³
- **Value contradictions:** The Brotherhood’s strategic documents reveal a deep tension between their public endorsement of democratic values and their private commitment to establishing Islamic governance. This dual posture exemplifies tactical dishonesty, the deliberate presentation of different messages to different audiences for strategic gain. Such inconsistencies complicate policy engagement, as government institutions may interact with Brotherhood-linked organizations based on their public moderation, without recognizing their privately stated long-term objectives. This discrepancy also reflects a form of “strategic deception,” in which ethical norms are manipulated to exploit democratic openness for ideologically driven ends.¹⁶⁴

These dynamics pose difficult questions for liberal democracies. Engaging with actors who utilize the tools of democracy to pursue agendas that contradict democratic norms challenges the foundational

¹⁵⁹ Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict* (US Army War College Press, 2015), chaps. 2–3.

¹⁶⁰ Bosmat Yefet, “In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Discourse on Democracy and Human Rights in Post-2013 Egypt,” *Religions* 16, no. 4 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040528>.

¹⁶¹ Yascha Mounk, *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It* (Harvard University Press, 2018), chaps. 2–3.

¹⁶² Nadia Fadil, “Recalling the ‘Islam of the Parents’: Liberal and Secular Muslims Redefining the Contours of Religious Authenticity,” *Identities* 24, no. 1 (2015): 82–99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2015.1091318>.

¹⁶³ Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), chap. 6. The authors discuss “legitimacy transfer” within the framework of organizational ecology, explaining how new social movements and organizations gain acceptance by affiliating with established entities.

¹⁶⁴ Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict* (US Army War College Press, 2015), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1134&context=articles_editorials.

values of pluralism. This dilemma is also known as the “paradox of tolerance”—the idea that a tolerant society may endanger itself if it extends tolerance to those committed to undermining the very conditions that make tolerance possible.¹⁶⁵

3.6.2 Social Cohesion

The Brotherhood’s strategy prioritizes the preservation of Islamic distinctiveness over integration into the broader cultural fabric of Western societies. Such an approach fosters the development of socially and ideologically insulated communities. In sociological terms, this dynamic is referred to as “parallel society development”—the emergence of distinct subcommunities within a shared geographic space, each operating by its own norms and values, often at the expense of broader social cohesion.¹⁶⁶

This dynamic poses several challenges:

- **Integration barriers:** The Brotherhood’s focus on preserving religious and cultural distinctiveness often contributes to the structural separation of Muslim immigrant communities within Western societies.¹⁶⁷ This approach reflects a form of “structural isolation,” in which institutional boundaries such as exclusive schools, welfare systems, media outlets, and financial services reinforce communal autonomy and reduce the incentives or need for broader integration. In urban environments, this model facilitates the emergence of “cultural enclaves”—demographically and ideologically distinct communities that maintain their own norms and practices despite their geographic presence within diverse urban settings.¹⁶⁸
- **Intergenerational tensions:** The Brotherhood’s emphasis on religious conservatism often contributes to friction between immigrant parents and their Western-raised children, who are exposed to more pluralistic and liberal cultural norms.¹⁶⁹ This dynamic often results in “identity contestation,” a process whereby younger generations challenge the norms inherited from their parents in search of more adaptable or hybrid cultural identities. Such framing—portraying Islamic and Western values as incompatible rather than complementary—amplifies what family sociologists describe as “differential acculturation stress”—the strain that arises when generations adapt to the host culture at different rates and in diverse ways, disrupting familial cohesion.¹⁷⁰
- **Social polarization:** By framing Muslim identity primarily in religious rather than civic terms, the Brotherhood’s ideological messaging fosters “communal fragmentation”—the division of society into segmented identity blocs with minimal cross-group engagement.¹⁷¹ This undermines shared civic identity and the sense of common belonging essential to

¹⁶⁵ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 1 (Routledge, 1945; reprinted 2013), 581–82.

¹⁶⁶ Nadezda Gorchakova, “The Concept of Parallel Societies and Its Use in the Immigration and Multiculturalism Discourse” (MA paper, University of Helsinki, November 2011), available online at: https://www.academia.edu/1175022/The_concept_of_Parallel_Societies_and_its_use_in_the_immigration_and_multiculturalism_discourse.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Richard Rothstein, *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America* (Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2017), chap. 4.

¹⁶⁹ Peter Skerry, “Problems of the Second Generation: To Be Young, Muslim, and American,” Brookings Institution, June 28, 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/problems-of-the-second-generation-to-be-young-muslim-and-american>; see also Kathleen Mullan Harris and Ping Chen, “The Acculturation Gap of Parent–Child Relationships in Immigrant Families: A National Study,” *Family Relations* 72, no. 4 (2023): 1748–72, <https://doi.org/10.1111/fare.12760>.

¹⁷⁰ Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (University of California Press, 2001).

¹⁷¹ Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 8.

democratic societies. In political science terms, this results in “centrifugal pluralism,” a form of diversity that weakens rather than strengthens societal integration, as identity groups orient themselves inward rather than toward collective public life.¹⁷²

- **Representational struggles:** The Brotherhood’s assertion of religious authority often leads to internal conflicts within Muslim communities over who has the legitimacy to represent Islamic interests.¹⁷³ These representational struggles reflect deeper tensions between ideological exclusivism and pluralism within the Muslim public sphere. By presenting themselves as the sole arbiters of authentic Islam, Brotherhood-aligned organizations marginalize diverse Muslim voices, particularly those advocating integrationist or reformist approaches.¹⁷⁴

3.6.3 Security Implications

Although the Brotherhood formally advocates nonviolent political engagement, particularly in Western contexts, its underlying ideological framework shares core themes with more explicitly violent Islamist movements. These include concepts such as the supremacy of Islamic governance, civilizational confrontation with the West, and the delegitimization of secular democracy. Security analysts have identified this convergence as a form of “narrative overlap”—a condition where groups with divergent tactics nonetheless draw from a shared ideological reservoir.¹⁷⁵ While the Brotherhood typically disavows violence, the overlap in messaging can contribute to radicalization pathways, legitimize grievance narratives, and blur distinctions between nonviolent Islamism and jihadist extremism. This dynamic raises several security concerns, including the potential for ideological cross-pollination, the mainstreaming of radical discourse, and the exploitation of democratic freedoms by actors who are hostile to democratic values.

- **Radicalization pathways:** Although the Brotherhood claims to officially disavow violence, its ideological messaging can contribute to radicalization by introducing concepts that lay the groundwork for more extreme interpretations.¹⁷⁶ Analysts have identified this process as a form of “conveyor belt” radicalization, in which nonviolent ideological movements provide individuals with foundational narratives such as Islamic supremacy, civilizational conflict, and divine sovereignty that more violent actors later exploit.¹⁷⁷ These narratives can generate a cognitive opening, making individuals more receptive to militant ideologies by challenging the legitimacy of secular democratic norms and positioning Islamic governance as the only legitimate system.
- **Legitimation of extremist positions:** The Brotherhood’s rhetoric often frames political conflicts, particularly the Israel-Palestinian issue, in religious rather than geopolitical or humanitarian terms. This framing can legitimize extremist positions by elevating political stances to the level of religious obligation.¹⁷⁸ This dynamic is a form of conceptual

¹⁷² Edith Hanke, Lawrence Scaff, and Sam Whimster, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Max Weber*, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford University Press, 2020; online ed., Oxford Academic, February 11, 2019), chap. 9, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679545.001.0001>.

¹⁷³ Edwin Bakker and Roel Meijer, eds., *The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe* (Oxford University Press, 2013; online ed., Oxford Academic, September 18, 2014), chap. 14, 309–11.

¹⁷⁴ Serhan Tanriverdi, “Paths to Islamic Modernities: The Emergence of Reformist American Muslim Intellectuals and Their Dialectical Engagement with Modernity,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 41, no. 2 (2021): 299–316, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2021.1943885>.

¹⁷⁵ Gilberto Capano, Maria T. Galanti, and Giulia Barbato, “When the Political Leader Is the Narrator: The Political and Policy Dimensions of Narratives,” *Policy Sciences* 56 (2023): 233–65, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-023-09505-6>.

¹⁷⁶ Peter R. Neumann, *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West* (I.B. Tauris, 2020).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2005): 68–78, available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20031777>.

reinforcement, wherein the mainstream Islamic discourse strengthens the legitimacy of radical positions by embedding them within widely accepted religious frameworks.¹⁷⁹ When such conflicts are presented as religious duties, they become sacred values, non-negotiable positions shielded from compromise, thus escalating polarization and reducing the space for political moderation.¹⁸⁰

- **Control over counterextremism narratives:** The Brotherhood’s resistance to ideologically oriented counterextremism programs reflects a deliberate effort to shape the discourse on Muslim engagement with the state. By asserting themselves as the principal representatives of Muslim communities, Brotherhood-linked organizations narrow the field of engagement and limit alternative voices. This dominance constrains the development of robust prevention frameworks, steering policy away from addressing the ideological underpinnings of radicalization. As a result, state-led counterextremism strategies often focus exclusively on violent manifestations, leaving the broader ecosystem of nonviolent Islamism unchallenged.¹⁸¹
- **Transnational networks:** The Brotherhood’s extensive financial, organizational, and communications network, which often operates through charities, educational institutions, and advocacy groups, has been instrumental in advancing the movement’s ideological and community-based objectives across borders. While these institutions are typically lawful and serve civil society functions, their broad reach and structural opacity can create vulnerabilities. In certain contexts, elements of this infrastructure may be co-opted or indirectly accessed by more extreme actors, enabling activities that diverge significantly from the Brotherhood’s declared objectives. This dynamic gives rise to what security analysts describe as “dual-use capacity”—the potential for legitimate platforms to also facilitate illegitimate operations. The resulting ambiguity complicates oversight and regulation, particularly in liberal democratic societies where such institutions often benefit from legal protections and public trust.¹⁸²

Effectively countering the security risks associated with ideological extremism requires agencies to adopt nuanced strategies that distinguish between violent actors and those promoting nonviolent but radical ideologies. This task involves addressing early indicators of potential threats while safeguarding civil liberties and maintaining the trust of communities that are essential to successful counterterrorism efforts. Achieving this balance depends on the ability to identify behavioral and organizational patterns that signal emerging risks without resorting to indiscriminate surveillance or profiling. This form of structured analysis is central to intelligence-led policing and early intervention models.¹⁸³

3.6.4 Cultural and Intellectual Implications

The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy includes engaging in discursive competition, shaping how key terms like religious freedom, pluralism, and justice are defined in public discourse. By embedding its

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, “Sacred Values and Cultural Conflict,” in *Advances in Culture and Psychology*, ed. Michele J. Gelfand et al. (University of Michigan, 2013), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/330/2015/10/michelejgelfand_ch06_copy_2.pdf.

¹⁸¹ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, *Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare* (Columbia University Press, 2010), chap. 6.

¹⁸² Matthew Levitt, *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God* (Georgetown University Press, 2019). While focused on Hezbollah, Levitt’s analysis of how legal networks can be exploited offers a useful conceptual framework for understanding vulnerabilities in Brotherhood-affiliated infrastructures.

¹⁸³ Michael E. DeVine, Lisa N. Sacco, and John W. Rollins, “Intelligence Coordination on Domestic Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report R47229, September 1, 2022, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47229>.

ideological interpretations within mainstream narratives, the movement influences cultural frameworks and expands its impact beyond formal political structures.¹⁸⁴

- **Semantic displacement and conceptual appropriation:** The Brotherhood’s rhetorical strategy frequently involves rearticulating liberal-democratic values such as religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. These terms are preserved linguistically but imbued with ideological meanings that serve the Brotherhood’s goals. This process is known as “semantic displacement”¹⁸⁵—the alteration of established concepts using familiar language to subtly redefine normative expectations. This also facilitates “conceptual appropriation,”¹⁸⁶ which allows Islamist narratives to borrow the moral legitimacy of liberal discourse while advancing substantively different meanings that challenge pluralist principles.
- **Historical reinterpretation:** In educational materials and media outreach, the Brotherhood promotes alternative historical interpretations that emphasize Muslim decline as a result of Western oppression. This revisionist approach is a form of “competitive historiography,”¹⁸⁷ in which history becomes a contested domain used to legitimate present-day political objectives. The construction of a selective historical consciousness,¹⁸⁸ which foregrounds grievance narratives and omits pluralistic or internally critical historical accounts, serves to reinforce ideological cohesion and emotional political mobilization.
- **Epistemological challenges:** Brotherhood thinkers often assert the superiority of Islamic epistemology while rejecting the universality of Western scientific, philosophical, or democratic knowledge systems. This posture supports “epistemic separation logic,”¹⁸⁹ which posits incompatible foundations between knowledge traditions. As a result, the Brotherhood’s discourse tends to cultivate parallel knowledge systems, in which Islamic truth claims are isolated from broader intellectual engagement. This inhibits the development of the kind of shared reasoning frameworks that are essential for civic dialogue in multicultural societies.

3.7 Conclusion: The Legacy of the Strategic Blueprints

The “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” provide detailed strategic blueprints for the Brotherhood’s long-term approach to transforming Western societies. These documents reveal a sophisticated understanding of Western institutional structures, legal frameworks, and social dynamics, combined with a patient, multigenerational commitment to advancing Islamic governance through primarily nonviolent means.

The implementation of these strategies over the past four decades has led to significant achievements in the areas of institutional development, narrative influence, and coalition building, offset by slightly less progress in the areas of political representation, financial independence, and ideological coherence. In all of this, the Brotherhood has demonstrated adaptive capacity, modifying its tactical approaches while maintaining consistent strategic objectives.

¹⁸⁴ Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford University Press, 2007), chaps. 4–5.

¹⁸⁵ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (Longman, 1989).

¹⁸⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (Verso, 1989).

¹⁸⁷ Stefan Berger with Christoph Conrad, *The Past as History: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁸⁸ Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (McGraw-Hill Education, 2003).

¹⁸⁹ Jean-René Courtault, Hans van Ditmarsch, and Didier Galmiche, “An Epistemic Separation Logic,” in *Logic, Language, Information, and Computation: 22nd International Workshop (WoLLIC 2015), Bloomington, IN, USA, July 20–23, 2015, Proceedings*, 156–73 (Springer, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47709-0_12.

The continued relevance of these strategic documents lies not merely in their historical significance but in their ongoing influence on Brotherhood operations in Western countries (especially in the United States).

The strategic frameworks outlined in these documents—the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project”—continue to shape Brotherhood activities three to four decades later, demonstrating the movement’s long-term perspectives and strategic patience. This continuity demonstrates strategic persistence, where an organization maintains its core ideological direction over time, despite making tactical adjustments in response to external challenges.

Understanding these strategic blueprints is crucial for developing effective policy responses that safeguard democratic values and social cohesion while respecting religious freedom and civil liberties. Such responses require resolute approaches that distinguish between legitimate religious practice and ideological efforts to transform Western societies based on fundamentally different values and governance models.

The ultimate significance of these documents extends beyond the specific organizations they reference to broader questions about democratic resilience against nonviolent extremism, the balance between religious freedom and shared civic values, and the maintenance of social cohesion in diverse societies. As Western societies continue to navigate these complex challenges, the strategic blueprints provided by the “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project” offer crucial insight into how ideological movements can pursue transformative objectives through initially nonviolent means.

4. Operational Implementation: Domains of Influence

This chapter explains how the Muslim Brotherhood applies its doctrine of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) in four domains: policy impact, legal manipulation, institutional infiltration, and narrative control. In the policy sphere, Brotherhood-aligned civil society groups have embedded themselves in government consultation mechanisms and congressional debates to influence national counterterrorism efforts and Middle Eastern foreign policy for their benefit and that of their allies, such as Hamas. Meanwhile, they present themselves as grassroots groups in order to form coalitions with other civil society groups, such as the “Red–Green Alliance” they have established with the ideologically dissimilar progressive left.

In the legal domain, these networks weaponize Western civil rights protections to silence critics and discredit reformist Muslims. One obvious example is expanding the definition of Islamophobia to shield the Islamist agenda from scrutiny while simultaneously downplaying antisemitic incidents and recasting them as legitimate political opposition.

Institutionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has built a dense ecosystem of mosques, schools, campus groups, and civil society organizations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the appendix to the “Explanatory Memorandum” lists 29 Brotherhood-affiliated organizations (such as CAIR, NAIT, and AMS) that operate in the United States in such areas as religion, advocacy, finance, and law, reinforced by proxy fronts, donor networks, and Gulf funding.

On the narrative front, the Muslim Brotherhood maintains a cultural hegemony by controlling media and education. Qatar’s Al Jazeera network promotes Islamist ideologues and adjusts content for Western audiences, while coordinated social media campaigns disseminate Brotherhood-aligned content. Central to this is the “Palestinization” of Muslim identity and the “Islamization” of antisemitism, framing anti-Zionism as a religious duty. This trend was reinforced after October 7, when Al Jazeera and other media outlets portrayed Hamas as resisting terrorism and as fighting to free all of Palestine from Israeli “occupation.”

These four interconnected domains of influence exemplify the Brotherhood’s integrated approach, which encompasses a long-term, flexible, and multi-domain strategy that embeds ideology, reshapes institutions, and manipulates democratic freedoms without compromising the movement’s ideological and political goals.

4.1 The First Domain: Policy Impact

The Muslim Brotherhood’s long-term strategy for implementing *tamkeen* in Western societies places significant emphasis on gaining policy influence across multiple levels of governance. This aspect of institutional entrenchment focuses on embedding Brotherhood perspectives within government decision-making processes, shaping legislation, and influencing foreign and domestic policy decisions. As outlined in the “Explanatory Memorandum,” the goal is to “possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to influence Western political systems without direct confrontation.

4.1.1 Executive Branch Engagement

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have systematically expanded their influence within Western policy circles, particularly in the United States, through multiple channels of engagement with the executive branch. This influence operates at multiple levels, from high-level advisory roles to routine consultations with federal agencies.¹⁹⁰ In recent years, this engagement has evolved to include

¹⁹⁰ Steven Merley, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States* (Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute, April 2009), https://www.globalmbresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/20090411_merley.usbrotherhood.pdf.

political advocacy, strategic voter mobilization, and participation in policymaking forums. For example, Emgage—a civil society organization with known ties to individuals previously linked to Brotherhood-aligned entities¹⁹¹ and organizations named as unindicted co-conspirators in the 2007 Holy Land Foundation trial¹⁹²—hosted then-presidential candidate Joe Biden during its 2020 “Million Muslim Votes” summit, marking a significant moment of access and political visibility.¹⁹³

Additionally, reports have highlighted the Muslim Brotherhood’s use of crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, to enhance its influence. A 2020 analysis by Trends Research in the UAE noted that the Brotherhood exploited the pandemic to incite opposition against governments and bolster its presence in various societies, including through media operations in Western countries.¹⁹⁴

These developments are part of the movement’s long-term strategy of embedding itself in political, civil, and advisory structures in the West while adapting to new sociopolitical contexts.

4.1.1.1 Consulting relationships with Federal Agencies

Since 2001, organizations with documented historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood have increasingly had access to US federal agencies and policy discussions. For example, despite being named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the 2007 Holy Land Foundation trial,¹⁹⁵ the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has continued to be an active participant in national policy debates. While CAIR itself was not named in the “Explanatory Memorandum,” since it was not founded until 1994, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) was explicitly listed among the Muslim Brotherhood’s 29 “organizations of our friends” in North America. All three of CAIR’s co-founders, Nihad Awad, Omar Ahmad, and Rafiq Jaber, were IAP officials when they established CAIR. The Memorandum tasked these organizations with carrying out a “civilizational struggle” aimed at undermining Western civilization from within. CAIR was later identified in court documents as part of the Palestine Committee, the Hamas-support network that included IAP.¹⁹⁶

Despite this designation, CAIR has continued to secure meetings with policymakers across multiple administrations. In 2020, it co-hosted the “Million Muslim Votes” summit, where then-presidential candidate Joe Biden addressed Muslim American voters and committed to policy reforms.¹⁹⁷ In May 2023, the Biden administration released the first US National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹ “CAIR—Philadelphia and Emgage PA Host ‘Muslim City Hall Day’ at Philadelphia City Hall,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations—Pennsylvania, June 15, 2023, <https://pa.cair.com/pressrelease/day-city-hall-2023/>.

¹⁹² *Review of FBI Interactions with the Council on American-Islamic Relations* (US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, September 2013), 1, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-J37-PURL-gpo133765/pdf/GOVPUB-J37-PURL-gpo133765.pdf>.

¹⁹³ “Watch: Biden Addresses the Million Muslim Votes Summit Remotely,” posted July 20, 2020, by PBS NewsHour, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/live/Z9rCpAkPuY4>; “Muslim Voters Survey Memo,” Emgage Foundation, November 12, 2021, <https://emgageusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Muslim-Voters-Survey-Memo-2.pdf>.

¹⁹⁴ Mohammed Abdullah Al-Ali, “How the Muslim Brotherhood Exploited COVID-19 for Political Mileage,” Trends Research and Advisory, October 15, 2020, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/how-the-muslim-brotherhood-exploited-covid-19-for-political-mileage/>.

¹⁹⁵ *Review of FBI Interactions with the Council on American-Islamic Relations* (US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, September 2013), 1, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-J37-PURL-gpo133765/pdf/GOVPUB-J37-PURL-gpo133765.pdf>.

¹⁹⁶ Attachment A: List of Unindicted Co-conspirators, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/423.pdf; Congressional Record, 111th Congress, 1st session, vol. 155, pt. 11, July 14, 2009, 14950–52, available online at: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRECB-2009-pt11/html/CRECB-2009-pt11-Pg14950-2.htm>.

¹⁹⁷ Mariam Fam and Elana Schor, “Biden Urges Muslim Americans to Help Him Defeat Trump,” *Associated Press*, July 20, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-religion-election-2020-5b3852d8ec16a95c8fbf127639c74fa4>.

¹⁹⁸ “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Releases First-Ever U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism,” press release, White House, May 25, 2023, <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/25/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-releases-first-ever-u-s-national-strategy-to-counter-antisemitism/>.

The White House fact sheet associated with the launch included CAIR among the civil society groups pledging to advance the strategy.¹⁹⁹ Following public criticism, CAIR's name was subsequently omitted from later White House communications and implementation materials, effectively removing the group from the strategy's official partners.²⁰⁰ While the administration did not issue a formal announcement of this removal, the absence of CAIR from subsequent lists of partner organizations indicates a de facto withdrawal of recognition.²⁰¹

Also in 2023, CAIR filed a federal lawsuit against the US government's use of the Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS), asserting that the system disproportionately targets Muslims and violates civil liberties.²⁰²

These developments illustrate CAIR's continued access and influence within US policy circles, despite longstanding concerns regarding its early affiliations. Organizations such as the Middle East Forum have documented CAIR's foundational links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, based on internal documents, court records, and leadership profiles.²⁰³

Court documents, FBI wiretaps, and testimony from federal agents have shown that CAIR was not only created by members of the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee in the United States, but that its founders coordinated with the Hamas leadership abroad.²⁰⁴ As a result of this documented history, supported by primary evidence, internal Brotherhood communications, and expert testimony, CAIR can accurately be described as a Brotherhood-linked organization.²⁰⁵

- **Policy influence:** Engagement with policymakers allows Brotherhood-linked organizations to shape policies on religious accommodation, hate crimes, and counterterrorism. This fulfills the Project's call to exploit democratic institutions to advance Islamic *da'wa*.
- **Intelligence gathering:** Access to consultations offers insight into government priorities and debates, enabling more adaptive strategies. This aligns with the Memorandum's directive to achieve "understanding [of] the U.S. society from its different aspects" as a qualification for "settling our *da'wa* in its country" and its emphasis on "thinking and future planning" to "shape the present to comply and suit the needs and challenges of the future."
- **Institutional legitimization:** Participation in official consultations confers credibility, enhancing standing within Muslim communities and among donors. This reflects the concept of "status transfer," in which legitimacy is gained through ties to established institutions.

¹⁹⁹ "CAIR Welcomes Biden Administration's Commitment to Comprehensive Approach to Combating Antisemitism, Islamophobia," press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), May 25, 2023, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-welcomes-biden-administrations-commitment-to-comprehensive-approach-to-combating-antisemitism-islamophobia/.

²⁰⁰ Jacob Kornbluh, "Jewish Groups Question CAIR's Inclusion in WH Antisemitism Fact Sheet," *Jewish Insider*, May 31, 2023, <https://jewishinsider.com/2023/05/white-house-antisemitism-national-strategy-fact-sheet-cair/>; Ariel Kahana, "The Biden Administration's Antisemitism Statement Gets Worse," *Tablet Magazine*, June 27, 2023, <https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/biden-antisemitism-strategy-cair>.

²⁰¹ "White House Removes CAIR from National Strategy on Antisemitism," *JNS*, December 8, 2023, <https://www.jns.org/white-house-removes-cair-from-national-strategy-on-antisemitism/>.

²⁰² Erum Salam, "US Sued over Terror Watchlist by Muslim Rights Group," *Guardian*, September 22, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/sep/22/us-sued-terror-watchlist-muslim-rights-group>.

²⁰³ "CAIR Exposed," Investigative Project on Terrorism, n.d., 83, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/122-cair-exposed.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2025).

²⁰⁴ FBI wiretap transcript, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/7589097/united-states-v-holy-land-foundation-for-relief-and-development/?page=5> (accessed November 11, 2025), case files are also available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/case/65/us-v-holy-land-foundation>; Steve Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (Free Press, 2003), chaps. 3–4; Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (Yale University Press, 2006).

²⁰⁵ Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press, 2010).

- **Critical infrastructure protection:** By acting as outreach partners, Brotherhood organizations create buffers against scrutiny or designation. This amounts to “institutional shielding,” in which close ties to government complicate efforts to investigate or confront them.

These consultative relationships expanded significantly following the September 11 attacks, when government agencies sought to enhance community outreach to Muslim communities. Brotherhood-aligned organizations strategically positioned themselves as authoritative community representatives, successfully marginalizing alternative voices, particularly those of reformist Muslims who might have offered perspectives more aligned with liberal democratic values.

4.1.1.2 Policy Advisory Roles

During the Obama administration (2009–2017), individuals with ideological or organizational ties to Islamist networks held advisory positions across multiple US government agencies. Several of these appointees had documented associations with organizations identified as being ideologically linked or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood during Holy Land Foundation trial, including the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim Students Association (MSA), and the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT).²⁰⁶

Prominent examples included:

- **Dalia Mogahed:** Appointed as an advisor to the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships during the Obama administration, Mogahed previously served as executive director of the Gallup Centre for Muslim Studies.²⁰⁷ She also co-authored *Who Speaks for Islam?* with Georgetown professor John Esposito.²⁰⁸ Although Mogahed has denied any formal affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, she has participated in events hosted by Brotherhood-linked organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Muslim American Society (MAS).²⁰⁹ Her public statements and commentary often reflect perspectives aligned with political Islam, including support for sharia-informed governance and criticism of Western secular paradigms.²¹⁰
- **Mohamed Elibiary:** Appointed to the Department of Homeland Security’s Advisory Council in 2010, Elibiary previously praised Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb in public forums and maintained professional ties to individuals later convicted in the Holy Land Foundation trial.²¹¹ According to media reports and congressional inquiries, Elibiary was investigated following allegations that he accessed and downloaded sensitive law enforcement documents from the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS SLIC) database.²¹² He attempted to share these documents with

²⁰⁶ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study. ISNA, MSA, and IIIT are listed in the document as organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

²⁰⁷ “Gallup Center for Muslim Studies,” Gallup, February 16, 2011, archived online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20110216105959/http://www.gallup.com/se/127907/Gallup-Center-Muslim-Studies.aspx> (accessed November 11, 2025).

²⁰⁸ John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (Gallup Press, 2008).

²⁰⁹ “Dalia Mogahed: A Muslim George Gallup or Islamist Ideologue?,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, April 15, 2010, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/1904/dalia-mogahed-a-muslim-george-gallup-or-islamist>.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ Ryan Mauro, “A Window on the Muslim Brotherhood in America: An Annotated Interview with DHS Advisor Mohamed Elibiary,” Occasional Paper Series no. 1001 (Center for Security Policy, Washington, DC, October 2013), <https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Elibiary-Occasional-Paper-1001.pdf>.

²¹² Patrick Poole, “Homeland Security Adviser Allegedly Leaked Intel to Attack Rick Perry,” PJ Media, October 26, 2011, available online at: <https://www.netadvisor.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2011-10-26-Homeland-Security-Adviser-Allegedly-Leaked-Intel-to-Attack-Rick-Perry.pdf>.

media outlets to substantiate claims of Islamophobia within the Texas Department of Public Safety under Governor Rick Perry.²¹³ Texas DPS officials confirmed that he had accessed internal documents, although the media outlets declined to publish the story due to lack of evidence. While the Department of Homeland Security did not pursue formal charges, the incident raised concerns about misuse of government access.²¹⁴

- **Rashad Hussain:** Appointed as US Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Hussain had earlier served in leadership roles within the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and spoke at events organized by ISNA, both organizations having been named as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation trial.²¹⁵ He also publicly defended Sami Al-Arian, who was later convicted for aiding Palestinian Islamic Jihad, during a 2004 conference, a position he later walked back.²¹⁶

These appointments provided strategic advantages, including:

- **Direct policy influence:** Advisory positions enable direct input in policy formulation regarding issues affecting Muslim communities domestically and internationally. This influence aligns with the Memorandum’s directive to obtain “the keys and the tools” necessary to carry out the “grand mission as a Civilization Jihadist responsibility” and to work toward “enabling Islam” through building influence within American institutions.”
- **Information access:** Advisory roles provide access to non-public information regarding government priorities, concerns, and internal debates. This access implements what intelligence analysts call “open-source intelligence collection”—the gathering of information through legitimate institutional access rather than clandestine means.
- **Narrative shaping:** Insider positions enable influence over how Islam and Islamism are discussed within government documents and public communications. This narrative function aligns with the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive media organizations, including “a daily newspaper,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” and other media infrastructure to advance the settlement project and shape public discourse about Islam in America.”
- **Personnel recommendations:** Advisory positions create opportunities to recommend additional appointments and consulting relationships, expanding network influence. This personnel function implements what organizational theorists call “institutional penetration”—the practice of gradually expanding presence within target institutions through existing positions.

While the Trump administration (2017–2021) significantly curtailed formal engagement with organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, informal influence persisted through career civil servants, pre-existing consultation channels, and coalition partners within broader civil society networks. Under the Biden administration, more formal engagement resumed, including the appointment of individuals with prior affiliations to Brotherhood-associated organizations to

²¹³ Congressional Record, vol. 157, no. 168 (November 4, 2011), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2011-11-04/pdf/CREC-2011-11-04.pdf>.

²¹⁴ “Former Obama DHS Adviser Tweets Support for Qatar,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, June 14, 2017, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/6289/former-obama-dhs-adviser-tweets-support-for-qatar>.

²¹⁵ *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008). See also the list of unindicted co-conspirators in “Memorandum Opinion Order,” *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-P (N.D. Tex. 2008), Doc. 1356, filed July 1, 2009, available online at: https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1425.pdf (accessed November 11, 2025).

²¹⁶ Josh Gerstein, “Islam Envoy Retreats on Terror Talk,” *Politico*, February 19, 2010, <https://www.politico.com/story/2010/02/islam-envoy-retreats-on-terror-talk-033210>.

influential roles within the State Department's Office of International Religious Freedom and the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). In 2022, President Biden reappointed Rashad Hussain who had previously served as the US Special Envoy to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, as US Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom.²¹⁷ In 2024, President Biden appointed Mohamed Elsanousi as a Commissioner on USCIRF.²¹⁸ Elsanousi previously served as the Interfaith and Government Relations Director at the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), one of the unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation trial.²¹⁹

4.1.1.3 Targeted Infiltration of Government Agencies

Beyond formal advisory roles, the Brotherhood has systematically targeted specific government agencies for longer-term infiltration through career civil service positions. This approach advances the Memorandum's goal of establishing "firmly-established organizations on which the Islamic structure is built" and achieving positions that enable the movement to "plan and struggle to obtain the keys and the tools" necessary for the "Civilization-Jihadist" mission of settlement.

Priority targets have included:

- **Department of Homeland Security:** The Brotherhood has targeted positions related to countering violent extremism, community outreach, and terrorism-related policy. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosures revealed that between 2009 and 2016, several DHS officials with links to organizations such as ISNA and CAIR played a role in removing references to "Islamic extremism" from internal training documents and policy language.²²⁰
- **Department of State:** The Brotherhood has consistently focused on positions related to Middle East policy, human rights reporting, and international religious freedom. Career civil servants with documented associations to organizations identified as Muslim Brotherhood affiliates have contributed to shaping the US State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and International Religious Freedom Reports, particularly in their treatment of Islamist movements in Muslim-majority countries. These affiliations have raised concerns about biased interpretations and the normalization of ideologically driven narratives in official US reporting.²²¹

²¹⁷ "USCMO Commends Biden Administration for Historic Nominations of Rashad Hussain, Khizr Khan to Religious Freedom Posts," US Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO), July 7, 2021, <https://uscmo.org/uscmo-comends-biden-administration-for-historic-nominations-of-rashad-hussain-khizr-khan-to-religious-freedom-posts/>.

²¹⁸ "USCIRF Welcomes President Joe Biden's Appointment of Mohamed Elsanousi to US Commission on International Religious Freedom," US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), July 3, 2024, <https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-welcomes-president-joe-bidens-appointment-mohamed-elsanousi-us>.

²¹⁹ "Controversial Hearings into American Muslims and Radicalization to Continue," *Voice of America (VOA)*, March 10, 2011, <https://www.voanews.com/a/controversial-hearings-into-american-muslims-and-radicalization-to-continue-123837304/173525.html>.

²²⁰ US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Log, 2009–2011 (accessed November 11, 2025), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/priv_foia-request-log-fy2009_1_0.pdf; https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/OIG_FOIA_Log_2qtr11.pdf; <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/priv-foia-logs-fy11.pdf>. See also "Identifying the Enemy: Radical Islamist Terror," hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 114th Congress, 2nd session, September 22, 2016, testimony of Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM09/20160922/105384/HHRG-114-HM09-Wstate-JasserM-20160922.pdf>.

²²¹ "Identifying the Enemy: Radical Islamist Terror," hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2nd session, September 22, 2016, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg25270/html/CHRG-114hhrg25270.htm>. FOIA-obtained State Department documents discussed during the hearing reveal official interaction with Libyan Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including invitations to speak in Washington, highlighting civil servant connections affecting Middle East policy.

- **The Department of Justice:** The Brotherhood has prioritized positions related to civil rights enforcement, hate crimes prosecution, and community outreach. Civil service attorneys with connections to Brotherhood-aligned organizations have influenced the development of prosecution priorities and community engagement strategies, particularly regarding the investigation of Muslim charities and religious organizations.²²²
- **Intelligence Community:** Positions related to analyzing Islamist movements and translating and interpreting Arabic-language materials have been subject to influence attempts. Language specialists and cultural advisors with connections to Brotherhood-aligned organizations have influenced intelligence assessments regarding Islamist movements, particularly through terminology management and contextual interpretation.²²³

This targeted form of institutional engagement is what intelligence analysts sometimes refer to as “placement and access.” By prioritizing career civil service roles over short-term political appointments, Brotherhood-aligned networks aim to establish a durable influence that can persist across successive administrations, regardless of party control.²²⁴

The effectiveness of this strategy was demonstrated in 2012 when 57 Muslim organizations, many with documented Brotherhood connections, sent a letter to then-White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan demanding “purge [of] all federal government training materials of biased materials.”²²⁵ The administration subsequently initiated a comprehensive review of training materials that led to the removal of references to Islamic terminology in counterterrorism training across multiple agencies.²²⁶

4.1.2 Legislative Branch Influence

Beyond executive branch engagement, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed sophisticated approaches to influencing legislative processes at the federal, state, and local levels. This influence operates through multiple channels, advancing the Memorandum’s strategic goals of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and “supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is,” as well as its directive to establish political organizations and build “relationships and alliances” to advance the settlement project.

4.1.2.1 Muslim Representation in Congress

Over the past decade, the representation of Muslims in the US Congress has seen a gradual increase, reflecting broader demographic and political shifts and an increase in the Brotherhood’s impact in certain states. According to the Pew Research Center, Muslims constitute approximately 0.8% of the 119th Congress, aligning closely with their proportion in the US adult population.²²⁷

²²² “PGCPS FOIA Request—Asian Americans Advancing Justice (AAJC), Part 1,” letter dated July 23, 2020, Asian Americans Advancing Justice (AAJC), https://www.advancingjustice-aaajc.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/PGCPS%20FOIA%20Request%20Asian%20Americans%20Advancing%20Justice%20-%20AAJC_compressed_Part1.pdf (accessed November 11, 2025).

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Lorenzo Vidino, *The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press, 2020), 181–185.

²²⁵ Debi Kar “Letter to DHS & John Brennan on FBI’s Use of Biased Experts and Training Materials,” Muslim Advocates, October 27, 2011, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2011/10/letter-to-dhs-john-brennan-on-fbis-use-of-biased-experts-and-training-materials/>.

²²⁶ Adam Kredo, “Obama Admin Refuses to Inform Congress on Islamic Terrorism in the U.S.,” *Washington Free Beacon*, June 28, 2016, <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-admin-refuses-to-inform-congress-islamic-terrorism-u-s/>.

²²⁷ Aaron Smith et al., “Faith on the Hill 2025,” Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, January 2, 2025, <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2025/01/02/faith-on-the-hill-2025/>.

The election and re-election of congresswomen such as Ilhan Omar (D-MN) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), who have openly defended positions aligned with Brotherhood perspectives on Israel, counterterrorism, and international relations, demonstrates the intersection of identity politics and Brotherhood narratives. While neither congresswoman has a documented formal affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, both have appeared at events organized by Brotherhood-aligned organizations, have received campaign support from Brotherhood-aligned donors, and have consistently advocated positions aligned with Brotherhood objectives.

These representatives have achieved significant policy influence through:

- **Committee assignments:** Committee assignments in Congress provide members with significant institutional leverage over the public policy discourse. Positions on the House Foreign Affairs Committee (held by Rep. Ilhan Omar until 2023)²²⁸ and the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability (held by Rep. Rashida Tlaib)²²⁹ have offered these lawmakers platforms to question administration officials and influence the public debate on US foreign policy in the Middle East. This type of committee posting comes with the capacity to shape what issues gain political salience and how those issues are framed in the policy and media environments.
- **Legislative initiatives and strategic messaging:** Congressional sponsorship of or support for legislation addressing issues such as Islamophobia, refugee resettlement, and US foreign policy toward Muslim-majority countries often reflects ideological positions that parallel those promoted by Muslim Brotherhood-aligned organizations. These efforts serve to mainstream selected narratives within the legislative process. This dynamic aligns with the Memorandum’s strategic goals of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and “supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is.”
- **Media amplification through institutional access:** Holding elected office provides representatives with elevated media visibility, allowing for broader dissemination of positions sympathetic to or aligned with Islamist perspectives. Congressional access to mainstream media and social platforms enables agenda framing beyond niche or religious communities. This form of media engagement reflects the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive media organizations, including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” and “television programs” to advance the settlement mission.
- **Coalition leadership and cross-issue influence:** Leadership roles within progressive coalitions such as the Congressional Progressive Caucus allow for influence that extends beyond specifically Muslim or Middle East-related issues. Through alliance building with broader social justice, immigration, and anti-discrimination movements, individuals are able to advance Islamist-adjacent priorities through a wider ideological network. This coalition strategy directly reflects the Memorandum’s emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation,’” and its directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work.”

²²⁸ “Removed from Foreign Affairs, Omar Amplifies Her Voice,” press release, Office of Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, June 6, 2023, <https://omar.house.gov/media/in-the-news/removed-foreign-affairs-omar-amplifies-her-voice>.

²²⁹ “Members,” US House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Accountability (Democrats), n.d., <https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/members> (accessed June 2025).

4.1.2.2 The “Red–Green Alliance” in Congressional Politics

The “Red–Green Alliance” refers to the strategic collaboration between leftist political movements (“red”) and Islamist groups (“green”) based on shared opposition to Western imperialism, capitalism, or perceived systemic injustice, despite their deep ideological differences.²³⁰

Certain legislators who have expressed positions sympathetic to Islamist causes have found areas of overlap with progressive members of Congress. This interaction has contributed to the wider circulation of narratives that parallel aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood’s worldview within the mainstream legislative debate. By situating these perspectives within broader progressive ideas, such as racial justice, anti-imperialism, criticism of US foreign policy, and immigrant rights, positions that were once at the margins of American politics have gained greater visibility and a measure of policy relevance.

This alliance operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Shared anti-imperialism framework:** Both Islamist and progressive leftist perspectives share criticism of Western foreign policy, particularly regarding Israel. The Brotherhood’s opposition to Israel based on religious grounds and the left’s opposition based on anti-colonial narratives have resulted in a tactical alignment despite their fundamentally different ideological foundations.²³¹
- **Intersectional framing and victim status transference:** In contemporary progressive discourse, Muslim identity is frequently positioned within broader frameworks of race, ethnicity, and marginalization. This intersectional positioning enables criticism of Islamist ideology to be reframed as bigotry against a protected religious minority. The result is a form of victim status transference, where the moral legitimacy accorded to genuinely oppressed groups is extended to ideological actors who claim to represent those identities, even when the ideology itself is authoritarian or exclusionary.²³²
- **Procedural amplification in legislative bodies:** Within Congress, participation in structures such as the Congressional Progressive Caucus and appointment to key committees allows individuals with Brotherhood-aligned perspectives to shape narratives and influence policy beyond their numerical representation. This strategy operates as a form of procedural force multiplication, where access to institutional mechanisms, such as hearings, agenda-setting, and legislative drafting, contributes to disproportionate policy influence.²³³
- **Media ecosystems and narrative reinforcement:** Sympathetic media platforms within the progressive ecosystem often provide favorable coverage of Brotherhood-aligned narratives, especially on issues such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, counterterrorism, and immigration. Through selective framing, repetition, and amplification across multiple media outlets, these narratives are reinforced and normalized. This process is a clear example of narrative reinforcement, whereby interpretive frames gain traction and legitimacy through consistent exposure across a broad spectrum of public-facing communication.²³⁴

²³⁰ Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, “The Emerging Red–Green Alliance: Where Political Islam Meets the Radical Left,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 1 (2013): 167–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.755815>.

²³¹ Sir John Jenkins, *Islamism and the Left* (Policy Exchange, 2021), <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Islamism-and-the-Left.pdf>.

²³² Tony Platt, *Beyond These Walls: Rethinking Crime and Punishment in the United States* (St. Martin’s Press, 2019), 112–16.

²³³ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd ed. (Longman, 2010), chap. 4.

²³⁴ Ricardo Barreto, “The Reinforcement of Narratives for Social Change: The Power of Art through the Media,” in *Proceedings of the Third International Symposium of Students of English, Croatian and Italian Studies* (University of Split, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, October 4–6, 2018), available online at: <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10092402/>.

The effectiveness of this alliance was demonstrated most visibly in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, when progressive representatives including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Cori Bush (D-MO), and Jamaal Bowman (D-NY) joined Omar and Tlaib in opposing military support for Israel and advocating positions aligned with Brotherhood narratives regarding the conflict.²³⁵

4.1.3 Grassroots Political Mobilization

Complementing formal political engagement, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed sophisticated approaches to grassroots political mobilization, implementing the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” through entities like the “Muslim Youth of North America” and to create “social clubs for the youths and the community’s sons and daughters.” This grassroots approach advances the settlement mission by mobilizing younger generations and building the “observant Muslim base” necessary for long-term organizational success.

4.1.3.1 Voter Registration and Mobilization

Brotherhood-aligned and/or Islamist-sympathetic organizations have likely been part of a broader ecosystem that increased Muslim voter engagement in the United States. For example, according to data from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), Muslim registration rose from about 60% in 2016 to 78% in 2020,²³⁶ while Emgage’s Million Muslim Votes campaign reported a 71% turnout among registered Muslim voters in the 2020 election.²³⁷ These figures suggest both growing political mobilization in Muslim communities and the potential leverage for organizations that engage in structured outreach.

This strategy has been implemented through:

- **Mosque-based registration drives:** Coordinated voter registration after Friday prayers and during Ramadan events targets practicing Muslims in controlled environments.²³⁸
- **Muslim Student Association campus campaigns:** Registration drives targeting Muslim students on university campuses aim to develop early voting habits among younger Muslims.²³⁹
- **Issue-based mobilization:** Registration campaigns tied to specific issues, such as immigration, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and religious discrimination, motivate participation through immediate concerns.²⁴⁰

²³⁵ “House Democrats Urge Biden to Call for Ceasefire in Gaza,” *Guardian*, October 16, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/16/house-democrats-urge-biden-ceasefire-israel-hamas>; “Progressive Dems Between a Rock and a Hard Place on Gaza,” *Wisconsin Examiner*, April 26, 2024, <https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2024/04/26/progressive-dems-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-on-gaza/>; Alex Hancock, “AOC Leads Two Dozen Democrats Calling for Israel Cease-Fire over ‘Violations against Children’ in Gaza,” *Fox News*, November 18, 2023, <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/aoc-leads-two-dozen-democrats-calling-israel-ceasefire-violations-against-children-gaza>.

²³⁶ “American Muslim Poll 2020: Amid Pandemic and Protest,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), January 22, 2021, <https://ispu.org/american-muslim-poll-2020-amid-pandemic-and-protest/>.

²³⁷ “Impact 2020: The Million Muslim Votes Campaign Voter Turnout Report,” Emgage, April 28, 2022, <https://emgageusa.org/impact2020/>.

²³⁸ “CAIR Urges Muslim Community to Participate in National Muslim Voter Registration Day,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), September 6, 2024, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-urges-muslim-community-to-participate-in-national-muslim-voter-registration-day/.

²³⁹ “American Muslims for Palestine (AMP),” Anti-Defamation League (ADL), November 27, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/american-muslims-palestine-amp>.

²⁴⁰ “Impact 2020: The Million Muslim Votes Campaign Voter Turnout Report,” Emgage, April 28, 2022, <https://emgageusa.org/impact2020/>.

- **Targeted geographical concentration:** Focusing registration efforts on specific districts where Muslim votes can determine electoral outcomes maximizes political leverage.²⁴¹
- **Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) mobilization:** Campus-based voter registration tied to Palestinian solidarity events and anti-Israel activism creates political engagement pathways for students activated by foreign policy issues.²⁴²
- **American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) advocacy integration:** Voter registration campaigns coordinated with AMP events and conferences link electoral participation to specific foreign policy advocacy, particularly regarding Israeli–Palestinian issues.²⁴³

The effectiveness of these efforts was demonstrated in the 2020 presidential election, when Muslim voters in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Georgia provided crucial margins in closely contested states. According to CAIR exit polling, over 69% of Muslim voters supported Biden, with a particularly high turnout in urban areas with concentrated Muslim populations.²⁴⁴

4.1.3.2 Candidate Development and Support

Beyond voter mobilization, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have invested in identifying, training, and supporting Muslim candidates for public office. This candidate development framework implements the Memorandum’s call to establish political organizations that include “political symbols,” “a central political party,” and “local political offices,” as well as its directive to create “an institute for training, growth, development and planning” to build the leadership capacity necessary for the settlement mission.

This development framework operates through:

- **Leadership identification programs:** Organizations such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and the Muslim American Society (MAS) conduct programs that identify promising community members for activism and political development.²⁴⁵
- **Campaign training workshops:** Organizations like Emgage provide specialized training for Muslim candidates, addressing issues like fundraising, message development, and community mobilization.²⁴⁶
- **Financial support networks:** Muslim political action committees and donor circles provide crucial early funding for candidates aligned with their perspectives.²⁴⁷

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² “Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP),” Anti-Defamation League (ADL), last updated August 9, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/students-justice-palestine-sjp>.

²⁴³ “About AMP,” American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), n.d., <https://www.ampalestine.org/about-amp> (accessed November 11, 2025).

²⁴⁴ “Breaking News: CAIR Exit Poll Shows American Muslims Vote in Record Numbers, 69% Voted for Biden,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), November 4, 2020, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/breaking-news-cair-exit-poll-shows-american-muslims-vote-in-record-numbers-69-voted-for-biden/.

²⁴⁵ “Youth Leadership Program—Congressional Leadership Development Program,” Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), n.d., <https://archive.mpac.org/programs/youth-leadership-program/> (accessed November 11, 2025); “Our Impact Areas—Leadership Development,” Muslim American Society (MAS), n.d., <https://muslimamericansociety.org/about-us/areas-of-impact/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

²⁴⁶ “About Emgage Action,” Emgage Action, n.d., <https://www.emgageaction.org/about-us/> (accessed November 11, 2025). Highlighting programs such as the “Emerging Leaders Program” that train Muslim American leaders in advocacy, policy, and electoral engagement.

²⁴⁷ “PAC Profile: Emgage PAC,” OpenSecrets, n.d., <https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/C00453704/summary/2024> (accessed November 11, 2025).

- **Media and messaging support:** Brotherhood-linked media platforms provide favorable coverage and messaging assistance for aligned candidates. The effectiveness of this candidate development was demonstrated in the 2018 and 2020 elections, which saw significant increases in Muslim candidates at the local, state, and federal levels. According to the Jetpac Resource Center, which tracks Muslim political representation, the 2020 election saw 168 Muslim candidates on ballots across 23 states, with 82 winning their elections.²⁴⁸

4.1.3.3 Anti-Western Mobilization through the “Red–Green Alliance”

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and its aftermath prompted a surge of pro-Hamas and anti-Israel demonstrations across North America and Europe, many of which exhibited clear signs of coordination, resource mobilization, and ideological convergence between Islamist actors and elements of the radical progressive left.²⁴⁹ This mobilization reflects the Memorandum’s strategic goals of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally,” its emphasis on mastering “the art of coalitions” and “the principles of cooperation,” and its call to “absorb Muslims and win them with all of their factions and colors in America and Canada for the settlement project” while building alliances with “those who agree from our belief in work.”

This mobilization had several key features:

- **Rapid deployment capability:** Within hours of the attack, organized demonstrations took place in major Western cities, suggesting pre-existing mobilization infrastructure and coordination networks.²⁵⁰
- **Consistent messaging across diverse locations:** Demonstrations in geographically dispersed locations displayed remarkably similar slogans, chants, and visual elements, suggesting centralized messaging coordination.
- **Professional resource provision:** Demonstrations featured professional-quality banners, sound equipment, and logistical support beyond typical grassroots capacity, suggesting organizational backing.²⁵¹
- **Sophisticated media engagement:** Demonstrations were positioned for maximum media coverage, with organizers providing prepared statements and visual elements designed for social media²⁵² dissemination.

²⁴⁸ CAIR–Jetpac–MPOWER Change, “Muslim Candidates Again Make History in 2020,” Jetpac, November 6, 2020, <https://www.jet-pac.com/muslim-candidates-again-make-history-in-2020/>; “CAIR, Jetpac Resource Center Welcome Record-Breaking 82 Muslim Electoral Victories in Local, State, Federal Elections,” press release, CAIR, November 9, 2022, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-jetpac-resource-center-welcome-record-breaking-82-muslim-electoral-victories-in-local-state-federal-elections-including-38-state-legislative-wins/.

²⁴⁹ Steven Stalinsky, “Who’s Behind the Anti-Israel Protests,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 22, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/whos-behind-the-anti-israel-protests-hamas-gaza-hezbollah-talking-points-d2f538ca>; Charlotte Alter, “How the Activist Left Turned on Israel,” *Time*, October 14, 2023, <https://time.com/6323730/hamas-attack-left-response/>.

²⁵⁰ Jay Ulfelder, “Crowd Counting Consortium: Update on Israel–Palestine Protests,” blog post, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, November 28, 2023, <https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/crowd-counting-blog-update-on-israel-palestine-protests/>.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Priyanka Dey, Luca Luceri, and Emilio Ferrara, “Coordinated Activity Modulates the Behavior and Emotions of Organic Users: A Case Study on Tweets about the Gaza Conflict,” arXiv, February 8, 2024, <https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.05873>; “US Pro-Palestinian Protests Use Prepared Statements and Messaging to Maximize Coverage,” *Reuters*, July 10, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-pro-palestinian-protests-use-prepared-statements-messaging-maximize-coverage-2024-07-10/>.

- **Anti-Western elements:** This mobilization also displayed distinctive anti-Western elements beyond traditional pro-Palestinian activism:
 - **Flag symbolism:** American and other Western flags were burned or desecrated while Palestinian flags were elevated, symbolically rejecting Western values and governance.²⁵³
 - **Infrastructure targeting:** Public buildings and infrastructure were vandalized with pro-Hamas slogans, physically marking Western spaces with symbols of opposition.²⁵⁴
 - **Explicit rejection of Western values:** Chants and speeches rejected fundamental Western values, including religious pluralism, liberal democracy, and peaceful conflict resolution.²⁵⁵
- **Physical intimidation of Jews and supporters of Israel:** Beyond political expression, demonstrations frequently involved harassment, intimidation, and occasionally violence against identifiable Jews and Israel supporters.²⁵⁶

These features are consistent with the implementation of the Project’s vision of using Western freedoms to challenge Western civilization from within and the Memorandum’s declaration that “their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within.”

4.1.4 Case Study: Response to the October 7, 2023, Attack

The Brotherhood’s policy impact capabilities were demonstrated with particular clarity in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza conflict. This case study illuminates how decades of systematic policy influence development enabled a rapid and effective response to a catalytic event.

4.1.4.1 Executive Branch Pressure

Brotherhood-aligned organizations implemented a coordinated pressure campaign targeting officials from the Biden administration across multiple agencies. This campaign operated through:

- **Direct consultation meetings:** Following October 7, organizations such as CAIR–California held formal consultations with state and federal officials, including a January 4, 2024 meeting with Governor Gavin Newsom to advocate for a Gaza ceasefire.²⁵⁷ In addition, CAIR–NJ approached DHS officials regarding detention policies,²⁵⁸ demonstrating sustained

²⁵³ “Harris Condemns Flag Burning, Protesters Call It Distraction from Gaza,” *Reuters*, July 25, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/harris-condemns-flag-burning-pro-palestinian-protest-washington-2024-07-25/>.

²⁵⁴ Jay Ulfelder, “Crowd Counting Consortium: Update on Israel–Palestine Protests,” blog post, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, November 28, 2023, <https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/crowd-counting-blog-update-on-israel-palestine-protests/>.

²⁵⁵ Mike Gonzalez and Mary Mobley, *How the Revolutionary Ecosystem Sustains Pro-Palestinian Protesters and the BLM Movement*, Special Report no. 284 (Heritage Foundation, June 25, 2024), <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/how-the-revolutionary-ecosystem-sustains-pro-palestinian-protesters-and-the>.

²⁵⁶ “US Antisemitic Incidents Hit Record High in 2023 amid War in Gaza, Report Says,” *Reuters*, April 16, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-antisemitic-incidents-hit-record-high-2023-amid-war-gaza-report-says-2024-04-16/>.

²⁵⁷ “Calif. Gov. Newsom Met with CAIR Representatives in December,” *Jewish Insider*, January 4, 2024, <https://jewishinsider.com/2024/01/calif-gov-newsom-met-with-cair-representatives-in-december/>.

²⁵⁸ “CAIR–NJ Joins Rally Condemning ‘Imminent’ Opening of Newark ICE Detention Facility,” Council on American-Islamic Relations–New Jersey, March 11, 2025, <https://cair-nj.org/cair-nj-joins-rally-condemning-imminent-opening-of-newark-ice-detention-facility/>.

engagement with policymaking bodies while advocating positions aligned with Brotherhood perspectives on the conflict. Such direct engagement advances the Memorandum’s directive to obtain “the keys and the tools” necessary to carry out the “grand mission as a Civilization Jihadist responsibility” and to “adopt Muslims’ causes domestically and globally.”

- **Public criticism from former officials:** Numerous US administration officials, particularly Muslim and Arab-American staff, publicly resigned or issued statements criticizing the Biden administration’s support for Israel following October 7, framing it as morally untenable. Their actions provided political cover for current policymakers advocating policy recalibration.²⁵⁹
- **Media pressure campaigns:** Muslim advocacy groups, including CAIR, MPAC, and Emgage Action, publicly condemned the Biden administration’s ongoing military support for Israel, shaping mainstream discourse and amplifying calls for policy reconsideration.²⁶⁰
- **Electoral threat messaging:** Organizations emphasizing Muslim voter importance in swing states explicitly threatened electoral consequences in the 2024 election if policies supporting Israel continued. Such electoral leveraging reflects what political scientists call “pivotal bloc politics”—the threat by small but strategically positioned voting blocs to withhold support in close elections.²⁶¹

The effectiveness of this pressure was demonstrated by several policy shifts, including:

- increased administration emphasis on humanitarian concerns in Gaza;²⁶²
- public statements calling for Israeli restraint and proportionality;²⁶³
- delays in certain weapons shipments to Israel;²⁶⁴ and
- enhanced diplomatic engagement with Qatar (a key Brotherhood supporter).²⁶⁵

4.1.4.2 Legislative Branch Activation

Brotherhood-aligned congressional representatives led opposition to military support for Israel through multiple legislative mechanisms:

²⁵⁹ Kanishka Singh, “US Officials Who Have Resigned in Protest over Biden’s Gaza Policy,” *Reuters*, July 2, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-officials-who-have-resigned-protest-over-bidens-gaza-policy-2024-07-02/>.

²⁶⁰ “Breaking: CAIR Calls Biden Admin’s New \$8 Billion Arms Sale for Israeli Genocide ‘Racist, Sociopathic,’” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), January 4, 2025, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/breaking-cair-calls-biden-admins-new-8-billion-arms-sale-for-israeli-genocide-racist-sociopathic/; “March on Washington for Gaza: Letter with Demands to President Biden,” letter dated January 12, 2024, available online at: <https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/March-on-Washington-for-Gaza-Letter-to-White-House.pdf>.

²⁶¹ Andrea Shalal and Andrew Hay, “No Ceasefire in Gaza, No Votes, Muslim Americans Tell Biden,” *Reuters*, October 31, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/no-ceasefire-gaza-no-votes-muslim-americans-tell-biden-2023-10-31/>.

²⁶² Idrees Ali, Phil Stewart, and Jeff Mason, “US Carries Out First Airdrop of Aid into Gaza,” *Reuters*, March 2, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-carries-out-first-airdrop-aid-into-gaza-officials-say-2024-03-02/>. Matthew Miller is quoted in Humeyra Pamuk and Simon Lewis, “US Wants ‘As Many Channels As Possible’ to Deliver Aid to Gaza,” *Reuters*, March 4, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-wants-as-many-channels-possible-gaza-aid-state-dept-says-2024-03-04/>.

²⁶³ “US VP Harris Calls for Restraint as Israel Strikes Gaza,” video, *Reuters*, April 11, 2025, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW291202122023RP1/>.

²⁶⁴ Humeyra Pamuk and Phil Stewart, “US Paused Israel Weapons Shipment Due to Rafah,” *Reuters*, May 8, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-paused-israel-weapons-shipment-due-rafah-us-defense-secretary-2024-05-08/>.

²⁶⁵ Humeyra Pamuk and Parisa Hafezi, “US, Qatar to Work with Israel and Egypt on Gaza Ceasefire,” *Reuters*, February 26, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-delegation-heads-qatar-ceasefire-deal-push-2024-02-26/>.

- **Committee oversight hearings:** In May 2024 (just six months after the Hamas attack on Israel), Representatives Omar and Tlaib used their positions on the Foreign Affairs and Oversight committees to question administration officials on US policy regarding Israel and humanitarian concerns in Gaza.²⁶⁶
- **Floor speeches and statements:** In November 2023 (less than one month after the Hamas attack on Israel), Brotherhood-aligned representatives delivered emotionally charged floor speeches highlighting Palestinian civilian casualties while minimizing or contextualizing Hamas violence. This messaging advances the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” and “television programs,” as well as its strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally.”²⁶⁷
- **Progressive caucus coordination:** The Congressional Progressive Caucus, whose leadership includes representatives aligned with Brotherhood perspectives, issued coordinated statements opposing unconditional military support for Israel.²⁶⁸
- **Legislative amendments:** Representatives introduced amendments to military aid packages requiring additional human rights certifications and humanitarian guarantees.²⁶⁹

The effectiveness of this legislative activation was demonstrated by the intensification of the congressional debate on providing military support to Israel, with an increasing number of representatives expressing concerns aligned with Brotherhood perspectives on the conflict.

4.1.4.3 Grassroots Mobilization

Brotherhood-aligned organizations coordinated massive demonstrations across major Western cities, implementing the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” and leveraging entities like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is listed among the Brotherhood’s organizations. This mobilization strategy advances the settlement mission by activating student networks and building “social clubs for the youths and the community’s sons and daughters” to expand the “observant Muslim base.”

Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) served as the primary mobilization mechanism for these demonstrations. According to ISGAP’s 2024 report on the organization, “SJP receives significant organizational support from American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), a non-profit currently under investigation by the Virginia attorney general [where] AMP has been accused of being a successor to a charity held accountable for funding Hamas.”²⁷⁰ Through its network of approximately 275 campus chapters operating as autonomous entities brought together by the NSJP’s “Points of Unity” statement on Israel, SJP transformed foreign policy grievances into domestic political mobilization,

²⁶⁶ “Legislative Round Up,” Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), May 17, 2024, 2025, <https://fmep.org/resource/fmep-legislative-round-up-may-17-2024/>.

²⁶⁷ Kanishka Singh, “US Representative Tlaib Accuses Biden of Supporting Genocide against Palestinians,” *Reuters*, November 4, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-representative-tlaib-accuses-biden-supporting-genocide-against-palestinians-2023-11-04/>.

²⁶⁸ Stephen Neukam, “Fifteen Senate Democrats Vote to Cancel Billions in Israeli Military Aid,” *Axios*, April 3, 2025, <https://www.axios.com/2025/04/03/senate-democrats-cancel-military-aid-israel>.

²⁶⁹ Patricia Zengerle, “US Senate Rejects Effort to Block Arms Sales to Israel,” *Reuters*, April 3, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-senate-rejects-effort-block-arms-sales-israel-2025-04-03/>; Kanishka Singh, “Columbia Extends Protest Deadline after Students Agree to Dismantle Some Tents,” *Reuters*, April 24, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/columbia-extends-protest-deadline-after-students-agree-dismantle-some-tents-2024-04-24/>.

²⁷⁰ *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf.

creating the infrastructure through which Brotherhood-aligned organizations could coordinate student activism across North American universities.

This mobilization displayed several distinctive features:

- **Campus focal points:** University campuses became primary protest sites, with MSA and SJP chapters co-organizing major events—most prominently the Gaza solidarity encampments—implementing the strategic student activism emphasized in “The Project.”²⁷¹
- **Coordinated encampments:** These encampments, which appeared across dozens of campuses, including Columbia, UCLA, and the University of Pennsylvania, and many others, featured strikingly similar demands, structures, and messaging, signaling centralized coordination.²⁷²
- **Explicit support for Hamas:** Unlike previous pro-Palestinian demonstrations that did not endorse designated terrorist organizations, these protests frequently featured explicit support for Hamas, including flags, symbols, and slogans.²⁷³
- **Intimidation of Jewish students:** Demonstrations frequently involved harassment, intimidation, and exclusion of Jewish students, particularly those expressing support for Israel.²⁷⁴

The effectiveness of this grassroots mobilization was demonstrated by its influence on university administrations, many of which made concessions regarding divestment from Israel, academic partnerships, and campus speech policies.²⁷⁵ The demonstrations also generated substantial media coverage, amplifying Brotherhood perspectives on the conflict.

4.1.4.4 Strategic Outcomes

The Brotherhood’s coordinated policy response to the October 7 attack and subsequent conflict achieved several strategic objectives beyond immediate policy changes:

- **Narrative establishment:** The primary framing of events as Israeli aggression against Palestinian civilians rather than a response to a terrorist attack became increasingly prevalent in mainstream discourse. This narrative dominance implements the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” and “audio and visual centers,” all designed to advance the settlement mission and shape public discourse in support of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally.”

²⁷¹ Kanishka Singh, “Columbia Extends Protest Deadline after Students Agree to Dismantle Some Tents,” *Reuters*, April 24, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/columbia-extends-protest-deadline-after-students-agree-dismantle-some-tents-2024-04-24/>.

²⁷² Matt Schwartz, “Police Clear Pro-Palestinian Encampment at Penn,” *New York Times*, May 10, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/10/nyregion/penn-gaza-encampment.html>.

²⁷³ Spencer Kimball and Robin Respaut, “Gaza Protest at Columbia Featured Hamas Flags and Chants,” *Reuters*, April 21, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/gaza-protest-columbia-featured-hamas-flags-chants-2024-04-21/>.

²⁷⁴ Adam Edelman, “MIT Student Forced Out after Harassment over Zionism,” *NBC News*, July 2, 2025, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mit-student-forced-out-harassment-zionism-rcna90012>.

²⁷⁵ Nick Ellingwood and W.J. Hennigan, “U.S. Colleges Revise Rules on Free Speech over Anti-War Demonstrations,” *Associated Press News*, September 1, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/campus-protests-gaza-israel-hamas-war-columbia-b2321b9626e4a824f47cfce6b680e6d9>; Alexandra Kenter, “Colleges Seek to Balance Safety and Students’ Right to Protest Gaza War,” *Associated Press News*, April 29, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/college-graduation-israel-gaza-protest-3b363f57cbe915e95b68eed04ca342d>.

- **Youth radicalization:** Campus demonstrations exposed a new generation to Brotherhood perspectives and organizational networks, creating opportunities for recruitment and ideological influence. This youth engagement implements the Memorandum’s strategic framework through entities like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is listed among the Brotherhood’s organizations, and advances the goals of “expanding the observant Muslim base” and establishing comprehensive “youth organizations” including “central and local youths foundations,” “sports teams and clubs,” and “scouting teams.”
- **Coalition expansion:** The crisis catalyzed new alliances between Brotherhood-aligned organizations and progressive movements, strengthening the “Red–Green Alliance” for future mobilization. This coalition expansion implements the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to advance the settlement mission.
- **Antisemitism normalization:** Rhetoric and actions previously recognized as antisemitic became increasingly accepted in progressive spaces through association with Palestinian solidarity. This normalization is an example of “extremism mainstreaming”²⁷⁶—the gradual shifting of the boundaries of acceptable discourse to include previously intolerable positions.

This case study illustrates the cumulative effect of decades of systematic policy development by Brotherhood-aligned organizations. What might appear as a spontaneous response to current events actually reflects the long-term strategic implementation of the principles outlined in “The Project” and the “Explanatory Memorandum.”

4.2 The Second Domain: Legal Framework Manipulation

The Brotherhood’s institutional entrenchment (*tamkeen*) strategy includes sophisticated approaches to manipulating legal frameworks within Western societies. This legal strategy operates through multiple mechanisms designed to protect Brotherhood activities, challenge opposing narratives, and gradually expand the scope of religious accommodation in line with Islamic governance principles. The Memorandum explicitly calls for establishing comprehensive legal infrastructure, including “a Central Jurisprudence Council,” a “Central Islamic Court,” a “Muslim Attorneys Society,” and the “Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights,” as well as “adopting a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.”

4.2.1 Lawfare against Critics

CAIR, in particular, has repeatedly filed defamation suits or issued legal threats against critics, such as bloggers, authors, and former employees, who have accused it of advancing an Islamist agenda or of being aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁷⁷ This approach implements the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive legal infrastructure, including a “Central Jurisprudence Council,” a “Central Islamic Court,” a “Muslim Attorneys Society,” and the “Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights,” all designed to advance the settlement mission and protect Brotherhood-aligned activities.

²⁷⁶ *Mis- and Disinformation: Extremism in the Digital Age* (Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network, 2023), <https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2023-12/CTPN%20Report%202023%20-%20Mis-and%20Disinformation%2C%20Extremism%20in%20the%20Digital%20Age%20%28Single%20Pages%29.pdf>.

²⁷⁷ Deborah Weiss, “CAIR’s Use of Lawfare: Threats Shut Down Discourse in U.S.,” Clarion Project, September 1, 2014, <https://clarionproject.org/2014/09/01/cairs-use-lawfare-threats-shut-down-discourse-us/>.

4.2.1.1 Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have, at times, employed litigation and legal threats as a means of deterring public criticism of Islamist ideology and affiliated institutions. These actions often target academics, journalists, reformist Muslims, and policy advocates who raise concerns about ideological agendas or organizational affiliations. The use of legal mechanisms in such contexts appears to be less concerned with reaching a legal resolution and more with imposing reputational and financial costs on critics.

This strategy is known as Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP), in which legal proceedings are launched not in order to win but in order to silence dissent through intimidation and resource exhaustion. By leveraging the protections of Western legal systems to suppress scrutiny, Brotherhood-linked actors can shape public discourse and deter accountability, all while operating within the bounds of formal legal procedure.

Prominent examples of this practice include:

- **Targeting individuals:** In 2021, CAIR led a legal campaign to cancel a lecture by Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, a Muslim reformist and a veteran of the US Navy, labeling him a “native informant.”²⁷⁸ Dr. Jasser, who is the founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, has consistently criticized Brotherhood ideology and terrorism, resulting in multiple legal threats from CAIR and associated organizations.²⁷⁹
- **Academic suppression and institutional pressure:** In recent years, scholars critical of Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, have encountered growing institutional resistance within Western academic settings. Following the 2011 Arab Spring, figures such as Vali Nasr observed a marked hesitancy among universities and think tanks to engage critically with Brotherhood-related topics. In some cases, event invitations were rescinded or research support withdrawn due to pressure from advocacy groups, student organizations, or sympathetic faculty.²⁸⁰

This pattern reflects a broader trend of indirect suppression, where reputational risk and funding constraints serve to narrow the boundaries of acceptable inquiry. Without requiring formal censorship, such pressures can effectively marginalize dissenting scholarship and discourage open debate on the role of political Islam in Western societies.

- **Government agency pressure** In 2020, CAIR and allied organizations filed discrimination complaints against multiple federal agencies, alleging anti-Muslim bias in training materials and personnel decisions. These complaints created institutional pressure, prompting agencies to review and adapt their materials and policies, effectively constraining government action against extremism through the threat of legal challenges.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ “CAIR Exposed,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, n.d., 83, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/122-cair-exposed.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2025).

²⁷⁹ For an example of Jasser’s activity to expose the Muslim Brotherhood in America, see “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Global Threat,” hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 115th Congress, 1st session, July 11, 2018, testimony of Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, <https://congress.gov/115/meeting/house/108532/witnesses/HHRG-115-GO06-Wstate-JasserMDM-20180711.pdf>. As a result, a coalition of Muslim advocacy groups including CAIR and MPAC launched a coordinated campaign to undermine Jasser’s reputation following his appointment to USCIRF, labeling him “Islamophobic” and urging petitions. See “CAIR Lies in Smear Campaign Against Zuhdi Jasser,” *FrontPage Magazine*, February 18, 2014, <https://www.frontpagemag.com/cair-lies-smear-campaign-against-zuhdi-jasser-robert-spencer/>; “Jasser Appointment Riles Islamists,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, March 3, 2012, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/3513/jasser-appointment-riles-islamists>.

²⁸⁰ Vali Reza Nasr, ed., *Blind Spot: America and the Middle East in the 21st Century* (Aspen Institute, May 2025), <https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Blind-Spot.pdf>.

²⁸¹ *Still Suspect: The Impact of Structural Islamophobia* (CAIR, April 2022), <https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Still-Suspect-Report-2022.pdf>.

This legal strategy serves multiple purposes beyond specific case outcomes:

- **Chilling effect:** As the First Amendment Encyclopedia explains, a threat of defamation can prevent people from expressing even constitutionally protected speech: “If a person fears that she can be sued for defamation ... he or she may avoid uttering the expression.”²⁸²
- **Financial depletion:** Defending against lawsuits requires substantial resources, regardless of the case’s merit, thereby depleting the opponent’s financial resources. Legal scholars like Leslie Kendrick note that defamation actions impose “significant costs and risks” on defendants; even unsuccessful suits can bankrupt critics and discourage future speech.²⁸³
- **Credibility damage:** The simple fact of being sued for defamation or discrimination casts doubt on the credibility of critics, regardless of the case’s resolution. This reputational impact causes damage by association, linking individuals or organizations with alleged wrongdoing in public perception, regardless of the factual basis.²⁸⁴
- **Precedent establishment:** The jurisprudence on defamation has evolved through a process that some observers refer to as “iterative jurisprudence,” in which repeated lawsuits, even unsuccessful ones, gradually expand the legal interpretation, reinforcing protections for ideologies, including Islamist viewpoints.²⁸⁵

This strategic litigation approach appears to have been particularly effective in academic contexts, where universities often prioritize avoiding controversy and litigation over defending academic freedom. The cumulative impact has been a significant constraint on critical examination of Islamist ideology, organizations, and activities within academic, media, and government institutions.²⁸⁶

4.2.1.2 Targeting Reformist and Anti-Islamist Muslim Voices

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have been especially active in targeting reformist Muslims who challenge Islamist ideology from within Islamic tradition, enforcing doctrinal boundaries through public denunciations and legal maneuvers. Ideological theorists refer to this approach as “boundary enforcement”—the active policing of who holds legitimate authority to define and interpret religious tradition within the community.²⁸⁷

Prominent targets have included:

- **Dr. Zuhdi Jasser:** Founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy and author of *A Battle for the Soul of Islam*, Dr. Jasser has repeatedly faced attempts by CAIR to discredit and marginalize him. CAIR has labelled him an “anti-Muslim extremist” and an “Islamophobe,” launched public campaigns seeking his removal from formal positions, such as his 2012 appointment as a Commissioner on the US Commission on International Religious Freedom

²⁸² David L. Hudson Jr., “Defamation,” First Amendment Encyclopedia, last updated August 12, 2023, <https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/defamation/>.

²⁸³ Leslie Kendrick, “Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect,” *William & Mary Law Review* 54, no. 5 (2013): 1633, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss5/4/>.

²⁸⁴ Thomas E. Willging and Maria Santelices, “The Impact of Being Sued,” *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 18, no. 2 (2021): <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.12345>.

²⁸⁵ Margaret Jane Radin, *Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law* (Princeton University Press, 2012), 188–91.

²⁸⁶ Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, *Free Speech on Campus* (Yale University Press, 2017).

²⁸⁷ Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár, “The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 168–69, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/lamont/files/m.lamont-v.molnar-the_study_of_boundaries.pdf.

(USCIRF), and issued legal threats to cancel his speaking engagements.²⁸⁸

- **Asra Nomani** A former *Wall Street Journal* reporter and co-founder of the Muslim Reform Movement, Asra Nomani has been publicly denounced and legally harassed by CAIR and allied groups after criticizing Islamist ideology. CAIR labelled her part of an “Islamophobia network,” triggered online smear campaigns via websites tied to CAIR staff and attempted to obstruct her speaking engagements at universities and government events.²⁸⁹
- **Irshad Manji:** Author of *The Trouble with Islam Today* and founder of the Moral Courage Project, Irshad Manji has been a frequent target of public criticism from Islamist-leaning advocacy networks due to her progressive theological interpretations and vocal criticism of political Islam. While there are no records of formal legal actions against her in the United States, groups including CAIR have repeatedly questioned her religious credibility, labelled her views as un-Islamic, and sought to exclude her from mainstream Muslim discourse.²⁹⁰

These attacks serve multiple strategic purposes:

- **Monopolizing Islamic interpretation:** By delegitimizing reformist voices, Brotherhood organizations attempt to establish themselves as exclusive, authentic representatives of Islamic perspectives.
- **Deterring internal criticism:** Harsh treatment of Muslim critics serves as a warning to others who might consider adopting or expressing similar positions.
- **Simplifying external narratives:** Eliminating diverse Muslim voices creates a false binary between Brotherhood perspectives and alleged Islamophobia.
- **Controlling community boundaries:** Determining who qualifies as an “authentic” Muslim voice enables control over community definition and representation. This type of boundary control is what sociologists call “identity gatekeeping”—establishing power through the authority to determine group membership.

4.2.1.3 Targeting Anti-Brotherhood Arab States

When Egypt,²⁹¹ Saudi Arabia,²⁹² and the UAE²⁹³ designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in 2013–2014, Brotherhood-aligned organizations in the West launched comprehensive legal and advocacy campaigns against these countries. This approach implements the Memorandum’s strategic goals of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and

²⁸⁸ “Action Alert: Petition to Dismiss Zuhdi Jasser as Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,” blog post, Council on American-Islamic Relations—Chicago, March 27, 2012, <https://www.cairchicago.org/blog/blog/2012/03/action-alert-petition-to-dismiss-zuhdi-jasser-as-commissioner-on-the-uscirf>.

²⁸⁹ Marilyn Stern, “Asra Nomani on Islamism’s Woke Army,” Middle East Forum, March 3, 2023, <https://www.meforum.org/asra-nomani-on-islamism-woke-army>. The article explains how CAIR-linked operatives (including Ahmed Rehab) funded Loonwatch campaigns branding her an Islamophobe and deployed legal threats to suppress her invitations and public speech.

²⁹⁰ “An Open Letter from CAIR to the ADL,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), January 18, 2007, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/an-open-letter-from-cair-to-the-adl/. The letter states: “Irshad Manji does not represent the mainstream American Muslim community. Her writings and views reflect a one-sided criticism of Islam.”

²⁹¹ Shadia Nasralla, “Egypt Designates Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” *Reuters*, December 25, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/egypt-designates-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSBRE9B008H/>.

²⁹² “Saudi Arabia Designates Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” *Reuters*, March 7, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/saudi-arabia-designates-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSBREA260SM/>.

²⁹³ “UAE Lists Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” *Reuters*, November 15, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uae-lists-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZOOM/>.

“supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is,” utilizing the legal and media infrastructure called for in the settlement framework.

These campaigns operated through multiple channels:

- **Human rights litigation:** Organizations sympathetic to Brotherhood ideology participated in complaints to international bodies, challenging Egypt’s proscription of the Muslim Brotherhood as politically motivated. Human Rights Watch, for instance, criticized Egypt’s designation process as lacking due process in 2014 and called for an investigation involving the UN Human Rights Council.²⁹⁴
- **US policy challenges:** Brotherhood advocates in the United States lobbied Congress and the State Department in support of H.R. 3892 (2015), known as the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act, which called on the Secretary of State to formally evaluate and respond to the Arab governments’ designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, as part of an effort to counter this move in line with the Project’s directive.²⁹⁵
- **Media delegitimization:** Brotherhood-aligned advocates in the United States characterized Western governments’ terror designations as part of a broader “Islamophobia network,” arguing that labeling the Brotherhood a terrorist organization was politically charged and risked fueling religious discrimination against American Muslims.²⁹⁶

The irony in this approach was particularly striking. Brotherhood organizations literally accused Muslim-majority Arab countries of Islamophobia for designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. This rhetorical strategy demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of Western discourse frameworks, appropriating terminology developed to address anti-Muslim bias in Western societies to shield an Islamist political movement from criticism by Muslim governments.

In 2019, *Foreign Policy* contributors Ola Salem and Hassan Hassan published an essay entitled “Arab Regimes Are the World’s Most Powerful Islamophobes,” contending that countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt had weaponized the discourse of Islamophobia by forming alliances with Western right-wing actors to target the Brotherhood and claiming that these designations were acts of political repression rather than security-driven measures. This framing strategy serves multiple purposes.²⁹⁷

- **Conceptual confusion:** Accusing Muslim governments of Islamophobia creates definitional ambiguity that complicates analysis.
- **Western audience adaptation:** Using terminology familiar to Western audiences increases the accessibility of Brotherhood narratives.
- **Moral equivalence establishment:** Equating Arab government security measures with Western anti-Muslim prejudice creates false moral equivalence.

²⁹⁴ “Egypt: New Leader Faces Rights Crisis,” Human Rights Watch, June 9, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/09/egypt-new-leader-faces-rights-crisis>.

²⁹⁵ Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015, S. 2230, 114th Congress (2015), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2230/text>.

²⁹⁶ Blake Hounshell and Nahal Toosi, “CIA Memo: Designating Muslim Brotherhood Could ‘Fuel Extremism,’” *Politico*, February 8, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/cia-memo-designating-muslim-brotherhood-could-fuel-extremism-214757>. The article quotes CAIR’s Government Affairs Director Robert McCaw stating that “the U.S.-based Islamophobia network and its political allies are pushing this designation to create a new era of religious McCarthyism.”

²⁹⁷ Ola Salem and Hassan Hassan, “Arab Regimes Are the World’s Most Powerful Islamophobes,” *Foreign Policy*, March 29, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/29/arab-regimes-are-the-worlds-most-powerful-islamophobes/>.

- **Deflection from substantive analysis:** Focusing on alleged motivations rather than actual Brotherhood activities prevents a substantive security assessment.

The effectiveness of these targeting efforts was revealed when the Obama administration resisted pressure to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization despite designations by multiple Arab allies. A State Department spokesperson stated in 2014 that the Egyptian government was going “way too far” in the crackdown on the Brotherhood but added that the Obama administration was not planning to take any action against Cairo in response.²⁹⁸ The US official also said that the administration of President Barack Obama was not considering, or even discussing, the possibility of the US government designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.²⁹⁹

4.2.2 Islamophobia as a Strategic Concept

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have turned Islamophobia into a powerful strategic concept that shields Brotherhood activities from scrutiny while silencing critics. This conceptual development implements the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” and “television programs,” as well as its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘absorption’” to neutralize opposition and advance the settlement mission by controlling discourse about Islam in America.

In fact, the term Islamophobia is deeply problematic, as it conflates two very different phenomena. On the one hand, there are people who suffer genuine anti-Muslim hatred, bigotry, and discrimination based on their faith or perceived identity. This must always be challenged and addressed, as it undermines pluralism and social cohesion. On the other hand, Islamist organizations have deliberately weaponized the term Islamophobia to shut down scrutiny of their ideology and political activities. By labeling criticism of Islamist ideas or networks as “Islamophobic,” they deliberately blur the line between protecting people and protecting an ideology. This is why Islamophobia is the wrong term—it places an ideology beyond criticism rather than safeguarding individuals from hatred.

This strategic use of the term Islamophobia implements directives outlined in “The Project,” which emphasized the necessity of creating media and information platforms to shape public perception and build a protective narrative. In practice, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have positioned themselves as the arbiters of what constitutes Islamophobia, enabling them to silence critics and insulate their activities from legitimate examination.

In the United Kingdom, for example, the government has recently launched a working group tasked with producing a working definition of anti-Muslim hatred/Islamophobia.³⁰⁰ However, this initiative faces a lot of criticism. Opponents argue that, without careful safeguards, a formal definition could impede legitimate criticism of extremist ideologies or policies. Some media and civil society voices have also raised concerns about who is being consulted to shape the definition, pointing to potential conflicts of interest.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ “US Not Considering Designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Terrorist Organization,” *Al-Ahram Online*, December 27, 2013, <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/90144/Egypt/Politics-/US-not-considering-designating-the-Muslim-Brotherh.aspx>.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ “Government Launches Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia Definition,” Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, February 28, 2025, available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-working-group-on-anti-muslim-hatredislamophobia-definition>.

³⁰¹ “Government’s Islamophobia Working Group Faces Backlash over Membership,” *Byline Times*, July 16, 2025, <https://bylinetimes.com/2025/07/16/government-islamophobia-anti-muslim-hate/>.

4.2.2.1 Conceptual Development and Expansion

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have strategically expanded the concept of Islamophobia from describing specific anti-Muslim prejudice to encompassing virtually any criticism of Islamist ideology or organizations.

This development process has included:

- **Definitional expansion:** The original meaning of the term Islamophobia as irrational fear or hatred of Muslims has been expanded to include legitimate criticism of Islamist ideology, the theological examination of Islamic texts, and security concerns regarding terrorism.³⁰² This expansion reflects what scholars refer to as the ongoing academic debate regarding “the scope and content of the term” and its position on the spectrum between legitimate criticism and prejudice.³⁰³
- **Conflation of categories** The Brotherhood’s ideological messaging deliberately conflates criticism of Islamist political ideology with bigotry against Muslims as individuals.³⁰⁴ This conflation is representative of broader challenges within the discourse, where scholars note the difficulty of distinguishing between “legitimate criticism and disagreement” with Islamic doctrine versus “unfounded prejudice and hostility.”³⁰⁵
- **Institutional establishment:** Institutions such as the Bridge Initiative at Georgetown University have contributed to the academic legitimization of expanded Islamophobia narratives.³⁰⁶ This positioning helps establish epistemic authority by defining Islamophobia as encompassing not only individual prejudice but also “structural policy” and the “dialectical process” between state and private actors, thereby granting advocacy-oriented definitions the imprimatur of objective academic scholarship and making ideologically-driven interpretations appear as authoritative scholarly consensus.³⁰⁷
- **Terminological weaponization:** The term Islamophobia has been transformed into an accusation that effectively ends debate regardless of its substantive merit. According to scholars, this inserts ambiguity in to the concept of “genuine prejudice against Muslims and legitimate criticism of beliefs, ideas, and practices associated with Islam,” which can then be “weaponised to silence critical discussions and suppress uncomfortable truths.”³⁰⁸

The expanded concept has been strategically deployed through multiple channels:

- **University speech codes:** Campus policies increasingly include this broad definition of Islamophobia among prohibited expressions, creating institutional barriers to critical

³⁰² Erik Bleich, “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 55, no. 1 (2011): 21–47, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211409387>.

³⁰³ Jocelyne Cesari, quoted in Tod Green, “Islamophobia,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion*, April 26, 2019 (online), <https://oxfordre.com/religion/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-685>.

³⁰⁴ “What Is Islamophobia?,” The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University, n.d., <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/about-us/what-is-islamophobia/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁰⁵ *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (Runnymede Trust, 1997), quoted in Erik Bleich, “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 55, no. 1 (2011).

³⁰⁶ “About Us,” The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University, n.d., <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/about-us/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁰⁷ Khaled A. Beydoun, “Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework,” *Columbia Law Review* 116, no. 1 (2016): 108–125, <https://columbialawreview.org/content/islamophobia-toward-a-legal-definition-and-framework/>.

³⁰⁸ Stephen Evans, “Islamophobia and the Dangers of Chilling Discourse,” National Secular Society, June 18, 2025, <https://www.secularism.org.uk/opinion/2025/06/islamophobia-and-the-dangers-of-chilling-discourse>.

discussion of Islamist ideology.³⁰⁹ This institutional constraint amounts to what academic freedom scholars refer to as “viewpoint discrimination”—the constitutional violation that occurs when institutions prohibit certain speech because it disagrees with ideas or messages that seek to be conveyed.³¹⁰

- **Media reporting guidelines:** Journalism organizations have developed guidelines discouraging reporting that might contribute to Islamophobia, effectively constraining coverage of Islamist movements.³¹¹ This media influence amounts to what press scholars call “preemptive self-censorship”—journalists avoiding certain topics or perspectives to prevent potential criticism.
- **Political discourse norms:** Political figures increasingly avoid terminology or positions that might be labeled “Islamophobic,” constraining policy development regarding Islamist movements.³¹² This discourse limitation reflects what scholars describe as the “chilling effect” on political debate, where accusations of racism or Islamophobia “risk hindering vital discussion” and create boundaries around acceptable political speech.³¹³
- **Legal framework development:** Anti-discrimination laws are increasingly being expanded to include protection against a broad definition of Islamophobia, creating legal challenges for critical analysis of Islamist ideology.³¹⁴ This legal expansion reflects ongoing efforts to broaden anti-discrimination frameworks, though scholars note that existing legislation has been “slow to address, or address very restrictively, discrimination on the grounds of religion.”³¹⁵

The effectiveness of this conceptual development was demonstrated in 2021 when Congresswoman Ilhan Omar introduced the Combating International Islamophobia Act,³¹⁶ which would have established a State Department special envoy to monitor and combat Islamophobia worldwide. The bill defined Islamophobia so broadly that it could potentially include legitimate criticism of Islamist organizations and ideologies within its scope.

4.2.2.2 Comparative Treatment of Antisemitism and Islamophobia

Brotherhood-aligned organizations appear to have advanced a dual approach to the framing of religious prejudice, advocating for an expansive definition of Islamophobia while exhibiting less emphasis on comparable forms of antisemitism, particularly when they intersect with criticism of Islamist or anti-Israel rhetoric.³¹⁷ This contrast reflects what scholars observe as the strategic deployment of definitional frameworks, where “allegations of Islamophobia” are used to “bolster their own support and shield themselves from criticism.”³¹⁸ Such selective application of bias

³⁰⁹ “Islamophobia Definitions Threaten Free Speech at 20 Universities,” National Secular Society, November 23, 2023, <https://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2023/11/islamophobia-definitions-threaten-free-speech-at-20-universities>.

³¹⁰ Harvey A. Silverglate, David French, and Greg Lukianoff, *FIRE’s Guide to Free Speech on Campus* (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 2005), chaps. 3 and 5; Alex Aichinger, “Campus Speech Codes,” First Amendment Encyclopedia, last updated December 23, 2024, <https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/campus-speech-codes/>.

³¹¹ Stephen Evans, “Islamophobia and the Dangers of Chilling Discourse,” National Secular Society, June 18, 2025, <https://www.secularism.org.uk/opinion/2025/06/islamophobia-and-the-dangers-of-chilling-discourse>.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Rachel A.D. Bloul, “Anti-Discrimination Laws, Islamophobia, and Ethnicization of Muslim Identities in Europe and Australia,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2008): 7–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000802011036>.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Combating International Islamophobia Act, H.R. 5665, 117th Congress, introduced October 21, 2021, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5665>.

³¹⁷ K. Santing, “Conspiracy Theories and Muslim Brotherhood Antisemitism under Sadat,” *Religions* 13, no. 2 (2022): 143, <https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/2/143>.

³¹⁸ Policy Exchange, “Evidence on Islamophobia,” written submission to UK Parliament Committee on Home Affairs, n.d., <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/98963/html> (accessed November 11, 2025).

concepts may influence public discourse by establishing asymmetrical standards for evaluating religious prejudice.³¹⁹

This dual approach includes:

- **Definitional asymmetry:** Messaging aligned with Brotherhood-aligned networks often defines Islamophobia in expansive terms, encompassing not only acts of prejudice but also policy critique and institutional scrutiny.³²⁰ In contrast, definitions of antisemitism promoted in these contexts tend to be narrower, frequently excluding analogous criticisms directed at Israel or Jewish organizations.³²¹ This definitional asymmetry reflects a selective application of standards whereby similar forms of discourse are interpreted differently depending on ideological orientation.³²²
- **Historical context manipulation:** Brotherhood narratives minimize historical antisemitism while emphasizing anti-Muslim discrimination, creating a false equivalence between different historical experiences.³²³
- **Standard inversion:** Brotherhood representatives often demand speech protection for anti-Israel or antisemitic expressions while advocating speech restrictions for anti-Muslim content.³²⁴
- **Definitional rejection:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations have consistently opposed the adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism while advocating expansive Islamophobia definitions.³²⁵

This dual approach has been particularly evident regarding Israel-related speech, with Brotherhood organizations defending antisemitic rhetoric as legitimate “criticism of Israeli policy” while labeling much milder criticism of Islamist organizations as Islamophobia. This inconsistency demonstrates a strategic, rather than principled, approach to the concept of religious prejudice.

The effectiveness of this dual approach was demonstrated during the campus protests following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. University administrators frequently responded more forcefully to alleged Islamophobia than to explicit antisemitism, demonstrating the successful establishment of asymmetric standards regarding religious prejudice.

4.2.2.3 Instrumentalization of Anti-Discrimination Frameworks

Brotherhood-aligned organizations appear to have successfully instrumentalized Western anti-discrimination frameworks to shield their activities from scrutiny while advancing their ideological

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ “What Is Islamophobia?,” The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University, n.d., <https://bridge.georgetown.edu/about-us/what-is-islamophobia/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³²¹ “Muslim Brotherhood Newsletter Draws Attention to Report by Europal Forum on Labour and Antisemitism,” Policy Exchange, January 27, 2021, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/blogs/muslim-brotherhood-newsletter-draws-attention-to-report-by-europal-forum-on-labour-and-antisemitism/>.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ K. Santing, “Conspiracy Theories and Muslim Brotherhood Antisemitism under Sadat,” *Religions* 13, no. 2 (2022): 143, <https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/2/143>. Documents historical Brotherhood antisemitic discourse.

³²⁴ “Muslim Brotherhood Newsletter Draws Attention to Report by Europal Forum on Labour and Antisemitism,” Policy Exchange, January 27, 2021, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/blogs/muslim-brotherhood-newsletter-draws-attention-to-report-by-europal-forum-on-labour-and-antisemitism/>. Highlights Brotherhood-aligned opposition to the IHRA definition while promoting expansive speech protections for anti-Israel content.

³²⁵ Ibid. Documents how the EuroPal Forum, identified as Brotherhood-aligned, characterized the IHRA definition as a tool to “prevent criticism of Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians.”

agenda.³²⁶ This instrumentalization implements the Memorandum’s strategy of achieving “understanding [of] the U.S. society from its different aspects” to qualify for “settling our da’wa” in America, and its call to establish comprehensive organizational infrastructure that operates within American institutional frameworks to advance the “Civilization-Jihadist Process” of settlement.

This instrumentalization operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Legal framework appropriation:** Anti-discrimination laws designed to protect individuals from prejudice are repurposed to shield ideological movements from criticism.³²⁷
- **Institutional pressure campaigns:** Human resources departments, diversity offices, and compliance units are targeted with complaints regarding alleged Islamophobia, creating institutional risk-aversion regarding any criticism of Islamist ideology.³²⁸
- **Professional certification jeopardy:** Individuals in licensed professions face complaints to licensing boards alleging Islamophobia, creating professional risk for criticizing Brotherhood organizations or ideology.³²⁹
- **Funding vulnerability exploitation:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations have increasingly leveraged allegations of Islamophobia to exert pressure on institutions dependent on government grants or philanthropic funding. By framing critical inquiry into Islamist ideology as discriminatory, they create reputational and financial risks for targeted organizations. This tactic has proven especially effective in shaping the behavior of NGOs, academic centers, and advocacy groups whose operations rely on external funding.³³⁰ Such pressure is a form of dependency exploitation, in which financial vulnerability is used as a tool to constrain institutional discourse, discourage scrutiny, and reinforce ideological conformity.

The effectiveness of this instrumentalization was demonstrated in 2018 when the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) designated several Muslim reformist organizations as “anti-Muslim extremists” based largely on their criticism of Brotherhood-aligned groups, demonstrating how anti-discrimination frameworks have been repurposed to target critics of Islamist ideology rather than protecting Muslims from genuine prejudice.

The SPLC subsequently apologized to the Quilliam Foundation and paid a settlement worth \$3.37 million³³¹ for wrongly naming the organization in its controversial “Field Guide to Anti-Muslim Extremists.” In a public statement, the SPLC’s president, Richard Cohen, explained that “Mr. Nawaz and Quilliam have made valuable and important contributions to public discourse, including by promoting pluralism and condemning both anti-Muslim bigotry and Islamist extremism.”³³²

³²⁶ Lorenzo Vidino, “The Rise of ‘Woke’ Islamism in the West,” Hudson Institute, January 23, 2022, <https://www.hudson.org/node/44718>.

³²⁷ Policy Exchange, “Evidence on Islamophobia,” written submission to UK Parliament Committee on Home Affairs, n.d., <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/98963/html> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³²⁸ Lorenzo Vidino, “The Rise of ‘Woke’ Islamism in the West,” Hudson Institute, January 23, 2022, <https://www.hudson.org/node/44718>.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Policy Exchange, “Evidence on Islamophobia,” written submission to UK Parliament Committee on Home Affairs, n.d., <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/98963/html> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³³¹ Jake Crowe, “SPLC Apologizes, Pays Settlement to Islamic Reformer It Wrongly Labeled ‘Anti-Muslim Extremist,’” *National Review*, June 18, 2018, <https://www.nationalreview.com/news/maajid-nawaz-splc-apologizes-settles-extremist-label/>.

³³² “Richard Cohen SPLC President Apologising to Maajid Nawaz and Quilliam,” posted June 18, 2018, by Quilliam International, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMAStj8Jtks>.

4.2.3 Muslim Legal Infrastructure Development

Beyond defending Brotherhood interests against criticism, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have invested significantly in developing a comprehensive legal infrastructure to advance Islamic norms within Western legal systems. This infrastructure development implements the Memorandum's directive to adopt "a written 'jurisprudence' that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement," and its call to establish a "Central Jurisprudence Council," a "Central Islamic Court," a "Muslim Attorneys Society," and "the Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims' Rights."

4.2.3.1 Specialized Muslim Legal Organizations

Brotherhood-aligned legal organizations have established sophisticated capabilities for advancing Islamic legal norms through Western judicial systems.³³³ This specialized development is evident from documented efforts to integrate Islamic legal principles into Western legal frameworks, with academic research identifying systematic patterns of legal advocacy across multiple jurisdictions.³³⁴ Such capacity building represents what scholars observe as the institutionalization of Islamic legal advocacy within Western democratic systems.³³⁵

Prominent examples include:

- **Muslim Advocates:** Founded in 2005 as an offshoot of the National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML), Muslim Advocates has developed specialized expertise in religious freedom litigation, hate crimes prosecution, and immigration policy.³³⁶ The organization maintains documented connections to Brotherhood-aligned networks through coordinated advocacy and shared leadership structures.³³⁷
- **CAIR Legal Defense Fund:** The legal arm of the Council on American-Islamic Relations has developed specialized expertise in employment discrimination, religious accommodation, and law enforcement practices. The organization has filed numerous lawsuits advancing Brotherhood-aligned interests while establishing precedents for expanded religious accommodation.
- **National Association of Muslim Lawyers:** This professional association connects Muslim attorneys across multiple practice areas, providing specialized training, networking, and resources to advance Islamic legal perspectives.³³⁸ The organization maintains documented connections with other Brotherhood-aligned entities through coordinated programming and shared advocacy objectives.³³⁹

³³³ "Shariah Law and American State Courts," Center for Security Policy, August 30, 2012, <https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/shariah-law-and-american-state-courts/>.

³³⁴ Ibid. Highlights that the documented cases represent "only a sample of possible cases—a 'tip of the iceberg'—of legal cases involving Shariah in local, state, and federal courts."

³³⁵ "Islamic Law," research guide, Case Western Reserve University Law Library, n.d., <https://lawresearchguides.cwru.edu/c.php?g=819978&p=5861096> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³³⁶ "NAML History," National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML), n.d., <https://www.naml.info/naml-history> (accessed November 11, 2025). Documents that "in 2005, the NAML Board of Directors launched a sister charitable organization, entitled Muslim Advocates."

³³⁷ Ibid. Highlights coordinated webinars with "experts from CAIR, Muslim Advocates, and the ACLU" on Brotherhood-related issues.

³³⁸ National Association of Muslim Lawyers, <https://www.naml.info>.

³³⁹ "NAML History," National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML), n.d., <https://www.naml.info/naml-history> (accessed November 11, 2025). Documents coordination between NAML and other Brotherhood-aligned organizations.

These specialized organizations have developed a form of “strategic impact litigation,” using carefully selected cases to establish precedents that advance broader ideological objectives.³⁴⁰ By systematically building legal capacity across multiple domains, Brotherhood-aligned legal organizations have established an infrastructure for the long-term transformation of Western legal approaches to Islamic practices and norms.³⁴¹

4.2.3.2 Legal Training and Professional Development

Beyond establishing specialized organizations, the Brotherhood has invested significantly in developing Muslim legal professionals aligned with its ideological perspectives. This professional development implements the Memorandum’s call to establish a “Muslim Attorneys Society” and to create “an institute for training, growth, development and planning” to build the specialized expertise and leadership capacity necessary for advancing the settlement mission through legal channels.

This development process operates through multiple channels:

- **Law students associations:** Muslim law students associations at major law schools provide ideological development, networking, and career support for Muslim law students.³⁴² These associations frequently host speakers on issues such as Islamic legal topics, civil rights, and related matters.³⁴³ The National Muslim Law Students Association (NMLSA) coordinates these local chapters and works in partnership with the National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML) to ensure organizational continuity.³⁴⁴
- **Professional development programs:** Organizations like NAML offer specialized training programs and educational conferences that address subjects including Islamic finance, religious accommodation, immigration, and national security law.⁴ These programs develop technical expertise within the Muslim legal community through annual conferences featuring hundreds of legal professionals, including attorneys, federal judges, law professors, and law students.
- **Judicial clerkship initiatives:** NAML operates mentorship programs connecting Muslim law graduates with career opportunities and sponsors educational programs on current legal topics.³⁴⁵ The organization coordinates activities across multiple regional Muslim bar associations throughout the United States.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁰ “Our Story,” Muslim Legal Fund of America, n.d., <https://mlfa.org/our-story/> (accessed November 11, 2025). The MLFA explicitly describes its approach as follows: “One of our strategic priorities is impact litigation, which involves a more holistic approach to changing laws and policies. Impact litigation is legal work that focuses on the big picture... In defending that one family, we gather valuable information and apply new strategies. As an organization, we impact the future of all Muslim families in this country by working to change the laws and policies that negatively impact them.”

³⁴¹ “In the Courts,” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), n.d., https://www.cair.com/civil_rights/in-the-courts/ (accessed November 11, 2025). CAIR describes systematic precedent building through cases like *United States v. Jones*, where CAIR filed Supreme Court amicus briefs arguing that “how the court rules on this case will set a precedent for all future cases of warrantless tracking and monitoring,” and noting that their litigation strategy aims to establish broader legal protections against practices that have affected “American Muslims for the last decade.”

³⁴² “Muslim Law Students Association (MLSA),” University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, n.d., <https://law.udmercy.edu/students/student-organizations/mlsa.php> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁴³ “Muslim Law Students Association,” University of Chicago Law School, n.d., <https://www.law.uchicago.edu/studentorgs/mlsa> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁴⁴ “About,” National Muslim Law Students Association, n.d., <https://www.nmlsa.com> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁴⁵ National Association of Muslim Lawyers, <https://www.naml.info>.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

- **Academic legal fellowship programs:** The influence of this professional development was demonstrated when Farhana Khera, Executive Director of Muslim Advocates and former counsel to the US Senate Judiciary Committee, successfully advocated for changes to federal law enforcement training materials.³⁴⁷ Khera’s organization requested that the FBI remove terms it considered “offensive and inflammatory” from counterterrorism training materials, demonstrating how specialized legal expertise was leveraged to influence security practices.³⁴⁸

4.2.3.3 Parallel Legal Systems Development

Perhaps the most ambitious aspect of the Brotherhood’s legal strategy is the gradual development of parallel Islamic legal systems operating alongside Western civil courts. This parallel development implements the Memorandum’s directive to adopt “a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement,” and its call to establish a “Central Jurisprudence Council” and a “Central Islamic Court,” with Islamic centers in every city serving as institutional foundations for this legal infrastructure.

This development operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Informal Islamic guidance councils:** Community-based Islamic guidance councils operate in many American cities through organizations like the Islamic Council America, which provides arbitration, reconciliation, and mediation services for Muslim communities, and the Imam Mahdi Association of Marjaeya (IMAM) Islamic religious services organization, which offers marriage counselling and family guidance services nationwide.³⁴⁹
- **Religious arbitration systems:** Formally recognized religious arbitration services operate under general arbitration laws in the United States, handling family and commercial matters in accordance with Islamic principles. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 allows Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others to use religious tribunals to arbitrate disagreements, with judgments given force of law by state and federal courts.³⁵⁰
- **Islamic financial contracts:** Specialized financial agreements structured to comply with both Islamic prohibitions on interest and Western commercial law have created a parallel financial system in the United States. These include *murabaha* (cost-plus financing), *ijara* (lease-to-own), and *musharaka* (partnership) contracts offered by institutions like Guidance Residential, UIF Corporation, Devon Bank, and others.³⁵¹ The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has approved these structures as “functionally equivalent” to conventional financing.³⁵²

³⁴⁷ “Farhana Khera,” Patheos, January 30, 2022, <https://www.patheos.com/faith-figures-database/f/farhana-khera>.

³⁴⁸ “Senate Hearing Witness Involved in FBI Training ‘Purge’: No Such Thing as Radical Islam,” The Daily Caller, June 29, 2016, <https://dailycaller.com/2016/06/28/senate-hearing-witness-involved-in-fbi-training-purge-no-such-thing-as-radical-islam/>.

³⁴⁹ Islamic Council America, <https://www.icamerica.org>; “Islamic Religious Services in North America,” IMAM, July 26, 2024, <https://imam-us.org/religious-services>.

³⁵⁰ Barbara Atwood “Religious Arbitration of Family Disputes,” *Family Advocate* 42, no. 2 (2019), available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27006939>.

³⁵¹ Shirley Chiu, Robin Newberger, and Anna Paulson, “Islamic Finance in the United States: A Small But Growing Industry,” Chicago Fed Letter no. 214 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 2005), <https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2005/may-214>; “3 Halal Mortgage Options for Muslims in the U.S.,” Musaffa Academy, October 3, 2024, <https://academy.musaffa.com/3-halal-mortgage-options-for-muslims-in-the-us/>.

³⁵² “Islamic Banking, American Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, January 17, 2025, https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2014/q2/feature1.

- **Regulatory accommodation:** Federal housing agencies Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have purchased Islamic mortgage products to provide liquidity, with Guidance Residential relying on Freddie Mac for more than \$1 billion in financing by 2007.³⁵³ Additionally, specialized Islamic banking divisions like Stearns Salaam Banking offer a full suite of sharia-compliant deposit and financing products reviewed by independent sharia supervisory boards.³⁵⁴
- **Religious family law accommodations:** Advocacy for recognition of Islamic marriage contracts, divorce procedures, and inheritance provisions within Western family law creates space for parallel family law systems. US courts have increasingly recognized and enforced *mahr* (dower) provisions in Islamic marriage contracts under neutral principles of contract law, with some courts treating these agreements as enforceable contracts when they meet basic contractual requirements.³⁵⁵ Organizations like Karamah work on developing model Islamic marriage contracts that will be enforceable in the United States, while Islamic legal service providers offer guidance on creating dual contracts that satisfy both US civil law and sharia requirements.³⁵⁶ Additionally, Islamic divorce processes operate in parallel to civil divorce systems, with community-based imams providing religious divorce recognition that, while not legally binding, serves an important ritual and religious function for Muslim couples.³⁵⁷ Recent legal developments have incrementally introduced religious legal norms into secular Western systems through mechanisms such as faith-based arbitration and rights-based exemptions. These limited entry points normalize alternative legal frameworks without overtly challenging existing structures.

This process constitutes juridical normalization—the gradual legitimization of religious legal principles through their procedural compatibility with liberal institutions. As these norms gain an institutional foothold, the distinction between secular and religious legal authority is increasingly blurred, subtly reshaping the legal landscape in ways that align with the Brotherhood’s broader ideological objectives.

The effectiveness of this parallel system development was demonstrated in 2009 when a New Jersey judge denied a restraining order against a Muslim husband who had sexually assaulted his wife, citing the husband’s religious beliefs regarding marital relations.³⁵⁸ Judge Joseph Charles ruled that the husband “was operating under his belief that it is, as the husband, his desire to have sex when and whether he wanted to, was something that was consistent with his practices and it was

³⁵³ “Spotlight: Islamic Financing and Investment Structures in USA,” Lexology, November 3, 2021, <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4bdf0abd-b743-41db-ab1b-ed53b3e761fc>.

³⁵⁴ “Stearns Salaam Banking,” Stearns Bank, n.d., <https://www.stearnsbank.com/about/salaam-banking> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁵⁵ “Opposing Enforcement of Islamic Marriage Contracts,” The Law Office of Jeremy D. Morley, n.d., https://www.international-divorce.com/Opposing_Enforcement_of_Islamic_Marriage_Contracts (accessed November 11, 2025); “Islamic Marriage Contracts: Analyzing Cultural and Religious Expectations to Achieve More Equitable Outcomes in U.S. Courts,” FIU College of Law, April 7, 2015, <https://law.fiu.edu/2015/03/26/islamic-marriage-contracts/>; “Recognition and Enforcement of Islamic Divorce in U.S. Courts,” Islamic Divorce in USA, May 19, 2013, <https://islamicdivorceinusa.com/>.

³⁵⁶ Kecia Ali, “Marriage Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence,” The Feminist Sexual Ethics Project, Brandeis University, last revised June 19, 2003, <https://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/muslim/marriage.html>; “Islamic Marriage Contracts in the USA: Legal Recognition and Validity Explained,” Islamic Wills Trust Services, n.d., <https://islamicwillstrust.com/islamic-marriage-contracts-in-the-usa-legal-recognition/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁵⁷ Julie MacFarlane, “Family Dispute Processes Among North American Muslims,” American Bar Association, September 30, 2018, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/magazine/archive/family-dispute-processes-among-north-american-muslims/.

³⁵⁸ “Advocates of Anti-Shariah Measures Alarmed by Judge’s Ruling,” Fox News, June 22, 2015, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/advocates-of-anti-shariah-measures-alarmed-by-judges-ruling>; “When Religious Beliefs and the Law Clash,” New Jersey Family Law Blog, August 3, 2010, https://www.newjerseyfamilylawblog.com/when_religious_beliefs_and_the/.

something that was not prohibited.”³⁵⁹ While this specific ruling was later overturned by New Jersey’s Appellate Court, it demonstrated the potential for religious norms to influence judicial decision-making in Western courts.³⁶⁰

4.2.4 Case Study: Muslim Advocates and *Fiqh al-Aqalliyat* (Jurisprudence of Minorities)

The development and activities of Muslim Advocates as a legal organization exemplify the Brotherhood’s sophisticated approach to manipulating legal frameworks in Western contexts. This case study illustrates how specialized jurisprudence for Muslim minorities, known as *fiqh al-aqalliyat*, has been operationalized through professional legal advocacy.

4.2.4.1 Organizational Development and Connections

Muslim Advocates emerged from the National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML) in 2005 as a specialized advocacy organization addressing Muslim civil rights in the post-9/11 legal environment.³⁶¹ The organization has engaged with Democratic political campaigns, and Biden’s campaign established a Muslim engagement operation that held over 150 events in Muslim communities during the 2020 election cycle.³⁶²

The organization’s connections to Brotherhood networks include:

- **Leadership alignment:** Farhana Khera, who served as Founding President and Executive Director of Muslim Advocates until 2021, had previously worked as counsel to the US Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights, where she worked directly for Senator Russell D. Feingold for six years, focusing on the Patriot Act, racial and religious profiling, and civil liberties issues raised by government anti-terrorism policies after September 11, 2001.³⁶³
- **Organizational partnerships:** Muslim Advocates has engaged in collaborations with other Muslim advocacy organizations, including CAIR. In April 2022, both organizations co-hosted a virtual “Know Your Rights” event focusing on religious accommodation rights during Ramadan, where legal experts from both organizations discussed the right to request religious accommodations in schools, colleges, and the workplace.³⁶⁴
- **Shared advocacy priorities** Muslim Advocates has consistently prioritized issues including religious accommodation, oversight of counterterrorism practices, and immigration policy,

³⁵⁹ *S.D. v. M.J.R.*, 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17690081954141610726.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ “NAML History,” National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML), n.d., <https://www.naml.info/naml-history> (accessed November 11, 2025); “National Association of Muslim Lawyers,” Alchetron, December 3, 2024, <https://alchetron.com/National-Association-of-Muslim-Lawyers>.

³⁶² “Muslim American Votes May Carry Outside Weight in U.S. Election,” *Al Jazeera*, October 16, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2020/10/14/muslim-americans-poised-for-potential-2020-electoral-impact>; Mariam Fam and Elana Schor, “Muslim Americans Aim for High Turnout, New Influence in 2020,” *AP News*, October 30, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-michigan-elections-presidential-elections-archive-309cbf73beb4eaf1817f7176eab5fe31>.

³⁶³ “Farhana Khera,” All American Speakers, n.d., <https://www.allamericanspeakers.com/speakers/422905/Farhana-Khera> (accessed November 11, 2025); “Farhana Khera,” Patheos, n.d., <https://www.patheos.com/faith-figures-database/f/farhana-khera> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁶⁴ “CAIR, Muslim Advocates to Hold Virtual Ramadan ‘Know Your Rights’ Event,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), April 11, 2022, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-muslim-advocates-to-hold-virtual-ramadan-know-your-rights-event/.

with a focus on promoting civil rights protections for American Muslims in the post-9/11 legal environment.³⁶⁵

4.2.4.2 Application of the Minorities Jurisprudence Framework

Muslim Advocates operationalizes the concept of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* (jurisprudence of minorities) developed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi and other Brotherhood-aligned scholars to advance Islamic legal norms within Western contexts. This application implements the Memorandum’s directive to adopt “a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement,” advancing Islamic legal frameworks through the establishment of a “Central Jurisprudence Council” and related legal infrastructure.

This application operates through multiple legal strategies:

- **Religious freedom expansion:** Muslim Advocates consistently advocates for expansive interpretations of religious freedom protections to accommodate Islamic practices in employment, education, and public accommodation contexts.³⁶⁶
- **Equal protection leveraging:** Discrimination claims are strategically submitted to establish enhanced protection for Islamic religious practices beyond mere equal treatment.³⁶⁷
- **Administrative law intervention:** Regulatory processes for religious accommodation, discrimination enforcement, and security practices are targeted for systematic advocacy to shape administrative interpretation.³⁶⁸
- **Narrative litigation:** Cases are selected not merely for their legal impact but also for their broader narrative influence on Muslim rights and concerns, utilizing individual legal cases to advance broader social narratives regardless of the actual legal outcome.

4.2.4.3 Strategic Impact on US Legal Frameworks

Beyond specific case outcomes, Muslim Advocates has systematically influenced broader legal frameworks in the areas of religion, security, and discrimination through strategic policy advocacy and coalition building. The organization led the NO BAN Act Coalition, an alliance of more than 100 faith, national security, and civil rights organizations working to support legislation that would prevent future presidents from enacting discriminatory immigration bans like the Muslim and African Ban.³⁶⁹ Muslim Advocates also successfully advocated for the Department of Justice to halt its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program, specifically the “Shared Responsibility Committees” initiative, which the organization argued would have “essentially deputized educators, health care workers, and religious leaders as arms of law enforcement.”³⁷⁰ This systemic impact implements the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive legal infrastructure including a “Central

³⁶⁵ “Joint Statement of Muslim Advocates and Former Executive Director Farhana Khera,” Muslim Advocates, March 24, 2022, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2022/03/joint-statement-of-muslim-advocates-and-former-executive-director-farhana-khera/>.

³⁶⁶ “Requesting Religious Accommodation for Ramadan & Eid—Education, Workplace and Prison,” Muslim Advocates, March 24, 2023, <https://muslimadvocates.org/defending-your-rights/religious-accommodation-at-school-college-and-work/>.

³⁶⁷ “Muslim Workers File Religious Discrimination Charges Against Amazon,” Muslim Advocates, May 2019, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2019/05/muslim-workers-file-religious-discrimination-charges-against-amazon/>.

³⁶⁸ “Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Department of Justice et al. (No. 1),” Muslim Advocates, September 7, 2022, <https://muslimadvocates.org/court-case/muslim-advocates-v-doj-dhs-information-quality-act/>.

³⁶⁹ “Muslim Advocates Cheers Reintroduction of NO BAN Act,” Muslim Advocates, February 25, 2021, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2021/02/muslim-advocates-cheers-reintroduction-of-no-ban-act/>.

³⁷⁰ “Muslim Advocates Commends Justice Department Decision to Stop Plans for Dangerous CVE Program,” Muslim Advocates, October 2016, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2016/10/dojendsplansforsrc/>.

Jurisprudence Council,” a “Muslim Attorneys Society,” and the “Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights,” as well as its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions’” and building alliances to advance the settlement mission.

This influence operates across multiple domains:

- **Security policy modification** Muslim Advocates led efforts to remove what they characterized as “biased” and “offensive” training materials containing terms like “jihad” and references to Islamic extremism from federal law enforcement training programs. In 2011, the organization sent a letter to the White House demanding that federal agencies “purge all federal government training materials of biased materials,” resulting in the FBI removing hundreds of pages of training documents.³⁷¹ During a 2016 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Executive Director Farhana Khera defended this position when questioned by Senator Ted Cruz, arguing that using terms like “jihad” and “radical Islamic terrorism” plays into ISIS’s narrative and makes America less safe.³⁷²
- **Religious accommodation expansion:** Through litigation and regulatory advocacy, Muslim Advocates has established expanded religious accommodation requirements for Islamic practices in employment, education, and public services contexts, including successful Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charges against major corporations like Amazon for failing to accommodate Muslim employees’ religious needs.³⁷³
- **Counterterrorism constraint:** Muslim Advocates has systematically challenged investigative and surveillance practices, including filing amicus briefs arguing that terrorist watchlists disproportionately target Muslim communities and violate due process rights.³⁷⁴ The organization successfully advocated for the Department of Justice to halt the CVE program’s “Shared Responsibility Committees,” which they argued would inappropriately deputize community members as law enforcement agents.³⁷⁵

Muslim advocacy organizations have achieved policy victories and legal precedents that have modified federal agency practices, enhanced enforcement of existing civil rights protections, and established important precedents for religious accommodation, representing significant but targeted changes rather than comprehensive legal transformation.

4.3 The Third Domain: Institutional Infiltration

The Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* strategy places particular emphasis on establishing and controlling institutions that shape societal values and train the next generation. The “Explanatory Memorandum” explicitly states that the goal is “establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood” with “firmly established organizations on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved.”

³⁷¹ “Letter to DHS John Brennan on FBI’s Use of Biased Experts and Training Materials,” Muslim Advocates, October 19, 2011, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2011/10/letter-to-dhs-john-brennan-on-fbis-use-of-biased-experts-and-training-materials/>.

³⁷² Alex Grubbs, “Cruz Blames Obama Administration’s ‘Willful Blindness’ for Not Preventing Terror Attacks,” *CNS News*, June 29, 2016, <https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/alex-grubbs/sen-cruz-blames-obama-administrations-willful-blindness-not-preventing>.

³⁷³ “Muslim Workers File Religious Discrimination Charges Against Amazon,” Muslim Advocates, May 2019, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2019/05/muslim-workers-file-religious-discrimination-charges-against-amazon/>.

³⁷⁴ “Muslim Advocates Files Brief Detailing Terrorist Watchlists Discrimination Against Muslims,” Muslim Advocates, June 4, 2020, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2020/06/muslim-advocates-files-brief-detailing-terrorist-watchlists-discrimination-against-muslims/>.

³⁷⁵ “Muslim Advocates Commends Justice Department Decision to Stop Plans for Dangerous CVE Program,” Muslim Advocates, October 2016, <https://muslimadvocates.org/2016/10/dojendsplansforsrc/>.

The document emphasizes that Islam must become “stable in the land,” “enabled within the souls, minds and the lives of the people,” and “resident and not a passing thing, or rooted entrenched in the soil of the spot where it moves.” This requires the Movement to “plan and struggle to obtain ‘the keys’ and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a ‘Civilization Jihadist’ responsibility.”

This institutional infiltration strategy operates across three primary arenas:

- Islamic centers and schools;
- university campuses; and
- civil society organizations.

4.3.1 Islamic Centers and Schools

Islamic religious and community centers (*marakiz*), also known as “houses of *da’wa*” or *masjids*, serve as crucial institutional platforms for the Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* strategy in Western societies. These centers implement the Memorandum’s various directives regarding the establishment of religious, social, cultural, educational, youth, and women’s organizations.

4.3.1.1 Institutional Network Development

Organizations identified as having Muslim Brotherhood connections have systematically established extensive institutional networks across the United States since the 1960s.³⁷⁶ Key Brotherhood-linked figures such as Hisham al-Talib, Jamal Barzinji, and Ahmed Totanji established foundational organizations such as the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), which assists in “the development of mosques, Islamic schools, and Islamic centers throughout the United States.”³⁷⁷ The Hudson Institute reports that these activists “founded or directed” major American Muslim organizations and, with funding from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sources, built networks that include approximately 270 full-time Islamic schools nationwide, numerous mosques, and educational institutions that have become “the most prominent representatives of local Muslim communities.”³⁷⁸ This institutional development has created what scholars describe as a “parallel society within a society,” designed to prevent Muslim integration into American society while advancing specific interpretations of Islamic governance.³⁷⁹

The scale of this institutional development is substantial:

- **Numerical growth:** As of 2020, there were 2,769 mosques in the United States, an increase of 31% from 2,106 mosques in 2010.³⁸⁰ This growth rate significantly exceeds the Muslim population growth during the same period, with the primary driving force being “the steady expansion of the population of Muslims in America due to immigration and birth rate.”³⁸¹

³⁷⁶ Zeyno Baran, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network,” Hudson Institute, February 27, 2008, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-muslim-brotherhood-s-u-s-network>.

³⁷⁷ “Muslim Students Association of the U.S. and Canada (MSA),” Discover the Networks, n.d., <https://www.discoverthenetworks.org/organizations/muslim-students-association-of-the-us-and-canada-msa/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁷⁸ Tom Rogan, “Push to Name Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group Worries U.S. Offshoots,” *NPR*, March 24, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/2017/03/24/520299701/push-to-name-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-group-worries-u-s-offshoots>.

³⁷⁹ Lorenzo Vidino, “Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Hudson Institute, November 1, 2006, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/aims-and-methods-of-europe-s-muslim-brotherhood>.

³⁸⁰ Ihsan Bagby, *The American Mosque 2020: Growing and Evolving* (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2021), <https://ispu.org/public-policy/mosque-survey/>.

³⁸¹ “Study Finds 31% Increase in U.S. Mosques from 2010 to 2020,” Hartford International University, June 9, 2021, <https://www.hartfordinternational.edu/news-events/news/study-finds-31-increase-us-mosques-2010-2020>.

- **Financial infrastructure:** The North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), which is identified in the “Explanatory Memorandum” as a Brotherhood financial hub, holds titles to over 300 Islamic centers in 42 states.³⁸²
- **Functional comprehensiveness:** Modern Islamic centers increasingly function as comprehensive community institutions, offering not only religious services but also educational programs, social services, and community activities, with the average mosque budget growing from \$167,600 in 2010 to \$276,500 in 2020.³⁸³

The institutional impact of Islamic centers extends beyond religious practice to comprehensive community formation, with centers operating as multifunctional institutions serving diverse community needs. Modern Islamic centers increasingly serve as community hubs offering religious services, educational programs, social support, youth activities, and cultural events, reflecting their traditional role in Islamic society, where mosques served as centers for education, social interaction, and community development.³⁸⁴

This comprehensive institutional presence serves as a foundation for developing the ideological influence necessary for implementing the Brotherhood’s long-term *tamkeen* strategy.

4.3.1.2 Educational System Development

Islamic centers across the United States operate extensive educational programs, with 76% of mosques offering weekend schools that serve an average of 116 children each. Additionally, 18% of mosques are affiliated with full-time Islamic schools, representing approximately 498 schools nationwide that educate an average of 207 students per institution.³⁸⁵

This educational infrastructure implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” that include “an Islamic university,” “Islamic schools,” “a council for education and scientific research,” “centers to train teachers,” “an office for academic guidance,” and “a body for authorship and Islamic curricula,” all designed to advance the settlement mission by shaping the next generation’s worldview and values.

The Islamic educational system in the United States operates through several key institutional mechanisms:

- **Accreditation structures:** The Council of Islamic Schools based in North America (CISNA), which was established following a 1989 education symposium organized by the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), was formally incorporated in 1991.³⁸⁶ CISNA describes itself as “the largest and only Islamic accreditation organization of Islamic schools in the world” and provides accreditation services focusing on governance, school leadership, teaching and learning, and school culture within an Islamic framework.³⁸⁷

³⁸² “North American Islamic Trust (NAIT),” InfluenceWatch, n.d., <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/north-american-islamic-trust-nait/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁸³ “New Study Shows Number of U.S. Mosques Continues to Grow,” *Arab American News*, June 6, 2021, <https://arabamericannews.com/2021/06/06/new-study-shows-number-of-u-s-mosques-continues-to-grow/>.

³⁸⁴ “Augmenting the Role of Mosques in Community Development,” IslamiCity, April 25, 2023, <https://www.islamicity.org/82783/augmenting-the-role-of-mosques-in-community-development/>.

³⁸⁵ Ihsan Bagby, *American Mosque Survey 2020: Report 2: Perspectives and Activities* (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2021), 24, <https://ispu.org/report-2-mosque-survey-2020/>.

³⁸⁶ Sufia Azmat and Leila H. Shatara, “The Council of Islamic Schools in North America (CISNA): An Internationally Recognized Accrediting Agency,” *Journal of Education in Muslim Societies* 4, no. 2 (2023): 118, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jems/article/view/6142>.

³⁸⁷ “About Us,” CISNA, n.d., <https://cisnausa.org/about-us/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

- **Professional development and networking:** The Islamic Schools League of America (ISLA), originally incorporated in 1998, works to foster Islamic education development through networking, resources, professional development, and research.³⁸⁸ ISLA collaborates with CISNA and other organizations to provide professional development opportunities for Islamic school educators.³⁸⁹
- **Curriculum development:** Both organizations work to support Islamic schools through various educational initiatives, with CISNA focusing on accreditation standards and ISLA emphasizing research and professional development networks.³⁹⁰

The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was named in the aforementioned list of “our organizations and the organizations of our friends” that appears in the “Explanatory Memorandum.” CISNA was established as an initiative of ISNA³⁹¹ but is not mentioned in the document.

4.3.1.3 Case Study: Education on Palestine Program

ISLA’s Education on Palestine program offers a clear example of how Brotherhood-aligned educational institutions implement ideological objectives through seemingly neutral educational content. The program implements the Memorandum’s strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally,” particularly through entities like the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which is listed among the Brotherhood’s organizations, and advances the settlement mission through “a body for authorship and Islamic curricula” designed to shape educational content and student perspectives.

Developed in 2024–2025, ISLA’s Palestine Toolkit provides comprehensive educational materials for Islamic schools with explicitly ideological objectives:

- **Educational mission:** The toolkit’s vision is “to empower educators and students with the knowledge, resources, and critical perspectives rooted in Islamic principles needed to understand and advocate for justice, human rights, and connection to the global *ummah* through the lens of Palestine’s history and current realities.”³⁹²
- **Islamic framework:** The program’s mission statement emphasizes that it is “rooted in Islamic values” and aims “to use Palestine as a case study to raise awareness about injustice, oppression, and the interconnected struggles of the global Muslim *ummah*, fostering a more informed, empathetic, and socially conscious generation of students.”³⁹³
- **Educational approach:** The toolkit is designed to provide “accessible, age-appropriate, and trauma-informed educational resources, systematic approaches, and professional development for educators.”³⁹⁴

³⁸⁸ “About Us,” Islamic Schools League of America, n.d., <https://theisla.org/about-us/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁸⁹ Nicole Steward-Streng, Dr. Shaza Khan, and Dr. Samar Al-Majaidh, “Improving Islamic Schools,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, June 26, 2024, <https://ispu.org/public-policy/improving-schools/>.

³⁹⁰ Sufia Azmat and Leila H. Shatara, “The Council of Islamic Schools in North America (CISNA): An Internationally Recognized Accrediting Agency,” *Journal of Education in Muslim Societies* 4, no. 2 (2023): 116–26, <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jems/article/view/6142>.

³⁹¹ Ibid.; “About Us,” CISNA, n.d., <https://cisnausa.org/about-us/> (accessed November 11, 2025); “Islamic Society of North America,” ISNA, n.d., <https://isna.net/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁹² “Teaching Palestine Toolkit,” Islamic Schools League of America, n.d., <https://theisla.org/teaching-palestine-toolkit/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

- **Funding and development:** ISLA raised funds for the Teaching Palestine Toolkit through its 2024 annual Ramadan webinar and fundraiser, with nearly 300 people registering for the event.³⁹⁵

This case study demonstrates how Brotherhood-aligned educational institutions systematically implement ideological objectives through formal educational structures. By embedding specific narratives within comprehensive educational systems, Brotherhood organizations create multigenerational ideological transmission mechanisms that form an essential part of their long-term *tamkeen* strategy.

4.3.1.4 Coordination between Islamic Centers and Schools

Brotherhood-aligned Islamic centers and schools operate as coordinated institutional networks rather than isolated organizations. This coordination implements the Memorandum’s directive to achieve “a union and balanced gradual merger between private work and public work” and to “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts” through comprehensive organizational infrastructure that advances the settlement mission across multiple domains.

4.3.2 University Campuses

University campuses are an important strategic arena for the Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* strategy in Western societies. The focus on campuses operationalizes the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” and “social clubs for the youths and the community’s sons and daughters” while “expanding the observant Muslim base” through student networks that advance the settlement mission.

4.3.2.1 The Muslim Students Association Network

The Muslim Students Association (MSA), which was established in part by Brotherhood members in 1963³⁹⁶ and is explicitly identified in the Memorandum’s list of Brotherhood organizations, serves as the primary vehicle for campus influence. The organization plays a major role in implementing the Memorandum’s strategy of “absorbing Muslims and winning them with all of their factions and colors in America and Canada for the settlement project” and “unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts” to advance the “Civilization-Jihadist Process.”

The MSA has achieved a significant institutional presence:

- **Campus penetration:** MSA operates chapters on over 600 college and university campuses across North America and has a presence across virtually all major educational institutions within society. This comprehensive coverage ensures that virtually all Muslim students have access to Brotherhood-influenced campus organizations.³⁹⁷
- **Organizational longevity:** While all campus organizations outlast the four-year cycle of individual students, many MSA chapters stand out for having operated continuously for decades thanks to sustained structures, external support, and in some cases “professional” student activists whose primary focus is the movement rather than academics. This has

³⁹⁵ “From Palestine to America: Lessons on Faith, Identity and Perseverance,” Islamic Schools League of America, n.d., <https://theisla.org/from-palestine-to-america/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁹⁶ *We Stand on Guard for Thee? The Growing Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Politics, Academia, and Civil Society in Canada* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Canada_Report_Final_250622_EN_Final.pdf.

³⁹⁷ “Muslim Students Association (MSA),” Investigative Project on Terrorism, n.d., <https://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/166/muslim-students-association-msa> (accessed November 11, 2025).

allowed the MSA to develop an unusual degree of resilience and continuity, embedding its influence more deeply into campus life than most peer organizations.

- **Administrative recognition:** Most MSA chapters have achieved formal recognition as student organizations, granting them institutional legitimacy, access to funding, and facility usage rights within established campus structures.³⁹⁸
- **Network coordination:** MSA National provides coordination, resources, and strategic direction to campus chapters, ensuring consistent operations and a unified identity across geographically dispersed, semi-autonomous units.³⁹⁹

The MSA serves multiple strategic functions beyond simple student organization:

- **Ideological development:** Campus MSA activities provide opportunities for intensive ideological indoctrination during the critical years of identity formation and potentially have a lifetime impact on students' religious and political orientation.
- **Leadership identification:** Through its activities, MSA identifies promising individuals for further development within the Brotherhood's organizational networks.
- **Institutional positioning:** MSA-led advocacy introduces Brotherhood perspectives into university policies on issues such as religious accommodation, speech codes, and curriculum content.
- **Coalition building:** MSA chapters develop alliances with other campus organizations around shared tactical objectives, implementing the Memorandum's directive that "there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work," and its emphasis on mastering "the art of 'coalitions,' the art of 'absorption' and the principles of 'cooperation.'"

4.3.2.2 Case Study: SJP and BDS

Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), which cooperates with MSA chapters in the area of campus activism⁴⁰⁰ at many colleges and universities, has been particularly effective in advancing Brotherhood objectives relating to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. SJP plays a major role in implementing the Memorandum's strategic goal of "adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally" and leveraging the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which is explicitly listed among the Brotherhood's organizations, to advance pro-Palestinian advocacy.

SJP has achieved significant campus influence:

- **Organizational expansion:** SJP operates chapters on over 200 US campuses, providing institutional infrastructure for anti-Israel activism.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ "MSA Guidebook: How to Establish and Operate a Successful MSA Chapter," Muslim Students Association National, January 2008, <https://www.msanational.org/s/MSA-Guidebook.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2025).

³⁹⁹ "About," Muslim Students Association National, n.d., <https://www.msanational.org/about> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴⁰⁰ Swarthmore MSA Board, "MSA Board Letter of Solidarity with SJP," Swarthmore Voices, April 4, 2018, <https://swarthmorevoices.com/content-1/2018/4/4/msa-board-letter-of-solidarity-with-sjp>.

⁴⁰¹ *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism, and the Threat to North American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), 20, https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf.

- **Funding connections:** SJP has received support from organizations with documented ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), which was founded by individuals previously involved with the now-defunct Holy Land Foundation.⁴⁰²
- **Political impact:** SJP chapters have successfully passed BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) resolutions in multiple student governments. These resolutions implement the Memorandum’s strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and utilizing campus networks to advance Brotherhood-aligned positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁰³
- **Coalition development:** SJP has formed strategic alliances with progressive campus groups around shared anti-Israel positions,⁴⁰⁴ implementing the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” These alliances facilitate cooperation based on shared positions on specific issues despite substantial differences on other key objectives.

The BDS movement, which is actively promoted by SJP and other Brotherhood-aligned campus organizations, serves several strategic purposes:

- **Narrative establishment:** BDS campaigns promoted by SJP frequently portray Israel as an illegitimate settler-colonial entity rather than a sovereign nation state, framing the country as fundamentally illegitimate rather than merely opposing particular Israeli policies.⁴⁰⁵ This narrative reflects the Project’s objective to present the Palestinian cause “as part of the plan for the Islamic solution.”
- **Activist recruitment:** BDS campaigns promoted by SJP serve as entry points into broader anti-Israel and pro-Islamist advocacy, creating a structured progression of engagement that can increase commitment over time.⁴⁰⁶ This recruitment implements the Memorandum’s call to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” and to “expand the observant Muslim base” through student networks that advance the settlement mission.
- **Institutional pressure:** Academic BDS supporters target institutional relationships, including study abroad programs, faculty exchanges, and research collaborations, systematically severing target institutions from international academic networks.⁴⁰⁷ This pressure implements the Memorandum’s strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and utilizing organizational infrastructure to advance Brotherhood-aligned objectives.
- **Normative transformation:** BDS campaigns gradually shift the boundaries of campus discourse regarding acceptable criticism of Israel, gradually normalizing previously marginal positions through repeated exposure and institutional legitimation.⁴⁰⁸ This transformation implements the Memorandum’s objective to “present Islam as a civilization[al] alternative.”

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ “Academic BDS Petitions,” AMCHA Initiative, n.d., <https://amchainitiative.org/faculty-boycotters/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴⁰⁸ “Why the Overton Window Has Suddenly Shifted on Israel-Palestine,” Monthly Review Online, May 26, 2021, <https://mronline.org/2021/05/26/why-the-overton-window-has-suddenly-shifted-on-israel-palestine/>.

The effectiveness of these campus strategies was dramatically demonstrated in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, when SJP chapters across American universities organized demonstrations supporting Hamas and advancing positions aligned with Brotherhood perspectives on the conflict. Many of these demonstrations explicitly rejected Western values while promoting violence,⁴⁰⁹ reflecting the successful implementation of the Project’s civilizational confrontation.

4.3.2.3 Academic Discipline Infiltration

Beyond student organizations, Brotherhood-aligned individuals and networks have systematically infiltrated academic disciplines, particularly Middle East studies, Islamic studies, and related fields. This academic influence implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” that include “scientific research centers,” “an Islamic university,” “a council for education and scientific research,” “cultural and intellectual foundations,” and “scientific societies” designed to produce “specialists in all areas” that advance the settlement mission and shape academic discourse about Islam and the Muslim world.

This academic infiltration operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Faculty placement:** This academic positioning operates through faculty placement mechanisms, with scholars aligned with similar ideological perspectives securing academic positions in relevant disciplines, creating what academic sociologists call “ideological clustering”—the concentration of similar perspectives within specific academic departments.⁴¹⁰ This faculty presence creates institutional platforms for promoting Brotherhood-aligned interpretations of Islam and Middle East issues.
- **Curricular influence:** Faculty members are able to shape course content, reading assignments, and pedagogical approaches as a result of academic freedom and curricular autonomy in higher education.⁴¹¹ This implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish “a body for authorship and Islamic curricula,” “an Islamic university,” and comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” designed to shape educational content and student perspectives in ways that advance the settlement mission and “expand the observant Muslim base.”
- **Research orientation:** Academic research agendas and methodologies in relevant fields often reflect Brotherhood-aligned priorities and perspectives, producing an “epistemic framing effect” that shapes knowledge production by determining what questions are asked and how they are pursued.⁴¹² This research influences the implementation of the Memorandum’s directive to establish “scientific research centers,” “a center for studies and research,” “cultural and intellectual foundations,” and “a publication, translation and

⁴⁰⁹ “Students for Justice in Palestine Endorses Terrorism and ‘Dismantling Zionism;’ Plans Day of Resistance,” Anti-Defamation League, October 2, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/students-justice-palestine-endorses-terrorism-and-dismantling-zionism-plans-day>; “What Is Students for Justice in Palestine? The Hamas-Supporting, Anti-Israel Group Being Banned,” American Jewish Committee, September 21, 2024, <https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-students-for-justice-in-palestine-the-hamas-supporting-anti-israel-group-being-banned>.

⁴¹⁰ “Higher Education in Crisis: The Problem of Ideological Homogeneity,” Mises Institute, April 11, 2024, <https://mises.org/mises-wire/higher-education-crisis-problem-ideological-homogeneity>.

⁴¹¹ “1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive comments,” American Association of University Professors (AAUP), n.d., <https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴¹² Jong Abbas and Rami Ali, “Political Islam as an Incomplete and Contested Category: A Post-Foundationalist Revision,” *Religions* 14, no. 8 (2023): 980, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14080980>; Shlomi Sher and Craig R.M. McKenzie, “Framing Effects and Rationality,” in *The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science*, ed. Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford (Oxford University Press, 2008), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216093.003.0004>.

distribution house for Islamic books” designed to shape academic discourse and produce specialists who advance the settlement mission.

- **Academic center development:** Institutes and centers focusing on Islam and Middle East studies at major universities have been established with substantial funding from Gulf states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia,⁴¹³ which are aligned with the Brotherhood’s objectives for academic influence. These centers implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” including “scientific research centers,” “an Islamic university,” “a council for education and scientific research,” and “centers to train teachers.”

The impact of this academic influence became particularly evident after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, when numerous academic departments and professional associations issued statements reflecting perspectives aligned with the Brotherhood’s framing of the conflict.⁴¹⁴ These statements systematically minimized Hamas terrorism while emphasizing Palestinian grievances, reflecting the deep institutional embedding of Brotherhood-aligned interpretive frameworks.

4.3.3 Civil Society Organizations

The “Explanatory Memorandum” lists 29 organizations identified as part of the Brotherhood’s network in North America, reflecting comprehensive institutional development across multiple social sectors. This organizational ecosystem implements the Memorandum’s strategic goals of “establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood” that “supports the global Islamic State wherever it is,” with Islamic centers in every city serving as institutional foundations where “Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland” through the “Civilization-Jihadist Process” of settlement.

4.3.3.1 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Organizational Network

Brotherhood-aligned organizations span multiple functional domains, forming an “institutional ecosystem” of mutually reinforcing organizations that collectively shape community development more powerfully than any single institution could accomplish alone. This ecosystem provides a comprehensive infrastructure for implementing the Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* strategy across multiple generations.

Key organizational categories include:

- **Religious institutions:** Organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) provide religious leadership, educational resources, and community development services.⁴¹⁵ These institutions implement the Memorandum’s directive that Islamic centers should turn into “a seed for a small Islamic society” and serve as “the axis of our Movement, the perimeter of the circle of our work, our balance center, the base for our rise,” with the goal of establishing such centers “at the continent level” to advance the settlement of Islam in America.

⁴¹³ *Higher Education and Contemporary Antisemitism: Soft Power and Foreign Influence* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2020), <https://isgap.org/post/2020/06/isgap-research-report-finds-billions-in-unreported-middle-east-funding-to-american-universities>.

⁴¹⁴ *Presidential Task Force on Combating Antisemitism and Anti-Israeli Bias: Final Report* (Harvard University, April 29, 2025), <https://www.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/FINAL-Harvard-ASAIB-Report-4.29.25.pdf>; “Statement,” Harvard Faculty and Staff for Justice in Palestine, n.d., <https://www.harvardfsjp.org/statement> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴¹⁵ “Energy Star Success Story: Islamic Society of North America,” Energy Star, n.d., <https://www.energystar.gov/buildings/resources-audience/congregations/successes/islamic-society-north-america> (accessed November 11, 2025).

- **Educational organizations:** Groups such as the Council of Islamic Schools based in North America (CISNA) and the Islamic Schools League of America (ISLA) provide educational infrastructure for Islamic K-12 schools, while the Muslim Students Association (MSA) serves Muslim university students through campus chapters.⁴¹⁶ These organizations implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish “Islamic schools,” “a council for education and scientific research,” “centers to train teachers,” and “a body for authorship and Islamic curricula” as part of comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations.”
- **Financial entities:** Organizations such as the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) and various *zakat* committees provide financial services, property management, and charitable distribution according to Islamic principles.⁴¹⁷ These institutions implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “economic organizations” that include “an Islamic Central bank,” “Islamic endowments,” “investment projects,” and “an organization for interest-free loans.”
- **Media platforms** According to UAE-based Trends Research and Advisory, Brotherhood-aligned organizations operate publications, websites, and broadcasting services including Ikhwanweb.com—the official English website of the Muslim Brotherhood targeting Western audiences—and Ikhwan Wikipedia, which is described as “a mini electronic library offering easy access to the Muslim Brotherhood literature and its thinkers and theorists’ writings.”⁴¹⁸ These media outlets implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” that include “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “audio and visual centers,” and “a production office.”
- **Political advocacy groups:** Organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) provide political representation and advocacy on issues affecting Muslim communities.⁴¹⁹ These advocacy groups implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “political organizations” that include “a central political party,” “local political offices,” “political symbols,” “relationships and alliances,” and “the American Organization for Islamic Political Action.”
- **Legal organizations:** Groups such as Muslim Advocates and the Muslim Legal Fund of America offer legal representation, policy advocacy, and professional development services to Muslim attorneys.⁴²⁰ These legal organizations implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “legal organizations” that include a “Central Jurisprudence Council,” a “Central Islamic Court,” a “Muslim Attorneys Society,” and the “Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights.”
- **Research institutes:** Organizations such as the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) promote intellectual development, scholarly research, and academic publications⁴²¹ that are aligned with the Brotherhood’s ideological and tactical perspectives. These research institutes implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish “cultural and intellectual organizations” that include “a center for studies and research,” “cultural and intellectual

⁴¹⁶ Council of Islamic Schools based in North America, <https://cisnausa.org/>.

⁴¹⁷ North American Islamic Trust, <https://www.nait.net/>.

⁴¹⁸ “Media and Communication Activities of the Muslim Brotherhood Vision, Goals, and Future,” Trends Research and Advisory, April 17, 2022, <https://trendsresearch.org/publication/media-and-communication-activities-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-vision-goals-and-future/>.

⁴¹⁹ “About Us,” CAIR, n.d., https://www.cair.com/about_cair/about-us/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴²⁰ “About Us,” Muslim Advocates, n.d., <https://muslimadvocates.org/about/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴²¹ “About Us,” International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), n.d., <https://iiit.org/en/about-us/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

foundations,” “an organization for Islamic thought and culture,” and “a publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books.”

These organizations operate with sufficient formal independence to maintain plausible deniability with regard to coordinated action while nevertheless demonstrating close alignment in terms of objectives, messaging, and tactical approaches. In other words, they maintain consistent strategic alignment without visible hierarchical control.

The effectiveness of this organizational network was demonstrated in 2008 during the Holy Land Foundation trial, when government investigations revealed extensive financial, operational, and ideological connections between ostensibly independent organizations.⁴²² Despite this exposure, most identified organizations continue operating effectively, demonstrating the network’s resilience against even substantial legal challenges.

4.3.3.2 Front Groups and Influence Operations

Beyond established organizations, Brotherhood networks have developed sophisticated approaches to creating and manipulating nominally independent groups to advance the movement’s objectives. This approach implements the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to “absorb Muslims and win them with all of their factions and colors in America and Canada for the settlement project.”

These influence operations utilize multiple mechanisms:

- **Specialized constituency organizations:** Organizations such as the Muslim Sisters Group (established in 1932 as the Brotherhood’s first women’s division) and various youth and professional associations promote “segmented mobilization” by targeting specific demographics with tailored engagement approaches, ensuring that women activists are at the forefront of the social and political struggle while maintaining alignment with broader organizational goals.⁴²³
- **Coalition fronts:** Coalition front organizations are designed to connect otherwise separate networks and build alliances with non-Muslim groups as “bridging organizations.” Groups like American Muslims for Palestine engage in coalition-building functions, though their organizational connections remain the subject of ongoing analysis and investigation.⁴²⁴
- **Issue-specific campaigns:** Organizations and campaigns focused on particular issues (such as Islamophobia, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and immigration) create coordinated messaging across multiple organizational platforms that focus on specific concerns. These single-issue efforts operate through specialized advocacy groups while maintaining connections within broader organizational networks.⁴²⁵

⁴²² “Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case,” press release, US Department of Justice, May 27, 2009, <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences-holy-land-foundation-case>.

⁴²³ Omayma Abdel-Latif, “Sisters in the Muslim Brotherhood,” Common Ground News Service, April 15, 2009, available online at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2009/04/sisters-in-the-muslim-brotherhood?lang=en>.

⁴²⁴ “American Muslims for Palestine (AMP),” Anti-Defamation League, November 27, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/american-muslims-palestine-amp>.

⁴²⁵ “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Global Threat,” hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 115th Congress, 2nd session, July 11, 2018, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg31367/html/CHRG-115hhrg31367.htm>.

- **Proxy funding mechanisms:** Financial transfers through multiple intermediary organizations obscure original funding sources, creating what financial investigators call “layered transactions”—multiple transfers that make it harder to trace financial origins. This funding approach enables donors to support aligned organizations without the need for a direct connection.⁴²⁶

The effectiveness of these influence operations was demonstrated in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, when numerous seemingly independent organizations issued remarkably similar statements reflecting Brotherhood perspectives on the conflict.⁴²⁷ This messaging consistency reveals the successful implementation of the Memorandum’s directive to achieve “unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts” and its call for coordinated organizational work where institutions “march according to one plan” despite maintaining the appearance of organizational independence.

4.3.3.3 Financial Networks and Resource Development

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed a sophisticated financial infrastructure to sustain their institutional presence across multiple domains. This financial development implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “economic organizations” that include “an Islamic Central bank,” “Islamic endowments,” “investment projects,” and “an organization for interest-free loans,” all designed to create independent financial power that supports the settlement mission and “supports the global Islamic State wherever it is.”

This financial infrastructure operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Centralized property ownership:** The North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) holds the titles to over 300 Islamic centers across 42 states, which is an example of “asset control centralization”—the practice of maintaining decentralized operations while consolidating fundamental property control.⁴²⁸ This centralized ownership enables coordinated institutional development despite operational independence.
- **Islamic banking options:** Financial institutions providing sharia-compliant banking, investment, and insurance services create an alternative economic infrastructure aligned with Islamic principles.⁴²⁹ These specialized financial services implement the Memorandum’s directive to establish “economic organizations” that include “an Islamic Central bank,” “Islamic endowments,” and “investment projects” that advance Brotherhood objectives.
- **Zakat collection systems:** Charitable giving mechanisms, which collect and distribute religious donations according to Islamic principles, provide substantial financial resources for Brotherhood-aligned organizations.⁴³⁰ These collection systems uphold traditional Islamic practices while directing resources toward organizations advancing Brotherhood objectives.

⁴²⁶ Noura AlHabsi, “Unveiling the Muslim Brotherhood’s business and funding networks,” Trends Research and Advisory, July 5, 2021, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/unveiling-the-muslim-brotherhoods-business-and-funding-networks/>.

⁴²⁷ “Compilation of NGO Statements on October 7 Massacre and Aftermath,” NGO Monitor, October 17, 2023, <https://ngo-monitor.org/reports/compilation-of-ngo-statements-on-october-7-massacre-and-aftermath/>.

⁴²⁸ “North American Islamic Trust (NAIT),” InfluenceWatch, n.d., <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/north-american-islamic-trust-nait/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴²⁹ Muhammad Zubair Mughal, “The Development of Islamic Finance in the USA: A Journey of Growth and Opportunity,” Financial IT, October 1, 2024, <https://financialit.net/blog/islamicfinance-usa/development-islamic-finance-usa-journey-growth-and-opportunity>.

⁴³⁰ “National Zakat Fund,” American Muslim Community Foundation, n.d., <https://amuslimcf.org/national-zakat-fund/> (accessed November 11, 2025); Aamir A. Rehman and Francine Pickup, “Zakat for the SDGs,” United Nations Development Programme, September 7, 2018, <https://www.undp.org/blog/zakat-sdgs>.

- **Donor networks:** Wealthy individuals and family foundations aligned with Brotherhood perspectives provide sustainable funding for organizations that share these perspectives, creating “ideological donor ecosystems”—funding networks that systematically support organizations advancing shared worldviews.⁴³¹ These donor networks engage in coordinated resource allocation while maintaining the appearance of independent giving.
- **Foreign funding channels:** Support from Gulf states, such as Qatar, and international Islamic organizations provides additional resources for Brotherhood-aligned organizations in Western contexts.⁴³²

4.3.3.4 Case Study: CAIR and Post-9/11 Positioning

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) presents a compelling case study in the development of institutional brotherhood and strategic positioning. Founded in 1994 and listed in the “Explanatory Memorandum” as a Brotherhood-aligned organization, CAIR has successfully established itself as a primary representative of Muslim American interests despite its Brotherhood connections being exposed during the Holy Land Foundation trial.

CAIR’s post-9/11 strategic repositioning reflects a sophisticated process of institutional adaptation:

- **Narrative transformation:** Following 9/11, CAIR systematically reframed public discourse by emphasizing discrimination and civil rights violations against Muslims rather than addressing security concerns about Islamist ideology. By documenting alleged targeting of Muslim Americans through government policies and positioning Muslims primarily as victims of discrimination rather than potential security threats, CAIR transformed the national conversation⁴³³ in ways that protected Brotherhood interests.
- **Institutional relationships:** Despite being named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trial, CAIR established formal consultation relationships with federal agencies, including the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, and the White House.⁴³⁴ By positioning itself as an essential partner for community outreach, CAIR gained access to security and policy discussions despite its documented connections to extremists.
- **Media positioning:** CAIR representatives became primary media sources for Muslim perspectives on terrorism, foreign policy, and religious discrimination, becoming a recognized expert voice on specific subjects and providing readily accessible Muslim perspectives⁴³⁵ aligned with Brotherhood objectives. CAIR continues to shape media coverage of issues affecting Muslim communities.

⁴³¹ “The Philanthropic Strategies and Networks Attacking Our Democracy,” National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, November 12, 2024, <https://ncrp.org/resources/responsive-philanthropy-fall-2024/https-ncrp-org-resources-responsible-philanthropy-fall-2024-the-philanthropic-strategies-and-networks-attacking-our-democracy/>.

⁴³² “Follow the Money: Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood Funding of Higher Education in the United States,” Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, n.d., <https://isgap.org/follow-the-money/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴³³ Edward Ahmed Mitchell, “CAIR Op-Ed: Ten Post-9/11 Measures That Targeted Muslim Americans—and the U.S. Constitution,” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), n.d., https://www.cair.com/op_ed/cair-op-ed-ten-post-9-11-measures-that-targeted-muslim-americans-and-the-u-s-constitution/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴³⁴ “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days,” Coalition Information Centers, December 20, 2001, available online at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/text/100dayreport.html>.

⁴³⁵ “Bookable Speakers,” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), n.d., <https://www.cair.com/news-and-media/bookable-speakers/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

- **Legal advocacy expansion:** CAIR developed comprehensive civil rights operations systematically addressing employment discrimination, religious accommodation, and government practices affecting Muslims. By framing Islamic religious practices within established civil rights frameworks and positioning religious discrimination as equivalent to other protected categories, CAIR successfully expanded legal protections for Muslim religious observances and secured constitutional protections for Islamic practices.⁴³⁶
- **Coalition development:** CAIR built strategic alliances with progressive civil rights organizations around shared concerns regarding discrimination and surveillance.⁴³⁷ These coalitions implement the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” By aligning with established civil rights groups, CAIR gained legitimacy and protection that would have been difficult to achieve independently.⁴³⁸

CAIR’s institutional success demonstrates the effectiveness of the Brotherhood’s strategic adaptability. Following the exposure of its Brotherhood connections during the Holy Land Foundation trial, CAIR neither admitted these connections nor abandoned its fundamental objectives. Instead, it adapted its public messaging while maintaining a consistent strategic direction, demonstrating what organizational theorists call “strategic persistence with tactical flexibility”⁴³⁹—the practice of maintaining fundamental objectives while adapting approaches to changing circumstances.

CAIR’s continued influence, despite its documented connections to extremism, highlights the effectiveness of the Brotherhood’s institutional development strategies. By establishing deep roots in multiple social sectors, building strategic alliances, and developing sophisticated narrative frameworks, CAIR has created what institutional theorists refer to as “resilient legitimacy”⁴⁴⁰—an established social position that withstands even substantial challenges to organizational credibility.

4.4 The Fourth Domain: Narrative Control

The Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* strategy places significant emphasis on controlling narratives about Islam, particularly in relation to Western societies and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This narrative control implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” that include “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “audio and visual centers,” “a production office,” and “a marketing and art production office,” all designed to shape public discourse and advance the settlement mission.

Narrative control represents what critical discourse analysts, drawing on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, identify as the capacity to shape dominant cultural narratives and determine how issues

⁴³⁶ “Report an Incident,” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), n.d., <https://www.cair.com/report/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴³⁷ ACLU of Illinois, “Prominent Chicago Area Organizations and Social Justice Activists Ask FBI to Make ‘Spy Files’ Public,” press release, American Civil Liberties Union, December 2, 2004, <https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/prominent-chicago-area-organizations-and-social-justice-activists-ask-fbi-make-spy>.

⁴³⁸ ACLU of Michigan, “Civil Rights Coalition Opposes Facial Recognition Technology in Letter to Detroit Board of Police Commissioners,” press release, American Civil Liberties Union, August 1, 2019, <https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/civil-rights-coalition-opposes-facial-recognition-technology-letter-detroit-board>; “Attorney Organizations,” Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, n.d., <https://clearinghouse.net/attorney-orgs> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴³⁹ Henk W. Volberda, “Building Flexible Organizations for Fast-Moving Markets,” *Long Range Planning* 29, no. 2 (1996): 169–83, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0024630196001100>.

⁴⁴⁰ Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 574, <https://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080331>.

are understood and discussed within a society.⁴⁴¹ By shaping prevailing narratives about Islam, Muslim communities, and Islamic movements, Brotherhood-aligned organizations influence not only specific policy decisions but also the fundamental frameworks through which these issues are conceptualized and discussed.

4.4.1 Media Strategy and Implementation

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed sophisticated approaches to media engagement, implementation, and platform development. This media strategy implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” with an extensive infrastructure including “a daily newspaper,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “a magazine for the Muslim child,” “a magazine for the Muslim woman,” “print and typesetting machines,” “a photography and recording studio,” and “art bands for acting, chanting and theater.”

4.4.1.1 Al Jazeera and Transnational Media Influence

The Al Jazeera Media Network, headquartered in Doha and funded by the Qatari government, has played a pivotal role in amplifying Brotherhood narratives globally.⁴⁴² This media platform implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” including “radio stations,” “television programs,” and “audio and visual centers” that advance the strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and shape international discourse about Islam and the Muslim world. Al Jazeera’s strategic role operates through multiple mechanisms, including its resistance to US regulatory oversight. Despite operating extensively within the United States and facing congressional pressure, Al Jazeera has thus far resisted registering under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which would require disclosure of its foreign government funding and activities. This resistance to transparency requirements allows the network to maintain the appearance of independent journalism while serving as what some critics describe as a state-funded platform for Qatari and Brotherhood-aligned messaging.

Al Jazeera’s strategic role operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Differentiated audience targeting:** Al Jazeera operates a dual-track communication strategy, delivering markedly different content across its Arabic and English-language platforms. While the underlying strategic objectives remain consistent, the messaging is tailored to distinct audiences. The Arabic-language channel often features more overtly ideological content aligned with Islamist perspectives, whereas the English-language counterpart presents a more moderated narrative calibrated for Western consumption.⁴⁴³ This segmented approach allows the network to maintain broad influence across cultural and linguistic contexts while minimizing reputational risk in more scrutinized environments.
- **Brotherhood leadership platforms:** Al Jazeera Arabic has provided extensive platforms for Brotherhood leaders, particularly Yusuf al-Qaradawi, whose program “Sharia and Life” reached millions of viewers worldwide.⁴⁴⁴ This programming strategy helped build

⁴⁴¹ Matthew Donoghue, “Beyond Hegemony: Elaborating on the Use of Gramscian Concepts in Critical Discourse Analysis for Political Studies,” *Political Studies* 66, no. 2 (2018): 473–89, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032321717722362>.

⁴⁴² David Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,” *Middle East Policy* 21, no. 3 (2014): 84–102, https://www.academia.edu/23623497/Qatar_and_the_Muslim_Brotherhood_Pragmatism_or_Preference.

⁴⁴³ Mohamed A. Satti, “Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English Websites: Agenda-Setting as a Means to Comparatively Analyze Online News Stories,” *Communication & Society* 33, no. 1 (2020): 8–9, <https://revistas.unav.edu/index.php/communication-and-society/article/view/36535>.

⁴⁴⁴ David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore, “One Nation under God? Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Changing Fiqh of Citizenship in the Light of the Islamic Legal Tradition,” *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 3 (2014): 217–37, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-013-0277-4>.

recognized thought leaders through sustained media exposure, enhancing their influence beyond the organizational membership.

- **Selective coverage patterns:** Al Jazeera systematically emphasizes stories aligned with Brotherhood perspectives while minimizing developments contrary to movement interests. By highlighting certain stories while ignoring others, Al Jazeera shapes the audience’s understanding of global events in ways that advance Brotherhood objectives.⁴⁴⁵
- **Digital platform development:** AJ+, Al Jazeera’s digital-first platform targeting younger Western audiences, repackages Brotherhood-aligned content in progressive language familiar to Western viewers.⁴⁴⁶ By translating Islamist perspectives into progressive terminology, AJ+ makes Brotherhood-aligned viewpoints accessible to audiences that might reject more explicit Islamist framing.

The effectiveness of Al Jazeera’s role in advancing Brotherhood objectives was demonstrated in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar, with one of their primary demands being that Qatar shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations due to the network’s alleged promotion of extremist ideology and support for terrorist organizations.⁴⁴⁷ This extraordinary diplomatic measure reflected a recognition of Al Jazeera’s central role in advancing Islamist influence throughout the region, with the blockading countries specifically citing Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood as a key grievance.⁴⁴⁸

4.4.1.2 Controlled Opposition and Expert Source Development

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have systematically developed recognized “expert sources” for media coverage of issues affecting Muslim communities. This strategic approach to media engagement reflects broader organizational objectives such as influencing public discourse and policy formation.⁴⁴⁹

Expert source development operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Organizational spokesperson positioning:** Representatives from organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) have established themselves as primary media sources for Muslim perspectives on terrorism, discrimination, and religious accommodation. By providing readily accessible commentary aligned with their organizational perspectives, these groups shape media coverage of issues affecting Muslim communities.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁵ Mohamed A. Satti, “Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English Websites: Agenda-Setting as a Means to Comparatively Analyze Online News Stories,” *Communication & Society* 33, no. 1 (2020): 8–9, <https://revistas.unav.edu/index.php/communication-and-society/article/view/36535>.

⁴⁴⁶ Mohamed Zayani, “Digital Journalism, Social Media Platforms, and Audience Engagement: The Case of AJ+,” *Digital Journalism* 9, no. 3 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1816140>.

⁴⁴⁷ Ben Smith, “Qatar Crisis,” Briefing Paper no. CBP 8030, House of Commons Library, June 30, 2017, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8030/>; “Understanding the Blockade Against Qatar,” *Al Jazeera*, June 5, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/5/understanding-the-blockade-against-qatar>.

⁴⁴⁸ Hani Albasoos, Gubara Said Hassan, and Sara Al Zadjali, “The Qatar Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” *International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science* 10, no. 1 (2021): 158–67, <https://doi.org/10.20525/ijrbs.v10i1.1013>.

⁴⁴⁹ Lorenzo Vidino, “Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in America: Goals, Ideologies, and Strategies,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 3, 2011, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/12/muslim-brotherhood-organizations-in-america-goals-ideologies-and-strategies/>.

⁴⁵⁰ Zeyno Baran, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network,” Hudson Institute, February 27, 2008, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-muslim-brotherhood-s-u-s-network>; “Organization Profiles: American Muslim Council (AMC),” Middle East Forum, August 2, 2024, <https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/organization-profiles>.

- **Narrative control strategies:** These organizations work to maintain influence over Muslim community representation in public discourse, often challenging alternative voices within Muslim communities that offer different interpretations of Islamic principles or criticisms of Islamist ideology.⁴⁵¹ This approach seeks to establish a particular framework for understanding Muslim community concerns and responses.
- **Islamic interpretation gatekeeping:** Brotherhood-aligned scholars and institutions position themselves as authoritative interpreters of Islamic texts and traditions, working to establish their interpretations as mainstream within American Muslim discourse. This interpretive influence extends to determinations about which understandings of Islam receive recognition in interfaith dialogue and academic settings.⁴⁵²

4.4.1.3 Social Media and Digital Influence Operations

Beyond traditional media, Brotherhood-aligned networks have developed sophisticated strategies for leveraging social media and digital influence. This digital strategy implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” that include “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “audio and visual centers,” and modern communication infrastructure designed to shape public discourse and advance the settlement mission through all available media channels.

These digital influence operations make use of multiple mechanisms:

- **Coordinated amplification networks:** Informal networks of aligned social media accounts systematically promote content advancing Brotherhood perspectives while attacking opposing viewpoints. By coordinating seemingly independent accounts, Brotherhood networks achieve greater reach and impact than their actual numbers would suggest. Examples include the mass promotion of hashtags such as *#FreePalestine* and *#GazaUnderAttack* after October 7, 2023,⁴⁵³ cross-campus message discipline through the National Students for Justice in Palestine’s “Day of Resistance” toolkits that were replicated across multiple US universities,⁴⁵⁴ and the social-first production model of AJ+, a Qatari state-backed media outlet, which facilitates the rapid recycling of identical clips across platforms.⁴⁵⁵ These operations are further reinforced by bot and troll networks, including Iranian state-aligned cyber-enabled influence campaigns, which artificially boost Islamist aligned narratives while suppressing or reporting opposing voices.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵¹ Abdel Monem Said Aly, “The Truth about the Muslim Brotherhood,” *Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, May 20, 2018, <https://www.thecairereview.com/essays/the-truth-about-the-muslim-brotherhood/>.

⁴⁵² Lorenzo Vidino, “Muslim Brotherhood Organizations in America: Goals, Ideologies, and Strategies,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 3, 2011, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/12/muslim-brotherhood-organizations-in-america-goals-ideologies-and-strategies/>.

⁴⁵³ Ahmad Ismail and Naufal Hafidz, “A Semantic Analysis of Pro-Palestine and Pro-Israel Hashtags on Selected News and Media Instagram Accounts,” *Jurnal Lingua Applicata (JLA)* 7, no. 2 (2024): 129–39, available online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/388401615_A_Semantic_Analysis_of_Pro-Palestine_and_Pro-Israel_Hashtags_on_Selected_News_and_Media_Instagram_Accounts.

⁴⁵⁴ “Deactivation of National Students for Justice in Palestine,” letter dated October 24, 2023, from Chancellor Ray Rodrigues to SUS Presidents, State University System of Florida, <https://www.flbog.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Deactivation-of-Students-for-Justice-in-Palestine.pdf>; “SJP—Day of Resistance Toolkit,” n.d., published by the Investigative Project on Terrorism, October 8, 2023, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/document/1179-sjp-day-of-resistance-toolkit>.

⁴⁵⁵ Jacob Granger, “‘We Are Just Like the Audience’: AJ+ Is Reinventing Its Newsroom to Engage New Audiences,” *Journalism UK*, June 13, 2019, <https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/reinventing-the-newsroom-to-engage-new-audiences/s2/a740193/>; Sara Fischer, “DOJ Pressed to Enforce Al Jazeera Foreign Agent Ruling,” *Axios*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.axios.com/2021/03/03/doj-enforce-al-jazeera-foreign-agent-ruling>.

⁴⁵⁶ Clint Watts, “Iran Accelerates Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations in Support of Hamas,” blog post, Microsoft on the Issues, February 6, 2024, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/02/06/iran-accelerates-cyber-ops-against-israel/>; “Three IRGC Cyber Actors Indicted for ‘Hack-and-Leak’ Operation Designed to Influence the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election,” press release, US Department of Justice, September 27, 2024,

- **Platform-specific content adaptation:** Brotherhood messaging is specifically tailored to the affordances and audience characteristics of different social media platforms. By optimizing content for each platform, Brotherhood messaging achieves maximum engagement and distribution.
- **Influencer cultivation:** Social media personalities with large followings are cultivated to disseminate Brotherhood-aligned perspectives to targeted demographic groups. By working through influencers who present themselves as independent activists, the movement’s narratives reach audiences that might otherwise reject explicitly ideological content. A prominent example is AJ+, the digital platform of Qatar’s Al Jazeera, which employs popular presenters such as Dena Tahruri to frame Islamist-aligned talking points in the language of social justice, civil rights, and identity politics for younger Western audiences.⁴⁵⁷ Similarly, commentators such as Ilhan Omar’s former campaign surrogate Linda Sarsour have used their large social media platforms to integrate Brotherhood-aligned positions on Israel and US foreign policy into progressive activist discourse.⁴⁵⁸ During and after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, TikTok personalities played a central role in broadcasting Hamas-aligned narratives to global audiences, often amplified by Islamist advocacy networks in the West.⁴⁵⁹ Influencers tied to campus movements such as Students for Justice in Palestine further amplified these messages, blending Islamist perspectives with the language of anti-colonialism and human rights to maximize reach.⁴⁶⁰ Through these mechanisms, Islamist perspectives are embedded into broader digital conversations under the guise of independent commentary and activism.
- **Algorithmic optimization:** Content is specifically crafted to maximize engagement metrics that determine algorithmic distribution on major platforms. This optimization implements what digital strategists call “algorithmic amplification hacking”—the deliberate triggering of platform algorithms to enhance content distribution. By understanding and leveraging platform distribution systems, Brotherhood content achieves disproportionate visibility relative to its ordinary audience size.

The strategic importance of social media influence operations was demonstrated during the 2023–2024 Israel–Hamas conflict, in which social media platforms became key battlegrounds for narrative control. Academic research has documented how “social media platforms have become a battleground for shaping public opinion, disseminating information (and misinformation), and rallying support for various causes” during the conflict.⁴⁶¹ Studies found that platforms like Instagram

<https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us>.

⁴⁵⁷ Jacob Granger, “‘We Are Just Like the Audience’: AJ+ Is Reinventing Its Newsroom to Engage New Audiences,” *Journalism UK*, June 13, 2019, <https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/reinventing-the-newsroom-to-engage-new-audiences/s2/a740193/>; Sara Fischer, “DOJ Pressed to Enforce Al Jazeera Foreign Agent Ruling,” *Axios*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.axios.com/2021/03/03/doj-enforce-al-jazeera-foreign-agent-ruling>.

⁴⁵⁸ Aaron Bandler, “Sarsour: Israel ‘Is Built on the Idea That Jews Are Supreme to Everyone Else,’” *Jewish News Syndicate (JNS)*, December 3, 2019, <https://www.ins.org/sarsour-israel-is-built-on-the-idea-that-jews-are-supreme-to-everyone-else/>.

⁴⁵⁹ “Media Give Platform to Gaza Journalists Who Infiltrated Israel or Praised Hamas Massacre,” *Honest Reporting*, November 16, 2023, <https://honestreporting.com/media-give-platform-to-gaza-journalists-who-infiltrated-israel-or-praised-hamas-massacre/>.

⁴⁶⁰ *Hamas’s Influence on U.S. Campuses: A Study of Networks, Strategies, and Ideological Advocacy* (Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2024-11/Pamphlet_compressed.pdf.

⁴⁶¹ Princewilliams Odera Oguejiofor, “The Role of Social Media in Shaping Narratives and Perceptions in the Israeli–Gaza Conflict That Escalated on October 2023,” *International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research* 8, no. 4 (2024): 74–82, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380734520_The_Role_of_Social_Media_in_Shaping_Narratives_and_Percptions_in_the_Israeli-Gaza_Conflict_that_Escalated_on_October_2023.

experienced unprecedented volume, with hashtags such as *#gaza* being used in over 6 million posts by April 2024, with further analysis revealing systematic “patterns of framing” that “involve selecting and highlighting certain aspects of a perceived reality to promote a particular interpretation.”⁴⁶² This digital landscape reflected what information warfare scholars recognize as sophisticated influence operations designed to shape public perception rather than reflect organic public opinion.⁴⁶³

4.4.2 Educational Curricula and Textbooks

Beyond media operations, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have systematically influenced educational materials on Islam, Middle East history, and Muslim communities. This educational influence implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish “a body for authorship and Islamic curricula,” “Islamic schools,” “a council for education and scientific research,” “centers to train teachers,” and comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” designed to shape educational content and advance the settlement mission through curriculum development.

4.4.2.1 Islamic Studies in Public Education

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed substantial influence over how Islam is presented in public education curricula and textbooks.⁴⁶⁴ This curricular influence implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish “a body for authorship and Islamic curricula,” “Islamic schools,” “a council for education and scientific research,” and comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” designed to shape educational content and advance the settlement mission by controlling how Islam is presented to the next generation.

This educational influence operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Textbook review participation:** Organizations such as the Institute on Religion and Civic Values (formerly the Council on Islamic Education) have directly reviewed world history textbooks of major publishers, including McGraw Hill, Houghton Mifflin, and Prentice Hall, influencing how Islam is presented in public education materials. By systematically engaging with textbook development, Brotherhood-aligned organizations shape how Islam is presented to students nationwide.⁴⁶⁵
- **Teacher training programs:** Organizations such as the Institute on Religion and Civic Values and other Brotherhood-aligned organizations conduct seminars and training programs for teachers on Islamic topics. By influencing teacher understanding, Brotherhood perspectives shape classroom instruction beyond formal curricular content.⁴⁶⁶
- **Educational standards advocacy:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations such as the Institute on Religion and Civic Values have been instrumental in developing standards for teaching religion in public schools and providing teacher and curriculum guidelines. By influencing

⁴⁶² Ayusha Chalise, “Scrolling Social Media Sentiments on the Gaza War,” *Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, May 31, 2024, <https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/scrolling-social-media-sentiments-on-the-gaza-war/>.

⁴⁶³ Alex Waterman, “Perception Management in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons for Democratic Practitioners from Ukraine (2014–16) and Gaza (2014),” *Journal of Defence Studies* 11, no. 1 (2017): 81–110, <https://www.idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/perception-management-in-asymmetric-warfare-lessons-for-democratic-practitioners-from-ukraine-2014-16-and-gaza-2014>.

⁴⁶⁴ *Foreign Influence and Anti-Israel Bias In K-12 Classrooms—An Investigation of Brown University’s Choices Program* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/K12_Report_Final_20250310.pdf.

⁴⁶⁵ Janet Levy, “Education Jihad: Promoting Islam in American Schools,” *American Thinker*, November 3, 2017, https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2017/11/education_iihad_promoting_islam_in_american_schools.html.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

educational standards, Brotherhood perspectives gain institutional authority within public education.⁴⁶⁷

- **Supplementary materials development:** Organizations such as the Institute of Islamic Information and Education, which is a branch of ISNA, produce classroom resources and educational materials designed to convey Islamic messages and remove materials deemed unfavorable to Islam. By developing readily accessible resources for teachers, Brotherhood-aligned perspectives gain classroom presence even without a formal curricular mandate.⁴⁶⁸

The impact of this educational influence shapes students' initial understanding of Islam in ways that influence how they process subsequent information about the religion and related topics. By controlling how Islam is first presented to students, Brotherhood-aligned organizations establish interpretive frameworks that condition how future information is understood and evaluated, creating lasting effects on student perspectives that extend beyond the classroom.

4.4.2.2 Academic Publishing and Scholarship

Brotherhood-aligned networks have developed significant influence within academic publishing in the fields of Islam, Middle East studies, and related disciplines. This academic influence implements the Memorandum's directive to establish "cultural and intellectual organizations" that include "a center for studies and research," "cultural and intellectual foundations," "an organization for Islamic thought and culture," and "a publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books," all designed to shape academic discourse and knowledge production.

This publishing influence operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **University press relationships:** Academic presses at major universities have published works by scholars associated with Qatar-funded institutions and Middle East studies centers, presenting perspectives that align with Brotherhood-connected narratives. By publishing through prestigious university presses, Qatar-aligned perspectives gain scholarly legitimacy that enhances their influence beyond academic contexts.⁴⁶⁹
- **Research funding:** Organizations and foundations aligned with Qatar have provided billions of dollars in funding to American universities, with some of this support directed toward programs on Islam, Islamic studies, and Middle East issues. Universities such as Georgetown, Yale, Texas A&M, and others have received major financial contributions that have shaped curricula, research priorities, and public programming. Through entities like the Qatar Foundation, these resources have been used to steer academic agendas and influence the framing of knowledge in ways that advance Qatar's ideological and political objectives.⁴⁷⁰
- **Academic conference and training sponsorship:** Qatar Foundation International has sponsored teacher training programs and academic conferences that address issues related to Islam and the Middle East, including funding curriculum development for American teachers and covering travel expenses for educators. By organizing and funding academic

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ *Foreign Infiltration: Georgetown University, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FTM-GEORGETOWN-REPORT-2025-05-23-1.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁰ "Follow the Money: Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood Funding of Higher Education in the United States," Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, n.d., <https://isgap.org/follow-the-money/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

gatherings, Qatar-aligned organizations shape which scholarly perspectives receive attention and recognition.⁴⁷¹

- **Institutional infiltration:** Through a fifty-year campaign at Georgetown University, Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood-aligned entities have shaped US foreign policy by normalizing anti-Western extremism within elite academic circles, influencing faculty recruitment, research priorities, and curriculum development at centers like the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. By establishing long-term institutional relationships, these funders create academic environments that favor perspectives aligned with Brotherhood objectives.⁴⁷²

The cumulative impact of this academic influence determines which perspectives are recognized as legitimate scholarly positions within universities and academic discourse. By systematically influencing research funding, publishers, and institutional priorities, Brotherhood-aligned networks shape how Islam and Muslim communities are understood within educational institutions and by educated publics, creating an academic environment where certain interpretations gain prominence while others are marginalized

4.4.2.3 Islamic Educational Materials

Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed comprehensive educational materials for use within Islamic schools and weekend programs. These materials align with the Brotherhood’s educational philosophy, which emphasizes the development and implementation of educational theory as a fundamental aspect of their *da’wa* (call to Islam).

These educational materials have several distinctive features:

- **Historical emphasis:** Historical events, particularly those relating to Islamic expansion and achievements, are presented in ways that highlight the positive contributions of Islamic civilization while advancing Brotherhood educational objectives. These accounts selectively emphasize scientific and cultural progress, but often omit episodes of conflict, coercion, or internal division. Chronology and causation are sometimes distorted by overstating Islamic influence while minimizing the contributions of other societies or the role of cross-cultural exchange. By ignoring alternative narratives, downplaying sectarian divisions, and excluding inconvenient historical realities, these materials construct an idealized identity framework that privileges affirmation over accuracy and curates history to reinforce a singular vision of Islamic achievement. By presenting selective historical accounts, these materials develop specific identity frameworks that emphasize the achievements of Islamic civilization.⁴⁷³
- **Ideological integration:** The Brotherhood’s educational perspectives emphasize the integration of Islamic principles in all aspects of life rather than compartmentalizing religious and secular knowledge. By presenting the Islamic worldview as an all-encompassing philosophy, these materials present Brotherhood perspectives as foundational knowledge rather than distinct political positions.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷¹ *Foreign Influence and Anti-Israel Bias in K-12 Classrooms—An Investigation of Brown University’s Choices Program* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/K12_Report_Final_20250310.pdf.

⁴⁷² *Foreign Infiltration: Georgetown University, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2025), <https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FTM-GEORGETOWN-REPORT-2025-05-23-1.pdf>.

⁴⁷³ Ehud Rosen, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Concept of Education,” Hudson Institute, November 11, 2008, <https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-muslim-brotherhood-s-concept-of-education>.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

- **Identity formation:** Brotherhood-aligned educational materials emphasize Muslim identity development and the cultivation of Islamic character rather than merely transmitting information. By focusing on identity formation through *tarbiyyah* (comprehensive Islamic education), these materials develop students who understand themselves primarily through a religious identity that is aligned with Brotherhood perspectives.⁴⁷⁵

These educational materials achieve their effectiveness by fundamentally shaping how young people understand their faith, their history, and their identity during critical developmental years. Through this comprehensive formation process, Brotherhood educational approaches create individuals whose religious convictions, historical perspective, and personal values align with movement objectives, leading them to naturally support and advance these goals throughout their adult lives.

In addition, by presenting a curated and exclusionary narrative, these materials reduce intellectual diversity, foster a sense of cultural exceptionalism, and diminish recognition of broader human contributions. In doing so, they not only entrench ideological loyalty but also weaken the capacity of students to engage constructively with pluralistic societies.

4.4.3 The Palestinization of Islam and the Islamization of Antisemitism

Beyond specific content, Brotherhood-aligned organizations have developed sophisticated ideological frameworks that shape how issues related to Islam and Muslim communities are conceptualized. These frameworks implement the Memorandum’s strategic goal of “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative” and its directive to establish “cultural and intellectual organizations” that include “a center for studies and research,” “an organization for Islamic thought and culture,” and “a publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books,” all designed to shape discourse and make Islam “enabled within the souls, minds and the lives of the people of the country in which it moves.”

Established in 1987 during the First Intifada, Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Brotherhood had maintained a presence in Gaza and the West Bank since the 1940s, its activities were initially largely confined to religious, charitable, and educational work. The eruption of widespread unrest created the conditions for a shift to open political and military engagement, leading the Brotherhood to establish the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, better known by its acronym Hamas) as its operational arm in Palestine. Hamas’s Founding Charter of 1988 explicitly identifies the movement as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, situating its struggle within the Brotherhood’s broader ideological project.⁴⁷⁶

Hamas is a perfect example of the application of the Brotherhood’s doctrine of *tamkeen*. It combines the provision of social service, grassroots mobilization, and religious education with violent resistance. Its extensive network of schools, mosques, charities, and health clinics in Gaza reflects the Brotherhood’s long-standing strategy of using community building as the basis for influence. At the same time, Hamas operationalizes the more militant aspects of Brotherhood ideology, framing armed conflict with Israel as both a national liberation struggle and a religious obligation.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁵ Abdul Momen, “Education in Islam: Comprehensive Insights into Concepts, Nature, Goals, and Principles,” *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, September 18, 2024, <https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/education-in-islam-comprehensive-insights-into-concepts-nature-goals-and-principles/>.

⁴⁷⁶ *The Qatari Regime, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2023), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/QATAR-REGIME_HAMAS_MB_FINAL.pdf.

⁴⁷⁷ “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas],” August 18, 1988, available online at the Avalon Project, Yale Law School, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

The Brotherhood has strategically positioned the Palestinian cause as central to Islamic identity, particularly for Muslims in Western societies. This positioning reflects the movement's long-standing commitment to making Palestine a pan-Islamic cause that transcends national boundaries.

This strategic positioning was developed in three key phases:

- **Hassan al-Banna—The Palestinian cause and Islamic revival:** The Brotherhood's founder positioned Palestine as a pan-Islamic religious cause rather than a simple territorial dispute. Al-Banna noted in 1936 that "the Palestinian people are our brethren; those stopping short of helping Palestine, are actually stopping short of defending Allah and His messenger and didn't defend Islam." By framing Palestine as an Islamic cause, al-Banna turned it into a religious obligation that transcends national boundaries.⁴⁷⁸
- **Sayyid Qutb—The Palestinian cause as a jihad against Western imperialism:** Qutb integrated opposition to Israel into his broader critique of Western civilization and imperialism, viewing American support for Israel's establishment in 1948 as evidence of Western hostility toward Arabs and Muslims. By connecting Palestine to this larger ideological framework, Qutb took al-Banna's religious obligation and turned it into a civilizational struggle.⁴⁷⁹
- **The Brotherhood—The Palestinian cause as a unifying global Islamic issue:** The Brotherhood has consistently maintained that Palestine represents a fundamental Islamic cause that unites Muslims worldwide. The movement's literature emphasizes that "the Palestinian cause is the cause of every Muslim" and connects Palestinian liberation to broader Islamic revival objectives.⁴⁸⁰ By designating Palestine as a primary cause, the Brotherhood has taken al-Banna's and Qutb's ideas and turned them into a powerful tool of recruitment and solidarity for Muslims in Western societies.

This evolution uses a specific issue as an entry point for broader ideological adoption. By positioning Palestine as a central Islamic cause, Brotherhood organizations create a pathway for Muslims to adopt broader movement perspectives through initial engagement with an emotionally resonant issue.⁴⁸¹

This strategy has several operational components:

- **Theological integration of antisemitism:** Anti-Jewish elements from Islamic history, tradition, and scripture are selectively emphasized and amplified, creating a religious foundation for contemporary antisemitism. By grounding antisemitism in religious sources, Brotherhood ideology transforms political positions into religious obligations.
- **Anti-Zionism as a religious duty:** Opposition to Israel's existence is presented as a fundamental Islamic obligation rather than a political position. By defining anti-Zionism as a religious duty, Brotherhood ideology creates a non-negotiable commitment that transcends political debate.

⁴⁷⁸ "Hassan al-Banna's Centenary ... Attitude Towards Palestinian Cause," Ikhwanweb, n.d., <https://ikhwanweb.com/hassan-al-bannas-centenary/>.

⁴⁷⁹ Peta Tarlinton, "Understanding the Adversary: Sayyid Qutb and the Roots of Radical Islam," *Australian Army Journal* 2, no. 2 (2005), <https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-2-number-2/understanding-adversary-sayyid-qutb-and-roots-radical-islam>.

⁴⁸⁰ "On Anniversary of His Martyrdom: Hassan al-Banna and the Palestinian Cause and Al-Aqsa Flood," Muslim Brotherhood website, n.d., <https://ikhwan.site/p-222792>.

⁴⁸¹ Massimo Introvigne, "The Origins of Hamas. 2. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Question of Palestine," *Bitter Winter*, December 1, 2023, <https://bitterwinter.org/the-origins-of-hamas-2-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-the-question-of-palestine/>.

- **Holocaust minimization, relativization, and inversion:** The Nazi genocide against the Jews is systematically minimized, denied, or compared to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. This false narrative wipes out the lessons of the Holocaust and undermines the moral basis for Israel’s existence.
- **Conspiracy theories:** Antisemitic conspiracy theories referring to Jewish control of the media, finance, and politics are systematically disseminated. By promoting such conspiracy theories, the Brotherhood creates an alternative framework for understanding reality that depicts the Jews as the primary threat to Muslims worldwide.

The effectiveness of this narrative was demonstrated following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, when Brotherhood-aligned organizations and their supporters framed the response to the conflict in ways that reflected their established ideological positions. The Biden administration cut off contact with CAIR after its executive director stated that he was “happy to see” Palestinians break Israel’s siege on Gaza, asserting that they had “the right to self-defense” while Israel “as an occupying power” did not.⁴⁸² This response pattern is a direct result of the successful long-term development of the aforementioned ideological frameworks, which predetermined how the conflict would be interpreted. It is clear that this framing also extended beyond Brotherhood-aligned networks, as sympathetic voices in progressive and academic circles echoed similar narratives. Commentators on the left defended or rationalized Hamas’s actions using the language of anti-imperialism and resistance,⁴⁸³ while campus protests and faculty statements in US universities framed the events through the lenses of occupation, colonialism, and Palestinian self-defense.⁴⁸⁴

These examples illustrate how educational and cultural strategies cultivated by Islamist movements can shape the broader public discourse, influencing non-Muslim activists and intellectuals who are supposedly far removed from the Brotherhood’s ideological base. This narrative framing was evident from the fact that many organizations characterized the Hamas attack as Palestinians breaking “the siege, the walls of the concentration camp”⁴⁸⁵ while simultaneously reporting record-high levels of anti-Muslim bias as evidence of systematic discrimination.⁴⁸⁶ This dual narrative, which presented the attack as a case of justified resistance while painting Muslim Americans as the victims of the backlash, demonstrates how Brotherhood-aligned organizations successfully relied on their established interpretive frameworks even in the face of widespread international condemnation of Hamas’s actions.⁴⁸⁷ The effectiveness of this approach was reflected in the fact that most major Muslim organizations in North America—as well as many left-wing and human rights organizations—declined to explicitly condemn Hamas by name, despite widespread calls to do so.⁴⁸⁸

4.5 Conclusion: The Integrated Implementation Model

Analysis of the Brotherhood’s operational implementation of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) across these four domains of influence reveals a systematic execution of coordinated strategy where

⁴⁸² Gabby Deutch, “CAIR Executive Director ‘Happy to See’ Oct. 7 Hamas Terror Attack,” *Jewish Insider*, December 7, 2023, <https://jewishinsider.com/2023/12/nihad-awad-council-american-islamic-relations-israel-gaza-terror-attacks/>.

⁴⁸³ Jonathan Chait, “Hamas, the Jews, and the Illiberal Left,” *New York Magazine*, October 16, 2023, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/10/hamas-jews-illiberal-left-progressive-israel-terrorism.html>.

⁴⁸⁴ Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar, “Resistance to Repression and Back Again: The Movement for Palestinian Liberation in US Academia,” *Middle East Critique* 33, no. 2 (2024): 313–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2024.2375669>.

⁴⁸⁵ Gabby Deutch, “CAIR Executive Director ‘Happy to See’ Oct. 7 Hamas Terror Attack,” *Jewish Insider*, December 7, 2023, <https://jewishinsider.com/2023/12/nihad-awad-council-american-islamic-relations-israel-gaza-terror-attacks/>.

⁴⁸⁶ Jason DeRose, “Anti-Muslim Bias Reports Skyrocket after Oct. 7 Hamas Attack on Israel,” *NPR*, April 4, 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/04/02/1242021356/anti-muslim-bias-skyrockets-after-oct-7th-hamas-attack-on-israel>.

⁴⁸⁷ “Arab Critique and Condemnation of Hamas Before October 7, 2023,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 30, 2023, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/arab-critique-and-condemnation-hamas-october-7-2023>.

⁴⁸⁸ Cosmin Dzsurdza, “One Out of Six Muslim Organizations Responded When Asked to Denounce Hamas,” True North, November 30, 2023, <https://tnc.news/2023/11/30/muslim-organizations-denounce-hamas/>.

political engagement, institutional development, legal activism, and narrative control operate as mutually reinforcing components of a unified framework.

Rather than functioning as isolated initiatives, these distinct operational domains are deliberately designed to support and amplify one another: political positions provide platforms for narrative dissemination; institutional networks supply human and financial resources for legal campaigns; legal victories create protective environments for institutional expansion; and narrative control facilitates political advancement.

This integrated approach implements the Memorandum's directive on "unifying and directing Muslims' efforts" through a comprehensive organizational infrastructure where different entities "march according to one plan." The document explicitly envisions this coordinated structure, calling for "firmly-established organizations on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved."

The Memorandum further emphasizes that "the Islamic center would turn into a place for study, family, battalion, course, seminar, visit, sport, school, social club, women gathering, kindergarten," demonstrating the Brotherhood's commitment to creating interconnected institutional ecosystems that operate across multiple societal domains simultaneously.

This multi-domain coordination transforms what might appear as disparate organizational activities into components of a coherent settlement strategy designed to establish Islam as "stable in the land," "rooted in the spirits and minds of its people," and "enabled in the lives of its society."

5. Pivotal Moments in the Implementation of the Brotherhood's US Strategy

This chapter describes how the implementation of the Muslim Brotherhood's long-term strategy in the United States has crystallized around three pivotal moments: the post-9/11 environment, the rise of the BDS movement in the late 2000s and early 2010s, and the worldwide surge in anti-Zionist activism and antisemitism after Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

After 9/11, Brotherhood-linked organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) secured presidential recognition by repositioning themselves as the leading voice of American Muslims. Thanks in part to this legitimation, they subsequently solidified their role as government allies, gatekeepers for Muslim communities, and arbiters of acceptable counterterrorism language. Meanwhile, they expanded their mosques, schools, and civil society organizations and redefined Islam's public image in order to further entrench their radical Islamist ideology.

A second turning point came with the rise of the BDS campaign (2007–2017), which was promoted as a form of grassroots Palestinian activism on American campuses. In fact, the campaign was heavily influenced by Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood through student organizations including American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). By framing Islamist goals using secular progressive terms like “apartheid” and “indigenous rights,” BDS established a lasting campus infrastructure that shifted the academic debate and led to the emergence of “Red–Green” coalitions that afforded Islamist actors multicultural legitimacy and access to non-Muslim audiences.

This set the stage for the third and most pivotal moment, the post–October 7 mobilization of anti-Zionist and antisemitic sentiment, in which SJP and allied groups rallied within hours on US campuses using professional materials, sharing unified messaging, and openly expressing support for Hamas, revealing their true ideological stance.

5.1 The Post-9/11 Security Environment

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States gave rise to a pivotal moment for the Muslim Brotherhood's infiltration strategy in Western societies. While these attacks, which were perpetrated by al-Qaeda, initially prompted unprecedented scrutiny of Islamist movements, Brotherhood-aligned organizations skillfully transformed this potential liability into a strategic opportunity by positioning themselves as essential partners in counterterrorism efforts while simultaneously restricting critical examination of Islamist ideology.⁴⁸⁹

5.1.1 The Brotherhood's Response to the 9/11 Attacks

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Brotherhood-aligned organizations implemented a sophisticated response strategy across multiple domains. This coordinated response operationalized the Memorandum's directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” including “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” and “television programs,” as well as its strategic goal of “adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally” through coordinated messaging that would shape public discourse during a critical moment for Muslim communities in America.

5.1.1.1 Initial Public Positioning

Brotherhood-aligned organizations such as CAIR often present themselves as moderate by drawing a sharp distinction between their positions and those of violent Islamist groups. Yet this distinction is less substantive than it appears. Al-Qaeda emerged directly from the intellectual tradition of the

⁴⁸⁹ “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days,” Coalition Information Centers, December 20, 2001, available online at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/text/100dayreport.html>.

Muslim Brotherhood, shaped above all by the radical writings of Sayyid Qutb⁴⁹⁰ and carried forward by figures such as Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri.⁴⁹¹ Both movements share the strategic aim of establishing an Islamic state governed by their strict interpretation of sharia, rejecting secularism, and resisting Western influence. Where they diverge is in the tactics they employ. The Brotherhood has emphasized gradualism, institution building, and social infiltration, while al-Qaeda pursued an immediate, violent jihad against Muslim governments and the West. Brotherhood-aligned organizations in the West exploit this tactical difference as a form of camouflage. By denouncing terrorism in narrow terms while continuing to sustain the ideological ecosystem that produced it, they are able to present themselves as authentic representatives of mainstream Islam and deflect scrutiny away from their long-term objectives.⁴⁹²

CAIR issued a statement hours after the attacks, declaring, “American Muslims utterly condemn what are apparently vicious and cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent civilians.”⁴⁹³

This public response incorporated several strategic elements:

- **Terminological distinction:** Organizations such as CAIR and ISNA carefully distinguished between “extremist” interpretations of Islam and their own supposedly moderate positions. By presenting al-Qaeda as ideologically distinct from mainstream Islam, Brotherhood organizations positioned themselves as representatives of authentic Islamic teaching while distancing themselves from extremist violence.⁴⁹⁴
- **Victimhood narrative:** Brotherhood representatives immediately emphasized the potential backlash against American Muslims, with CAIR documenting and publicizing anti-Muslim incidents. The organization began tracking bias incidents and hate crimes, shifting the focus toward Muslim Americans as victims of discrimination rather than examining ideological connections to extremism.⁴⁹⁵
- **Essential partnerships:** Organizations such as CAIR positioned themselves as essential partners for government agencies seeking to understand and engage with Muslim communities. President Bush included an imam from ISNA at the national prayer service and met with American Muslim leaders at the Islamic Center of Washington, legitimizing these organizations as official representatives of Muslim Americans.⁴⁹⁶
- **Minority protection:** Brotherhood representatives framed their organizations primarily as civil rights defenders protecting vulnerable religious minorities from discrimination. This framing enabled them to gain legal and institutional protections typically afforded to minority advocacy groups while avoiding scrutiny of their ideological positions.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁰ David C. Eikmeier, “Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism,” *Parameters* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 85–97, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2340&context=parameters>.

⁴⁹¹ Andrew McGregor, “‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone’: ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and the Islamist Revolution,’” *Journal for Contemporary Studies* 23, no. 2 (2003), https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/jcs/2003-v23-n2-jcs23_2/jcs23_2art06.

⁴⁹² Ehud Rosen, *The Spider Web: The Roots of BDS and the Campaign to Delegitimize Israel* (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2018), chap. 4, available online at: <https://icpa.org/the-spiders-web/chapter-iv-delegitimization-in-the-united-states/islamist-organizations> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴⁹³ “CAIR’s Condemnation of Terrorism,” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), n.d., https://www.cair.com/about_cair/cairs-condemnation-of-terrorism/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Edward Ahmed Mitchell, “CAIR Op-Ed: Ten Post-9/11 Measures That Targeted Muslim Americans—and the U.S. Constitution,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, n.d., https://www.cair.com/op_ed/cair-op-ed-ten-post-9-11-measures-that-targeted-muslim-americans-and-the-u-s-constitution/ (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁴⁹⁶ “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days,” Coalition Information Centers, December 20, 2001, available online at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/text/100dayreport.html>.

⁴⁹⁷ Ali Harb, “How Muslim Americans Pushed for Political Prominence Post-9/11,” *Al Jazeera*, September 11, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/11/how-muslim-americans-pushed-for-political-prominence-post-9-11>.

The impact of this initial positioning was demonstrated by President George W. Bush's visit to the Islamic Center of Washington just six days after the attacks, where he met primarily with Brotherhood-aligned Muslim community leaders and delivered remarks.⁴⁹⁸ This presidential visit reflected the success of Brotherhood-aligned Islamist organizations in positioning themselves as legitimate representatives of American Islam during a critical moment. The White House's decision to include Islamic leaders in high profile events, such as having an imam from ISNA speak at the national prayer service following the attacks, demonstrated how these organizations achieved unprecedented mainstream recognition and governmental legitimation in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.⁴⁹⁹

The visit was part of a broader administration strategy to distinguish between terrorists and mainstream Muslims, with Bush stating as follows: "These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. And it's important for my fellow Americans to understand that."⁵⁰⁰ This presidential endorsement provided significant legitimacy to the Brotherhood-aligned Islamist organizations that had positioned themselves as authoritative voices for American Islam, enabling them to secure ongoing relationships with government agencies and establish themselves as essential partners in interfaith dialogue and community relations.⁵⁰¹

5.1.1.2 Managing the Media Narrative

Beyond initial positioning, Brotherhood-aligned organizations implemented a comprehensive media strategy to shape ongoing coverage of terrorism, Islam, and Muslim communities. This media management strategy, characterized by rapid response capabilities, coordinated messaging across multiple platforms, and systematic engagement with mainstream media outlets, implements the Memorandum's directive to establish comprehensive "media and art organizations" that include "a daily newspaper," "weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines," "radio stations," "television programs," "audio and visual centers," "a production office," and "a marketing and art production office," all designed to shape public discourse and advance the settlement mission by controlling narratives about Islam in America.

This media strategy employed multiple techniques:

- **Deploying spokespersons:** Representatives from organizations such as CAIR became ubiquitous media sources for Muslim perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism. They also became expert interpreters for specific communities. By providing readily accessible representatives aligned with Brotherhood perspectives, these organizations shaped media coverage of issues affecting Muslim communities.
- **Policing terminology:** Brotherhood representatives systematically challenged terms like "Islamist terrorism" or "radical Islam" as inherently Islamophobic, regardless of factual accuracy, controlling permissible language in order to influence conceptual frameworks. By restricting terminology linking Islam to terrorism, Brotherhood organizations limited the media's capacity to examine the ideological dimensions of terrorist motivation.

⁴⁹⁸ "‘Islam Is Peace’ Says President—Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C.," Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 17, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html>.

⁴⁹⁹ "The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days," Coalition Information Centers, December 20, 2001, available online at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/text/100dayreport.html>.

⁵⁰⁰ "‘Islam Is Peace’ Says President—Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C.," Office of the Press Secretary, September 17, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html>.

⁵⁰¹ Dana Milbank and Emily Wax, "Bush Visits Mosque to Forestall Hate Crimes," *Washington Post*, September 18, 2001, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/09/18/bush-visits-mosque-to-forestall-hate-crimes/d6c41c9c-9e89-4008-b7f9-292e352bc7c7>.

- **Causal inversion:** Media coverage increasingly presented anti-Muslim sentiment as the cause rather than the effect of Islamist terrorism. By positioning Islamophobia as a cause rather than a consequence of terrorism, the Brotherhood’s discourse shifted responsibility from Islamist ideology to Western society. CAIR publicly condemned the September 11 attacks but also contextualized them in a 2002 report by emphasizing grievances over US foreign policy, especially with regard to support for Israel and military involvement in Muslim countries, which it described as factors extremists could exploit.⁵⁰²
- **Promoting a false equivalence:** Media coverage increasingly presented terrorist attacks and anti-Muslim discrimination as morally comparable threats. By establishing a false equivalence between two fundamentally different phenomena, the Brotherhood’s communications strategy undermined the media’s ability to offer a clear moral assessment of terrorist threats.

The effectiveness of this media strategy was demonstrated by a rapid evolution in mainstream reporting, which increasingly adopted Brotherhood-approved terminology, causal frameworks, and moral equivalencies when covering terrorism and counterterrorism. This media transformation reflected the successful implementation of influence operations that fundamentally altered how terrorism was presented to Western audiences.

5.1.1.3 Legal and Policy Intervention

Beyond public communications, Brotherhood-aligned organizations implemented a systematic legal and policy intervention strategy. This strategy operationalizes the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “legal organizations” that include a “Central Jurisprudence Council,” a “Central Islamic Court,” a “Muslim Attorneys Society,” and the “Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights,” as well as its call to adopt “a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.”

The legal and policy intervention strategy operated through multiple channels:

- **Filing discrimination complaints:** Organizations such as CAIR have filed numerous discrimination complaints on airport security measures, law enforcement investigations, and employment practices, often using legal proceedings as a pressure tactic, regardless of the ultimate outcome. By filing complaints regardless of merit, Brotherhood-aligned organizations created institutional hesitation regarding security measures affecting Muslim communities.
- **Building civil liberties coalitions:** Brotherhood aligned organizations formed strategic alliances with established civil liberties organizations over shared concerns about surveillance and profiling. These coalitions implement the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” By aligning with respected civil liberties groups, Brotherhood organizations gained institutional legitimacy and protection that would have been difficult to achieve independently.
- **Controlling community access:** Organizations positioned themselves as essential interfaces between law enforcement and Muslim communities, creating what security analysts refer to

⁵⁰² *American Muslims: One Year After September 11, 2001* (Council on American-Islamic Relations, September 5, 2002), <https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/MuslimsOneYearAfterSept112001.pdf>.

as “access gatekeeping”—the practice of controlling interactions between government agencies and specific communities. By establishing themselves as community representatives, Brotherhood organizations gained influence over law enforcement engagement with Muslim communities while monitoring investigative approaches.

- **Revising training materials:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations systematically challenged counterterrorism training materials that addressed Islamist ideology, limiting information available to practitioners. By restricting counterterrorism training content, these organizations prevented security personnel from understanding the ideological dimensions of terrorist threats.

5.1.2 Government Engagement with Brotherhood Organizations

Despite the Brotherhood’s documented extremist connections exposed during the Holy Land Foundation trial, government agencies across multiple administrations established formal and informal relationships with Brotherhood-aligned organizations. This engagement created “institutional legitimation,” conferring official recognition that enhanced the credibility and influence of these organizations.

5.1.2.1 Community Outreach Programs

In the post-9/11 environment, government agencies at federal, state, and local levels established extensive community outreach programs with Brotherhood-aligned organizations to carry out “community-based counterterrorism,” engaging community representatives to enhance intelligence collection and prevent radicalization.

These outreach programs featured several distinctive elements:

- **Formal consultation structures:** Agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and numerous local police departments, established formal consultation mechanisms with Brotherhood-aligned organizations. This stakeholder engagement incorporated community representatives into policy development processes. By securing positions within these consultation structures, Brotherhood organizations had direct influence on the development of security policy.
- **Training partnerships:** Government agencies invited Brotherhood-aligned organizations to provide cultural awareness training for law enforcement personnel. These training relationships helped determine what information practitioners received regarding specific subjects. By controlling training content, Brotherhood organizations shaped how security personnel understood Islam and Muslim communities.
- **Participation in community events:** Government officials routinely attended events organized by Brotherhood-aligned organizations, conferring legitimacy through official presence. By securing the participation of government representatives, Brotherhood organizations enhanced their credibility as legitimate community representatives despite their documented extremist connections.
- **Information sharing arrangements:** Government agencies established formal and informal information sharing mechanisms with Brotherhood-aligned organizations to monitor community concerns and potential threats. By positioning themselves as information sources, Brotherhood organizations gained insight into investigative priorities while controlling the flow of information to government agencies.

From the Brotherhood’s perspective, the effectiveness of these outreach programs was demonstrated by the influence they acquired over security practices relating to Muslim communities. By establishing themselves as essential partners in counterterrorism efforts, Brotherhood-aligned organizations paradoxically gained unprecedented access to the very agencies responsible for monitoring their activities.

5.1.2.2 Official Administration Engagement

Beyond operational relationships with specific agencies, Brotherhood-aligned organizations enjoyed significant engagement with senior administration officials across multiple presidencies. This resulted in direct relationships with senior decision-makers, expanding the Brotherhood’s political influence beyond formal institutional channels.

This engagement took multiple forms:

- **White House meetings:** Representatives from organizations such as ISNA, MPAC, and CAIR secured meetings with senior White House officials across the administrations of presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. White House visitor logs and contemporaneous reporting show that representatives of organizations such as CAIR and MPAC met repeatedly with senior White House staff during the Obama years. For example, CAIR–LA’s Hussam Ayloush and MPAC’s Salam Al-Marayati and Haris Tarin attended multiple West Wing meetings between 2009 and 2012.⁵⁰³ By securing White House access, Brotherhood-aligned representatives gained opportunities to shape policy at the highest levels.
- **Policy consultation roles:** Brotherhood-aligned individuals served on government advisory boards addressing issues such as religious freedom, countering violent extremism, and international religious engagement. In 2010, for example, Imam Mohamed Magid (then of the ADAMS Center; later ISNA president) served as a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) working group, which submitted recommendations to Department of Homeland Security’s leadership.⁵⁰⁴ By securing advisory positions, Brotherhood representatives had direct influence on policy formulation regarding issues affecting Muslim communities.
- **Diplomatic representation:** Brotherhood-aligned individuals such as MPAC’s Salam Al-Marayati, who blamed Israel for 9/11, served as a public member of the US delegation to the 2012 OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in Warsaw, where he participated in the official US delegation’s activities.⁵⁰⁵ By securing positions within diplomatic initiatives, Brotherhood representatives gained an international platform as well as political legitimacy.
- **Inclusion in ceremonies:** Presidential administrations included Brotherhood-aligned representatives such as Salam Al-Marayati (MPAC), Dr. Ingrid Mattson (ISNA), and Imam Mohamed Magid (ADAMS) in ceremonial events, such as Ramadan celebrations, Eid

⁵⁰³ Steven Emerson and John Rossomando, “A Red Carpet for Radicals at the White House,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, October 21, 2012, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/3777/a-red-carpet-for-radicals-at-the-white-house>.

⁵⁰⁴ “Recommendations,” Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Spring 2010, 26–28, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations.pdf (accessed November 11, 2025). The list of CVE members in the document includes Imam Mohamed Magid.

⁵⁰⁵ Adam Kredo, “Anti-Israel Advocate Reps U.S. at Rights Conference,” *Washington Free Beacon*, October 3, 2012, <https://freebeacon.com/politics/anti-israel-advocate-reps-u-s-at-rights-conference/>.

observances, and interfaith gatherings.⁵⁰⁶ By appearing alongside presidents and senior officials, Brotherhood representatives gained a perception of mainstream legitimacy despite documented extremist connections.

The effectiveness of this high-level engagement was especially evident during the Obama administration, when numerous individuals with Brotherhood connections secured positions within the administration. This unprecedented access reflected the successful implementation of a long-term influence strategy that transformed a potential adversarial relationship following 9/11 into unprecedented political access and legitimacy.

5.1.2.3 Influence on Counterterrorism Policy

Perhaps most significantly, Brotherhood-aligned organizations exerted substantial influence over the development and implementation of counterterrorism policy. This policy influence implements the Memorandum's directive to obtain "the keys and the tools" necessary to carry out the "grand mission as a Civilization Jihadist responsibility," and its strategic goal of "adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally," utilizing the comprehensive legal and political infrastructure called for in the settlement framework to shape government policy in ways favorable to Brotherhood objectives.

This influence operated through multiple channels:

- **Controlling terminology:** Brotherhood pressure led government agencies to systematically remove terms like "jihad," "Islamism," and "Islamic terrorism" from official communications.⁵⁰⁷ By controlling acceptable terminology, Brotherhood organizations fundamentally altered how security agencies conceptualized and communicated about terrorism threats.
- **Restricting training content:** Brotherhood complaints led to the wholesale revision of counterterrorism training materials, removing content that addressed Islamist ideology and religious motivations for terrorism and determining what subjects could be legitimately examined.⁵⁰⁸ By restricting training content, Brotherhood organizations prevented security personnel from understanding the ideological dimensions of terrorist threats.
- **Limitations on investigation:** Brotherhood advocacy contributed to policies restricting the investigation of religious organizations, the surveillance of suspected extremists, and the monitoring of religious spaces.⁵⁰⁹ By securing these limitations, Brotherhood-aligned organizations played their part in helping to create protected spaces for potentially concerning activities.
- **Promoting community partnership:** Brotherhood advocacy helped shift the counterterrorism approach from traditional intelligence-led policing toward community partnership models where Brotherhood-aligned organizations served as intermediaries,

⁵⁰⁶ "Expected Attendees at the White House Iftar Dinner," Office of the White House Press Secretary, August 13, 2010, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/13/expected-attendees-white-house-iftar-dinner>.

⁵⁰⁷ John Gregg, "Newt Gingrich Says the Obama Administration Instructed Terrorism Training to Not Mention Islam," PolitiFact, December 14, 2011, <https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2011/dec/14/newt-gingrich/newt-gingrich-says-obama-administration-issued-ins/>.

⁵⁰⁸ Janeen Capizola, "FBI Removed Material 'Offensive to Muslims' from Training Guides," *BizPac Review*, June 8, 2013, <https://www.bizpacreview.com/2013/06/08/fbi-removed-material-offensive-to-muslims-from-training-guides-75453/>.

⁵⁰⁹ Leila Rafei, "How the FBI Spied on Orange County Muslims—And Attempted to Get Away With It," American Civil Liberties Union, November 8, 2021, <https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/how-the-fbi-spied-on-orange-county-muslims-and-attempted-to-get-away-with-it>.

transferring partial security responsibility to nongovernmental entities.⁵¹⁰ By positioning themselves as essential partners, Brotherhood organizations gained influence over security practices affecting Muslim communities.

The effectiveness of this policy influence was demonstrated by the changes that were made in the FBI's counterterrorism lexicon in 2012 following Brotherhood pressure. Words like "jihad," "Islamist," and "Islamic terrorism" were systematically removed from training materials regardless of their analytical value for understanding terrorist motivation. This deference to Brotherhood terminology preferences reflected the successful implementation of influence operations that fundamentally altered how government agencies conceptualized and addressed terrorist threats.

5.1.3 Institutional Positioning and Narrative Control

Beyond specific policy interventions, Brotherhood-aligned organizations used the post-9/11 environment to improve their institutional positioning and exert an unprecedented level of narrative control in matters relating to Islam and Muslim communities in Western societies. These achievements implement the Memorandum's directive to "present Islam as a civilization[a] alternative," one of the six core strategic goals explicitly stated in the document as part of establishing an effective Islamic Movement in North America.

5.1.3.1 Self-Appointed Community Representation

Brotherhood-aligned organizations systematically positioned themselves as authoritative representatives of Muslim communities despite representing specific ideological positions rather than diverse Muslim populations.

- **Unrepresentative representation:** Organizations routinely presented themselves as the primary representatives of American Muslims to enhance perceived legitimacy.⁵¹¹ CAIR describes itself as "the nation's largest Muslim civil liberties and advocacy organization" and positions itself as representing the interests of American Muslims broadly, despite critics arguing it represents a specific ideological position within the diverse Muslim American population.⁵¹² By positioning itself as the authoritative voice of American Muslims, Brotherhood-aligned organizations enhanced their political influence beyond their actual constituency base.
- **Marginalizing alternative voices:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations systematically delegitimized Muslim voices presenting alternative perspectives, particularly those critical of Islamist ideology. For example, organizations such as CAIR have systematically targeted progressive Muslim voices such as Asra Nomani through what she described as "character assassination campaigns" that included being labeled an "Islamophobe" on anonymous websites allegedly funded by CAIR officials.⁵¹³ Nomani has also been characterized by critics

⁵¹⁰ John Guandolo, "Assault on the Truth, Part 2: How the Muslim Brotherhood Censors Federal Counterterrorism Training," *Breitbart*, November 20, 2011, <https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2011/11/20/assault-on-the-truth-part-2-how-the-muslim-brotherhood-censors-federal-counterterrorism-training/>.

⁵¹¹ "The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)," Anti-Defamation League (ADL), last updated December 23, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/council-american-islamic-relations-cair>.

⁵¹² Ehud Rosen, *The Spider Web: The Roots of BDS and the Campaign to Delegitimize Israel* (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2018), chap. 4, available online at: <https://jcpa.org/the-spider-web/chapter-iv-delegitimization-in-the-united-states/islamist-organizations> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁵¹³ Marilyn Stern, "Asra Nomani on Islamism's Woke Army," *Middle East Forum*, March 3, 2023, <https://www.meforum.org/asra-nomani-on-islamism-woke-army>; Dexter Van Zile, "CAIR Accused of Hiding Behind Anonymous Website to Attack Critics, Called Unethical," *Focus on Western Islamism*, February 23, 2023, <https://islamism.news/news/cair-accused-of-hiding-behind-anonymous-website-to-attack-critics-called-unethical/>.

as “delusional” and a “self-hating Muslim.”⁵¹⁴ Progressive reformer Irshad Manji has been accused of “pandering to an Islamophobic mainstream press” and has been categorized among “notorious Islamophobic writers” by prominent Islamic scholars.⁵¹⁵ The systematic exclusion of critical voices from conferences, media platforms, and community events ensures that alternative perspectives on Islam remain marginalized within the broader Muslim discourse. This marginalization determines who has legitimate authority to speak on behalf of specific communities. By labeling critics of Islamism as “inauthentic” or “Islamophobic,” Brotherhood organizations maintained a narrative monopoly over Muslim community representation.

- **Cultivating media relationships:** Brotherhood representatives developed extensive relationships with journalists as go-to sources for Muslim perspectives, enabling them to shape media coverage regardless of their actual representativeness.
- **Accumulating institutional recognition:** Organizations systematically secured formal recognition by government agencies, interfaith groups, and civil society organizations, accumulating official acknowledgments that enhanced their perceived authority. By securing recognition from respected institutions, Brotherhood organizations enhanced their credibility despite not being truly representative of the entire Muslim community.

Organizations such as CAIR and ISNA successfully positioned themselves as prominent Muslim voices in post-9/11 America through strategic media outreach and institutional positioning. CAIR established “the Independent Writers Syndicate ... to offer a Muslim perspective on current issues” and distributed commentaries to newspapers and websites throughout North America, while ISNA leadership participated in high-profile national events such as the nationally televised healing service at the National Cathedral following 9/11.⁵¹⁶ These organizations leveraged their institutional infrastructure to become go-to sources for media commentary on Muslim affairs, though research indicates that overall Muslim American media coverage remained more negative compared to other minority groups.⁵¹⁷

5.1.3.2 Developing the Islamophobia Narrative

The post-9/11 environment provided an unprecedented opportunity to develop Islamophobia as a comprehensive narrative framework that shifted the focus from examining Islamist ideology to addressing alleged discrimination against Muslims. This narrative development implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” that include “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” and extensive media infrastructure, as well as its strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and making Islam “enabled within the souls, minds and the lives of the people of the country in which it moves.”

This development of the narrative employed multiple techniques:

⁵¹⁴ “Asra Nomani—A Rebel with a Cause,” The Chicago Ambassador (blog), May 3, 2016, <https://thechicagoambassador.wordpress.com/2016/05/03/asra-nomani-a-rebel-with-a-cause/>.

⁵¹⁵ Madeleine Elfenbein, “Irshad Manji’s Flying Leap,” *The American Prospect*, April 19, 2007, <https://prospect.org/2007/04/19/irshad-manji-s-flying-leap>; Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Worst Books on Islam: Identified by Dr. Abou El Fadl,” Usuli Institute, December 1, 2003, <https://www.usuli.org/2003/12/01/the-worst-books-on-islam-identified-by-dr-abou-el-fadl>.

⁵¹⁶ *American Muslims: One Year After September 11, 2001* (Council on American-Islamic Relations, September 5, 2002), <https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/MuslimsOneYearAfterSept112001.pdf>.

⁵¹⁷ Nava Lajevardi, “The Media Matters: Muslim American Portrayals and the Effects on Mass Attitudes,” *Journal of Politics* 83, no. 3 (2021): 1060–79, <https://doi.org/10.1086/711300>.

- **Semantic expansion:** The concept of Islamophobia evolved from describing specific anti-Muslim bigotry to encompassing virtually any criticism of Islamic doctrine, practices, or organizations.
- **Incident documentation systems:** Organizations such as CAIR established formal reporting systems for alleged Islamophobia incidents, with basic vetting procedures but significant discrepancies in comparison to official statistics. For example, while California’s attorney general reported 24 anti-Islamic bias events in 2024, CAIR–CA’s internal reporting documented 154 incidents, demonstrating how organizational reporting systems can create significantly different statistical pictures of the same phenomenon.⁵¹⁸
- **Utilizing the civil rights framework:** Anti-Muslim sentiment was presented within established civil rights frameworks despite significant differences between religious criticism and racial discrimination. By positioning the former as equivalent to the latter, the Brotherhood sought to establish similar levels of legal protection against any criticism of Islam or Islamist ideology.

The effectiveness of this narrative development was demonstrated by the rapid institutional adoption of Islamophobia as an established analytical category across American institutions. Universities quickly embraced the framework, with UC Berkeley, led by the founder of the Brotherhood-aligned American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), establishing the Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project at its Center for Race and Gender and launching the *Islamophobia Studies Journal* in 2012. This institutional adoption reflected the successful implementation of a narrative strategy that fundamentally altered how interaction between Islam and American society was conceptualized and discussed.

5.1.3.3 Expansion of Institutional Infrastructure

The post-9/11 environment paradoxically facilitated the unprecedented expansion of a Brotherhood-aligned institutional infrastructure across Western societies. This institutional expansion implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “scientific, educational and professional organizations” that include “scientific research centers,” “an Islamic university,” “Islamic schools,” “a council for education and scientific research,” and various professional societies, as well as its goal of creating “firmly-established organizations on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved.”

This development operated across multiple domains:

- **Religious institutions:** Islamic centers and mosques experienced substantial expansion despite heightened security concerns. The number of mosques in the United States grew from 1,209 in 2000 to 2,106 in 2011 (a 74% increase) and reached 2,769 by 2020—more than double the number from two decades earlier.⁵¹⁹
- **Civil rights organizations:** Organizations focusing specifically on Muslim civil rights and discrimination significantly expanded their operations, staff, and funding. CAIR experienced substantial expansion post-9/11, growing from 8 chapters and offices in 2001 to 33 by 2007, according to the organization’s board chairman.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁸ “CAIR–CA Says State Hate Crime Report Fails to Capture Scope of Anti-Muslim, Anti-Palestinian Hate,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), July 1, 2025, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-ca-says-state-hate-crime-report-fails-to-capture-scope-of-anti-muslim-anti-palestinian-hate/.

⁵¹⁹ Besheer Mohamed, “Muslims Are a Growing Presence in U.S., But Still Face Negative Views from the Public,” Pew Research Center, September 1, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/09/01/muslims-are-a-growing-presence-in-u-s-but-still-face-negative-views-from-the-public/>.

⁵²⁰ “CAIR Membership Falls 90% Since 9/11,” *Washington Times*, June 12, 2007, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jun/12/20070612-122251-2620r/>.

- **Media platforms:** Brotherhood-aligned media companies expanded substantially, establishing direct communication channels with Muslim communities and influencing the broader public discourse. In 2001, the Islamic Media Foundation, whose directors were connected to ISNA, launched the Islamic Broadcasting Network (IBN)—the first Islamic network to broadcast daily in the United States.⁵²¹ Brotherhood-aligned media personalities gained prominence across the Arab media, which was also broadcast in the United States. Al Jazeera’s Yusuf al-Qaradawi pioneered the Brotherhood genre in the late 1990s with his popular program “Sharia and Life.”⁵²²

The effectiveness of this institutional expansion was demonstrated by the expansion and improvement of the Brotherhood’s operational capabilities following 9/11 despite initial security concerns. What might have become a period of curtailed operations instead became an unprecedented growth opportunity, reflecting the successful implementation of the crisis response strategy that transformed a potential existential threat into a historic development opportunity.

5.1.4 Long-term Strategic Outcomes

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Muslim Brotherhood advanced long-term strategic outcomes that extended well beyond immediate crisis management. These results reflected the Memorandum’s vision of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment), embedding an Islamist presence within Western institutions and narratives.

Key achievements during this period included:

- **Neutralization of the security apparatus:** Through restrictions on terminology, limits on training, and the imposition of narrative boundaries, security agencies were prevented from addressing the ideological roots of Islamist extremism. The use of investigative tools such as surveillance and informants was constrained, while resources were redirected toward combating Islamophobia. At the same time, self-censorship took hold, with officials reluctant to raise ideological concerns for fear of career repercussions. The consequences of this environment were evident in cases such as the Boston Marathon bombing, where prior FBI monitoring of Tamerlan Tsarnaev had been curtailed despite warning signs.
- **Penetration of mainstream institutions:** Individuals sympathetic to the Brotherhood’s perspectives secured positions across government agencies, academia, the media, and civil society organizations. This presence ensured alignment of messaging across sectors, creating consistency in how issues of Islam and extremism were presented. Such outcomes reflected a deliberate personnel placement strategy envisioned in the Project’s call to occupy influential positions that shape policy and public debate.
- **Narrative capture:** Finally, the Brotherhood successfully *established narrative frameworks* that shaped—and continue to shape—mainstream discourse. Public debate increasingly dissociated terrorism from Islamic theology, emphasized Muslim victimhood over that of terror victims, and portrayed terrorism as a response to Western policy rather than the product of ideological conviction. Criticism of Islamist ideology was progressively equated with anti-Muslim bigotry. These frameworks endured well beyond the crisis of 9/11, embedding lasting constraints on how Western societies discuss Islam, Muslim communities, and extremism.

⁵²¹ “Islamic Media Foundation,” InfluenceWatch, n.d., <https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/islamic-media-foundation/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁵²² *New Islamic Media*, POMEPS Studies no. 23 (Project on Middle East Political Science, February 10, 2017), <https://pomeps.org/the-new-islamic-media>.

Taken together, these developments demonstrate how the Brotherhood turned the post-9/11 environment into an opportunity for long-term consolidation. What began as crisis management matured into structural influence across the security, institutional, and narrative domains, guaranteeing a lasting impact regardless of shifting political contexts.

5.2 The Delegitimization Network and the BDS Movement

The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement is the most visible manifestation of a broader delegitimization network that is dedicated to challenging Israel's legitimacy as a sovereign state. While BDS has gained prominence through university campus activism, trade union engagement, and progressive activist spaces, it is part of a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that extends far beyond boycotts and sanctions and amounts to a sustained campaign of political, cultural, and intellectual delegitimization.⁵²³

The movement encompasses a wide spectrum of mutually reinforcing initiatives, including the proliferation of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapters, the creation of Palestine solidarity committees, lobbying for institutional divestment resolutions in universities and professional associations, and participation in "Red-Green" coalitions linking Brotherhood-aligned actors with progressive movements.⁵²⁴ ISGAP has documented how SJP operates as part of a broader network that has "direct connections to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood" and is characterized by organizational structures that facilitate coordination across hundreds of chapters while obscuring funding sources and accountability mechanisms.⁵²⁵

These parallel efforts work together to erode Israel's legitimacy in the public discourse while normalizing opposition to its existence across multiple institutional and cultural domains. The interconnected nature of these organizations creates what ISGAP researchers describe as a "network of extremism propagated by SJP on university campuses," where individual chapters coordinate messaging and tactics through umbrella organizations such as National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP) while maintaining plausible deniability regarding their broader strategic objectives.⁵²⁶

BDS should therefore be understood not as an isolated initiative but as the flagship project of this larger delegitimization strategy. The movement's effectiveness relies on the broader delegitimization network, which provides amplification, recruits allies from outside Muslim communities, and embeds the Palestinian cause within widely accepted activist frameworks such as human rights, anti-racism, and anti-colonialism.⁵²⁷ By operating within this wider delegitimization network, various operators have ensured that BDS narratives persist and circulate far beyond the movement's formal organizational structures, utilizing what many observers refer to as "Red-Green" coalitions that unite progressive and Brotherhood-aligned movements around shared anti-Western and anti-Zionist objectives.⁵²⁸

⁵²³ Shai Farber, "Weaponisation of Academia: The Palestinian BDS Movement and Anti-Israel Campus Protests," *Israel Affairs* 34, no. 6 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2025.2516167>.

⁵²⁴ Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, "The Emerging Red-Green Alliance: Where Political Islam Meets the Radical Left," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 2 (2013): 167–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.755815>.

⁵²⁵ *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to North American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Gil D. Murciano, "Unpacking the Global Campaign to Delegitimize Israel: Drawing the Line between Criticism of Israel and Denying Its Legitimacy," SWP Research Paper no. 7 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 22, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP07>.

⁵²⁸ Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, "The Emerging Red-Green Alliance: Where Political Islam Meets the Radical Left," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 2 (2013): 167–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.755815>.

This strategic approach constitutes a fundamental challenge to democratic institutions, particularly universities, which serve as “the place where young people, future leaders, scholars, journalists, and others learn values, ethics, and what it is to be a citizen in a democratic society.”⁵²⁹ The success of delegitimization campaigns in higher education creates precedents and frameworks that extend far beyond campus boundaries, influencing the broader cultural and political discourse about Israel’s legitimacy and right to exist, as well as furthering the Muslim Brotherhood’s *tamkeen* project.

5.2.1 Origins and Development of the BDS Movement

The formal BDS movement emerged in 2005 when 171 Palestinian civil society organizations issued a call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel modeled on the former anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa.⁵³⁰ However, an examination of the movement’s actual development reveals significant Brotherhood influence in the areas of conceptualization and implementation, predating the official 2005 launch by several years.

Contemporary research has established that conceptual origins of BDS can be traced to the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa, which saw the emergence of the so-called Durban strategy—“a systematic effort by NGOs to demonize and delegitimize Israel precisely in the manner of apartheid South Africa.”⁵³¹ This conference marked the convergence of multiple activist streams, including Palestinian organizations, international NGOs, and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated entities operating within the broader anti-Israel coalition.

The Palestine Return Centre in London, described by researchers as “a Muslim Brotherhood associated group founded in 1986,” claimed to have been supporting boycotts of Israel as early as 2001, demonstrating the pre-existing organizational infrastructure that would later facilitate the formal launch of BDS.⁵³² This earlier timeline reveals how Brotherhood-affiliated networks had already established boycott frameworks and messaging strategies that would be incorporated into the broader 2005 BDS call.

Brotherhood-aligned organizations developed an infrastructure that continues to influence contemporary campus activism, with organizational models established in the early 2000s creating structured mechanisms to sustain BDS activities across campuses.⁵³³ This infrastructure development was facilitated by what court documents from the Holy Land Foundation trial described as “extensive operational and financial networks connecting campus organisations to broader Islamist entities.”⁵³⁴

The formal 2005 BDS call was not the spontaneous emergence of Palestinian civil society activism but rather the culmination of a strategic process that had been developing since the late 1990s. Academic sources note that Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) was established in Ramallah in 2004, providing the institutional framework that would support the broader 2005 civil society call.⁵³⁵

⁵²⁹ Testimony of Dr. Charles Asher Small, Founder and Executive Director, Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) before the US House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Oversight: “Fueling Chaos: Tracing the Flow of Tax-Exempt Dollars to Antisemitism,” July 23, 2024, available online at: <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Small-Testimony.pdf>.

⁵³⁰ “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS,” open letter, July 9, 2005, available online at: <https://bdsmovement.net/call>.

⁵³¹ Alex Joffe, “Why the Origins of the BDS Movement Matter,” Middle East Forum, August 31, 2016, <https://www.meforum.org/bds-origins>.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Shai Farber, “Weaponisation of Academia: The Palestinian BDS Movement and Anti-Israel Campus Protests,” *Israel Affairs* 34, no. 6 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2025.2516167>.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ “What Is BDS?,” BDS Movement, n.d., <https://bdsmovement.net/what-bds> (accessed November 11, 2025).

The financial architecture supporting the development of BDS has been documented through systematic analysis revealing billions of dollars in funding from Qatar and other Brotherhood-affiliated sources, creating a sophisticated support system for campus activism and broader delegitimization campaigns.⁵³⁶ This funding model has enabled the rapid expansion of the BDS movement while obscuring the organizational connections between Palestinian civil society groups and the Brotherhood-aligned network that provides strategic direction and financial resources.

5.2.1.1 Brotherhood Connections to BDS Origins

While presenting itself as a grassroots Palestinian initiative, the BDS movement has been subject to significant Brotherhood influence from its inception. This influence operates through multiple connections:

- **Organizational founders:** Launched in 2005, the BDS movement was driven primarily by Palestinian civil society organizations with documented ties to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Al-Haq and other NGOs within the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) provided the infrastructure for the movement, with PFLP-linked figures playing prominent roles in its leadership.⁵³⁷ While Hamas was not among the original founders, it subsequently endorsed and promoted BDS as a strategic component of its broader resistance strategy. By doing so, Hamas and Brotherhood-aligned networks were able to integrate the campaign into their long-term project of delegitimizing Israel internationally. The result was a coalition that drew on both Marxist-nationalist currents rooted in the PFLP and Islamist networks aligned with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, converging in a broader delegitimization movement aimed at eroding Israel’s legitimacy in the political, cultural, and academic domain.
- **Ideological alignment:** The founding documents of BDS present three demands that, according to the movement’s co-founder Omar Barghouti, are designed to end Israel’s existence as a Jewish state rather than merely criticize specific policies.⁵³⁸ Barghouti has stated explicitly that “definitely, most definitely we oppose a Jewish state in any part of Palestine” and has acknowledged that implementation of the right of return demand “would end Israel’s existence as a Jewish state.”⁵³⁹ By incorporating Brotherhood positions on Israel’s fundamental illegitimacy, BDS plays a key role in advancing the Islamist solution to the Palestinian question, in line with the directives of “The Project.”
- **Hamas leadership connections:** Senior Hamas leaders have publicly welcomed international boycott efforts, framing them as complementary to armed resistance.⁵⁴⁰ These endorsements illustrate how the BDS campaign, while formally presented as a civil-society initiative, has been integrated into a wider delegitimization movement that draws on both Islamist and nationalist currents. By supporting BDS from outside the formal NGO framework, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood were able to extend their influence while maintaining plausible deniability.

⁵³⁶ Testimony of Dr. Charles Asher Small, Founder and Executive Director, Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) before the US House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Oversight: “Fueling Chaos: Tracing the Flow of Tax-Exempt Dollars to Antisemitism,” July 23, 2024, available online at: <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Small-Testimony.pdf>.

⁵³⁷ “Al-Haq,” NGO Monitor, last updated September 10, 2023, https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/al_haq/.

⁵³⁸ “What Is BDS?,” BDS Movement, n.d., <https://bdsmovement.net/what-bds> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁵³⁹ “Omar Barghouti: ‘No Palestinian Will Ever Accept a Jewish State in Palestine,’” posted May 26, 2014, by Palestinianism is Racism, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYyvsGd8K4Y>; Ali Mustafa, “‘Boycotts Work’: An Interview with Omar Barghouti,” The Electronic Intifada, May 31, 2009, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/boycotts-work-interview-omar-barghouti/8263>.

⁵⁴⁰ Sean Durns, “Hamas: We ‘Salute and Support’ BDS,” blog post, Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA), July 10, 2017, <https://blog.camera.org/2017/07/hamas-we-salute-and-support-bds>.

The effectiveness of these connections is evident from the consistent alignment between BDS and Brotherhood positions regarding Israel, despite BDS presenting itself as an independent human rights initiative. This alignment also reflects the successful implementation of an influence strategy that promotes a clear ideological direction while minimizing visible organizational connections.

5.2.1.2 The Role of AMP and SJP

Within the United States, the Brotherhood's primary influence over BDS has operated through American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) and its campus affiliate Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). These organizations operationalize the Memorandum's directive to establish comprehensive "youth organizations" and leverage student networks like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is explicitly listed among the Brotherhood's organizations, to "expand the observant Muslim base" and "adopt Muslims' causes domestically and globally" through campus activism that advances Brotherhood-aligned positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Brotherhood's connections to AMP and SJP operate through multiple channels:

- **Organizational lineage:** The 2008 Holy Land Foundation trial identified IAP, its leadership, and the Palestine Committee as part of the US-based Hamas support network. Later, key figures from that network—including Rafeeq Jaber, Osama Abuirshaid, and Hatem Bazian—became central organizers of American Muslims for Palestine (AMP).⁵⁴¹ By creating formally distinct organizations with the same leadership and objectives, the Brotherhood was able to maintain operational continuity while evading scrutiny.
- **Financial connections:** AMP has received funding from organizations and individuals with documented Brotherhood ties.⁵⁴²
- **Operational coordination:** AMP provides direct organizational support, training, and resources to SJP chapters across American campuses. Through this support structure, Brotherhood networks exercised strategic influence over campus BDS activities while preserving the appearance of grassroots student initiatives.

5.2.1.3 Campus Infiltration Strategy

The BDS movement served as an ideal vehicle for implementing the Brotherhood's campus infiltration strategy, as outlined in the "Explanatory Memorandum." This strategy implements the Memorandum's directive to establish comprehensive "youth organizations" and leverage student networks like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is explicitly listed among the Brotherhood's organizations, to "expand the observant Muslim base" and "adopt Muslims' causes domestically and globally" through campus activism.

This infiltration strategy operated through multiple mechanisms:

⁵⁴¹ *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, 445 F.Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Tex. 2006), <https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914b55dadd7b049347723bc>; *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-P (N.D. Tex. 2008), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-txnd-3_04-cr-00240/pdf/USCOURTS-txnd-3_04-cr-00240-15.pdf; *United States v. El-Mezain et al.*, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (appellate confirmation), <https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/09/09-10560-CR0.wpd.pdf>; "Investigation Exposes AMP Leaders' Ties to Former U.S.-Based Hamas-Support Network," Investigative Project on Terrorism, June 24, 2015, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/4891/investigation-exposes-amp-leaders-ties-to-former>.

⁵⁴² *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf.

- **Establishing of student groups:** SJP chapters were systematically established across US campuses.
- **Developing coalitions:** SJP chapters formed strategic alliances with other progressive student organizations based on shared anti-Israel positions. These coalitions implement the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” By creating these alliances, Brotherhood-influenced organizations amplified their influence beyond their actual membership while accessing broader progressive networks.
- **Cultivating faculty alliances:** SJP chapters systematically developed relationships with sympathetic faculty members who provided institutional protection and academic legitimation. By securing faculty support, Brotherhood-influenced campus activities gained protection from administrative intervention while also enhancing their perceived legitimacy.
- **Establishing narrative dominance:** SJP activities systematically promoted Brotherhood perspectives on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as the exclusive legitimate viewpoint on campus, while other Brotherhood-influenced organizations established ideological control over how Israeli–Palestinian issues were understood and discussed within academic environments.

The effectiveness of this campus infiltration is illustrated by the adoption of BDS resolutions by numerous student governments and academic associations. While having limited practical impact on Israel, these resolutions reflected the successful implementation of a campus influence strategy that contributed to the dominance of Brotherhood-aligned perspectives within academic environments.

5.2.2 Strategic Alignment between BDS and the Brotherhood

Beyond specific organizational connections, the BDS campaign’s overall approach is closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic vision as articulated in “The Project” and the “Explanatory Memorandum.” In many respects, BDS functions as a practical expression of the Brotherhood’s doctrine of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment), embedding ideological objectives within Western institutional, academic, and civil society structures.

The campaign’s methodology mirrors several operational principles outlined in Brotherhood strategy documents. Its emphasis on targeting universities, cultural institutions, and civil society groups rather than governments directly corresponds to the institutional focus outlined in “The Project,” which calls for leveraging “the power to boycott” as a tool of influence. By embedding its campaign within the above-mentioned spaces, BDS followed the Brotherhood’s long-term strategy of shaping societal perceptions from below rather than relying on immediate state-level engagement.

Equally significant is the coalition-building model used by BDS. The movement systematically cultivates partnerships with progressive and leftist organizations, implementing the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation.’” These partnerships enable Islamist-aligned groups to amplify their messaging while presenting themselves as part of a broader human rights movement. The “Red–Green Alliance,” which combines Islamist organizational discipline with the institutional access of progressive groups, reflects the successful operationalization of this directive.

BDS also exemplifies the Brotherhood's principle of *tadarruj* (gradualism). Campaigns frequently begin with symbolic or narrowly focused actions—such as student resolutions or academic petitions—and incrementally expand toward more ambitious goals, such as institutional divestment or academic boycotts. This step-by-step process, long emphasized by Brotherhood ideologues like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, allows radical objectives to be advanced under the guise of incremental reform.

Finally, the movement embodies the Brotherhood's stress on narrative control. By systematically framing Israel as an illegitimate colonial entity that practices apartheid, BDS is implementing the Project's directives on "media policy" and discourse management. The use of terms such as "foreign occupation," "indigenous rights," and "settler-colonialism" reframes the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in progressive terms, rendering Islamist perspectives more accessible to Western audiences.

Taken together, these features demonstrate that BDS operates not simply as an isolated activist initiative but as a vehicle for the strategic replication of Brotherhood doctrines within Western contexts. The alignment of its organizational structures, tactical choices, and narrative strategies with the Brotherhood's blueprints for transforming Western society highlights its role as a practical instrument of Islamist influence within the broader delegitimization campaign against Israel.

5.2.2.1 Alignment with "The Project" and "Explanatory Memorandum"

The BDS campaign's methodology closely parallels approaches outlined in the Brotherhood's strategic documents. This alignment reflects what organizational theorists call "strategic replication"—the practice of reproducing successful methodologies across different operational contexts.

Specific parallels include:

- **Institutional targeting:** BDS focuses on universities, cultural institutions, civil society organizations, and governments, precisely matching the institutional focus in the Brotherhood's documents. This targeting reflects the Project's directive to use the power of boycotts to advance the movement's objectives. By leveraging civil society to target governments indirectly, BDS followed the Brotherhood's established approach to societal transformation through institutional influence.
- **Emphasis on coalitions:** BDS systematically builds alliances with non-Muslim progressive groups, implementing the Memorandum's directive that "there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work," and its emphasis on mastering "the art of 'coalitions,' the art of 'absorption' and the principles of 'cooperation.'" By creating these coalitions, BDS applies the Brotherhood's methodology for gaining influence beyond Muslim communities while advancing specifically Islamist objectives.
- **Graduated tactical approach:** BDS employs an incrementalist strategy, moving from symbolic victories to larger institutional changes, implementing the Brotherhood concept of *tadarruj* (gradualism), as promoted by al-Qaradawi. By adopting this gradualist approach, BDS applied the Brotherhood's methodology for achieving transformative objectives through seemingly modest initial steps.
- **Narrative weaponization:** BDS transforms terminology and conceptual frameworks to delegitimize Israel, implementing the Memorandum's directive to establish comprehensive "media and art organizations" that include "a daily newspaper," "weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines," "radio stations," "television programs," and extensive media infrastructure designed to shape public discourse and advance the strategic goal of

“presenting Islam as a civilization alternative.” By weaponizing the anti-Israel narrative, BDS followed the Brotherhood’s approach of establishing narrative dominance as a foundation for policy influence.

5.2.2.2 The “Red–Green Alliance” in Practice

The BDS movement is a perfect example of the “Red–Green Alliance”—a strategic coalition between Islamist organizations (green) and leftist movements (red). This alliance reflects the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to advance the settlement mission through partnerships with diverse groups that share tactical objectives.

This alliance operates through multiple mechanisms:

- **Terminological adaptation:** BDS portrays what is a fundamentally religious conflict using secular terminology (e.g. colonialism, apartheid, indigenous rights), making it accessible to progressive audiences. This terminological adaptation has transformed the Israeli–Palestinian conflict into a rallying point for an unlikely alliance between secular leftists and religious extremists.
- **Shared opposition:** The “Red–Green” alliance focuses exclusively on shared opposition to Israel while minimizing fundamental disagreements on such issues as women’s rights, gay rights, and religious freedom. By emphasizing common enemies while downplaying contradictory values, Brotherhood-influenced organizations built functional partnerships with progressive movements despite irreconcilable underlying worldviews.
- **Mutual legitimization:** The “Red–Green” alliance provides Islamist organizations with progressive credibility and endows leftist groups with much-coveted multicultural authenticity. By creating this mutually beneficial exchange, Brotherhood-influenced organizations enhanced their standing with progressive audiences while maintaining fundamentally different ideological positions.
- **Operational synergy:** The “Red–Green” alliance combines Islamist organizational capacity with progressive institutional access, utilizing different strengths to enhance overall effectiveness. By leveraging progressive academic and institutional presence while contributing organizational expertise, Brotherhood-influenced organizations achieved greater impact than either movement could accomplish independently.

The effectiveness of this alliance was demonstrated by the rapid adoption of BDS within progressive academic and activist circles, despite the movement’s ideological foundations and strategic objectives receiving minimal examination. This uncritical acceptance reflected the successful implementation of the coalition strategy, which effectively obscured the fundamental contradictions between Islamist and progressive values behind tactical cooperation on specific issues.

5.2.2.3 Infiltration Beyond Specific Issues

While ostensibly focused specifically on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, BDS effectively implemented a broader Brotherhood infiltration strategy across multiple institutional domains, achieving multiple strategic goals through seemingly single-purpose operations.

This broader infiltration strategy operated through several mechanisms:

- **Terminological modification:** BDS systematically altered academic terminology and conceptual frameworks not only with regard to Israel but also concerning other related issues. By successfully modifying academic language and framing, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy of transforming knowledge production systems to suit specific political objectives.
- **Restricting discourse:** BDS campaigns determined which positions on Israel and related issues were considered acceptable within academic and progressive circles, thus deciding which perspectives benefited from institutional tolerance. By establishing these boundaries, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy of controlling permissible discourse within influential institutions.
- **Institutional development:** BDS developed organizational networks and operational methodologies suitable for subsequent mobilization on other issues, creating activation capabilities went beyond its immediate campaign objectives. By building these networks, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy of developing a framework for long-term institutional influence that transcends specific tactical campaigns.
- **Ideological transmission:** BDS created educational programs, training materials, and organizational methodologies that promoted broader ideological frameworks while ostensibly addressing a specific issue. By establishing these transmission mechanisms, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy of developing multigenerational ideological influence frameworks.

5.2.3 Tactical Implementation and Methodology

Beyond strategic alignment, the BDS campaign’s operational methodologies demonstrated consistency with the Brotherhood’s tactical approaches outlined in “The Project” and “Explanatory Memorandum.”

5.2.3.1 Campus Tactics

On university campuses, BDS campaigns followed a consistent operational methodology that aligns closely with the Brotherhood’s tactical approach.

This operational methodology included the following:

- **Graduated escalation:** Campaigns typically began with seemingly modest educational events before progressing to increasingly confrontational actions. By following this escalation sequence, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach of gradually expanding operational intensity while avoiding premature institutional resistance.
- **Targeting institutional pressure points:** Campaigns systematically identified and exploited specific institutional vulnerabilities like diversity policies, speech codes, and administrative sensitivity to controversy. By focusing on these pressure points, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s methodology for maximizing influence from a minority position.
- **Dual-track engagement:** Campaigns operated through official institutional channels (e.g. student government resolutions and academic petitions) while also organizing disruptive direct actions (e.g. protests and building occupations). By pursuing both tracks simultaneously, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s methodology for achieving institutional transformation through multiple complementary vectors.

- **Controlling the discourse:** Campaigns established specific language rules and conceptual frameworks that predetermined debate outcomes by restricting permissible terminology and reference points. By establishing these linguistic boundaries, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach of controlling outcomes through the manipulation of discursive frameworks.

The effectiveness of this operational methodology was demonstrated by the tactical consistency observed across diverse campus contexts nationwide. This consistency was the result of the successful implementation of the Brotherhood’s operational approach of maintaining a coherent method while adapting to specific institutional environments.

5.2.3.2 Narrative Construction and Management

Beyond specific campus tactics, BDS campaigns implemented a sophisticated system of narrative control that aligned closely with the Brotherhood’s approach to discourse management. This narrative approach operationalizes the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” that include “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” and extensive media infrastructure, all designed to shape public discourse and advance the strategic goal of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative.”

This narrative management employed multiple techniques:

- **Terminology inversion:** Traditional terminology was systematically replaced with alternative concepts (“occupation” rather than “dispute,” “apartheid” rather than “security,” “indigenous” rather than “religious claim”). By altering the underlying terminology, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach of controlling the discourse through linguistic transformation.
- **Historical revisionism:** Historical events were systematically presented through selective frameworks that removed any context that contradicted the campaign’s narrative. By manipulating the historical context, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s methodology for establishing narrative dominance through selective historiography.
- **Simplifying the moral framework:** A complex conflict with legitimate perspectives on multiple sides was reduced to a simplistic moral binary between oppressor and oppressed and presented as an existential struggle between good and evil. By establishing this simplistic moral framework, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach of bolstering mobilization through moral absolutism.
- **Evidence manipulation:** Information supporting the campaign narrative was amplified while contradictory evidence was systematically excluded from consideration. This led to the selective processing of information based on compatibility with predetermined conclusions. By controlling the information flow, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s methodology for maintaining narrative control regardless of contradictory evidence.

The effectiveness of this narrative management was demonstrated by the consistency in how the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was presented across diverse academic and activist contexts. This consistency reflected the successful implementation of the Brotherhood’s approach to controlling the discourse, which established conceptual frameworks that determined how issues should be understood regardless of their factual complexities.

5.2.3.3 Opposition Targeting and Neutralization

BDS campaigns employed sophisticated approaches for targeting and neutralizing the opposition that aligned closely with Brotherhood methodologies for managing resistance. This approach implements what strategic theorists call “obstacle neutralization”—the practice of systematically eliminating factors that might impede operational success.

This opposition targeting operated through multiple mechanisms:

- **Reputation bashing:** Individuals opposed to BDS faced systematic attacks on their personal and professional credibility with no regard for the substance of their arguments. By attacking opponents personally rather than substantively, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach of eliminating intellectual resistance through intimidation rather than engagement.
- **Institutional complaints:** Opponents were targeted with formal complaints to universities accusing them of discrimination, jeopardizing their careers regardless of the complaint’s actual merit. By filing such complaints, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s methodology of suppressing opposition through the exploitation of institutional vulnerabilities.
- **Identity-based delegitimization:** Opponents were systematically delegitimized based on their identity (especially in the case of Jewish opponents) rather than the substance of their arguments. By focusing on identity rather than substance, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach of eliminating opposition through delegitimization rather than engagement.
- **Targeted mobilization:** Coalition partners were systematically deployed against specific opponents. By mobilizing diverse coalitions against specific individuals, bodies, and organizations, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s methodology of eliminating resistance through the application of overwhelming distributed pressure.

The effectiveness of this opposition targeting is illustrated by the significant professional and personal costs incurred by faculty and students who publicly opposed BDS campaigns. These consequences reflected the successful implementation of the Brotherhood’s approach to resistance management, which seeks to eliminate opposition through intimidation and institutional manipulation rather than substantive engagement.

5.2.4 Long-term Strategic Outcomes

The BDS movement achieved several critical, long-term strategic objectives that went beyond its primary goals, advancing Brotherhood interests and producing consequential strategic outcomes.

5.2.4.1 Campus Radicalization

Perhaps most significantly, BDS campaigns established an enduring campus infrastructure for ideological radicalization aligned with Brotherhood objectives. This infrastructure development implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” and leverage student networks like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is explicitly listed among the Brotherhood’s organizations, to “expand the observant Muslim base,” “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts,” and advance the “Civilization-Jihadist Process” of settlement through systematic campus activism.

This radicalization infrastructure relies on several factors:

- **Organizational persistence:** SJP chapters established an enduring institutional presence on hundreds of campuses. By establishing these permanent organizations, BDS operationalized the Brotherhood’s strategy for long-term campus influence beyond specific campaigns.
- **Training and leadership:** BDS campaigns developed sophisticated training programs and leadership development pathways, systematically cultivating personnel capabilities for long-term operations. By establishing these development mechanisms, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach to ensuring multigenerational activism through systematic skills transfer.
- **Ideological transmission:** BDS developed educational materials, orientation programs, and mentorship structures designed to systematically transmit comprehensive worldviews beyond specific campaign issues. By establishing these transmission systems, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy for guaranteeing ideological influence across multiple student generations.
- **Activation networks:** Relationships with diverse progressive organizations created enduring mobilization capabilities beyond specific campaigns, establishing activation potential for future deployment. By developing these networks, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach to amplifying influence through strategic alliances.

The effectiveness of this radicalization infrastructure was demonstrated following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, when SJP chapters nationwide immediately mobilized substantial campus support for Hamas despite widespread condemnation elsewhere. This was the result of a long-term infrastructure development strategy that created an enduring capacity for radicalization that transcended specific campaigns or issues.

5.2.4.2 Transformation of the Academic Discourse

Beyond specific campaign outcomes, BDS activities fundamentally transformed the academic discourse regarding Israel, Middle East issues, and related topics. This transformation implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” and “cultural and intellectual organizations” that include “a center for studies and research,” “an organization for Islamic thought and culture,” and “a publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books,” all designed to shape academic discourse and advance the strategic goal of “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative.”

This process operated through multiple mechanisms:

- **Terminological normalization:** Language initially considered extreme (e.g. apartheid and settler-colonialism) gradually became normalized within academic discourse. By normalizing this terminology, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy of controlling the discourse through linguistic transformation.
- **Redefining the conceptual framework:** Interpretive frameworks relating to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict became increasingly restricted to specific narratives aligned with Brotherhood perspectives. By redefining these frameworks, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy of controlling the narrative by restricting interpretive possibilities.
- **Revising educational materials:** Textbooks, course readings, and pedagogical approaches on Middle East issues increasingly reflected narratives aligned with Brotherhood perspectives. By influencing the content and direction of these materials, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy for achieving multigenerational influence through formal educational structures.

The effectiveness of this narrative transformation is demonstrated by the consistency of the messaging on Israeli–Palestinian issues across diverse academic institutions and disciplines. This consistency reflects the successful implementation of the Brotherhood’s strategy of controlling how issues are understood and discussed rather than merely advocating specific positions.

5.2.4.3 Infiltration of Progressive Movements

Beyond their campus impacts, BDS campaigns facilitated an unprecedented level of Brotherhood infiltration of progressive movements and institutions. This infiltration implements the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to advance Brotherhood objectives through partnerships with diverse groups.

The infiltration process operated through multiple mechanisms:

- **Coalition formalization:** Temporary tactical coalitions between Brotherhood-aligned organizations and progressive groups evolved into enduring institutional alliances. By formalizing these relationships, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s strategy for ensuring long-term influence over allied movements beyond specific campaigns.
- **Personnel integration:** Individuals with Brotherhood connections secured positions within progressive organizations through alliance relationships. By placing these individuals in key positions, BDS implemented the Brotherhood’s approach to exerting institutional influence through personnel integration rather than merely relying on external pressure.
- **Narrative transfer:** Progressive organizations increasingly adopted interpretive frameworks concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and related issues that originated with Brotherhood-aligned sources, aligning the worldviews of different ideological communities. By prompting this narrative shift, BDS helped implement the Brotherhood’s strategy of expanding its ideological influence beyond Muslim communities.
- **Priority alignment:** Progressive organizations increasingly treated issues important to Brotherhood-aligned groups as core priorities regardless of their connection to traditional progressive concerns. By encouraging this alignment, BDS helped implement the Brotherhood’s strategy of redirecting external resources toward movement priorities.

5.3 Post–October 7 Mobilization

The Muslim Brotherhood’s decades-long infiltration strategy in Western societies achieved unprecedented operational success following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. What appeared to be a spontaneous response to current events actually represented the activation of pre-established capabilities in the political, legal, institutional, and narrative domains aimed at advancing the Brotherhood’s objectives. This coordinated mobilization of anti-Zionist and antisemitic sentiment was a natural outcome of the Brotherhood’s strategy of *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) for embedding Islamic influence within Western societies, as outlined in the “Explanatory Memorandum.”⁵⁴³

⁵⁴³ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, *U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.*, 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study.

5.3.1 Campus Activation and Coordination

Campus demonstrations following the October 7 attack provided visible proof of the Brotherhood’s successful infiltration of institutions of higher education. These demonstrations were wholly consistent with the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “youth organizations” and leverage student networks like the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which is explicitly listed among the Brotherhood’s organizations, to “expand the observant Muslim base” and “unify and direct Muslims’ efforts” through coordinated campus activism.

5.3.1.1 Organizational Readiness and Response

The campus response to the October 7 attack revealed an organizational readiness that reflected a process of long-term planning rather than a spontaneous outburst of solidarity.

This organizational readiness was evident in multiple areas:

- **Immediate mobilization:** Within hours of the attack, Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and affiliated organizations mobilized substantial demonstrations across dozens of campuses nationwide.⁵⁴⁴ This rapid mobilization was the result of long-term preparation rather than a spontaneous response to events.
- **Messaging consistency:** Campus demonstrations across the United States featured remarkably similar slogans, chants, visual elements, and narratives.⁵⁴⁵ The consistency of the messaging at these demonstrations was strongly indicative of their centralized coordination.
- **Resource preparation:** Demonstrations featured professional-quality materials (e.g. banners, sound equipment, and printed materials) that could not have been produced so quickly without some form of preparation.⁵⁴⁶ The immediate availability of these resources indicated that the organizations involved were ready for this specific contingency.
- **Tactical uniformity:** In a further demonstration of nationwide consistency, demonstrations across diverse campuses also featured similar tactical approaches, escalation patterns, and confrontation strategies.⁵⁴⁷

The effectiveness of this organizational readiness was demonstrated by the scale, immediacy, and consistency of campus responses nationwide. Within days of the attack, substantial demonstrations were underway at dozens of major universities, reflecting the successful implementation of a long-term organizational development strategy that created activation capabilities available for immediate deployment when circumstances provided an appropriate trigger.

5.3.1.2 Explicit Support for Hamas

Unlike previous pro-Palestinian demonstrations that did not endorse designated terrorist organizations, the post–October 7 campus protests frequently featured explicit support for

⁵⁴⁴ Jay Ulfelder, “Crowd Counting Consortium: Update on Israel–Palestine Protests,” blog post, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, November 28, 2023, <https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/crowd-counting-blog-update-on-israel-palestine-protests/>.

⁵⁴⁵ Matt Schwartz, “Police Clear Pro-Palestinian Encampment at Penn,” *New York Times*, May 10, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/10/us/penn-encampment-police.html>.

⁵⁴⁶ Jay Ulfelder, “Crowd Counting Consortium: Update on Israel–Palestine Protests,” blog post, Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, November 28, 2023, <https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/crowd-counting-blog-update-on-israel-palestine-protests/>.

⁵⁴⁷ “Anti-Israel Activism on U.S. Campuses, 2023–2024,” Anti-Defamation League, September 16, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/anti-israel-activism-us-campuses-2023-2024>.

Hamas.⁵⁴⁸ This increased visibility simply revealed the actual objectives that were previously concealed for tactical purposes.

This explicit support manifested in multiple ways:

- **Celebration of terrorism:** Many demonstrations openly celebrated Hamas’s October 7 attack despite its explicit targeting of civilians.⁵⁴⁹ In doing so, the demonstrations revealed their ideological alignment with terrorist objectives rather than a purely humanitarian concern for Palestinians.
- **Organizational symbolism:** Hamas flags, symbols, and slogans appeared prominently across campus demonstrations.⁵⁵⁰ By displaying these symbols, many demonstrations revealed their direct alignment with a terrorist organization in addition to their issue-based activism.
- **Adoption of extremist rhetoric:** Slogans explicitly calling for Israel’s elimination (“from the river to the sea”) were systematic features of demonstrations nationwide⁵⁵¹ and revealed an eliminationist objective beyond specific policy criticism.
- **Veneration of terrorist leaders:** Hamas leaders were frequently portrayed positively in demonstration materials and speeches.⁵⁵²

The significance of this explicit extremism lies in the involuntary revelation of the Brotherhood’s actual terrorist and eliminationist objectives that had been strategically concealed for tactical purposes. After decades of presenting themselves as moderate human rights advocates, the organizations behind these demonstrations revealed an underlying extremist alignment that they had carefully hidden during the infrastructure development phase. This public exposure of previously concealed ideological positions demonstrated the gap between the moderate public messaging these organizations had cultivated and their actual sympathies when confronted with terrorist violence.

5.3.1.3 Mobilization of the “Red–Green” Coalition

The post–October 7 campus demonstrations featured the mobilization of an unprecedented “Red–Green” coalition between Brotherhood-aligned organizations and progressive groups. The activation of this coalition implements the Memorandum’s directive that “there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work,” and its emphasis on mastering “the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’” to advance the settlement mission through tactical partnerships.

⁵⁴⁸ Jack Elbaum, “‘Hamas, We Love You!’ A List of the Chants, Statements from Columbia University’s ‘Gaza Solidarity Encampment,’” *The Algemeiner*, April 22, 2024, <https://www.algemeiner.com/2024/04/22/hamas-we-love-you-list-chants-statements-columbia-universitys-gaza-solidarity-encampment/>.

⁵⁴⁹ “Anti-Israel Activism on U.S. Campuses, 2023–2024,” Anti-Defamation League, September 16, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/anti-israel-activism-us-campuses-2023-2024>.

⁵⁵⁰ “Campus Antisemitism Surges Amid Encampments and Related Protests at Columbia and Other U.S. Colleges,” Anti-Defamation League, April 22, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/campus-antisemitism-surges-amid-encampments-and-related-protests-columbia-and>.

⁵⁵¹ Bryan Pietsch, “How a Palestinian Slogan Has Ignited Debate on College Campuses and Beyond,” *Washington Post*, May 2, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/14/river-sea-free-palestine-meaning/>; “Stop and Think: Anti-Israel Chants and What They Mean,” Anti-Defamation League, November 2, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/stop-and-think-anti-israel-chants-and-what-they-mean>.

⁵⁵² “Students for Justice in Palestine Chapters Celebrate 10/7 Anniversary on Campuses across US with Terror-Glorifying Posts,” Combat Antisemitism Movement, October 8, 2024, <https://combatantisemitism.org/studies-reports/students-for-justice-in-palestine-chapters-celebrate-10-7-anniversary-on-campuses-across-us-with-terror-glorifying-posts/>; “Anti-Israel Protesters Glorify Terror Groups, Violence,” Anti-Defamation League, February 27, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/anti-israel-protesters-glorify-terror-groups-violence>.

The mobilization of the coalition operated through multiple mechanisms:

- **Organization of joint demonstrations:** Brotherhood-aligned organizations, such as SJP, coordinated directly with progressive student groups to organize joint demonstrations, conducting unified activities rather than parallel, independent operations.⁵⁵³ By organizing joint actions, Brotherhood-aligned groups appeared to leverage progressive organizational influence.
- **Shared messaging:** Progressive organizations systematically adopted Brotherhood messaging regarding the conflict.⁵⁵⁴
- **Mutual defense:** Coalition partners systematically defended each other against criticism or administrative consequences.⁵⁵⁵
- **Resource sharing:** Coalition partners provided additional resources (e.g. financial support, meeting spaces, institutional access, and personnel) to enhance the effectiveness of the demonstrations, combining different organizational strengths to enhance their overall impact.⁵⁵⁶ By establishing this resource-sharing arrangement, Brotherhood-aligned groups gained capabilities beyond their independent organizational capacity.

The effectiveness of this coalition was demonstrated by the scale and institutional impact of campus demonstrations nationwide. By mobilizing progressive alliance networks developed through years of BDS activism, Brotherhood-aligned organizations achieved operational capabilities far beyond their independent organizational capacity, reflecting the successful implementation of a long-term coalition development strategy.

5.3.1.4 Institutional Impact and Administrative Response

Campus demonstrations produced measurable institutional outcomes, as evidenced by administrative concessions and policy shifts at several major universities.

This impact manifested in multiple ways:

- **Administrative accommodation:** University administrations frequently offered concessions to demonstrators despite their explicit extremism, creating a form of policy adaptation

⁵⁵³ *Hamás's Influence on U.S. Campuses: A Study of Networks, Strategies, and Ideological Advocacy* (Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2024-11/Pamphlet_compressed.pdf; *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to North American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf; "AMP Seeks to Coordinate Student Anti-Israel Activity," Anti-Defamation League, December 21, 2010, <https://www.adl.org/resources/news/amp-seeks-coordinate-student-anti-israel-activity>; "Anti-Israel Activism on US Campuses, 2022–2023," Anti-Defamation League, September 12, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/anti-israel-activism-us-campuses-2022-2023>.

⁵⁵⁴ "Saudi Journalist: Behind U.S. Student Protests Stands the Muslim Brotherhood, Which Does Not Have the Palestinians' Interests At Heart," Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), June 3, 2024, <https://www.memri.org/reports/saudi-journalist-behind-us-student-protests-stands-muslim-brotherhood-which-does-not-have>.

⁵⁵⁵ "The PFLP Condemns the Repressive Practices of the Administrations of Universities in the United States, and Affirms Its Support for the Struggle of the Student Movement in Support of Palestine," Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Central Media Office, April 25, 2024, <https://pflp.ps/post/24086/the-pflp-condemns-the-repressive-practices-of-the-administrations/>; "Statement in Solidarity with Student Protests for Gaza," MPower Change, n.d., <https://www.mpowerchange.org/gazastudentprotests> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁵⁵⁶ "Students for Justice in Palestine," Anti-Defamation League, last updated August 9, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/students-justice-palestine-sjp>.

based on the avoidance of disruption rather than substantive agreement.⁵⁵⁷ By securing these accommodations, the demonstrations revealed their ability to exert institutional pressure regardless of their normative legitimacy.⁵⁵⁸

- **Uneven regulation of permissible speech:** Some universities enforce different standards for pro-Hamas and pro-Israel expression, applying different rules to similar behaviors based on ideological content.⁵⁵⁹
- **Faculty alignment:** Hundreds of faculty members issued statements in support of demonstrations or in opposition to the university’s attempts to maintain order.⁵⁶⁰ In addition, organized groups such as Faculty & Staff for Justice in Palestine (FJP) emerged to institutionalize this support, providing coordinated faculty backing for student-led campaigns.⁵⁶¹ By mobilizing this faculty support, the demonstrations revealed the existence of multi-level institutional penetration that went beyond mere student activism.

The significance of this institutional impact lies in how administrative decisions were shaped by external pressure rather than through standard governance procedures. The ability of demonstrators to effect substantial policy change through disruptive tactics underscores the degree to which institutions can be influenced by concentrated activist pressure, even when such actions may not align with the broader preferences of the campus community or adhere to established decision-making norms.

5.3.2 Media Strategy and Narrative Control

Beyond campus activism, Brotherhood-aligned networks implemented sophisticated media and narrative strategies following the October 7 attack. This management of the media narrative implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “media and art organizations” that include “a daily newspaper,” “weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines,” “radio stations,” “television programs,” “audio and visual centers,” “a production office,” and “a marketing and art production office,” all designed to shape public discourse and advance the strategic goals of “adopting Muslims’ causes domestically and globally” and “presenting Islam as a civilization alternative.”

5.3.2.1 Immediate Narrative Framing

Within hours of the Hamas attack, Brotherhood-aligned organizations and media platforms implemented a coordinated narrative strategy. This immediate framing shaped how events were

⁵⁵⁷ Alex Parker, “Student Protesters Are Demanding Universities Divest from Israel,” *CNN Business*, April 30, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/30/business/what-is-divestment-college-protests-israel>; Rachel Treisman, “What We Can Learn from 4 Schools That Have Reached Agreements with Gaza Protesters,” *NPR*, May 7, 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/05/07/1249368151/gaza-college-protest-deal-brown-rutgers>.

⁵⁵⁸ Vimal Patel, “Protesters Agreed to Leave. This Is What Some Colleges Promised in Return,” *New York Times*, May 17, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/17/us/campus-protests-agreements-divestment-israel.html>.

⁵⁵⁹ Andrew Lapin, “Universities Take Action against Pro-Israel Faculty for ‘Inflammatory’ Speech about Israel-Hamas War,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, December 1, 2023, <https://www.jta.org/2023/12/01/united-states/universities-take-action-against-pro-israel-faculty-for-inflammatory-speech-about-israel-hamas-war>.

⁵⁶⁰ “Letter from UC San Diego Faculty to the Students of the Gaza Solidarity Encampment,” *UCSD Guardian*, June 4, 2024, <https://ucsdguardian.org/2024/06/04/letter-from-uc-san-diego-faculty-to-the-students-of-the-gaza-solidarity-encampment/>; Claire Fagin, “165 UT Faculty Sign Letter to Hartzell, Condemn University’s Response to Pro-Palestine Protest,” *Daily Texan*, April 26, 2024, <https://thedailytexan.com/2024/04/26/165-ut-faculty-sign-letter-to-hartzell-condemn-universitys-response-to-pro-palestine-protest/>; Alexia Brown, “Faculty Join Students in Palestine Divestment Protests,” *Prism*, June 3, 2024, <https://prismreports.org/2024/06/03/faculty-join-students-palestine-divestment-protests/>.

⁵⁶¹ “Principles of Unity,” Faculty & Staff for Justice in Palestine Network, n.d., <https://www.fjp-network.org/about-us> (accessed November 11, 2025).

understood before alternative interpretations could gain traction, allowing one perspective to dominate the public discourse in the critical early stages of response.⁵⁶²

This narrative framing employed several key elements:

- **Context inversion:** The attack was presented as a Palestinian response to Israeli oppression rather than an act of unprovoked terrorism, altering the chronology to shift responsibility.⁵⁶³ By positioning the attack as a response rather than a trigger, the Brotherhood’s discourse transferred moral responsibility from Hamas to Israel regardless of the true sequence of events.
- **Terminological manipulation:** By using calculated language choices to whitewash morally egregious actions (e.g. “resistance” rather than “terrorism,” “operations” rather than “massacres,” “settlers” rather than “civilians”),⁵⁶⁴ the Brotherhood’s discourse shaped moral perceptions in advance, directing judgment away from the severity of the events themselves.
- **Historical decontextualization:** The attack was presented without reference to Hamas’s long-declared objective of destroying Israel,⁵⁶⁵ thereby removing it from the broader historical and ideological context necessary for fully understanding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. By omitting Hamas’s explicitly genocidal goals, the Brotherhood’s discourse framed the event as a standalone occurrence rather than as part of a sustained, long-term strategy.

The effectiveness of this immediate framing was evident in the way that mainstream media quickly adopted key elements of the narrative, even when they were factually inaccurate. This outcome reflected the success of a long-standing effort to build communication networks capable of shaping the public interpretation of events, allowing certain perspectives to dominate regardless of the underlying facts.

5.3.2.2 Social Media Coordination and Amplification

Brotherhood-aligned networks deployed a coordinated social media strategy to promote their preferred narratives while actively minimizing or discrediting opposing viewpoints. This approach enabled them to shape the online information environment in their favor, utilizing timing, repetition, and platform coordination to influence how broad audiences perceived events.

This social media strategy employed multiple techniques:

- **Coordinated distribution networks:** Informal networks of aligned social media accounts systematically promoted content supporting Brotherhood narratives while discrediting opposing views. By coordinating the activity of multiple independent profiles, these

⁵⁶² Princewilliams Odera Oguejiofor, “The Role of Social Media in Shaping Narratives and Perceptions in the Israeli–Gaza Conflict That Escalated on October 2023,” *International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research* 8, no. 4 (April 2024): 74–82, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380734520_The_Role_of_Social_Media_in_Shaping_Narratives_and_Perceptions_in_the_Israeli-Gaza_Conflict_that_Escalated_on_October_2023.

⁵⁶³ Tom Sharon, “The Arab Media Discourse Following the October 7 Attacks,” Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, May 16, 2024, <https://dayan.org/content/arab-media-discourse-following-october-7-attacks?utm>.

⁵⁶⁴ Bernard Harrison, “How the Media Promote Antisemitism: Reality versus Narrative,” ISCA Research Paper 2024-4 (Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism, Indiana University Bloomington, October 2024), 29, <https://isca.indiana.edu/publication-research/research-paper-series/bernard-harrison-research-paper.html>.

⁵⁶⁵ “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas],” August 18, 1988, available online at the Avalon Project, Yale Law School, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

networks created the illusion of widespread support, enabling their messages to reach larger audiences and exert more influence than their actual size would typically allow.

- **Platform-specific content strategies:** Brotherhood-aligned messaging was carefully adapted to the strengths of different social media platforms—short-form videos on TikTok, visually striking infographics on Instagram, and threaded arguments on Twitter—to maximize reach and user engagement. By tailoring content to fit each platform’s format and algorithmic preferences, these campaigns significantly increased visibility and user interaction.
- **Use of influencers for narrative dissemination:** Social media personalities with large followings appeared to be strategically engaged to spread Brotherhood-aligned messaging to targeted audiences.⁵⁶⁶ By delivering content through individuals perceived as authentic or relatable, these campaigns extended their influence on demographics that might otherwise dismiss ideologically explicit material. This method increased message credibility and softened public perception of the source.

The effectiveness of this social media strategy was evident in the overwhelming dominance of pro-Hamas content across major platforms, despite the fact that actual public support for Hamas terrorism remains limited. This disparity highlighted the success of carefully orchestrated influence operations designed to create the appearance of widespread support. Rather than reflecting genuine public sentiment, the online environment was shaped to project a distorted narrative that aligned with strategic objectives.

5.3.2.3 Deployment of Aligned Sources and Content

As mentioned previously—Brotherhood-aligned networks have strategically developed and positioned media-ready “expert sources” to shape mainstream coverage of conflicts involving Islamist actors. By controlling who is recognized as a legitimate commentator, these networks have influenced how events are interpreted and which narratives gain credibility in public discourse.

This strategy operated through multiple mechanisms:

- **Foregrounding supportive scholars:** Scholars with a known ideological alignment to Brotherhood perspectives were prominently featured as expert commentators in mainstream outlets. By elevating these academics, the networks influenced public understanding of complex geopolitical events and framed Islamist narratives as authoritative, often sidelining alternative scholarly interpretations.
- **Mainstreaming Brotherhood spokespersons:** Representatives from Brotherhood-linked advocacy organizations were repeatedly presented as spokespersons for the broader Muslim community. This created the impression that their views represented the consensus position of American or global Muslims, despite significant diversity of opinion within these populations.
- **Exploiting identity-based credibility:** Media coverage frequently highlighted individuals whose identities conferred added moral weight to their messages, such as Jewish anti-Zionists or former Israeli soldiers critical of Israel. These figures were used to endorse narratives aligned with Brotherhood positions, lending them perceived credibility and cross-community legitimacy.

⁵⁶⁶ Michael Barak, “The War on Public Consciousness: Social Media as a Tool of Influence by Supporters of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” BeeHive Bulletin, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, March 28, 2022, <https://dayan.org/content/war-public-consciousness-social-media-tool-influence-supporters-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood>.

- **Providing alternative media content:** Brotherhood-aligned platforms produced well-packaged content, such as interviews, op-eds, and reports, that mainstream outlets adopted when seeking “alternative perspectives.” By supplying ready-made material, these networks indirectly shaped broader media narratives without the need for direct editorial control.

The effectiveness of this deployment strategy was reflected in the uniformity of coverage across a range of media outlets, many of which echoed Brotherhood-aligned interpretations despite the complexity of the facts and the existence of multiple legitimate viewpoints. This narrative coherence demonstrated the impact of long-term investments in the cultivation of credible experts and strategic media engagement.

5.3.2.4 Narrative Evolution and Adaptation

As the conflict progressed, Brotherhood-aligned networks demonstrated a high level of narrative agility, adjusting their messaging to new developments while maintaining core ideological objectives. This ability to adapt in real time allowed the networks to preserve strategic coherence even as facts on the ground changed or challenged their framing.

This adaptive strategy employed several techniques:

- **Denial and minimization of atrocities:** Reports and visual evidence of atrocities committed by Hamas were routinely denied, downplayed, or reframed as natural reactions to long-standing oppression. Rather than engaging with the substance of the evidence, these responses focused on discrediting sources, alleging bias, or asserting moral equivalence. This tactic delayed or obstructed public moral clarity regarding Hamas’s actions, regardless of the strength or credibility of the documentation.
- **Manipulation of casualty figures:** Palestinian casualty figures were often presented without critical scrutiny, while the role of Hamas in endangering civilians, through tactics like using human shields or launching attacks from densely populated areas, was minimized or omitted entirely.⁵⁶⁷ The resulting messaging evoked emotional outrage toward Israel while obscuring the operational causes of the casualties, fostering a distorted moral narrative detached from battlefield realities.
- **Promotion of unverified claims:** False or highly questionable allegations—such as intentional Israeli attacks on hospitals or the deliberate targeting of civilians—were widely circulated, often before any verification had taken place.⁵⁶⁸ These claims persisted even after they were contradicted by independent investigations or evidence. By repeatedly promoting such narratives, Brotherhood-aligned messaging constructed a parallel information space that resisted correction or factual revision.
- **Framing of exclusive victimhood:** The messaging consistently portrayed Palestinians as the sole legitimate victims of the conflict, ignoring or excusing Hamas’s intentional targeting of Israeli civilians.⁵⁶⁹ This selective application of moral concern positioned one group as inherently innocent, thereby eliminating the possibility of balanced ethical analysis. Civilian

⁵⁶⁷ Andrew Fox, *Questionable Counting: Analysing the Death Toll from the Hamas-Run Ministry of Health in Gaza* (Henry Jackson Society, December 2024), <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/HJS-Questionable-Counting-%E2%80%93-Hamas-Report-web.pdf>.

⁵⁶⁸ David Gilbert, “Who’s Responsible for the Gaza Hospital Explosion? Here’s Why It’s Hard to Know What’s Real,” *Wired*, October 18, 2023, <https://www.wired.com/story/al-ahli-baptist-hospital-explosion-disinformation-osint/>.

⁵⁶⁹ Merissa Khurma, “A Year of War Since October 7: On Narrative and Dehumanization in Arab and Israeli Societies,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 8, 2024, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/year-war-october-7-narrative-and-dehumanization-arab-and-israeli-societies>.

suffering on the Israeli side was rarely acknowledged or was framed as an unfortunate but understandable consequence of resistance.

The effectiveness of this adaptive messaging strategy was evident in its widespread adoption across the public discourse, despite the presence of credible, contradictory evidence. The persistence of these narratives demonstrated the success of a long-term influence campaign capable of maintaining emotional and ideological traction regardless of evolving facts or objective challenges.

5.3.3 Political and Policy Impact

Beyond influencing the media, Brotherhood-aligned networks had a significant political and policy impact following the October 7 attack. This policy influence implements the Memorandum's directive to obtain "the keys and the tools" necessary to carry out the "grand mission as a Civilization Jihadist responsibility," and its call to establish comprehensive "political organizations" that include "a central political party," "local political offices," "political symbols," "relationships and alliances," and "the American Organization for Islamic Political Action," all designed to advance the strategic goal of "adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally."

5.3.3.1 Influencing the US Administration's Response

Brotherhood-aligned organizations implemented a coordinated strategy to influence the Biden administration's response to the Israel–Hamas conflict. Rather than relying on formal authority, this influence campaign used strategic pressure, coalition building, and media amplification to shape policy decisions and public messaging.

This strategy operated across multiple channels:

- **Direct engagement with policymakers:** Islamist organizations secured meetings with administration officials, providing platforms to advocate for perspectives aligned with Brotherhood narratives. These consultations granted them rare access to decision-making circles and allowed them to present policy recommendations directly, regardless of their formal representational status within the broader Muslim-American community.⁵⁷⁰
- **Electoral pressure in swing states:** These same organizations and their allies publicly warned of potential electoral consequences if the administration failed to shift its position on Gaza. In key swing states with sizable Muslim populations, such as Michigan, community leaders threatened to withhold political support in future elections. This tactic created immediate political incentives for policy adjustments, irrespective of broader national polling or strategic imperatives.⁵⁷¹
- **Media-based pressure campaigns:** Brotherhood-aligned media outlets and social media influencers launched targeted campaigns highlighting administration actions that contradicted their positions. These efforts concentrated public criticism on selected decisions, increasing the political cost of continued support for Israel and encouraging a recalibration of (then) US messaging and aid commitments.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷⁰ Peter Nicholas, "With No Fanfare or Acknowledgment, Biden Hosts White House Meeting with Muslim Leaders," *NBC News*, October 27, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-hosts-meeting-muslim-leaders-rcna122433>.

⁵⁷¹ By Alex Seitz-Wald, Shaquille Brewster, and Kailani Koenig, "'I Will Never Vote Biden': Some Muslim Americans in a Key Swing State Feel Betrayed by the President," *NBC News*, October 21, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/muslim-arab-americans-rage-biden-michigan-israel-gaza-rcna121513>.

⁵⁷² Avishai Karo, "Documentary Evidence of Hamas–Al Jazeera Relations and Cooperation," Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, October 19, 2025, <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/documentary-evidence-of-hamas-al-jazeera-relations-and-cooperation/>.

- **Mobilization of progressive coalitions:** By working with progressive political allies and activist networks, Brotherhood-aligned groups amplified their influence through joint public statements, congressional pressure, and coordinated media appearances. This dual-pronged approach—activating both faith-based and ideological networks—ensured that demands on the administration came from multiple, seemingly distinct directions.⁵⁷³

The impact of this multi-layered strategy became evident in the administration’s gradual shift in tone and policy. Changes included greater emphasis on humanitarian concerns, delays in weapons transfers, and public statements urging Israeli restraint. These developments illustrate how organized pressure from a relatively small but strategically coordinated bloc can shape high-level policy, even in the absence of majority public support.

5.3.3.2 Legal and Regulatory Leverage

Brotherhood-aligned legal organizations implemented a comprehensive strategy to leverage legal and regulatory systems following the October 7 attack. This legal approach implements the Memorandum’s directive to establish comprehensive “legal organizations” that include a “Central Jurisprudence Council,” a “Central Islamic Court,” a “Muslim Attorneys Society,” and the “Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims’ Rights,” as well as its call to adopt “a written ‘jurisprudence’ that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.”

This leverage operated through multiple channels:

- **Strategic use of discrimination complaints:** Organizations filed numerous complaints alleging anti-Muslim discrimination, often in response to campus or workplace incidents. Simultaneously, many of these same groups actively opposed expanded protections for Jewish students, particularly around antisemitism related to anti-Zionist activism. This dual approach allowed them to present themselves as civil rights defenders while undermining similar protections for other groups, resulting in uneven application of anti-discrimination principles.
- **Selective free speech advocacy:** Free speech protections were invoked to defend extremist or pro-Hamas expression, even in cases involving calls for violence or antisemitic rhetoric. However, when pro-Israel speakers or events faced disruption or censorship, these organizations often remained silent or, in some cases, justified the silencing. This selective defense of free speech revealed an ideologically driven approach to First Amendment principles rather than a consistent commitment to viewpoint neutrality.
- **Manipulation of administrative complaint mechanisms:** Existing administrative procedures—particularly those involving education and civil rights enforcement—were systematically used to file complaints and initiate investigations, regardless of whether there was a strong factual basis. The sheer volume of procedural complaints often imposed a significant burden on institutions, creating pressure to settle, revise policies, or concede to avoid reputational or legal risk. This strategy effectively turned regulatory processes into instruments of ideological influence.
- **Uneven deployment of legal support:** While pro-Hamas demonstrators received extensive legal assistance from affiliated organizations, victims of harassment or intimidation by those

⁵⁷³ “Interfaith Leaders Join Call for Ceasefire in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Friends Committee on National Legislation, December 11, 2023, <https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2023-10/interfaith-leaders-join-call-ceasefire-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territory>.

same demonstrators—particularly Jewish or Israeli students—were often left without similar institutional backing. This unequal allocation of legal resources influenced the practical enforcement of rights, resulting in disparities in protection that were based not on legal principle but on ideological alignment.

The effectiveness of this legal strategy was evident in how institutions responded differently to comparable incidents relating to speech or protest depending on the viewpoint involved. These disparities reflect a calculated effort to manipulate legal and procedural frameworks in ways that advanced a specific ideological agenda not through formal legal reform but through sustained pressure and selective application of rights.

5.3.4 Long-term Strategic Outcomes

The post–October 7 mobilization should not be understood as an isolated political reaction to events in the Middle East. It represented a significant moment of strategic consolidation for Brotherhood-linked networks operating in Western countries. Beyond shaping immediate policy debates, this mobilization functioned as an exercise in what may be described as “tool kit testing and boundary checking.” Through coordinated campaigns across the political, civil society, and media arenas, Brotherhood-aligned actors effectively stress-tested their capacity to shift discourse, mobilize sympathetic constituencies, and pressure decision-makers without incurring prohibitive backlash.

This dynamic offered a rare opportunity to measure progress within the Brotherhood’s long-term project. As articulated in the “Explanatory Memorandum,” the movement’s vision of “civilizational jihad” is framed not as a single event but as a century-long process of embedding Islamist influence in Western societies. The post–October 7 activism can therefore be seen as a strategic test run. It served as a rehearsal for how well existing infrastructures of advocacy, lobbying, and public mobilization could be deployed in real time during a period of heightened geopolitical crisis.

The mobilization revealed several important insights. First, it exposed the extent to which Western political systems, particularly in the United States and parts of Europe, are permeable to organized and ideologically driven pressure campaigns that present themselves under the banners of civil rights, humanitarianism, or anti colonial solidarity. Second, it demonstrated the institutional footholds already achieved by Brotherhood-aligned organizations, from congressional caucus relationships to partnerships with mainstream nongovernmental organizations, enabling them to influence debates beyond their actual demographic base. Third, the mobilization highlighted societal vulnerabilities, as universities, city councils, and cultural platforms became arenas where anti-Israel narratives could be mainstreamed with relatively little resistance.

In this sense, October 7 provided an unintended but invaluable calibration point for Islamist strategists. It offered a chance to evaluate how far their networks had penetrated Western institutions, how effective their narratives proved in shifting public opinion, and where the red lines of state and societal tolerance might lie. Viewed this way, the mobilization was not only about defending Hamas or condemning Israel; it was also a deliberate step in a longer trajectory. It marked a phase transition that assessed Western society’s readiness to move closer toward the Brotherhood’s envisioned end state.

These developments illustrate how the Brotherhood adapts to crisis moments in order to accelerate long-term goals. By embedding its ideological project within the infrastructures of democracy, civil society, and advocacy, the Brotherhood transforms moments of acute geopolitical conflict into laboratories for advancing its century-long mission. The post–October 7 mobilization should therefore be viewed not only as a manufactured outburst of protest but also as a systematic trial run. It was designed to test capacities, expose weaknesses, and prepare the ground for the next stage of its strategic continuum.

5.3.4.1 Normalization of Extremist Positions

The period following the October 7 attacks witnessed the mainstreaming of rhetoric and positions that had previously been confined to the political margins. What was once considered radical or unacceptable in Western discourse gained public legitimacy and institutional tolerance through sustained mobilization and coordinated messaging campaigns. This shift marked a substantial redefinition of the boundaries of permissible speech and moral evaluation.

This normalization was advanced through several mutually reinforcing mechanisms:

- **Mainstreaming of eliminationist slogans:** Phrases such as “from the river to the sea,” long understood as calls for the eradication of the world’s only Jewish state began to appear prominently in protests, media coverage, and even institutional statements. Despite their eliminationist implications, these slogans were increasingly tolerated or defended under the banner of free expression or anti-colonial resistance. As a result, rhetoric once associated with extremist activism became part of everyday public and institutional discourse.
- **Justification of violence against civilians:** Acts of terrorism targeting Israeli civilians were rebranded in many quarters as legitimate “resistance,” with the moral weight of the term shifted from condemnation to justification. This reframing transformed indiscriminate violence into something to be explained or even praised, fundamentally altering how Western audiences assessed actions previously recognized as terrorism.
- **Adoption of extremist positions by academic institutions:** Following the attacks, numerous academic departments and faculty associations released statements that echoed radical talking points or downplayed the role of terrorist actors. This institutional endorsement lent scholarly authority to narratives that had been previously considered outside the bounds of legitimate academic debate, despite lacking empirical grounding or methodological rigor.
- **Transformation of media representation:** Media platforms that had once treated pro-terror narratives as fringe positions began to present such views as part of a legitimate spectrum of opinion. Spokespersons and commentators who expressed sympathy for or justification of violence received airtime alongside mainstream analysts, creating a false sense of moral equivalence between advocacy for terror and its condemnation.

The long-term impact of these developments lies in the restructuring of the speech environment itself. Positions once clearly outside acceptable discourse now operate within the bounds of institutional legitimacy, shaping future debates not only on the Middle East but on the very standards of moral and political reasoning within democratic societies.

5.3.4.2 Institutional Boundary Enforcement Mechanisms

In the aftermath of October 7, the mobilization of Brotherhood-aligned networks contributed not only to narrative shaping but also to the entrenchment of enforcement mechanisms within academic and institutional settings. These mechanisms served to discipline dissent, reward ideological conformity, and establish durable frameworks that extend far beyond the immediate crisis.

This consolidation was influenced by several key factors:

- **Professional consequences for dissenting faculty:** University faculty who expressed opposition to Brotherhood-aligned narratives or challenged the dominant campus discourse concerning the conflict faced tangible professional repercussions. These included public denunciation, social ostracization, investigation, or exclusion from academic panels and

internal committees. Such outcomes created strong disincentives for open intellectual disagreement and encouraged faculty to self-censor or align with prevailing ideological expectations, regardless of scholarly evidence or rigor.

- **Delegitimization through identity-based accusations:** Criticism of pro-Hamas or Brotherhood-aligned messaging was frequently dismissed or condemned on the grounds of Islamophobia, racism, or cultural insensitivity. This approach transformed ideological positions into identity-protected categories, effectively shielding them from substantive criticism. As a result, individuals seeking to engage critically with these ideas often found themselves accused of bias rather than being challenged on the merits of their argument.
- **Establishment of administrative precedents:** In responding to protests, complaints, and public pressure, university administrations adopted a range of policies and procedures that have since become precedents. These included changes to event approval processes, speech guidelines, and bias response protocols. Though initially reactive, these administrative actions have shaped future governance decisions, locking institutions into patterns of response that will influence campus policy even as their leadership changes.
- **Uneven reputational risks for content regulation:** Institutions that restricted or condemned pro-Israel expression often faced little backlash from media or activist communities, while those perceived as suppressing pro-Palestinian or pro-Hamas messaging were quickly subjected to reputational attacks. This asymmetry created a powerful incentive for administrators to tolerate or excuse one form of expression while disciplining the other, based not on content neutrality but on the anticipated public response.

Taken together, these formal and informal enforcement mechanisms have laid the groundwork for long-term changes in how influential institutions, particularly within higher education, respond to ideological conflict. The systems and incentives established in the post–October 7 period are likely to persist, shaping intellectual and political boundaries well beyond the current conflict.

5.3.4.3 Coalition Infrastructure Development

The mobilization following the October 7 attacks significantly expanded the cooperative infrastructure linking Brotherhood-aligned organizations with progressive movements in the United States. What had in many cases been informal or issue-specific collaboration evolved into more structured, ongoing alliances. This development reflects long-standing strategic objectives in Brotherhood planning documents, which emphasize coalition building, even if temporary, as a key instrument for advancing broader ideological goals.

The growth of this alliance infrastructure was visible across several key dimensions:

- **Formalization of organizational partnerships:** Ad hoc coordination between Islamist-aligned and progressive organizations matured into consistent working relationships. One example of this is a joint statement from CAIR, Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) condemning attacks on Palestinian “human rights defenders.” This collaboration reflects institutional alignment beyond a single protest or moment.⁵⁷⁴ In another instance, the Los Angeles branch of CAIR partnered with MPAC, JVP Action, and other organizations to stage a press conference demanding accountability from UCLA over

⁵⁷⁴ CAIR–San Francisco Bay Area, “CAIR, JVP, and National SJP Issue Joint Statement Responding to ADL’s Attack on Groups Supporting Palestinian Human Rights,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations–California, May 25, 2022, <https://ca.cair.com/press-release/cair-jvp-and-national-sjp-issue-joint-statement-responding-to-adls-attack-on-groups-supporting-palestinian-human-rights/>.

alleged assaults on pro-Palestinian protesters.⁵⁷⁵ On many campuses, SJP chapters have routinely co-organized with IfNotNow, Democratic Socialists of America, and other progressive student bodies, demonstrating a shift from past episodic alliances to regular joint organizing.

- **Shared operational resources:** As these partnerships deepened, coalition partners began pooling material, logistical, and legal resources. In the context of campus encampments, such as UCLA’s Palestine Solidarity Encampment, protest infrastructure—such as tents, sound equipment, media coordination, and legal defense teams—was jointly provided by overlapping Brotherhood-aligned and progressive actors.⁵⁷⁶ Examples of legal coordination are particularly telling. Palestine Legal and CAIR have jointly litigated cases defending SJP chapters against university sanctions and censorship.⁵⁷⁷ For example, in 2025, Palestine Legal and CAIR secured a \$100,000 settlement from the University of Maryland for unlawfully suppressing student speech in a pro-Gaza vigil co-hosted by SJP and JVP.⁵⁷⁸ Similarly, departments of the National Lawyers Guild have sometimes worked alongside CAIR or progressive legal groups to defend students under threat of disciplinary or legal action.⁵⁷⁹
- **Coordinated communications, messaging, and mutual protection:** The alliance infrastructure also facilitated synchronized narrative strategies. Protest slogans and calls to action such as “Ceasefire Now” or “Free Palestine” often appeared simultaneously in protests organized by different groups, suggesting shared messaging frameworks. The 2024 March on Washington for Gaza, which was co-organized by the American Muslim Task Force for Palestine and CAIR, signaled the convergence of advocacy and broader activist coalitions.⁵⁸⁰ When campus authorities or university administrations threatened disciplinary measures against pro-Palestine student groups, CAIR, JVP, and allied organizations sometimes issued joint statements defending those students and reframing the controversy as the suppression of free speech or Islamophobia.⁵⁸¹ These public defenses add a layer of reputational and political protection to grassroots actors.

The long-term significance of these developments lies in the creation of durable systems that will persist beyond the immediate conflict. The operational infrastructure built during the post-October 7 mobilization now exists as a ready-made platform for future political campaigns and crisis responses. These alliances and systems are no longer contingent on a single event. They now form part of a sustained and integrated movement architecture that can be activated as needed in future political, academic, or media contexts.

⁵⁷⁵ CAIR–Los Angeles, “CAIR–LA, Partners Demand Accountability for Assault on UCLA Pro-Palestinian Protesters,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations–California, April 25, 2025, <https://ca.cair.com/press-release/cair-la-partners-demand-accountability-for-assault-on-ucla-pro-palestinian-protesters-and-end-to-crackdown-on-student-speech/>.

⁵⁷⁶ “UCLA Campus Protests,” UCLA Alumni Association, n.d., <https://alumni.ucla.edu/campus-protests/> (accessed November 11, 2025).

⁵⁷⁷ *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to North American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf.

⁵⁷⁸ “Palestine Legal, CAIR Announce Historic \$100K Settlement from U of Maryland for Unlawfully Suppressing Pro-Palestinian Student Speech,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations, August 6, 2025, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/palestine-legal-cair-announce-historic-100k-settlement-from-u-of-maryland-for-unlawfully-suppressing-pro-palestinian-student-speech/.

⁵⁷⁹ *National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP): Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to North American Universities* (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, 2024), https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf.

⁵⁸⁰ March on Washington for Gaza, <https://march4gaza.org/>.

⁵⁸¹ “CAIR Joins 500 Groups in Condemning Political Violence, Opposing Threats to Free Speech and Non-Profit Organizations,” press release, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), September 23, 2025, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-joins-500-groups-in-condemning-political-violence-opposing-threats-to-free-speech-and-non-profit-organizations/.

5.3.4.4 Neutralization of Institutional Defense Mechanisms

The mobilization that followed the October 7 attacks effectively dismantled several key protections within Western institutions that were originally designed to limit the spread of extremist ideologies. Through coordinated pressure, strategic reinterpretation of principles, and the exploitation of legal frameworks, this campaign weakened the ability of institutions—particularly in academia—to resist ideological infiltration.

This breakdown of institutional safeguards occurred through multiple channels:

- **Redefining academic freedom:** Traditional protections for academic freedom were reinterpreted to shield extremist rhetoric while curbing the ability to criticize it. In effect, principles meant to encourage open debate were used selectively to silence dissenting voices and protect radical narratives. This shift compromised institutions’ capacity to ensure viewpoint diversity while maintaining reasonable limits on extremist messaging.
- **Misuse of anti-discrimination policies:** Legal and procedural frameworks originally created to protect marginalized groups were used to insulate extremist ideas from scrutiny. By framing ideological criticism as discrimination, activists were able to stifle opposition and suppress critical engagement. Institutions found themselves using their own civil rights procedures to protect harmful rhetoric and actors from legitimate accountability.
- **Administrative intimidation of leadership:** University leaders who sought to uphold institutional integrity and resist extremist pressure faced sustained public and internal intimidation. Administrators were often subject to campaigns designed to discredit, isolate, or force resignation, limiting their ability to exercise leadership and enforce standards. The result was a chilling effect that weakened governance and invited more radical demands.
- **Undermining campus security functions:** Efforts to restrict the ability of campus security and law enforcement to manage disruptions associated with extremist protests further reduced institutional resilience. Security personnel were criticized, restricted, or de-authorized, even when dealing with behavior that posed a clear threat to safety or public order. These developments left campuses more vulnerable to future unrest and less equipped to respond effectively.

The long-term impact of these developments is the creation of lasting institutional weaknesses. Even after the immediate wave of mobilization passes, the procedural, administrative, and cultural damage will remain. Without structural reform, these vulnerabilities will persist, leaving institutions exposed to continued ideological pressure and limiting their ability to enforce neutral standards of conduct, scholarship, and safety.

5.3.5 Case Study: The Columbia University Encampment

The post–October 7 encampment at Columbia University provides a particularly clear demonstration of the implementation of Brotherhood strategy across multiple operational domains. The following case study illuminates how decades of systematic infiltration enabled effective institutional capture during critical moments.⁵⁸²

⁵⁸² Lara-Nour Walton, “Inside the Gaza Solidarity Encampment at Columbia University,” *The Nation*, April 19, 2024, <https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/columbia-university-gaza-solidarity-encampment-cuad-palestine-protest/>.

5.3.5.1 Organizational Preparation and Execution

The Columbia encampment demonstrated sophisticated organizational capabilities reflecting long-term preparation rather than a spontaneous protest. This is an example of what operational theorists call “prepared contingency activation”—the practice of executing pre-planned operations in response to triggering events.

This preparation was evident in multiple areas:

- **Rapid deployment capability:** Within days of the October 7 attack, organizers established a substantial encampment with sophisticated logistics, implementing what mobilization theorists call “ready-reserve activation”—the act of immediately deploying pre-established operational resources. By establishing this capability, organizers demonstrated advanced preparation rather than a spontaneous response.
- **Tactical sophistication:** The encampment demonstrated advanced tactical understanding of positioning, resource management, and security operations, implementing what operational theorists call “professional-grade execution”—the use of methodologies that are beyond the capability of typical student protests. By demonstrating this sophistication, organizers revealed that their training and preparation exceeded that of everyday student activism.
- **Operational persistence:** Despite significant administrative pressure, the encampment operated continuously for an extended period, implementing what operational theorists call “sustained operational capability”—the ability to maintain functionality despite external pressure. By demonstrating this persistence, organizers revealed a logistical depth and organizational resilience that went beyond ad hoc protests.
- **Strategic adaptation:** The encampment’s leadership demonstrated a sophisticated response to evolving circumstances, implementing what tactical theorists call “dynamic operational adjustment”—the practice of modifying approaches based on environmental changes while maintaining strategic objectives. By demonstrating such adaptation, organizers revealed a command structure and situational awareness that extended beyond spontaneous activism.

The effectiveness of this organizational capability was demonstrated by the encampment’s ability to maintain operations despite administrative opposition and eventually secure substantial concessions. This effectiveness reflected the successful implementation of long-term organizational development that created sophisticated operational capabilities available for deployment during critical moments.

5.3.5.2 Narrative Control

The Columbia encampment employed sophisticated narrative management strategies that shaped the public’s understanding of the protest, despite the contradictory reality. This narrative control implements the Project’s directive regarding “media policy that will allow us to communicate with public opinion and contribute to changing it.”

This implementation operated through multiple techniques:

Victimhood narrative centralization: Despite physically occupying campus buildings and disrupting university operations, encampment presented itself as a vulnerable victim of oppression, implementing what narrative theorists call “power inversion framing”—presenting power wielders as victims regardless of actual power dynamics. By establishing this framing, the encampment

shifted moral assessment from objective behavior to subjective narrative, irrespective of the factual circumstances.

Terminology management: Encampment systematically employs strategic language choices (“apartheid” rather than “conflict,” “resistance” rather than “terrorism,” “decolonization” rather than “political demand”), implementing what linguistic theorists call a “conceptual preset”—establishing terminology that predetermines conceptual understanding. By controlling language, encampment shaped how events were understood, regardless of objective reality.

Extremism concealment: Encampment leadership carefully managed public visibility of explicitly extremist elements, implementing what strategic theorists call “radical flank management”—controlling which ideological components receive public exposure. By managing this visibility, the encampment presented a moderate public face while maintaining an extremist operational core, regardless of its actual composition.

Media engagement selectivity: The encampment systematically controlled which journalists received access and information, implementing what media theorists call “narrative partner selection”—engaging exclusively with outlets likely to present favorable coverage. By managing this access, encampment shaped public representation despite the operational reality that might have produced different coverage under neutral observation.

The effectiveness of this narrative control was demonstrated by a remarkable discrepancy between the encampment’s public representation and documented operational reality. Despite substantial evidence of antisemitism, extremist ideology, and disruptive behavior, the encampment maintained public representation as a peaceful social justice protest. This representational achievement reflected the successful implementation of a sophisticated narrative management strategy developed through years of previous campus activism.

5.3.5.3 Exploitation of Institutional Vulnerabilities

The Columbia encampment demonstrated a remarkable ability to identify and exploit specific institutional vulnerabilities. This exploitation implements what strategic theorists call “systemic weakness targeting,” focusing operational pressure on specific organizational vulnerabilities to achieve a disproportionate impact.

The exploitation of these vulnerabilities operated through multiple channels:

- **Exploiting administrative divisions:** The encampment systematically exploited disagreements between different parts of the university administration, implementing what organizational theorists call “governance fracture exploitation”—the practice of leveraging internal institutional divisions to prevent a unified response. By activating these divisions, the encampment prevented the university administration from adopting a coordinated response despite its formal institutional authority.
- **Mobilizing faculty support:** The encampment secured support from key faculty groups and members who were willing to challenge administrative authority, implementing what institutional theorists call “vertical authority disruption”—the practice of utilizing lower hierarchical elements to challenge authority at higher levels. By mobilizing this faculty support, the encampment created a multi-level institutional crisis that extended beyond the student–administration conflict.
- **Leveraging reputational vulnerabilities:** The encampment systematically exploited university concerns relating to public perception and donor relations, implementing what

influence theorists call “image vulnerability exploitation”—the practice of leveraging organizational sensitivity to reputational damage. By activating these concerns, the encampment imposed constraints on decision-making that went beyond direct operational pressure.

- **Manipulating legal risks:** The encampment created complex legal liability scenarios for potential university responses, implementing what legal theorists call “risk asymmetry generation,” creating different liability profiles for the administration’s various response options. By establishing such complexity, the encampment constrained the administration’s options regardless of its formal authority.

The effectiveness of this exploitation of vulnerabilities was demonstrated by the university’s inability to implement straightforward solutions despite clear policy violations. This institutional paralysis was the result of sophisticated institutional analysis, which identified hidden vulnerabilities and pressure points within organizational structures.

5.3.5.4 Policy Impact

Despite representing a minority campus position, the Columbia University encampment achieved significant policy impact through sophisticated pressure tactics. This impact implements what political scientists call “preference imposition”—the practice of influencing institutional actions through organized pressure rather than representative processes.

This policy impact operated through multiple mechanisms:

- **Divestment commitment extraction:** The University eventually committed to disclosing and reviewing investments with Israeli connections, implementing specific movement demands regardless of broader community preferences. By securing this commitment, the encampment demonstrated its ability to determine institutional policy through pressure tactics rather than representative governance.
- **Leadership resignation procurement:** The University president eventually resigned following pressure from encampments, demonstrating the capability to remove institutional leadership through disruption rather than established governance processes. By achieving this resignation, the encampment established a precedent for leadership accountability to pressure groups rather than institutional governance bodies.
- **Academic freedom boundary redefinition:** The encampment has permanently altered the practical boundaries regarding permissible expression within the educational environment, creating asymmetric standards based on ideological content rather than neutral principles. By establishing these boundaries, the encampment created enduring speech constraints beyond the immediate protest context.
- **Educational disruption normalization:** The encampment established a precedent of accepting substantial educational disruption as a legitimate protest tactic, regardless of its impact on uninvolved students. By normalizing this disruption, the encampment created a template for future institutional coercion, regardless of the educational mission.

The long-term significance of this policy impact lies in what governance theorists call “precedent establishment”—creating decision patterns that shape future institutional responses regardless of leadership personnel. By achieving these impacts, the Columbia encampment created a template for institutional capture through direct action that will influence university governance nationwide, beyond the immediate circumstances.

5.4 Conclusion: The Steady Progression of Brotherhood Strategy

The three phases documented in this chapter reveal a coherent, cumulative strategy of institutional entrenchment rather than a series of discrete reactions to external events. Each phase built systematically upon its predecessor, with the post-9/11 crisis management establishing foundational legitimacy and protective narratives, the BDS era developing a permanent campus infrastructure and “Red–Green” coalition networks, and the post–October 7 mobilization demonstrating the operational readiness achieved through decades of systematic preparation.

The post-9/11 period transformed a crisis into a strategic opportunity. Brotherhood-aligned organizations successfully repositioned themselves as authoritative representatives of American Muslim communities, secured unprecedented government access through advisory roles and consultation relationships, and established the Islamophobia construct as a boundary enforcement mechanism that would constrain public discourse for decades. This phase created the legitimacy, institutional access, and protective narratives essential for subsequent operations.

The BDS era expanded this foundation by establishing a sophisticated campus infrastructure extending far beyond Muslim student organizations. Through entities such as Students for Justice in Palestine and American Muslims for Palestine, Brotherhood-aligned networks established a permanent organizational presence across hundreds of campuses, developed systematic training and leadership pipelines, and successfully embedded Islamist objectives within progressive frameworks through coalition building. This phase transformed campuses from sites of occasional activism into permanent operational theaters with a self-sustaining radicalization capacity.

The post–October 7 mobilization constituted the culmination and stress test of this infrastructure development. Within hours of Hamas’s attack, Brotherhood-aligned networks activated pre-existing structures, deployed professionally produced materials, coordinated messaging across hundreds of institutions, and mobilized coalition partners cultivated through years of systematic outreach. The rapid normalization of explicitly pro-Hamas positions and the institutional paralysis of university administrations demonstrated both the depth of the ideological transformation achieved and the effectiveness of boundary enforcement mechanisms established in earlier phases.

What distinguishes this progression is its systematic, cumulative nature and the Brotherhood’s sophisticated understanding of Western institutional vulnerabilities. The movement demonstrated tactical flexibility across different operational environments: crisis response after 9/11, gradual infrastructure development during the BDS era, and rapid activation after October 7, while consistently advancing core strategic objectives articulated in foundational documents such as the “Explanatory Memorandum.” The ability to present identical ideological positions using different rhetorical frameworks appropriate to each context reflects strategic sophistication that Western institutions have proven largely incapable of recognizing or countering.

The post–October 7 period should therefore be understood not as an anomalous outbreak of campus extremism but as the predictable outcome of systematic preparation. The infrastructure was built deliberately, the coalitions were cultivated methodically, and the narrative frameworks were developed progressively. When the October 7 attacks provided the triggering event, Brotherhood-aligned networks were positioned to exploit an opportunity they had spent decades preparing to seize. This mobilization should be viewed as a milestone rather than an endpoint, revealing how far the Brotherhood has advanced in embedding its influence within Western institutions and providing a stress test of operational capabilities that will inform future strategy.

The pattern documented across these three phases—crisis exploitation, infrastructure consolidation, and capability demonstration—represents a replicable model that can be applied to future triggering events. Each iteration has left Brotherhood-aligned networks more deeply embedded, more

operationally sophisticated, and better positioned for subsequent advancement. The question facing Western institutions is therefore not whether the Brotherhood's influence has reached concerning levels but whether institutional defenses can be reconstituted before the next phase of this progression further narrows the remaining space for effective responses.

6. Strategic Assessment, Conclusions, and Policy Recommendations

6.1 Comprehensive Strategic Assessment

This study's systematic analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's Western infiltration strategy reveals a sophisticated, multigenerational campaign to transform Western society from within, primarily through nonviolent means. The research demonstrates that what has sometimes been dismissed as a conspiracy theory or misunderstood as mere religious advocacy actually constitutes a coherent, strategically implemented program of civilizational transformation operating across multiple domains simultaneously.

6.1.1 Doctrinal Foundation

The examination of the evolution of the *tamkeen* doctrine from Hassan al-Banna to contemporary theorists reveals remarkable strategic continuity despite tactical adaptation. The Brotherhood's theoretical framework demonstrates several critical characteristics that distinguish it from conventional political movements.

Theological integration with political objectives: Unlike secular political movements, the Brotherhood's strategy draws legitimacy from religious sources while pursuing explicitly political goals. This theological grounding provides powerful motivation for sustained commitment across multiple generations while creating resistance to compromise on fundamental objectives. The concept of *tamkeen* transforms political activism into religious obligation, ensuring dedication that transcends typical political engagement.

Strategic patience and multigenerational commitment: The Brotherhood's 100-year timeframe, outlined in "The Project,"⁵⁸³ demonstrates an understanding that societal transformation requires a prolonged effort that transcends individual lifespans. This temporal scope enables tactical flexibility while maintaining strategic consistency, allowing the movement to adapt its methods to the prevailing circumstances without compromising its ultimate objectives.

Operational flexibility within ideological consistency: The complementary relationship between *tamkeen* (institutional entrenchment) and *marhaliyyah* (phase adaptation) provides theological justification for tactical compromises that might otherwise appear contradictory to fundamental principles. This doctrinal sophistication enables the Brotherhood to operate effectively within democratic systems while maintaining a commitment to establishing Islamic governance.

6.1.2 Strategic Blueprint Implementation

Analysis of the "Explanatory Memorandum" and "The Project" reveals that these documents function not merely as aspirational statements but as operational blueprints that have been successfully implemented across Western society. The research demonstrates that the organizational patterns, tactical approaches, and strategic priorities outlined in these documents closely correspond to observed Brotherhood activities over subsequent decades.

Document authenticity and significance: The authentication of these documents through federal court proceedings and their alignment with subsequent organizational behavior establishes their significance beyond mere proposals. The consistency between documented strategy and observed implementation suggests systematic organizational execution rather than coincidental alignment.

⁵⁸³ "The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982)," translated by Scott Burgess (based on the French text published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–205), first published serially in *The Daily Ablution* in December 2005, available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf> and included in the appendix to this study [hereinafter "The Project"].

Geographic adaptation with strategic coherence: While “The Project” provides a global framework and the “Explanatory Memorandum” addresses North American specifics, both documents demonstrate how universal Brotherhood objectives are adapted to diverse cultural and political contexts while maintaining strategic coherence. This adaptive capability facilitates global coordination despite local operational variations.

6.1.3 Operational Implementation

The analysis of the four “domains “ of influence reveals that the Brotherhood has achieved varying degrees of success across different operational areas.

Policy impact: Brotherhood-aligned organizations have secured unprecedented access to government agencies, advisory positions, and policy consulting roles despite documented extremist connections exposed during federal trials. This access has translated into measurable policy influence, including changes in counterterrorism training terminology, expanded religious accommodation requirements, and altered diplomatic approaches toward Muslim-majority countries.

Legal framework manipulation: The development of “Islamophobia” as a strategic concept and the systematic use of anti-discrimination frameworks to shield Brotherhood activities from scrutiny represents a sophisticated implementation of legal strategy. Brotherhood-aligned legal organizations have successfully expanded religious accommodation requirements while constraining critical examination of Islamist ideology through strategic litigation and regulatory pressure.

Institutional infiltration: The Brotherhood has established comprehensive institutional networks spanning religious centers, educational systems, civil society organizations, and media platforms. This institutional ecosystem provides sustainable infrastructure for ideological transmission, community mobilization, and political influence, thereby reducing dependence on individual personalities or short-term political circumstances.

Narrative control: Brotherhood-aligned networks have achieved substantial influence over how Islam, Muslim communities, and Islamist movements are discussed within mainstream discourse. This narrative influence operates through media strategy, educational content development, and expert source positioning, shaping public understanding beyond specific policy advocacy.

6.1.4 Critical Infiltration Moments

The analysis of three pivotal historical moments demonstrates how the Brotherhood has strategically exploited circumstances to advance long-term objectives.

Post-9/11 positioning: Despite initial security concerns following the September 11 attacks, Brotherhood-aligned organizations successfully transformed a potential existential threat into unprecedented legitimacy and access opportunities. This transformation demonstrates a sophisticated crisis response capability that neutralized significant attention from the security apparatus while establishing institutional relationships that persist across multiple administrations.

BDS movement: The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign provided an ideal vehicle for implementing the Brotherhood’s campus infiltration strategy while building coalitions with progressive movements. The campaign has established an enduring organizational infrastructure, ideological transmission mechanisms, and alliance networks that extend far beyond specific anti-Israel/pro-Palestine advocacy.

Post–October 7 mobilization: The coordinated support for the Hamas attack on Israel revealed the cumulative impact of decades of systematic infiltration across policy, legal, institutional, and narrative domains. The rapid activation of campus demonstrations, media coordination, and political pressure campaigns revealed the existence of sophisticated operational capabilities developed through long-term strategic implementation.

6.2 Strategic Conclusions

Based on a comprehensive analysis of its doctrinal foundations, strategic documents, and operational implementation, as well as several historical examples, several critical conclusions emerge regarding the Brotherhood’s Western strategy and its implications for democratic societies.

6.2.1 The Brotherhood Threat

Sophisticated nonviolent extremism: The Muslim Brotherhood promotes what security analysts recognize as “nonviolent extremism”—an ideology that rejects violence as a primary tactic while maintaining objectives fundamentally incompatible with liberal democratic values. This approach exploits Western legal protections and democratic freedoms to advance anti-democratic goals, creating what political theorists call the “tolerance paradox”—the challenge liberal democracies face in protecting themselves against movements that exploit universal freedoms to undermine the foundations of democracy.

Asymmetric institutional warfare: The Brotherhood’s strategy constitutes a sophisticated form of asymmetric warfare that targets institutional vulnerabilities rather than directly confronting Western military or security capabilities. By focusing on cultural, educational, legal, and political institutions, the Brotherhood attacks the ideological foundations of Western civilization while operating within legal boundaries that constrain traditional security responses.

Civilizational challenge vs. terrorist threat: Unlike organizations like al-Qaeda or ISIS, which employ spectacular violence to achieve political objectives, the Brotherhood poses a civilizational challenge that seeks the comprehensive transformation of Western society according to Islamic governance principles. This approach requires different analytical frameworks and response strategies than those developed for counterterrorism.

6.2.2 Democratic Vulnerability

Procedural exploitation capabilities: The Brotherhood’s strategy systematically exploits procedural aspects of democratic governance while rejecting the philosophical foundations of democratic systems. This exploitation creates what constitutional scholars call “autoimmune vulnerabilities”—situations where democratic institutions’ protective mechanisms become vectors for their own compromise.

Weaponization of rights: Anti-discrimination laws, religious freedom protections, and civil liberties designed to protect individual rights have been strategically weaponized to shield ideological movements from legitimate scrutiny. This weaponization transforms protective frameworks into offensive capabilities for advancing anti-democratic objectives.

Institutional capture through minority mobilization: The Brotherhood illustrates how demographically small but strategically organized minorities can achieve disproportionate institutional influence through concentrated pressure tactics, coalition building, and the exploitation of administrative risk aversion. This capability challenges assumptions about democratic representation and majority rule in diverse societies.

6.2.3 Long-term Strategic Impact

Transforming the narrative framework: Beyond specific policy victories, the Brotherhood has achieved fundamentally transformed the narrative framework regarding Islam, Muslim communities, terrorism, and Western foreign policy. These discursive changes shape how issues are understood and discussed, creating a lasting influence that persists regardless of changing political circumstances or leadership.

Establishing institutional precedents: Brotherhood activities have established institutional precedents regarding religious accommodation, speech restrictions, security limitations, and minority representation that will influence organizational behavior long after specific campaigns conclude. These precedents create what institutional theorists call “path dependence”—decision patterns that constrain future options regardless of changing preferences or leadership.

Coalition and infrastructure building: The “red-green alliance” between Islamist organizations and progressive movements has created an enduring operational infrastructure capable of coordinated mobilization across multiple issue areas. This infrastructure provides the Brotherhood with influence amplification capabilities that extend far beyond Muslim communities and Middle East issues.

6.2.4 Adequacy of the Western Response

Conceptual limitations: Western governments and civil society organizations lack adequate conceptual frameworks for understanding and responding to nonviolent extremism that operates within legal boundaries while rejecting democratic values. Existing counterterrorism approaches focus on violent threats while missing ideological movements that may be more strategically significant.

Legal inadequacies: Current legal frameworks provide insufficient tools for addressing ideological movements that exploit democratic freedoms to advance anti-democratic objectives. Anti-discrimination laws, religious freedoms, and civil liberties create protective barriers that sophisticated ideological movements can exploit for strategic advantage.

Institutional vulnerability: Despite documented infiltration by the Brotherhood across multiple domains, Western institutions have failed to develop adequate defensive mechanisms against ideological influence operations. This institutional vulnerability reflects both inadequate threat assessment and insufficient will to implement necessary protective measures.

6.3 Policy Recommendations

Based on the strategic assessment and conclusions presented above, this section outlines a series of comprehensive policy recommendations across multiple domains to address the challenges posed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s infiltration strategy while preserving democratic values and civil liberties.

6.3.1 Immediate Priorities

These recommendations are designed to tackle the entryism under the *tamkeen* doctrine that the US faces from Brotherhood-aligned entities that are registered at home.

Recommendation 1: Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

The United States should move to formally designate the Muslim Brotherhood and its network as a domestic terrorist organization. The escalation of violent attacks inspired by Islamist ideology on American soil, together with the fact that US-based supporters of Hamas have openly engaged in intimidation, property destruction, and physical aggression on public streets and university campuses, makes a formal designation not only justified but urgent and necessary.

The United States should also formally designate the Muslim Brotherhood and its international network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under existing federal law. This measure is not symbolic but foundational to all subsequent counter-entryist policies. As ISGAP’s analysis demonstrates through authenticated primary documents and verified network mapping, the Brotherhood functions as a transnational ideological movement whose strategic objective is the systematic subversion of democratic institutions through what its own materials describe as “civilizational jihad.” Its operational and financial continuity with Hamas and other designated entities confirms that it satisfies the statutory criteria for designation. Formal recognition will provide the legal and strategic framework necessary to constrain Brotherhood-aligned networks, limit their access to governmental and institutional platforms, and prevent the misuse of civil rights and charitable frameworks to advance anti-democratic objectives. Without this step, all other measures—reforming legislation, enhancing institutional resilience, and supporting authentic pluralistic Muslim voices—remain partial and reactive.

The proposed Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act would mandate the US Secretary of State to investigate and potentially designate the organization—in whole or in part—as a terrorist entity. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology poses a direct and constant threat to US national security, as several groups with origins in, or formal ties to, the Brotherhood are directly involved in terrorism.

Recommendation 2: Develop Comprehensive National Strategies for Nonviolent Extremist Influence Operations

Intelligence and security agencies should develop comprehensive national strategies for identifying and countering nonviolent extremist influence operations within the bounds of the law. These strategies should:

- Identify institutional vulnerabilities that hostile ideological movements can exploit.
- Establish defensive mechanisms that preserve democratic values while preventing institutional capture.
- Create early-warning systems that detect patterns of coordinated ideological influence before they achieve critical mass.
- Develop response protocols that maintain institutional integrity without compromising civil liberties.

Recommendation 3: Reform Anti-Discrimination Laws to Prevent Exploitation

Legislative bodies should reform anti-discrimination laws to prevent exploitation while preserving universal protections. Recommended reforms should:

- Distinguish between criticism of ideological movements and discrimination against religious communities.
- Establish that ideological criticism does not constitute religious discrimination when addressing specific organizational behavior or doctrinal positions.
- Create safe harbors for legitimate academic, journalistic, and policy analysis of extremist movements.
- Prevent strategic litigation designed to silence critics rather than address genuine discrimination.

Recommendation 4: Enhance Institutional Resilience against Systematic Influence Operations

Government institutions and civil society organizations must enhance their institutional resilience against systematic influence operations. Relevant measures should include:

- Background investigation requirements for sensitive positions involving national security or community representation.
- Enhanced vetting procedures for advisory positions and consulting relationships.
- Clear guidelines for documenting extremist connections that preclude government partnerships.
- Regular security education for personnel on recruitment and influence attempts by ideological movements.

Recommendation 5: Restore Analytical Capabilities Regarding Ideological Dimensions of Extremist Movements

Security and intelligence agencies should restore analytical capabilities regarding the ideological dimensions of extremist movements that were curtailed as a result of Brotherhood pressure campaigns:

- Reinstatement training materials addressing the ideological dimensions of extremist movements.
- Develop specialized analytical units focused on nonviolent extremism assessment.
- Create information-sharing protocols that enable pattern recognition across different extremist movements.
- Establish review mechanisms that prevent political pressure from constraining legitimate intelligence analysis.

6.3.2 Long-term Strategic Initiatives

Recommendation 6: Develop Whole-of-Government Strategies

Executive branches must develop whole-of-government strategies that coordinate responses across agencies while establishing clear policy definitions of extremism that encompass nonviolent ideological threats. These strategies should:

- Create interagency coordination mechanisms for addressing nonviolent extremism.
- Establish consistent definitions and assessment criteria across government agencies.
- Develop unified messaging strategies that counter extremist narratives while maintaining credibility.
- Create regular assessment and adaptation mechanisms to respond to evolving threats.

Recommendation 7: Enact Comprehensive Legal Reforms

Congress must enact comprehensive legal reforms addressing the weaponization of democratic protections. These reforms should include:

- Enhanced transparency requirements for organizations claiming religious or charitable status while engaging in political advocacy.
- Strengthened Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) enforcement for organizations advancing foreign government interests.
- Clear guidelines distinguishing between legitimate religious practice and political advocacy claiming religious protection.
- Procedural reforms that prevent abuse of legal processes for strategic litigation purposes.

Recommendation 8: Implement Educational Initiatives Promoting Authentic Moderate Muslim Voices

Educational institutions and government agencies should implement educational initiatives promoting authentic moderate Muslim voices while exposing extremists claiming to represent all Muslims. These initiatives should:

- Provide platforms and resources for Muslim reformists who support democratic values.
- Challenge false claims of community representation by extremist organizations.
- Support educational initiatives that present diverse Islamic perspectives rather than extremist monopolization.
- Create alternative institutional pathways for Muslim community engagement beyond Brotherhood-aligned organizations.

Recommendation 9: Establish Enhanced International Cooperation

Western governments must establish enhanced international cooperation frameworks to address the transnational nature of Brotherhood operations. This cooperation should include:

- Intelligence-sharing agreements regarding Brotherhood networks and activities.
- Coordinated response strategies among Western allies facing similar infiltration attempts.
- Joint assessment of Brotherhood-aligned organizations operating across multiple countries.
- Shared best practices for maintaining democratic resilience against ideological influence operations.

Recommendation 10: Develop Cultural Resilience Programs

Educational systems and civic organizations should develop cultural resilience programs to strengthen democratic values and civic understanding. These programs should include:

- Civic education programs that enhance understanding of democratic values and institutions.
- Media literacy initiatives that help citizens identify and resist extremist propaganda.
- Dialogue programs that promote genuine understanding rather than extremist monopolization.
- Community engagement initiatives that build social cohesion and resist polarization.

6.3.3 Implementation: Challenges and Considerations

Constitutional and Legal Constraints

All recommended policies must operate within constitutional frameworks that protect universal rights and religious freedoms. Implementation requires a careful balance between security concerns and civil liberties. In this regard, it is important to:

- Ensure that enhanced scrutiny focuses on organizational behavior and documented connections rather than religious identity.
- Maintain clear distinctions between legitimate religious practice and political advocacy claiming religious protection.
- Preserve academic freedom and free speech while preventing institutional capture by extremist movements.
- Create oversight mechanisms that prevent abuse by enhanced authorities while enabling an effective response to genuine threats.

Political Feasibility

Many recommended policies face significant political obstacles due to Brotherhood influence operations and broader political polarization. In this regard, it is important to:

- Build bipartisan coalitions around shared concerns regarding foreign influence and extremist operations.

- Frame policy initiatives in terms of protecting democratic institutions rather than targeting specific religious communities.
- Emphasize the protection of moderate Muslim voices rather than merely constraining extremist organizations.
- Create incremental implementation approaches that build support through demonstrated effectiveness.

Resources and Capacity

Implementing a comprehensive response to Brotherhood infiltration requires substantial resource investments and capacity development. In this regard, it is important to:

- Develop specialized expertise for analyzing and responding to nonviolent extremism.
- Create sustained funding for programs supporting democratic resilience and authentic moderate voices.
- Build institutional capabilities that can maintain effectiveness across changing political administrations.
- Invest in long-term educational and cultural initiatives that enhance societal resilience against ideological influence operations.

International Coordination

Effective responses to transnational Brotherhood operations require sustained international cooperation despite varying national approaches. In this regard, it is important to:

- Develop flexible cooperation frameworks that accommodate different national legal systems and political constraints.
- Create information-sharing mechanisms that respect national sovereignty while enabling a coordinated response.
- Establish regular consultation processes among allies facing similar Brotherhood infiltration attempts.
- Build shared assessment capabilities that enhance understanding of Brotherhood operations across national boundaries.

6.4 Conclusion: The Imperative for Strategic Response

The Muslim Brotherhood's strategy in the United States represents one of the most sophisticated challenges to democratic governance in the contemporary era. Unlike conventional threats that operate outside legal boundaries, the Brotherhood exploits democratic freedoms and institutions to advance objectives fundamentally incompatible with democratic values. This strategic approach necessitates equally sophisticated responses that uphold democratic principles while safeguarding democratic institutions.

The evidence presented in this study demonstrates that the Brotherhood's Western operations are neither spontaneous nor defensive but rather the embodiment of long-term strategic objectives outlined in authenticated planning documents. The movement's success in achieving policy influence, legal protection, institutional presence, and narrative control despite documented extremist connections reveals the existence of significant vulnerabilities in how democratic societies understand and respond to ideological influence operations.

The recommended policy responses acknowledge that addressing the Brotherhood challenge necessitates a comprehensive approach spanning multiple domains rather than relying solely on security or legal measures. Effective responses must combine enhanced analytical capabilities, legal

reforms, educational initiatives, international cooperation, and civil society engagement while protecting the democratic values and civil liberties that distinguish free societies from their authoritarian competitors.

However, this challenge also presents an opportunity. By developing a sophisticated understanding of nonviolent extremism and creating institutional resilience against ideological influence operations, democratic societies can strengthen their foundational institutions while preserving the freedoms that make democratic governance superior to its authoritarian alternatives. The Brotherhood's strategy ultimately depends on exploiting democratic weaknesses; eliminating those weaknesses enhances democratic strength without compromising democratic character.

Appendices: The “Explanatory Memorandum” and “The Project”

“An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (1991), part of Government Exhibit GX003-0085, U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al., 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008), available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf>.

“The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982),” translated by Scott Burgess (based on the French text published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–205), first published serially in *The Daily Ablution* in December 2005, available online at: <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/687.pdf>.

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ
الحمد لله رب العالمین و الصلوة و السلام علی سید المرسلین

مذكرة تفسيرية

للهدف الإستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية

١٩٩١/٥/٢٢

المحتويات :

- ١- مقدمة في التفسير .
- ٢- مفهوم التوطين .
- ٢- عملية التوطين .
- ٤- مؤسسات التوطين الشاملة .

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
003-0085
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000413

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله رب العالمين و العاقبة للمتقين

التاريخ : ٢٢ / ٥ / ١٩٩١

الأخ الحبيب / فضيلة المسؤول العام حفظه الله .
الأخ الحبيب / أمين مجلس الشورى حفظه الله .
الأخوة الاحبة / أعضاء مجلس الشورى حفظهم الله .
السلام عليكم و رحمة الله و بركاته ... و بعد

أتمنى على الله تعالى أن تكونوا و أهليكم و من تحبون ممن حولكم على أحسن حال ترضيه عز و جل .
أتوجه اليكم بخطابي هذا راجيا أن يحظى اهتمامكم و ينال حسن رعايتكم فأنتم أهل المسؤولية و أصحاب
الأمانة . بين أيديكم « مذكرة تفسيرية » اجتهدت في تدوينها حتى لا تبقى حبيسة الصدر و العقل ، و لكي
أشارككم جزءاً من المسؤولية الملقاة على عواتقنا في قيادة الجماعة في هذه البلاد .
و لعلّ الذي شجعني على أن أتقدم بالمذكرة في هذا الوقت بالذات هو احساسي « ببارقة أمل » و اشرافة خير
تبشر بأننا بدأنا ندخل مرحلة جديدة من مراحل العمل الاسلامي في هذه القارة .
و الأوراق التي بين أيديكم ليست ترفا زائداً أو خيالات و هواجس مرّت في مخيلة أحد إخوانكم . و إنما هي
آمال و طموحات و تحديات أرجو أن تشاركونني فيها أو معظمها . و لا أتمنى لها العصاة و الصواب المطلق .
و إنما هي اجتهاد يحتاج منكم الى دراسة و نظر و تفصيل و تأصيل .
و طلبتي من إخواني... أن يقرأوا المذكرة و يكتبوا ما شاءوا من تعليقات و تصويبات ، مع العلم أن الذي بين
أيديكم ليس غريباً أو طرْحاً جديداً منبثاً لا أصل له . و إنما هو محاولة لتفسير و شرح بعض ما جاء في
الخطة بعيدة المدى ، و التي اعتمدها و أقرناها في مجلسنا و مؤتمرها عام (١٩٨٧) .
فلا تعجل أخي الكريم بإلقاء هذه الاوراق بعيداً لكثرة انشغالك و همومك .. كل الذي أطلبه منك أن تقرأها و
تعلق عليها . علّنا نستكمل مع بعضنا مشروع خطتنا و عملنا الاسلامي في هذه البقعة من العالم . و لئن
فعلت لأكوننّ لك من الشاكرين الممتنين .
كما و أرجو من أخي الكريم أمين المجلس حفظه الله أن يدرج موضوع المذكرة على جدول أعمال المجلس في
اجتماعه القادم .

و جزاكم الله خيراً و حفظكم ذخراً لدعوته

أخوكم / محمد أكرم

(١)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله رب العالمين و العاقبة للمتقين

الموضوع : مشروع لمذكرة تفسيرية للهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية
الوارد في الخطة بعيدة المدى .

أولاً : تستند هذه المذكرة الى :

- ١- الهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا و المعتمد من قبل مجلس الشورى و المؤتمر التنظيمي لعام [١٩٨٧] و هو « تمكين الاسلام في أمريكا الشمالية أي : ايجاد حركة اسلامية فعالة و مستقرة بقيادة الاخوان المسلمين . تتبنى قضايا المسلمين محلياً و عالمياً . و تعمل على توسيع القاعدة الاسلامية الملتزمة . و تهدف الى توحيد و توجيه جهود المسلمين . و تطرح الاسلام كبديل حضاري . و تدعم دولة الاسلام العالمية أينما كانت » .
- ٢- الاولوية المعتمدة من قبل مجلس الشورى لعمل الجماعة في دورته الحالية و السابقة و هي : « التوطين » .
- ٣- تطور العلاقة ايجابياً مع الاخوة في الحلقة الاسلامية في محاولة الوصول الى الوحدة الاندماجية .
- ٤- الحاجة الدائمة للتفكير و التخطيط المستقبلي و محاولة استشرافه و العمل على « تطويع » الحاضر ليستجيب و يتلائم مع احتياجات و تحديات المستقبل .
- ٥- ورقة الاخ فضيلة المسؤول العام حفظه الله التي أرسلها مؤخراً الى أعضاء المجلس .

ثانياً : مقدمة في مذكرة التفسير :

- لكي نبدأ بالتفسير لابد من « استحضار » السؤال الاتي و - وضعه نصب أعيننا لأن علاقته مهمة و لازمة بالهدف الاستراتيجي و بمشروع التفسير الذي نحن بصدده- . و السؤال هو : « كيف تمب أن ترى حركة الاسلام في أمريكا الشمالية بعد عشرة أعوام ؟ » أو « استصحاب » الجملة التالية -عند التخطيط و العمل- و هي : « العمل الاسلامي في أمريكا الشمالية عام (٢٠٠٠) : رؤية استراتيجية » .
- و لابد -أيضاً- من إستحضار و إستصحاب « عناصر » الهدف الاستراتيجي العام للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية و سأكورها « مرقمة » متعمداً و هي :
- [١- ايجاد حركة اسلامية فعالة و مستقرة بقيادة الاخوان المسلمين .
- ٢- تبني قضايا المسلمين محلياً و عالمياً .
- ٣- توسيع القاعدة الاسلامية الملتزمة .
- ٤- توحيد و توجيه جهود المسلمين .

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٥- طرح الاسلام كبديل حضاري .

٦- دعم إقامة دولة الاسلام العالمية أينما كانت .

- و لابد من التأكيد على أنه أصبح من الواضح و من « المعلوم من الواقع بالضرورة » أنّ الجميع متفقون على أننا نريد أن « نوطن » أو « نمكّن » الاسلام و حركته في هذه البقعة من الارض .
- فلا بد - إذن - من تبني فهماً مشتركاً لمدلول التوطين أو التمكين . نفّس في سياقه و على أساسه الهدف الاستراتيجي العام - بمناصره الستة - للجماعة في أمريكا الشمالية .

ثالثاً : مفهوم التوطين :

وردت هذه الكلمة في « معجم » و وثائق الجماعة بمصطلحات متعددة . بالرغم من أن الجميع قصد بها أمراً واحداً . و نعتقد أن الفهم في المضمون مشترك . و سنحاول هنا تفسير الكلمة و « مرادفاتها » تفسيراً عملياً ذو دلالة حركية واقعية و ليس تفسيراً لغوياً فلسفياً . مع التأكيد أن تفسيرنا لا يكتمل الا بعد استيعاب تفسيرنا « لعملية » التوطين ذاتها و التي ترد في الفقرة اللاحقة . فنقول بإختصار ما يلي :

- التوطين - « أن يكون الاسلام و حركته جزءاً من الوطن الذي يحيا فيه » .
- التأسيس - « أن يتحول الاسلام الى مؤسسات ثابتة الأركان تقوم عليها قواعد الحضارة و البناء و الشهود » .
- الاستقرار - « أن يكون الاسلام مستقراً في الارض التي يتحرك عليها اهله » .
- التمكين - « أن يكون الاسلام متمكناً من نفوس و عقول و حياة اهل البلد الذي يتحرك فيه » .
- التأصيل - « أن يكون الاسلام أصيلاً و ليس طارناً أي متأصلاً «متجذراً» في تربة البقعة التي يتحرك عليها و ليس نبثنا غريباً عنها » .

رابعاً : عملية التوطين :

- و لكي يكون الاسلام و حركته « جزءاً من الوطن » الذي يحيا فيه و « مستقراً » في ارضه و « متأصلاً » في نفوس و عقول أهله و « متمكناً » من حياة مجتمعه و له « مؤسسات » ثابتة الأركان يقوم عليها البناء الاسلامي و يتحقق بها الشهود الحضاري . فلا بد أن تخطط الحركة و تجاهد من أجل استلاك « مفاتيح » و أدوات هذه العملية لإنجاز المهمة العظيمة كمسؤولية « جهادية حضارية » تقع على عاتق المسلمين و على رأسهم الاخوان المسلمين في هذه البلاد . و من هذه المفاتيح و الأدوات ما يلي :

١- تبني مفهوم التوطين و ادراك دلالاته العملية :

ركّزت المذكرة التفسيرية على البعد الحركي و الواقعي لمفهوم عملية التوطين و على دلالاتها العملية دون الالتفات الى الاختلاف في الفهم بين من هو المقيم و غير المقيم ؟ أو من هو المستوطن أو غير المستوطن؟

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و نعتقد أن الذي جاء في الخطة بعيدة المدى بهذا الصدد فيه الكفاية .

٢) إحداهن نقلة نوعية في منهجية تفكيرنا و عقليتنا لتناسب مع تحديات مهمة التوطين :
المتصور بأحداث النقلة - و هو تعبير ايجابي - هو الاستجابة للتحديات الكبيرة لمهمة التوطين ، و نعتقد
أن أية استجابة تفييرية تبدأ بمنهج التفكير و مركزه العقل أولاً . و لكي يتضح ما نقصد بالنقلة التي ننادي
بها كمفتاح يؤهلنا لخوض ميدان التوطين ، نقول باختصار شديد ... أن يتحقق :

- الانتقال من عقلية التفكير الجزئي الى عقلية التفكير الشمولي ،
- الانتقال من عقلية التخطيط الجزئي «المبتور» الى عقلية التخطيط الشمولي «المتواصل» ،
- الانتقال من عقلية الحذر و التحفظ الى عقلية المجازفة و التحرر المنضبط ،
- الانتقال من عقلية تنظيم النخبة الى عقلية التنظيم الشعبي ،
- الانتقال من عقلية الوعظ و الارشاد الى عقلية البناء و الإشهاد ،
- الانتقال من عقلية احادية الرأي الى عقلية تعددية الرأي ،
- الانتقال من عقلية التصادم الى عقلية الاستيعاب ،
- الانتقال من عقلية الفرد الى عقلية الفريق ،
- الانتقال من عقلية الترقب الى عقلية المبادرة ،
- الانتقال من عقلية التردد الى عقلية الحسم ،
- الانتقال من عقلية المبادئ الى عقلية البرامج ،
- الانتقال من عقلية الافكار المجردة الى عقلية المؤسسات الحقيقية [و هنا بيت القصيد و لب المذكرة] .

٢- فهم المراحل التاريخية التي مرّ بها العمل الاسلامي الاخواني في هذه البلاد :
يعتقد كاتب المذكرة أن فهم و استيعاب المراحل التاريخية للعمل الاسلامي الذي قاده و يقوده الاخوان
المسلمين في هذه القارة مفتاح مهم جداً في العمل من أجل التوطين ، تلحظ من خلاله الجماعة سيرها و
اتجاه حركتها و منحنيات و منعطفات دربها . و سنكتفي هنا بذكر عنوان [العنوان هنا يعبر عن السمة
الغالبة للمرحلة] كل مرحلة من هذه المراحل [و لعل التفصيل يكون في دراسة مستقبلية أخرى] ، و أغلب
الظن أن المراحل هي :

- أ- مرحلة البحث عن الذات و تحديد الهوية ،
- ب- مرحلة البناء الداخلي و إحكام التنظيم ،
- ج- مرحلة المساجد و المراكز الاسلامية ،
- د- مرحلة انشاء المؤسسات الاسلامية -الطور الاول - ،
- هـ- مرحلة انشاء المدارس الاسلامية -الطور الاول- ،

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و- مرحلة التفكير في الحركة الاسلامية العلنية -الطور الاول- .
ز- مرحلة الانفتاح على الحركات الاسلامية الاخرى و محاولة الوصول الى صيغة للتعامل معها -الطور الاول-
ح- مرحلة احياء و استكمال انشاء المؤسسات الاسلامية -الطور الثاني- :
نعتقد أن الجماعة على أبواب هذه المرحلة في طورها الثاني فعليها أن تدلف الباب و تدخله كما دخلته أول مرة .

٤- فهم طبيعة دور الاخ المسلم في أمريكا الشمالية :
إنّ عملية التوطين « عملية جهادية حضارية » بما تحمل الكلمة ، و لابد أن يستوعب الاخوان أن عملهم في أمريكا هو نوع من أنواع الجهاد العظيم في إزالة و هدم المدنية او الحضارة الغربية من داخلها و «تخريب» بيوتها الشقيّة بأيديهم و أيدي المؤمنين لكي يتم جلاؤهم و يظهر دين الله على الدين كله . و دون هذا المستوى من الاستيعاب ، فاننا دون التحدي و لنا نعدّ أنفسنا للجهاد بعد . فقدر المسلم ان يجاهد و يعمل حيثما كان و حيثما حلّ حتى قيام الساعة و لا مفرّ من هذا القدر الا لمن اختار القعود .. و لكن هل يستوي القاعدون و المجاهدون .

٥ ادراك أننا لا نستطيع أن نقوم بمهمة التوطين بمفردنا أو بمعزل عن الناس :
إنّ مهمة بهذه الجسامه و الضخامة كمهمة التوطين ، تحتاج الى جهود عظيمة و مضنية ، و لن يستطيع الاخوان - بإمكاناتهم و مواردهم البشرية و المالية و العلمية - أن يقوموا بهذه المهمة بمفردهم أو بمعزل عن الناس ، و الذي يعتقد هذا فهو مضطرب و الله أعلم . أما دور الاخوان فهو المبادرة و الريادة و القيادة و رفع الراية و دفع الناس بهذا الاتجاه . ثم يعملون على توظيف و توجيه و توحيد جهود و قوى المسلمين لهذه العملية . و من أجل ذلك لابد أن يتعمق عندنا فقه « التحالفات » و فن « الاستيعاب » و أدب « التعاون » .

٦- ضرورة تحقيق المزاجية و الاندماجية المتدرجة المتوازنة بين العمل الخاص و العمل العام :

نظن أن ما كُتب حول هذا الموضوع كثير و فيه الكفاية و لكن يحتاج منا الى تأطير زمني و عملي بحيث يتحقق المطلوب بشكل متدرج و متوازن و متواكب مع متطلبات عملية التوطين .

٧- القناعة بأن نجاح توطين الاسلام و حركته في هذه البلاد هو نجاح للحركة الاسلامية العالمية و اسناد حقيقي للدولة المنضوذة بإذن الله تعالى :

هناك فهم - تخالفه هذه المذكرة - و هو أن تركيز عملنا في محاولة توطين الاسلام في هذه البلاد سيؤدي الى تقصيرنا و إخلالنا بدورنا في أداء واجبنا تجاه الحركة الاسلامية العالمية في دعم مشروعها في قيام الدولة . نعتقد أن الاجابة من شقين : الاول - ان نجاح الحركة في أمريكا باقامة قاعدة اسلامية ملتزمة ذات قوة و فعالية و تأثير سيكون خير عون و دعم و اسناد لمشروع الحركة العالمية .

(٥)

و الثاني - هو أن الحركة العالمية لم تنجح بعد في « توزيع الأدوار » على فروعها فتحدد لهم المطلوب منهم كأحد المشاركين أو المساهمين في مشروع قيام الدولة الإسلامية العالمية . و يوم أن يتم هذا فسيكون لابناء الفرع الإخواني الأمريكي أيادٍ و مواقف بيضاء يفخر بها الآباء .

٨- استيعاب المسلمين و كسبهم بكل فئاتهم و ألوانهم في أمريكا و كندا لصالح مشروع التوطين و جعله قضيتهم و مستقبلهم و أساس حياتهم الإسلامية في هذه البقعة من العالم :

هذه المسألة تحتاج منا إلى « فقه للتعامل مع الآخرين » . فالتناسع معادى و الناس كإهل مائة . نحن نحتاج إلى اعتماد المبدأ الذي يقول « خذ من كل الناس ..أفضل ما عندهم » ، أفضل ما عندهم من تخصصات و خبرات و فنون و طاقات و كفاءات ، و المقصود بالناس هنا من داخل الصف أو خارجه من الافراد و المؤسسات . و سياسة « الأخذ » تكون بما يحقق خدمة الهدف الاستراتيجي و عملية التوطين . و لكن التحدي الكبير الذي أمامنا هو : كيف نربطهم جميعا في « فلك » خطتنا و « دائرة » حركتنا لتحقيق « مناط » مصلحتنا ؟ و ليس لنا خيار - في ظني - الا التحالف و التفاهم مع من يرغب في ملتنا . و يرضى بمذهبنا في العمل . و الساحة الإسلامية الأمريكية مليئة بهؤلاء ينتظرونالرواد .

المهم أن نوصل الناس إلى مستوى ادراك التحدي الذي أمامنا كمسلمين في هذا البلد و الاقتناع بمشروعنا في التوطين . و ادراك مصلحة اللقاء و التعاون و التحالف . حينها لو طلبنا المال سيأتي طائلاً ، و لو طلبنا الرجال لجاؤوا صفواً . المهم أن تكون خطتنا هي « المعيار و الميزان » في علاقاتنا مع الآخرين . و هنا ينبغي تسجيل نقطتين ، الأولى : نحن بحاجة إلى ادراك و فهم موازين القوى الإسلامية على الساحة الأمريكية [و لعل هذا يكون مشروع دراسة مستقبلية] ، و النقطة الثانية : ان الذي توصلنا إليه مع الاخوة في « اكنا » يعتبر خطوة في الاتجاه الصحيح و بداية الخير و أول الفيت ، يحتاج منا إناءً و ترشيداً .

٩- اعادة النظر في هيكلنا التنظيمية و الادارية و نوعية القيادات و أساليب اختيارها بما يتلائم مع تحديات مهمة التوطين :

ستمسكت المذكرة عن التفصيل في هذا البند لحين آخر مع انه أمر بدهي و فيه قول كثير .

١٠- تنمية و تطوير مصادرها و مواردنا و امكانياتنا المالية و البشرية بما يتناسب مع ضخامة المهمة الكبيرة :

لو استعرضنا الموارد البشرية و المالية التي يملكها الاخوان لوحدهم في هذا البلد لشعرنا و شعر غيرنا بالفخر و الاعتزاز ، و لو ضمنا إليها موارد أصدقائنا و حلفائنا و من هم في فلكنا يسبحون و لرايتنا ينتظرون ، لأدركنا أننا يمكن أن نفوض بمر التوطين و نستعرضه لإعلاء كلمة الله سبحانه .

١١- اعتماد المنهج العلمي في التخطيط و التفكير و اعداد الدراسات التي تحتاجها عملية التوطين :

- نعم نحتاج الى هذا المنهج ، و نحتاج الى العديد من الدراسات التي تعين في هذه العملية الجهادية الحضارية . و لعله نكتفي هنا بذكر بعضها بإيجاز :
- تاريخ الوجود الاسلامي في أمريكا .
 - تاريخ العمل الاسلامي الاخواني في أمريكا .
 - الحركات و المنظمات و المؤسسات الاسلامية : تحليل و نقد
 - ظاهرة المراكز و المدارس الاسلامية : تحديات و احتياجات و احصاءات .
 - الاقليات الاسلامية .
 - الجاليات الاسلامية و العربية .
 - المجتمع الامريكي ، تركيبة و سياسة .
 - نظرة المجتمع الامريكي الى الاسلام و المسلمين ... و غيرها كثير من الدراسات التي يمكن ان نوجه اليها اخواننا و حلفائنا لاعدادها اما من خلال دراستهم الاكاديمية أو من خلال مراكزهم العلمية أو من خلال تكليفاتهم الحركية . المهم أن نبدأ .

١٢- الاتفاق على « آلية » مرنة و متوازنة و واضحة لتنفيذ عملية التوطين ضمن « اطار زمني » محدد و متدرج و متوازن و متواسب مع متطلبات و تحديات عملية التوطين .

١٣- فهم المجتمع الامريكي من جوانبه المختلفة فهماً « يُؤهلنا » من القيام بمهمة توطين دعوتنا في وطنه و « إستنباتها » على أرضه .

١٤- تبني « فقه » مدوّن يتضمن قواعد و مبادئ و سياسات و تفسيرات شرعية و حركية تتلائم مع حاجات و تحديات عملية التوطين .

١٥- الاتفاق على « معايير » و موازين تكون بمثابة « حاسة الاستشعار » أو « برج المراقبة » للتأكد من أن أولوياتنا و خططنا و برامجنا و هياكلنا و قياداتنا و اموالنا و مناشطنا كلها تسير باتجاه عملية التوطين.

١٦- تبني صيغة عملية مرنة يتكامل فيها عملنا المركزي مع عملنا المحلي .
[البنود من ١٢ الى ١٦ سيرد فيها التفصيل لاحقاً] .

١٧- ادراك دور و طبيعة عمل « المركز الاسلامي » في كل مدينة بما يحقق عملية التوطين :

إن المركز الذي نسمى له هو الذي : يُمثّل « محور » حركتنا و « محيط » دائرة عملنا و « نقطة » ارتكازنا و « قاعدة » انطلاقنا و « دار أرقمنا » لتربيتنا و اعدادنا و إنفاذ سرايانا بالاضافة الى انه « محراب » عبادتنا .

(٧)

حتى يتحول المركز الاسلامي -بالفعل- لا بالقول الى نواة « لمجتمع اسلامي » صغير يكون انعكاساً و مرآة لمؤسساتنا المركزية . ينبغي أن يتحول المركز الى « خلية نمل » يُخرج شهداً حلو المذاق . فيتحول بذلك المركز الاسلامي الى مكان الدرس و الاسرة و الكتيبة و الدورة و الندوة و الزيارة و الرياضة و المدرسة و النادي الاجتماعي و ملتقى المرأة و محضن الناشئة و الناشئات و مكتب صنع القرار السياسي المحلي و مركز توزيع صحفنا و مجلاتنا و كتبنا و أشرطتنا السعوية و المرئية .

باختصار نقول : أننا نريد أن يصبح المركز الاسلامي « دار الدعوة » و « المركز العام » بالمضمون أولاً قبل الاسم . و على قدر امتلاكنا و توجيهنا لهذه المراكز على مستوى القارة .. على قدر ما يمكننا القول أننا نسير بنجاح نحو توطين الدعوة في هذه البلاد .

أي أن يكون دور « المركز » كدور « المسجد » على عهد رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم عندما انطلق يباشر « توطين » الدعوة في عهداها الاول في المدينة المنورة، و من المسجد إستأنف الحياة الاسلامية و قدم للعالم أروع و أبهى حضارة عرفتها الإنسانية .

و هذا يحتم أن تتحول -بعد حين- المنطقة و الشعبة و الأسرة الى « غرف عمليات » للتخطيط و التوجيه و المراقبة و القيادة للمركز الاسلامي ليكون مثلاً و نموذجاً يُحتذى .

١٨- اعتماد نظام يؤكد على ان « فرز » العاملين و « توزيع الادوار و « تقليد » المناصب و المسؤوليات يكون على أساس التخصص و الرغبة و الحاجة و بما يحقق عملية التوطين و يسهم في إنجاحها .

١٩- تحويل مبدأ التفرد لمسئولي المواقع الرئيسية في الجماعة الى قاعدة و أساس و سياسة في العمل ، و بدونها قد تتعطل عملية التوطين [و الكلام حول هذا الموضوع يحتاج الى تفصيل و تأصيل] .

٢٠- ادراك أهمية النقلة « المؤسساتية » في عملنا الحركي . و الجهاد من أجل تحقيقها على أرض الواقع بما يخدم عملية التوطين و يعجل نتائجها بأذن الله عزّ و جلّ :

إنّ سبب تأخير هذا البند على أهميته القصوى هو لأنه يمثل سر و لب هذه المذكرة . و يمثل أيضاً المظهر العملي و المعيار الحقيقي لنجاحنا أو إخفاقنا في سيرنا نحو هدف التوطين . و الحديث عن المؤسسات العقلية أو الظاهرة « المؤسساتية » لا يحتاج منا الى تفصيل كثير . و يكفينا أن نقول أن أول رائد لهذه الظاهرة كان نبينا محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم إذ انه وضع الأساس لأول مؤسسة حضارية و هي المسجد فكانت بحق « المؤسسة الشاملة » . ثم هكذا كان فعل رائد الدعوة الاسلامية المعاصرة الامام الشهيد حسن البنا رحمه الله عندما أحسنّ هو و إخوانه بضرورة اعادة « تأسيس » الاسلام و حركته من جديد . فأقام المؤسسات بكل أنواعها : الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية و الاعلامية و الكشفية و المهنية و حتى العسكرية . و يجدر القول أننا في بلد لا يفهم الالفة المؤسسات و لا يحترم و يحسب وزناً لأي مجموعة بدون مؤسسات فاعلة و مؤثرة و قوية .

(A)

و من حسن الطالع أن بيننا من إخواننا من سبقونا بالقول و العمل من عنده هذه «النزعة» أو العقلية أو الميل لإنشاء المؤسسات . مما يدفعنا الى القول بشجاعة و مراعاة - كما قالها ذات مرة السادات في مصر «نحن نريد أن نقيم دولة المؤسسات» - كلمة حق أراد بها الباطل . و أنا أقول لآخواني دعونا نرفع شعار الحق لإقامة الحق « نحن نريد أن نقيم جماعة المؤسسات » . إذ ان بدونها لن نضع أقدامنا على الطريق الصحيح .

- و من أجل أن تتم عملية التوطين لآبد أن نخطط و نعمل من الآن على تهيئة و اعداد أنفسنا و إخواننا و أجهزتنا و أقسامنا و لجاننا لكي تتحول الى مؤسسات شاملة بشكل متدرج و متوازن و متواكب مع الحاجة و الواقع . و الذي يشجعنا على ذلك - بالاضافة الى الذي ذكر سابقاً - هو أننا نملك « أنوية » لكل مؤسسة من المؤسسات التي ننادي بوجودها . [انظر الى الملحق رقم (١)] .

-كل الذي نحتاجه هو أن نُحْكِمَ رباطهم و نُنَسِّقَ عملهم و نَجْمَعِ عناصرهم و نوَحِّدَ جهودهم مع غيرهم ثم نصلهم بالخطة الشاملة التي نسمى لها .

فعلى سبيل المثال :

عندنا نواة لمؤسسة « اعلامية و فنية شاملة » : نملك مطبعة + جهاز صف حروف متطور + مركز سمعيات و بصريات + مكتب اخراج فني + مجلات و صحف بالعربية و الانكليزية [الافاق و الامل و السياسي و الى فلسطين و المقتطفات الصحفية و الزيتونة و الراصد الفلسطيني و مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية ...] + فرقة فنية + مصورين + مخرجين + مقدمي برامج + محررين + بالاضافة الى خبرات اعلامية و فنية اخرى .

مثال آخر :

عندنا نواة لمؤسسة « دعوية تربوية شاملة » : عندنا قسم الدعوة الاسلامية في الاسنا + مؤسسة الدكتور جمال بدوي + المركز الذي يديره الاخ حامد الفزالي + مركز الدعوة الذي تسمى له لجنة الدعوة الآن و الاخ شاكِر السيد + بالاضافة الى جهود دعوية هنا و هناك ... » .

و هكذا يمكن أن نقيس على جميع المؤسسات التي ننادي بايجادها .

-التحدي الكبير الذي أمامنا هو أننا كيف نجعل من هذه الأنوية أو العناصر « المبعثرة » مؤسسات شاملة مستقرة « متوطنة » مرتبطة بحركتنا و تدور في فلك خطتنا و تأتمر بتوجيهنا . و لا يمنع - بل ينبغي - أن يكون لكل مؤسسة مركزية فروعها المحلية و لكن ارتباطها بالمركز الاسلامي في المدينة شرط .

-المطلوب : أن نسمى لتهيئة الأجواء و السبل لتحقيق « الاندماج » بحيث تكون الاتسام و اللجان و المناطق و الشعب و الاسر هي لب و جوهر المؤسسات - بعد حين - .

أي أن تحصل النقلة و التحول كما يلي :

(٩)

- ١- قسم التنظيم + قسم الامانة
٢- قسم التربية + لجنة الدعوة
٣- قسم الاخوات
٤- قسم المال + لجنة الاستثمار + الوقف
٥- قسم الناشئة + قسم المنظمات الشبابية
٦- اللجنة الاجتماعية + لجنة الزواج + م. الرحمة = المؤسسة الاجتماعية
٧- اللجنة الامنية = المؤسسة الامنية
٨- القسم السياسي + لجنة فلسطين
٩- محكمة الجماعة + اللجنة القانونية
١٠- قسم العمل المحلي
١١- مجلاتنا + المطبعة + فرقنا الفنية
١٢- مؤسسة الدراسات + دار النشر + دار الكتاب = المؤسسة الفكرية و الثقافية
١٣- الجمعيات العلمية و الطبية = المؤسسة العلمية و التعليمية و المهنية
١٤- المؤتمر التنظيمي = المؤتمر التأسيسي الاسلامي الامريكي
١٥- مجلس الشورى + لجنة التخطيط = مجلس شورى الحركة الاسلامية الامريكية .
١٦- المكتب التنفيذي = المكتب التنفيذي للحركة الاسلامية الامريكية
١٧- المسئول العام = رئيس الحركة الاسلامية و الناطق الرسمي لها .
١٨- المناطق + الشعب + الاسر = القيادات الميدانية للمؤسسات و المراكز الاسلامية.

خامساً : مؤسسات التوطين الشاملة :

- ثم نسعى و نجاهد من أجل أن تصبح كل مؤسسة من هذه المؤسسات المذكورة أعلاه « مؤسسة شاملة » على مدى الايام و السنين و ما نُدرّ لنا أن نكون في هذه الديار ..المهم يكفيننا اعتزازاً أننا وضعنا اللبانات و يأتي من بعدنا أقبام و أجيال تكمل المسيرة و الطريق و لكن بهدي سابق واضح المعالم .
و لكي يتضح القول بمقصودنا من المؤسسة الشاملة المتخصصة ، نذكر هنا ملامح و مظاهر كل مؤسسة من المؤسسات « الواعدة » :

١- دعوية و تربوية [المؤسسة الدعوية و التربوية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مؤسسة نشر الدعوة (مركزية و فروع محلية) .
- معهد لتخريج الدعاة و المربين ،
- علماء و دعاة و مربين و مبشرين و مقدمي برامج ،
- فنون و تقنية الاتصال و التبليغ و الدعوة .

- محطة تلفزيونية .
- مجلة دعوية متخصصة .
- محطة اذاعية .
- المجلس الاسلامي الاعلى للدعاة و المربين .
- المجلس الاعلى للمساجد و المراكز الاسلامية .
- جمعيات الصداقة مع الاديان الاخرى ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٢- سياسيا [المؤسسة السياسية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- حزب سياسي مركزي .
- مكاتب سياسية محلية .
- رموز سياسية .
- علاقات و تحالفات .
- المنظمة الامريكية للعمل السياسي الاسلامي .
- مراكز معلومات متطورة ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٢- اعلاميا [المؤسسة الاعلامية و الفنية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- جريدة يومية .
- مجلات اسبوعية شهرية و فصلية .
- اذاعات .
- برامج تلفزيونية .
- مركز سمعيات و بصريات .
- مجلة للطفل المسلم
- مجلة للمرأة المسلمة
- مطبعة و أجهزة صف حروف .
- مكتب اخراج .
- استديو تصوير و تسجيل .
- فرق فنية للتمثيل و الانشاد و المسرح .
- مكتب تسويق و انتاج فني ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٤- اقتصاديا [المؤسسة الاقتصادية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- بنك اسلامي مركزي .
- اوقاف اسلامية .
- مشاريع استثمارية .
- مؤسسة للقروض الحسنة ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٥- علميا و مهنيا [المؤسسة العلمية و التعليمية و المهنية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مراكز بحث علمي .
- معاهد تقنية و تدريب مهني .
- جامعة اسلامية .
- مدارس اسلامية .
- مجلس للتعليم و البحث العلمي .
- مراكز لتدريب المعلمين .
- جمعيات علمية في المدارس .
- مكتب للتوجيه الاكاديمي .
- جهاز للتأليف و المناهج الاسلامية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٦- ثقافيا و فكريا [المؤسسة الثقافية و الفكرية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مراكز للدراسات و البحوث .
- منظمات ثقافية و فكرية مثال : [جمعية العلماء الاجتماعيين - جمعية العلماء و المهندسين ...] .
- معهد للفكر و الثقافة الاسلامية .
- دار نشر و ترجمة و توزيع للكتاب الاسلامي .
- مكتب للتدوين و التأريخ و التوثيق .
- مشروع ترجمة القرآن الكريم و الحديث الشريف ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٧- اجتماعيا [المؤسسة الاجتماعية الخيرية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- نوادي اجتماعية للشباب و ابناء و بنات الجاليات .
- جمعيات محلية للرعاية الاجتماعية و الخدمات مرتبطة بالمراكز الاسلامية .
- المنظمة الاسلامية لمكافحة الامراض الاجتماعية للمجتمع الامريكى .
- مشاريع المساكن الاسلامية .
- مكاتب الزواج و القضايا العائلية ... و ما شابه ذلك .

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٨- شبابيا [المؤسسة الشبابية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- منظمات شبابية مركزية و محلية .
- فرق و نوادي رياضية .
- فرق كشفية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

٩- نسويا [المؤسسة النسوية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- جمعيات نسوية مركزية و محلية .
- معاهد التدريب و التشغيل الفني و التدبير المنزلي .
- معهد لتدريب الداعيات .
- دور الحضانة الاسلامية ... و ماشابه ذلك .

١٠- تنظيميا و اداريا [المؤسسة الادارية و التنظيمية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- معهد للتدريب و التنمية و التطوير و التخطيط .
- خبراء بارزين في هذا المجال .
- أنظمة عمل و لوائح و دساتير تصلح لادارة اجهزة و المؤسسات .
- مجلة دورية في التنمية و الادارة الاسلامية .
- امتلاك مخيمات و قاعات للانشطة المختلفة .
- بنك للمعلومات و الحصر و الاحصاء البشري .
- شبكة اتصالات متطورة .
- آرشفيف متطور لتراثنا و انتاجنا ... و ما شابه ذلك .

١١- أمنيا : [المؤسسة الامنية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- نوادي للتدريب و تعلم وسائل الدفاع عن النفس .
- مركز يعنى بالشؤون الامنية [فنيا و فكريا و تقنيا و بشريا] ... و ماشابه ذلك .

١٢- قانونيا : [المؤسسة القانونية] : بحيث تشمل على :

- مجلس فقهي مركزي .
- محكمة اسلامية مركزية .
- جمعية المحامين المسلمين .
- المنظمة الاسلامية للدفاع عن حقوق المسلمين ... و ما شابه ذلك .

و الله ولي التوفيق

قائمة بمؤسساتنا و مؤسسات أصدقائنا
[تخيل لو أنها كلها تسير وفق خطة واحدة !!!]

- 1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
- 2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
- 3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
- 4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
- 5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
- 6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

- 7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
- 8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
- 9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- 10-IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
- 11-ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
- 12-ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
- 13-AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
- 14-IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
- 15-MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
- 16-MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
- 17-IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
- 18-IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
- 19-IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

- 20-MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
- 21-MISC = MALASIAN ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
- 22-IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
- 23-UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
- 24-OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
- 25-MIA = MERCEY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

- 26-ICNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
- 27-BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28-IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29-IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

Bate #ISE-SW/ 1B10/ 0000413

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds,
Prayers and peace be upon the master of the Messengers

An Explanatory Memorandum
On the General Strategic Goal for the Group
In North America
5/22/1991

Contents:

- 1- An introduction in explanation
- 2- The Concept of Settlement
- 3- The Process of Settlement
- 4- Comprehensive Settlement Organizations

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In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds
And Blessed are the Pious

5/22/1991

The beloved brother/The General Masul, may God keep him
The beloved brother/Secretary of the Shura Council, may God keep him
The beloved brothers/Members of the Shura Council, may God keep them
God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you.... To proceed,

I ask Almighty God that you, your families and those whom you love around you are in the best of conditions, pleasing to God, glorified His name be.

I send this letter of mine to you hoping that it would seize your attention and receive your good care as you are the people of responsibility and those to whom trust is given. Between your hands is an "Explanatory Memorandum" which I put effort in writing down so that it is not locked in the chest and the mind, and so that I can share with you a portion of the responsibility in leading the Group in this country.

What might have encouraged me to submit the memorandum in this time in particular is my feeling of a "glimpse of hope" and the beginning of good tidings which bring the good news that we have embarked on a new stage of Islamic activism stages in this continent.

The papers which are between your hands are not abundant extravagance, imaginations or hallucinations which passed in the mind of one of your brothers, but they are rather hopes, ambitions and challenges that I hope that you share some or most of which with me. I do not claim their infallibility or absolute correctness, but they are an attempt which requires study, outlook, detailing and rooting from you.

My request to my brothers is to read the memorandum and to write what they wanted of comments and corrections, keeping in mind that what is between your hands is not strange or a new submission without a root, but rather an attempt to interpret and explain some of what came in the long-term plan which we approved and adopted in our council and our conference in the year (1987).

So, my honorable brother, do not rush to throw these papers away due to your many occupations and worries. All what I'm asking of you is to read them and to comment on them hoping that we might continue together the project of our plan and our Islamic work in this part of the world. Should you do that, I would be thankful and grateful to you.

I also ask my honorable brother, the Secretary of the Council, to add the subject of the memorandum on the Council agenda in its coming meeting.

May God reward you good and keep you for His Daw'a

Your brother/Mohamed Akram

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In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Thanks be to God, Lord of the Two Worlds
And Blessed are the Pious

Subject: A project for an explanatory memorandum for the General Strategic goal
for the Group in North America mentioned in the long-term plan

One: The Memorandum is derived from:

- 1- The general strategic goal of the Group in America which was approved by the Shura Council and the Organizational Conference for the year [1987] is "Enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and a stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims' causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims' efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic State wherever it is".
- 2- The priority that is approved by the Shura Council for the work of the Group in its current and former session which is "Settlement".
- 3- The positive development with the brothers in the Islamic Circle in an attempt to reach a unity of merger.
- 4- The constant need for thinking and future planning, an attempt to read it and working to "shape" the present to comply and suit the needs and challenges of the future.
- 5- The paper of his eminence, the General Masul, may God keep him, which he recently sent to the members of the Council.

Two: An Introduction to the Explanatory Memorandum:

- In order to begin with the explanation, we must "summon" the following question and place it in front of our eyes as its relationship is important and necessary with the strategic goal and the explanation project we are embarking on. The question we are facing is: "How do you like to see the Islam Movement in North America in ten years?", or "taking along" the following sentence when planning and working, "Islamic Work in North America in the year (2000): A Strategic Vision".

Also, we must summon and take along "elements" of the general strategic goal of the Group in North America and I will intentionally repeat them in numbers. They are:

- [1- Establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood.
- 2- Adopting Muslims' causes domestically and globally.
- 3- Expanding the observant Muslim base.
- 4- Unifying and directing Muslims' efforts.

5- Presenting Islam as a civilization alternative

6- Supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is].

- It must be stressed that it has become clear and emphatically known that all is in agreement that we must "settle" or "enable" Islam and its Movement in this part of the world.

- Therefore, a joint understanding of the meaning of settlement or enablement must be adopted, through which and on whose basis we explain the general strategic goal with its six elements for the Group in North America.

Three: The Concept of Settlement:

This term was mentioned in the Group's "dictionary" and documents with various meanings in spite of the fact that everyone meant one thing with it. We believe that the understanding of the essence is the same and we will attempt here to give the word and its "meanings" a practical explanation with a practical Movement tone, and not a philosophical linguistic explanation, while stressing that this explanation of ours is not complete until our explanation of "the process" of settlement itself is understood which is mentioned in the following paragraph. We briefly say the following:

Settlement: "That Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland it lives in".

Establishment: "That Islam turns into firmly-rooted organizations on whose bases civilization, structure and testimony are built".

Stability: "That Islam is stable in the land on which its people move".

Enablement: "That Islam is enabled within the souls, minds and the lives of the people of the country in which it moves".

Rooting: "That Islam is resident and not a passing thing, or rooted "entrenched" in the soil of the spot where it moves and not a strange plant to it".

Four: The Process of Settlement:

- In order for Islam and its Movement to become "a part of the homeland" in which it lives, "stable" in its land, "rooted" in the spirits and minds of its people, "enabled" in the live of its society and has firmly-established "organizations" on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain "the keys" and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a "Civilization Jihadist" responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and - on top of them - the Muslim Brotherhood in this country. Among these keys and tools are the following:

1- Adopting the concept of settlement and understanding its practical meanings:

The Explanatory Memorandum focused on the Movement and the realistic dimension of the process of settlement and its practical meanings without paying attention to the difference in understanding between the resident and the non-resident, or who is the settled and the non-settled

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and we believe that what was mentioned in the long-term plan in that regards suffices.

2- Making a fundamental shift in our thinking and mentality in order to suit the challenges of the settlement mission.

What is meant with the shift - which is a positive expression - is responding to the grand challenges of the settlement issues. We believe that any transforming response begins with the method of thinking and its center, the brain, first. In order to clarify what is meant with the shift as a key to qualify us to enter the field of settlement, we say very briefly that the following must be accomplished:

- A shift from the partial thinking mentality to the comprehensive thinking mentality.
- A shift from the "amputated" partial thinking mentality to the "continuous" comprehensive mentality.
- A shift from the mentality of caution and reservation to the mentality of risk and controlled liberation.
- A shift from the mentality of the elite Movement to the mentality of the popular Movement.
- A shift from the mentality of preaching and guidance to the mentality of building and testimony
- A shift from the single opinion mentality to the multiple opinion mentality.
- A shift from the collision mentality to the absorption mentality.
- A shift from the individual mentality to the team mentality.
- A shift from the anticipation mentality to the initiative mentality.
- A shift from the hesitation mentality to the decisiveness mentality.
- A shift from the principles mentality to the programs mentality.
- A shift from the abstract ideas mentality the true organizations mentality [This is the core point and the essence of the memorandum].

3- Understanding the historical stages in which the Islamic Ikhwani activism went through in this country:

The writer of the memorandum believes that understanding and comprehending the historical stages of the Islamic activism which was led and being led by the Muslim Brotherhood in this continent is a very important key in working towards settlement, through which the Group observes its march, the direction of its movement and the curves and turns of its road. We will suffice here with mentioning the title for each of these stages [The title expresses the prevalent characteristic of the stage] [Details maybe mentioned in another future study]. Most likely, the stages are:

- A- The stage of searching for self and determining the identity.
- B- The stage of inner build-up and tightening the organization.
- C- The stage of mosques and the Islamic centers.
- D- The stage of building the Islamic organizations - the first phase.
- E- The stage of building the Islamic schools - the first phase.

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F- The stage of thinking about the overt Islamic Movement - the first phase.

G- The stage of openness to the other Islamic movements and attempting to reach a formula for dealing with them - the first phase.

H- The stage of reviving and establishing the Islamic organizations - the second phase.

We believe that the Group is embarking on this stage in its second phase as it has to open the door and enter as it did the first time.

4- Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America:

The process of settlement is a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal.

5- Understanding that we cannot perform the settlement mission by ourselves or away from people:

A mission as significant and as huge as the settlement mission needs magnificent and exhausting efforts. With their capabilities, human, financial and scientific resources, the Ikhwan will not be able to carry out this mission alone or away from people and he who believes that is wrong, and God knows best. As for the role of the Ikhwan, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims' efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a mastery of the art of "coalitions", the art of "absorption" and the principles of "cooperation".

6- The necessity of achieving a union and balanced gradual merger between private work and public work:

We believe that what was written about this subject is many and is enough. But, it needs a time and a practical frame so that what is needed is achieved in a gradual and a balanced way that is compatible with the process of settlement.

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7- The conviction that the success of the settlement of Islam and its Movement in this country is a success to the global Islamic Movement and a true support for the sought-after state, God willing:

There is a conviction - with which this memorandum disagrees - that our focus in attempting to settle Islam in this country will lead to negligence in our duty towards the global Islamic Movement in supporting its project to establish the state. We believe that the reply is in two segments: One - The success of the Movement in America in establishing an observant Islamic base with power and effectiveness will be the best support and aid to the global Movement project.

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And the second - is the global Movement has not succeeded yet in "distributing roles" to its branches, stating what is needed from them as one of the participants or contributors to the project to establish the global Islamic state. The day this happens, the children of the American Ikhwani branch will have far-reaching impact and positions that make the ancestors proud.

8- Absorbing Muslims and winning them with all of their factions and colors in America and Canada for the settlement project, and making it their cause, future and the basis of their Islamic life in this part of the world:

This issues requires from us to learn "the art of dealing with the others", as people are different and people in many colors. We need to adopt the principle which says, "Take from people... the best they have", their best specializations, experiences, arts, energies and abilities. By people here we mean those within or without the ranks of individuals and organizations. The policy of "taking" should be with what achieves the strategic goal and the settlement process. But the big challenge in front of us is: how to connect them all in "the orbit" of our plan and "the circle" of our Movement in order to achieve "the core" of our interest. To me, there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work. And the U.S. Islamic arena is full of those waiting...., the pioneers.

What matters is bringing people to the level of comprehension of the challenge that is facing us as Muslims in this country, conviction of our settlement project, and understanding the benefit of agreement, cooperation and alliance. At that time, if we ask for money, a lot of it would come, and if we ask for men, they would come in lines. What matters is that our plan is "the criterion and the balance" in our relationship with others.

Here, two points must be noted; the first one: we need to comprehend and understand the balance of the Islamic powers in the U.S. arena [and this might be the subject of a future study]. The second point: what we reached with the brothers in "ICNA" is considered a step in the right direction, the beginning of good and the first drop that requires growing and guidance.

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9- Re-examining our organizational and administrative bodies, the type of leadership and the method of selecting it with what suits the challenges of the settlement mission:

The memorandum will be silent about details regarding this item even though it is logical and there is a lot to be said about it.

10- Growing and developing our resources and capabilities, our financial and human resources with what suits the magnitude of the grand mission:

If we examined the human and the financial resources the Ikhwan alone own in this country, we and others would feel proud and glorious. And if we add to them the resources of our friends and allies, those who circle in our orbit and those waiting on our banner, we would realize that we are able to open the door to settlement and walk through it seeking to make Almighty God's word the highest.

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11- Utilizing the scientific method in planning, thinking and preparation of studies needed for the process of settlement:

Yes, we need this method, and we need many studies which aid in this civilization Jihadist operation. We will mention some of them briefly:

- The history of the Islamic presence in America.
- The history of the Islamic Ikhwani presence in America.
- Islamic movements, organizations and organizations: analysis and criticism.
- The phenomenon of the Islamic centers and schools: challenges, needs and statistics.
- Islamic minorities.
- Muslim and Arab communities.
- The U.S. society: make-up and politics.
- The U.S. society's view of Islam and Muslims... And many other studies which we can direct our brothers and allies to prepare, either through their academic studies or through their educational centers or organizational tasking. What is important is that we start.

12- Agreeing on a flexible, balanced and a clear "mechanism" to implement the process of settlement within a specific, gradual and balanced "time frame" that is in-line with the demands and challenges of the process of settlement.

13- Understanding the U.S. society from its different aspects an understanding that "qualifies" us to perform the mission of settling our Dawa' in its country "and growing it" on its land.

14- Adopting a written "jurisprudence" that includes legal and movement bases, principles, policies and interpretations which are suitable for the needs and challenges of the process of settlement.

15- Agreeing on "criteria" and balances to be a sort of "antennas" or "the watch tower" in order to make sure that all of our priorities, plans, programs, bodies, leadership, monies and activities march towards the process of the settlement.

16- Adopting a practical, flexible formula through which our central work complements our domestic work.

[Items 12 through 16 will be detailed later].

17- Understanding the role and the nature of work of "The Islamic Center" in every city with what achieves the goal of the process of settlement:

The center we seek is the one which constitutes the "axis" of our Movement, the "perimeter" of the circle of our work, our "balance center", the "base" for our rise and our "Dar al-Arqam" to educate us, prepare us and supply our battalions in addition to being the "niche" of our prayers.

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This is in order for the Islamic center to turn - in action not in words - into a seed "for a small Islamic society" which is a reflection and a mirror to our central organizations. The center ought to turn into a "beehive" which produces sweet honey. Thus, the Islamic center would turn into a place for study, family, battalion, course, seminar, visit, sport, school, social club, women gathering, kindergarten for male and female youngsters, the office of the domestic political resolution, and the center for distributing our newspapers, magazines, books and our audio and visual tapes.

In brief we say: we would like for the Islamic center to become "The House of Dawa'" and "the general center" in deeds first before name. As much as we own and direct these centers at the continent level, we can say we are marching successfully towards the settlement of Dawa' in this country.

Meaning that the "center's" role should be the same as the "mosque's" role during the time of God's prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, when he marched to "settle" the Dawa' in its first generation in Madina. from the mosque, he drew the Islamic life and provided to the world the most magnificent and fabulous civilization humanity knew.

This mandates that, eventually, the region, the branch and the Usra turn into "operations rooms" for planning, direction, monitoring and leadership for the Islamic center in order to be a role model to be followed.

18- Adopting a system that is based on "selecting" workers, "role distribution" and "assigning" positions and responsibilities is based on specialization, desire and need with what achieves the process of settlement and contributes to its success.

19- Turning the principle of dedication for the Masuls of main positions within the Group into a rule, a basis and a policy in work. Without it, the process of settlement might be stalled [Talking about this point requires more details and discussion].

20- Understanding the importance of the "Organizational" shift in our Movement work, and doing Jihad in order to achieve it in the real world with what serves the process of settlement and expedites its results, God Almighty's willing:

The reason this paragraph was delayed is to stress its utmost importance as it constitutes the heart and the core of this memorandum. It also constitutes the practical aspect and the true measure of our success or failure in our march towards settlement. The talk about the organizations and the "organizational" mentality or phenomenon does not require much details. It suffices to say that the first pioneer of this phenomenon was our prophet Mohamed, God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon him, as he placed the foundation for the first civilized organization which is the mosque, which truly became "the comprehensive organization". And this was done by the pioneer of the contemporary Islamic Dawa', Imam martyr Hasan al-Banna, may God have mercy on him, when he and his brothers felt the need to "re-establish" Islam and its movement anew, leading him to establish organizations with all their kinds: economic, social, media, scouting,

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professional and even the military ones. We must say that we are in a country which understands no language other than the language of the organizations, and one which does not respect or give weight to any group without effective, functional and strong organizations.

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It is good fortune that there are brothers among us who have this "trend", mentality or inclination to build the organizations who have beat us by action and words which leads us to dare say honestly what Sadat in Egypt once said, "We want to build a country of organizations" - a word of right he meant wrong with. I say to my brothers, let us raise the banner of truth to establish right "We want to establish the Group of organizations", as without it we will not able to put our feet on the true path.

- And in order for the process of settlement to be completed, we must plan and work from now to equip and prepare ourselves, our brothers, our apparatuses, our sections and our committees in order to turn into comprehensive organizations in a gradual and balanced way that is suitable with the need and the reality. What encourages us to do that - in addition to the aforementioned - is that we possess "seeds" for each organization from the organization we call for [See attachment number (1)].

- All we need is to tweak them, coordinate their work, collect their elements and merge their efforts with others and then connect them with the comprehensive plan we seek.

For instance,

We have a seed for a "comprehensive media and art" organization: we own a print + advanced typesetting machine + audio and visual center + art production office + magazines in Arabic and English [The Horizons, The Hope, The Politicians, Ila Falastine, Press Clips, al-Zaytouna, Palestine Monitor, Social Sciences Magazines...] + art band + photographers + producers + programs anchors + journalists + in addition to other media and art experiences".

Another example:

We have a seed for a "comprehensive Dawa' educational" organization: We have the Daw'a section in ISNA + Dr. Jamal Badawi Foundation + the center run by brother Hamed al-Ghazali + the Dawa' center the Dawa' Committee and brother Shaker al-Sayyed are seeking to establish now + in addition to other Daw'a efforts here and there...".

And this applies to all the organizations we call on establishing.

- The big challenge that is ahead of us is how to turn these seeds or "scattered" elements into comprehensive, stable, "settled" organizations that are connected with our Movement and which fly in our orbit and take orders from our guidance. This does not prevent - but calls for - each central organization to have its local branches but its connection with the Islamic center in the city is a must.

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- What is needed is to seek to prepare the atmosphere and the means to achieve "the merger" so that the sections, the committees, the regions, the branches and the Usras are eventually the heart and the core of these organizations.

Or, for the shift and the change to occur as follows:

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- | | |
|---|--|
| 1- The Movement Department +
The Secretariat Department | - The Organizational & Administrative Organization -
The General Center |
| 2- Education Department + Dawa'a Com. | - Dawa' and Educational Organization |
| 3- Sisters Department | - The Women's Organization |
| 4- The Financial Department + Investment
Committee + The Endowment | - The Economic Organization |
| 5- Youth Department + Youths
Organizations Department | - Youth Organizations |
| 6- The Social Committee + Matrimony
Committee + Mercy Foundation | - The Social Organization |
| 7- The Security Committee | - The Security Organization |
| 8- The Political Depart. + Palestine Com. | - The Political Organization |
| 9- The Group's Court + The Legal Com. | - The Judicial Organization |
| 10- Domestic Work Department | - Its work is to be distributed to the rest of the
organizations |
| 11- Our magazines + the print +
our art band | - The Media and Art Organization |
| 12- The Studies Association + The
Publication House + Dar al-Kitab | - The Intellectual & Cultural Organization |
| 13- Scientific and Medial societies | - Scientific, Educational & Professional
Organization |
| 14- The Organizational Conference | - The Islamic-American Founding Conference |
| 15- The Shura Council + Planning Com. | - The Shura Council for the Islamic-American
Movement |
| 16- The Executive Office | - The Executive Office of the Islamic-American
Movement |
| 17- The General Masul | - Chairman of the Islamic Movement and its official
Spokesman |
| 18- The regions, branches & Usras | - Field leaders of organizations & Islamic centers |

Five: Comprehensive Settlement Organization:

- We would then seek and struggle in order to make each one of these above-mentioned organizations a "comprehensive organization" throughout the days and the years, and as long as we are destined to be in this country. What is important is that we put the foundation and we will be followed by peoples and generations that would finish the march and the road but with a clearly-defined guidance.

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And, in order for us to clarify what we mean with the comprehensive, specialized organization, we mention here the characteristics and traits of each organization of the "promising" organizations.

1- From the Dawa' and educational aspect [The Dawa' and Educational Organization]: to include:

- The Organization to spread the Dawa' (Central and local branches).
- An institute to graduate Callers and Educators.
- Scholars, Callers, Educators, Preachers and Program Anchors.
- Art and communication technology, Conveyance and Dawa'.

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(10)

- A television station.
- A specialized Dawa' magazine.
- A radio station.
- The Higher Islamic Council for Callers and Educators.
- The Higher Council for Mosques and Islamic Centers.
- Friendship Societies with the other religions... and things like that.

2- Politically [The Political Organization]: to include:

- A central political party.
- Local political offices.
- Political symbols.
- Relationships and alliances.
- The American Organization for Islamic Political Action
- Advanced Information Centers....and things like that.

3- Media [The Media and Art Organization]: to include:

- A daily newspaper.
- Weekly, monthly and seasonal magazines.
- Radio stations.
- Television programs.
- Audio and visual centers.
- A magazine for the Muslim child.
- A magazine for the Muslim woman.
- A print and typesetting machines.
- A production office.
- A photography and recording studio
- Art bands for acting, chanting and theater.
- A marketing and art production office... and things like that.

(11)

4- Economically [The Economic Organization]: to include:

- An Islamic Central bank.
- Islamic endowments.
- Investment projects.
- An organization for interest-free loans.... and things like that.

5- Scientifically and Professionally [The Scientific, Educational and Professional Organization]: to include:

- Scientific research centers.
- Technical organizations and vocational training.
- An Islamic university.
- Islamic schools.
- A council for education and scientific research.
- Centers to train teachers.
- Scientific societies in schools.
- An office for academic guidance.
- A body for authorship and Islamic curricula.... and things like that.

6- Culturally and Intellectually [The Cultural and Intellectual Organization]: to include:

- A center for studies and research.
- Cultural and intellectual foundations such as [The Social Scientists Society - Scientists and Engineers Society....].
- An organization for Islamic thought and culture.
- A publication, translation and distribution house for Islamic books.
- An office for archiving, history and authentication
- The project to translate the Noble Quran, the Noble Sayings....and things like that.

7- Socially [The Social-Charitable Organization]: to include:

- Social clubs for the youths and the community's sons and daughters
- Local societies for social welfare and the services are tied to the Islamic centers
- The Islamic Organization to Combat the Social Ills of the U.S. Society
- Islamic houses project
- Matrimony and family cases office....and things like that.

(12)

8- Youths [The Youth Organization]: to include:

- Central and local youths foundations.
- Sports teams and clubs
- Scouting teams....and things like that.

9- Women [The Women Organization]: to include:

- Central and local women societies.
- Organizations of training, vocational and housekeeping.
- An organization to train female preachers.
- Islamic kindergartens...and things like that.

10- Organizationally and Administratively [The Administrative and Organizational Organization]: to include:

- An institute for training, growth, development and planning
- Prominent experts in this field
- Work systems, bylaws and charters fit for running the most complicated bodies and organizations
- A periodic magazine in Islamic development and administration.
- Owning camps and halls for the various activities.
- A data, polling and census bank.
- An advanced communication network.
- An advanced archive for our heritage and production....and things like that.

11- Security [The Security Organization]: to include:

- Clubs for training and learning self-defense techniques.
- A center which is concerned with the security issues [Technical, intellectual, technological and human]....and things like that.

12- Legally [The Legal Organization]: to include:

- A Central Jurisprudence Council.
- A Central Islamic Court.
- Muslim Attorneys Society.
- The Islamic Foundation for Defense of Muslims' Rights...and things like that.

And success is by God.

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Attachment number (1)

A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends
[Imagine if t they all march according to one plan!!!]

- 1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
- 2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
- 3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
- 4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
- 5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
- 6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

- 7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
- 8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
- 9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- 10- IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
- 11- ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
- 12- ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
- 13- AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
- 14- IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
- 15- MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
- 16- MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
- 17- IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
- 18- IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
- 19- IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

- 20- MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
- 21- MISG = MALASIAN [sic] ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
- 22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
- 23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
- 24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
- 25- MIA = MERCY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

- 26- ISNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
- 27- BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
- 28- IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
- 29- IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

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- ١ -

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

تقرير من / ٥ / ١٠٠

١ / ١٢ / ١٩٨٢ م

نحو استراتيجية عالمية للسياسة الاسلامية
(منطلقات ، وعناصر ، ومستلزمات اجرائية ومهميات)

يقدم هذا التقرير تظورا شاملا لاستراتيجية عالمية للسياسة الاسلامية ويتم في ضوئها وينسجم معها رسم السياسات الاسلامية المحلية في الاقطار المختلفة ، وقد روعي ان تثبت منطلقات هذه السياسة ، ثم تذكر اهم عناصر كل منطلق ، واهم المستلزمات الاجرائية لكل منطلق ، وبعض المهمات المقترحة على سبيل المثال وليس الحصر ، والله ولي التوفيق .
وفي ما يلي اهم مَبْطَلَقَات هذه السياسة :

المنطلق الاول : معرفة ارض الواقع واعتماد المنهجية العلمية في التخطيط والتنفيذ
المنطلق الثاني : الجدية في العمل .

المنطلق الثالث : الجمع بين الالتزام العالمي والمرونة المحلية .
المنطلق الرابع : الجمع بين الاشتغال بالسياسة وعدم الانعزال من جهة والتربية المستمرة للاجيال والعمل المؤسسي من جهة اخرى .
المنطلق الخامس : السعي لاقامة الدولة الاسلامية والعمل الموازي التدريجي في السيطرة على مراكز القوى المحلية من جهة اخرى واستخدام العمل المؤسسي وسيلة لذلك .

المنطلق السادس : العمل باخلاص مع الجماعات والهيئات الاسلامية في محاور مختلفة وبالاتفاق على قدر مشترك من النقاط " نتعاون فيما اتفقنا عليه ويعذر بعضنا بعضا فيما اختلفنا فيه " .

المنطلق السابع : قبول فكرة نوع من التعاون المبرطي بين الحركات الاسلامية وغيرها من الحركات الوطنية وفي قضايا عامة وفي بعض النقاط غير الخلافية كمحاربة الاستعمار والتبشير والدولة لليهودية بصورة لا ترقى الى مستوى التحالفات بل تتم على مستويات عناصر محدودة في القيادة او الاتمال ، ويبقى في نطاق دراسة كل حالة على حده والى المدى الذي يوافق الشرع دون موالاتهم او الاطمئنان اليهم مع ملاحظة ان تكون الحركة الاسلامية صاحبة المبادرة والتوجيه .

المنطلق الثامن : اتقان فن التمكن من الناحية المبرطية دون التفريط بالمبادئ الاساسية مع العلم ان احكام الله جميعا ممكنة التطبيق والدعوة الى ممارسة الامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر مع ابداء الرأي الموثق بالبيانات والكتب دون اضطرار الدعوة الى المحابسة غير المتكافئة مع خصومها المحليين او اعدائها العالميين .

التي قد تقود الى ضربات قاصمة للدعوة والدعاة .
المنطلق التاسع : البناء المستمر للقوة اللازمة للدعوة الاسلامية ودعم الحركات
الجهادية في العالم الاسلامي بنسب متفاوتة قدر المستطاع .

المنطلق العاشر : الاعتماد على اجهزة رصد متنوعة وفي امكنة مختلفة للتغذية
بالمعلومات واعتماد سياسة اعلامية واعية وفعالة لخدمة السياسة
الاسلامية العالمية ، فالرصد وعمل القرارات السياسية ، والاعلام
الفعال عمل متكامل الاجزاء من حيث التكوين والاداء .

المنطلق الحادي عشر : تبني القضية الفلسطينية ، على المستوى الاسلامي العالمي
على الصعيدين السياسي والجهادي لانها مفتاح نهضة العالم الاسلامي
من جديد في العصر الحاضر .

المنطلق الثاني عشر : النقد الذاتي والتقييم المستمر للسياسة الاسلامية العالمية
من حيث الاهداف والمضمون والاجراءات بقصد التطوير والتحسين واجب
اسلامي وامر ضروري وهذا مما توجه احكام الشريعة الاسلامية - الخراء .

+++++

المنطلق الاول :

- * معرفة ارض الواقع واعتماد المنهجية العلمية في التخطيط والتنفيذ .
أ- العناصر

- ١ - معرفة العوامل المؤثرة الفاعلة في العالم من حيث القوى الاسلامية
القوى المعادية ، القوى المحايدة .
٢ - استخدام الاساليب العلمية والتكنولوجية في التخطيط والتنظيم والتنفيذ
ومواكبتها .
ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - انشاء مراكز رفد للمعلومات وتجميعها وتخزينها والاستفادة منها حين
الحاجة مستعينين بالوسائل التكنولوجية الحديثة .
٢ - انشاء مراكز للدراسات والبحوث وانتاج بحوث علمية في القضايا السياسية
في اطار اسلامي .
ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - عمل خريطة عقائدية زمنية للعالم ، بقصد اعطاء نظرة كلية شاملة : تشمل
العالم منذ مائة عام الى اليوم ، وتحليل الوضع الحالي في ضوء ذلك مع التفسير
الذي حدث والتوقعات المرتقبة .
٢ - عمل خريطة مذهبية للعالم الاسلامي .
٣ - عمل خريطة للحركات الاسلامية في العالم الاسلامي .
٤ - القيام بدراسات سياسية متتالية باسلوب علمي للقضايا المختلفة في اطار
اسلامي وبخاصة الاحداث الجارية .
٥ - دراسة علمية تقييمية لتاريخ الحركات الاسلامية المعاصرة والاستفادة منها .

المنطلق الثاني :

الجدية في العمل

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - وضوح اهداف الدعوة الرشيعة للجميع واهداف مرحلية تستثمر الطاقات وتنظمها وتساعد على تجميعها وتوجيهها وترتيبها .
 - ٢ - بذل الجهد الكافي للعاملين وتجميع هذه الجهود في طريق واحد .
 - ٣ - بذل الوقت الكافي .
 - ٤ - بذل العال المعكن .
- ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١- تشغيل جميع طاقات العاملين لخدمة الدعوة كل حسب امكاناته (مقياس الفعالية ان يشتغل الجميع كل في بيئته سخر له) .
 - ٢ - تفريغ العدد الكافي من الدعاة والقياديين .
 - ٣ - فعالية جمع العال ووضع صرفه واستثماره للمصالح العام .
- ج- مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - عمل مسح بشري متخصص للعاملين (الرجل المناسب في المكان المناسب)
- ٢ - عمل جداول زمنية باوقات العاملين والمتخصصين وحين استخدام هذه الجهود في الاوقات المناسبة (الجهد المناسب في الوقت المناسب) .
- ٣ - عمل المؤسسات الاقتصادية اللازمة لدعم الدعوة ماليا .

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المنطلق الثالث:

الجمع بين الالتزام العالمي والمرونة المحلية .

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - تحديد الامور العامة التي ينبغي على الجميع الالتزام بها .
- ٢ - ترك المجال لتحرية والمرونة الكافية في القضايا المحلية التي لا تتعارض مع الخطوط العامة للسياسة الاسلامية العالمية .

ب - مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - يقوم التنظيم العالمي بتحديد المجالات والقضايا الاسلامية العامة التي تتطلب التزام الجميع بها وفق نظام اولويات مدروس .
- ٢ - يقوم التنظيم المحلي بتحديد القضايا المحلية التي يتكفلها الحرية والمرونة في التصرف بها وفق نظام اولويات مدروس .

ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - الالتزام الاسلامي العالمي تجاه تحرير فلسطين كاملة واقامة الدولة الاسلامية فيها ، ويقوم التنظيم العالمي بهذا التحديد .
- ٢ - المحاورة المحلية مع العاملين للقفية ضمن الخط السياسي العام للدعوة ، ويقوم التنظيم المحلي برسم خطوط هذا الحوار .

المنطلق الرابع:

الجمع بين الاشتغال بالسياسة وعدم الانعزال من جهة والتربية المستمرة للأجيال والعمل المؤسسي من جهة أخرى .

أ- العناصر

إعطانية

- ١ - حرية العمل السياسي ~~في قطر~~ داخل كل قطر حسب الظروف المحلية ، مع ملاحظة عدم الاشتراك في مسؤولية اتخاذ قرارات مصيرية تخالف نصوص الشريعة الإسلامية .
 - ٢ - ندب الجميع للاشتراك في المجالس النيابية والبلدية والنقابية وغيرها من المؤسسات التي يختار مجالسها الشعب بما يحقق مصلحة الاسلام والمسلمين .
 - ٣ - الاستمرار في تربية الافراد والاجيال بما في ذلك اعداد الاختصاصيين في المجالات المختلفة وفق مخطط مدروس .
 - ٤ - بناء المؤسسات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والصحة والعلمية والدخول في ميادين الخدمة الاجتماعية للاتصال بالشعب وخدمته عن طريق المؤسسات الاسلامية .
- ب - مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - دراسة البيئات السياسية المختلفة ومدى امكانية النجاح في كل قطر .
 - ٢ - عمل مخطط ارسال بعثات للدراسات المتخصصة في الحقول النادرة والمفيدة كالاتم والمؤرخ الاسلامي الخ
 - ٣ - عمل دراسات جدوى لمؤسسات متنوعة وانشاؤها وفق اولويات محددة في كل قطر .
- ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - دراسة التجارب السياسية للحركات الاسلامية واخذ العبر منها .
- ٢ - ابداء الرأي السياسي الاسلامي في سائر القضايا الملحة .
- ٣ - تبني القضايا المحلية الهامة في اطار اعلامي ، كقضايا العمال ، والنقابات الخ
- ٤ - انشاء عدد من المؤسسات الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والصحية والتربوية وفق الامكانيات الممكنة وذلك لخدمة الشعب في اطار اعلامي .

المنطلق الخامس :

السعي لقيام الدولة الاسلامية والعمل الموازي التدريجي في السيطرة على مراكز القوى المحلية من جهة اخرى واستخدام العمل المؤسسي وسيلة لذلك .

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - تركيز الفكر والتربية والعمل لاقامة حكم اسلامي في الارض .
- ٢ - التأثير على مراكز القوى المحلية والعالمية لصالح الاسلام .

ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - عمل دراسة علمية لامكانيات قيام حكم الله في اية بقعة في الارض وفق اولويات مدروسة .
- ٢ - دراسة علمية لمراكز القوى العالمية والمحلية وامكانية التأثير فيها .
- ٣ - عمل دراسة عصرية لمفهوم " النصر " للدعوة الاسلامية والحكم الاسلامي من حيث الرجال المؤثرون في الدولة والبلد .

ج - مهمات مقترحة

- ١ - العمل على تدوين دستور اسلامي في ضوء دراسة المجهودات التي بذلت لحد الآن .
- ٢ - العمل على تدوين قوانين اسلامية ،مدنية وغير ذلك الخ
- ٣ - اختيار بقعة واعطاؤها الاولوية لاقامة حكم اسلامي فيها وتركيز الجهد فيها .
- ٤ - العمل في المؤسسات المختلفة ذات مراكز القوى واستخدامها لصالح الاسلام ..
- ٥ - عمل مؤسسات اسلامية خاصة اقتصادية واجتماعية الخ

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المنطلق السادس :

العمل باخلاص مع الجماعات والهيئات الاسلامية في مجاور مختلفة وبالاتفاق على قدر مشترك من النقاط " نتعاون فيما اتفقنا عليه ويعذر بعضنا بعضا فيما اختلفنا فيه " .

أ- العناصر:

١ - تنسيق العمل الاسلامي في اتجاه واحد ليتكامل وينمو في طريق اقامة المجتمع الاسلامي وحكم الله في الارض .
كل في المجال الذي يرغبه او يتقنه وحسب ما يعطى من جهد ، والعبرة بالاخلاص وتنسيق الجهود .

ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

١ - دراسة واقع الحركات الاسلامية وتقييم تجاربها ورسم الخطط للتعاون فيما بينها .
٢ - عدم اقامة مزيد من الحركات الاسلامية في بلاد فيها حركات اسلامية شاملة واعية واحدة على الاقل .

ج- مهمات مقترحة :

١ - التنسيق بين العاملين للاسلام في كل بلد وقيامه الصلة الحسنة مع العاملين للاسلام افرادا وجماعات .
٢ - تضييق نطاق الخلافات بين العاملين للاسلام ، والسعي لحل نزاعاتهم وقضاياهم وفق الشريعة الاسلامية .

المنطلق السابق

قبول فكرة نوع من التعاون المرطبي بين الحركات الاسلامية وغيرها من الحركات الوطنية في قضايا عامة وفي بعض النقاط غير الخلافية كمنهجية الإستعمار والتبشير والدولة اليهودية بصورة لا ترقى الى مستوى التحالفات/بل تتم على مستويات عناصر محدودة في القيادة او الاتصال وتبقى في نطاق دراسة كل حالة على حده والى المدى الذي يوافق الشرع دون موالاتهم او الاطمئنان اليهم مع ملاحظة أن تكون الحركة الاسلامية صاحبة المبادرة والتوجيه .

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - توحيد الجهود ضد قوى الشر الكبرى استنادا الى القاعدة الشرعية " يدفع الضرر الاشد بالضرر الاخف " .
- ٢ - قصر التعاون على عناصر قيادية او عناصر محدودة للاتصال ،تزيد من الفائدة الممكنة وتنقص من الضرر المحتمل .
- ٣ - ان يكون العمل في اطار هذا المنطلق لتحقيق الاهداف التي رسمتها الدعوة مسبقا .

ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - دراسة تقييمية شاملة للمجالات التي تمت في السابق بين الحركات الاسلامية وغيرها من الحركات واستخلاص الدروس والعبر منها .
- ٢ - دراسة المجالات التي يمكن التنسيق فيها مع الآخرين وتحديد مدى ذلك التنسيق وصوره .
- ٣ - دراسة فكر وخطط الحركات الأخرى .

ج- مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - يقوم كل قطر بدراسة امكانيات التعاون في المستقبل في ذلك القطر .

المنطلق الثامن :

اتقان فن العمكن من الناحية المرهنية دون التفريط بالمبادئ الاساسية مع العلم ان احكام الله جميعا ممكنة التطبيق والدعوة الى ممارسة الامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر مع ابداء الرأى الموشق بالبيانات والكتب دون اضطرار الدعوة الى المجابهة غير المتكافئة مع خصومها المحظيين او اعدائها العالميين التي قد تقود الى ضربات قاصمة للدعوة والدعاة .

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - تقييم تربية الافراد وعدم المغالاة والتطرف في التربية المشالية الكفريشة التي لا تستند الى الواقع ولا تؤمن بالمرونة والتدرج ،لما يترتب على ذلك من اخطار قد تؤدى الى تصادم الافراد انفسهم لمجرد ملاحظة أى تقصير .
- ٢ - ابداء الرأى الموشق بالخطبة والبيان والكتاب في الاحداث الكبرى التي تمر بآمتنا باسلوب علمي .
- ٣ - تجنب الدعوة العجائبية الحادة التي تؤدى الى ضرب الدعوة جذريا من قبل اعدائها .

ب - مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - دراسة تقييمية لتجارب الحركات الاسلامية بقصد تجنب الاخطاء البقاتلة .
- ٢ - تطوير مناهج التربية للافراد بحيث تجمع بين المشالية والواقعية ،بين التمسك بالمبادئ واليمرونية في مواجهة المواقف .

ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - تطوير برامج اعداد الدعاة وتوعيتهم بالتجارب العاضية .
- ٢ - المباشرة في اعداد الافراد وفق مناهج تربوية مطورة .

المنطلق التاسع :

البناء المستمر للقوة اللازمة للدعوة الاسلامية ودعم الحركات الجهادية في العالم الاسلامي بنسب متفاوتة قدر المتطاع .

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - حماية الدعوة الى الله بالقوة اللازمة لأمنها محليا وعالميا .
- ٢ - الاتصال بأية حركة جهادية تنشأ في اي قطر من العالم الاسلامي والاقليات الاسلامية وبناء الجسور معها بنسب متفاوتة من اجل دعمها والتعاون المشترك .
- ٣ - ابقاء فريضة الجهادية في الأمة الاسلامية .

ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - بناء قوة أمن ذاتية لحماية الدعوة والدعاة محليا وعالميا .
- ٢ - دراسة الحركات الجهادية في العالم الاسلامي والاقليات الاسلامية بقصد معرفة اوضاعها بدقة .

ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - عمل جسور اتصالات مع الحركات الجهادية في العالم الاسلامي والاقليات الاسلامية ودعمها في الحدود وبالصورة الممكنة والتعاون المشترك معها .

المنطلق العاشر :

الاعتماد على اجهزة رصد متنوعة وفي امكنة مختلفة للتغذية بالمعلومات واعتماد سياسة اعلامية واعية وفعالة لخدمة السياسة الاعلامية العالمية ، فالرصد وعمل القرارات السياسية ، والاعلام الفعال على متكامل الاجزاء من حيث التكوين والاداء .

f- العناصر :

- ١ - اعتماد القرار السياسي على رصد المعلومات الهامة والدقيقة .
- ٢ - اعتماد نشر السياسة الاسلامية على اعلام شامل من حيث التغطية وفعال من حيث الاداء .

ب- مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - انشاء جهاز رصد حديث ، مستخدمين التكنولوجيا المتطورة (وربما تكامل ذلك مع مركز المعلومات المقترح) .
- ٢ - انشاء جهاز اعلامي واع وقدير .

ج- مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - تنبيه المسلمين على الاخطار المحدقة بهم والمؤامرات العالمية التي تحاك ضدهم .
- ٢ - ابداء الرأي الاسلامي في القضايا المعاصرة المطروحة والقضايا المستقبلية .

المنطلق الحادي عشر :

تبني القضية الفلسطينية ، على المستوى الاسلامي العالمي على الصعيدين السياسي والجهادي لأنها مفتاح نهضة العالم الاسلامي من جديد في العصر الحاضر .

أ- العناصر :

- ١ - ابداء الرأي الاسلامي في كل الامور والطول والمشكلات التي تواجه القضية الفلسطينية مع بلورة حكم الاسلام في ذلك .
- ودوام توعية المسلمين على اساسه .
- ٢ - اعداد الامة للجهاد من اجل تحرير فلسطين ، ويمكن قيادة الامة وتحقيق مآثر اهداف الحركة الاسلامية عن هذا الطريق وخصوصا اذا تحقق النصر ان شاء الله .
- ٣ - بدء نواة الجهاد في فلسطين ، مهما كان متواضعا ، وتنميته على مر الزمن لابقاء جذوة الجهاد وكطريق وحيد لتحرير فلسطين ، وابقاء القضية الفلسطينية نفسها حية حتى يأذن الله بالتحريز .

ب - مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - ضمان جمع العمال اللازم للجهاد باستمرار .
- ٢ - عمل مسح بشري للاوضاع الاسلامية واوضاع العدو في فلسطين المحتلة .

ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - عمل دراسات عن اليهود اعداء المسلمين وما يقوم به الاعداء اليهود من اذى واضهاد لاخواننا في فلسطين المحتلة بالاضافة الى الخطب والنشرات .
- ٢ - محاربة روح الاستسلام في الامة ورفض الطول الاستسلامية وبيان ان الملح مع اليهود يعني التفريط بقضيتنا الام وتراثها .
- ٣ - عمل دراسات مقارنة بين الحروب المليبية واسرائيل وان النصر للاسلام .
- ٤ - بناء خلايا جهادية في فلسطين وتنميتها لتتبع وتشمل فلسطين المحتلة بكاملها .
- ٥ - عقد الصلة بين المجاهدين في فلسطين والمجاهدين في كل ارض اسلامية .
- ٦ - اذكاء روح الحقد على اليهود وعدم التعايش معهم .

المشلق الثاني عشر :

النقد الذاتي والتقييم المستمر للسياسة الإسلامية العالمية من حيث الأهداف والمضمون والأجراءات بقصد التطوير والتحسين واجب إسلامي وأمر ضروري وهذا مما توجهه الأحكام الشرعية الإسلامية الغراء .

أ- العناصر:

- ١ - النقد الذاتي الشيء الفعال يؤدي الى تجنب الاخطاء .
- ٢ - التقييم المستمر يجب ان يبني على اسي علمية ويؤدي الى تطوير السياسات .
- ٣ - تحسين السياسات الإسلامية بالاستفادة من تجارب الماضي يجب ان يكون هدفا أساسيا واضحا .

ب - مستلزمات اجرائية :

- ١ - تقييم الممارسات العالمية والاستفادة من تجارب الماضي .
- ٢ - الطلب من القيادات في الاقطار المختلفة وكذلك الافراد في كل قطر ان يبدوا آراءهم وافكارهم في مسيرة الدعوة قيادة ومنهجها وخطتها ونتائج بحورة مستمرة .

ج - مهمات مقترحة :

- ١ - اقرار وثيقة للسياسة الإسلامية العالمية بحورة رسمية .
- ٢ - توعية الاقطار والمسؤولين وفق هذه السياسة وتوعية الافراد في ضوء ذلك .
- ٣ - البدء بتطبيق هذه السياسة وتقومها سنويا وتطورها وفقا لذلك .

The Muslim Brotherhood "Project"

The following English translation of *The Project* has been prepared by Scott Burgess and was first published in serial form by The Daily Ablution in December 2005 (Parts I, II, III, IV, V, Conclusion). It is based on the French text of *The Project* published in Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des Islamistes* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2005), pp. 193-205.]

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent and Merciful

S/5/100 report

1/12/1982 [December 1, 1982]

*Towards a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy
(Points of Departure, Elements, Procedures and Missions)*

This report presents a global vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy [or "political Islam"]. Local Islamic policies will be drawn up in the different regions in accordance with its guidelines. It acts, first of all, to define the points of departure of that policy, then to set up the components and the most important procedures linked to each point of departure; finally we suggest several missions, by way of example only, may Allah protect us.

The following are the principal points of departure of this policy:

Point of Departure 1: To know the terrain and adopt a scientific methodology for its planning and execution.

Point of Departure 2: To demonstrate proof of the serious nature of the work.

Point of Departure 3: To reconcile international engagement with flexibility at a local level.

Point of Departure 4: To reconcile political engagement and the necessity of avoiding isolation on one hand, with permanent education and institutional action on the other.

Point of Departure 5: To be used to establish an Islamic State; parallel, progressive efforts targeted at controlling the local centers of power through institutional action.

Point of Departure 6: To work with loyalty alongside Islamic groups and institutions in multiple areas to agree on common ground, in order to "cooperate on the points of agreement and set aside the points of disagreement".

Point of Departure 7: To accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching and the Jewish

state, without however having to form alliances. This will require, on the other hand, limited contacts between certain leaders, on a case by case basis, as long as these contacts do not violate the [*shari'a*] law. Nevertheless, one must not give them allegiance or take them into confidence, bearing in mind that the Islamic movement must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken.

Point of Departure 8: To master the art of the possible on a temporary basis without abusing the basic principles, bearing in mind that Allah's teachings always apply. One must order the suitable and forbid that which is not, always providing a documented opinion. But we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the *dawa* or its disciples.

Point of Departure 9: To construct a permanent force of the Islamic *dawa* and support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world, to varying degrees and insofar as possible.

Point of Departure 10: To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement. In fact, surveillance, policy decisions and effective communications complement each other.

Point of Departure 11: To adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy plan and by means of *jihad*, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today.

Point of Departure 12: To know how to turn to self-criticism and permanent evaluation of worldwide Islamic policy and its objectives, of its content and its procedures, in order to improve it. This is a duty and a necessity according to the precepts of *shari'a*.

THE FIRST POINT OF DEPARTURE:

Know the terrain and adopt a scientific methodology for [The Project's] planning and execution.

a- Elements:

Know the influential factors in the world, whether they act as Islamic forces, adverse forces, or neutral forces.

Use the necessary scientific and technical means for planning, organization, execution and follow-up.

b- Procedures:

Create observation centers in order to gather and store information for all useful purposes, if need be relying on modern technological methods.

Create centers of study and research and produce studies on the political dimension of the Islamic movement.

c- Suggested missions:

Draw up a map of [religious and ideological] doctrines in the world to have a global vision from 100 years ago to our era, and analyze the current situation in light of that configuration, taking account of changes both happening and predicted.

Draw up a map of doctrines of the Muslim world.

Draw up a map of Islamic movements in the Muslim world.

Carry out successive political and scientific studies in varying Islamic areas, those which apply more particularly to current events.

Carry out a scientific study which addresses the history of contemporary Islamic movements, and use it.

THE SECOND POINT OF DEPARTURE

To demonstrate proof of the serious nature of the work.

a- Elements:

Clarity of the principal objectives of the *dawa* in the eyes of all, as well as clarity of the temporary objectives, necessitates exploitation, channeling and orientation of the energies.

Devote sufficient effort to the service of the workers [for Allah] and coordinate their efforts to the sole and same objective.

Devote sufficient time.

Spend money to the extent possible.

b-Procedures:

Exploit all the energies of the workers to the service of the *dawa*, each at his level (the criterion of efficiency, given that each must be devoted to the task to which he's assigned).

Mobilize the greatest possible number of supporters and officials.

Collect money efficiently, control expenses and invest in the general interest.

c- Suggested missions:

Carry out a survey of workers (appropriate men and appropriate location)

Establish schedules with the hours of workers and specialists and use their efforts with good judgment and on time (appropriate effort at the right time).

An engagement with economic institutions adequate to support the cause financially.

THE THIRD POINT OF DEPARTURE

Reconcile international engagement with flexibility at the local level.

a- Elements:

To define the guidelines that everyone [worldwide] must follow.

To leave a margin that provides sufficient flexibility at the local level for the issues that do not conflict with the general lines of the global Islamic policy.

b- Procedures:

The Movement, at a global level, will define the Islamic domain and issues in a general way which will require the engagement of all according to previously defined priorities.

The local leadership will define local issues that come within their prerogative, according to the principle of flexibility and according to previously defined priorities.

c- Suggested Missions

Worldwide Islamic engagement for a total liberation of Palestine and the creation of an Islamic state is the mission which falls to the global leadership.

To establish a dialogue at a local level with those who work for the cause according to the global political lines of the Movement. It is up to the local leadership to define the shape of that dialogue.

THE FOURTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To reconcile political engagement with the necessity of avoiding isolation, on the one hand, with permanent education and institutional work on the other.

a- Elements

Liberty to function politically in each country according to local circumstances, without however participating in a process which makes a decision which would be contrary to the texts of *Shari'a*.

To invite everyone to take part in parliament, municipal councils, labor unions and other institutions of which the membership is chosen by the people in the interest of Islam and of Muslims.

To continue to educate individuals and generations and to guarantee the training of specialists in various areas according to a previously designed plan.

To construct social, economic, scientific and health institutions and penetrate the domain of the social services, in order to be in contact with the people and to serve them by means of Islamic institutions.

b- Procedures

To study the varied political environments and the probabilities of success in each country.

To plan specialized study missions which will concentrate on useful areas such as communications, the history of Islam, etc.

To conduct feasibility studies concerning various institutions and create them according to priorities established in each country.

c-Suggested Missions

To conduct studies relating to the experiences of political Islam and to draw lessons from them.

To give an Islamic policy perspective on the pressing questions of the day.

To keep questions of local importance such as issues concerning workers, unions, etc. within an Islamic framework.

To create a certain number of economic, social, health care and educational institutions, using available means, to serve the people within an Islamic framework.

THE FIFTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To dedicate ourselves to the establishment of an Islamic state, in parallel with gradual efforts aimed at gaining control of local power centers through institutional action.

a- Elements

To channel thought, education and action in order to establish an Islamic power [government] on the earth.

To influence centers of power both local and worldwide to the service of Islam.

b- Procedures

To prepare a scientific study on the possibility of establishing the reign of God throughout the world according to established priorities.

To study the centers of power, both local and worldwide, and the possibilities of placing them under influence.

To conduct a modern study on the concept of support for the *dawa* and Islamic law, and more particularly on the men of influence in the State and the country.

c- Suggested Mission

To draw up an Islamic Constitution in light of efforts deployed up to now.

To draw up Islamic laws, civil laws, etc.

To work within various influential institutions and use them in the service of Islam.

To use the work of economic, social, and other specialized Islamic institutions.

THE SIXTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To loyally work alongside Islamic groups and institutions in various areas and in agreement on a common ground in order to "cooperate on points of agreement and put aside points of disagreement".

a- Elements

To coordinate the Islamic work in a single direction as will permit the laying of the foundations of the growth of Muslim society and dedication to the power of God on Earth.

For each to work according to his capacities in his chosen field and to master it, with loyalty and coordination of effort.

b- Procedures

To study the true nature of Islamic movements, to evaluate their experiences and draw up plans to initiate collaboration among them.

To avoid creating new Islamic movements in a country which already has one; there will be but one movement, serious and complete.

c- Suggested missions

To coordinate the efforts of all those working for Islam, in each country, and to establish good contact with them, whether they work in individuals or in groups.

To reduce the differences that exists between workers for Islam and to resolve their conflicts according to *shari'a*.

THE SEVENTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances. This will require, on the other hand, limited contacts between certain leaders, on a case by case basis, as long as these contacts do not violate the [*shari'a*] law. Nevertheless, one must not give them allegiance or take them into confidence, bearing in mind that the Islamic movement must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken.

a-Elements:

To combine all efforts against the supreme forces of evil in accordance with the principle that one must "battle one evil with a lesser evil".

To limit the collaboration to the leadership or to a limited number of individuals in order to maximize the benefit and minimize the possible drawbacks.

To work from perspective of the objectives previously defined for the *dawa*.

b-Procedures:

To make a study to evaluate the areas with the object of mutual assistance between Islamic and other movements and draw lessons from it.

To study the areas which allow cooperation, and define the boundaries.

To study the philosophy and plans of other movements.

c- Suggested Missions:

Each country should study the possibility, in the future, of strengthening internal collaboration.

THE EIGHTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To master the art of the possible on a temporary basis without abusing the basic principles, bearing in mind that Allah's teachings always apply. One must order the suitable and forbid that which is not, always giving a documented opinion [according to *shari'a*]. But we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the *dawa* or its disciples.

a- Elements:

To evaluate the education of individuals and not to excessively use typical modern education that does not correspond to reality, which is devoid of flexibility and could have grave consequences such as the conflict between individuals for a simple comment or a simple failure.

To give a documented and scientific view, in the form of speeches, communiqués and books, that bears on events important to the *Ummah*.

To avoid the Movement hurting itself with major confrontations, which could encourage its adversaries to give it a fatal blow.

b-Procedures:

To carry out a study to evaluate the experiences of Islamist movements in order to avoid their fatal errors.

To develop educational methods that are at the same time exemplary, realistic and true to our principles, in order to bestow a flexibility sufficient to permit the facing of reality.

c-Suggested Missions:

To develop initiation programs for the faithful and proceed with sensitivity to the foundation of past experience.

To prepare individuals according to modern educational methods.

THE NINTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To construct a permanent force of the Islamic *dawa* and support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world, to varying degrees and insofar as possible.

a-Elements:

To protect the *dawa* with the force necessary to guarantee its security at the local and international levels.

To make contact with all new movements engaged in *jihad*, everywhere on the planet, and with Muslim minorities, and to create links as needed to establish and support collaboration.

To maintain jihad and awakening throughout the *Ummah*.

b-Procedures:

To form an autonomous security force to protect the *dawa* and its disciples locally and worldwide.

To study movements engaged in *jihad* in the Muslim world, as well as among Muslim minorities, to better understand them.

c-Suggested Missions:

To build bridges between movements engaged in *jihad* in the Muslim world, and between Muslim minorities, and to support them insofar as possible within a framework of collaboration.

THE TENTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement. In fact, surveillance, policy decisions and effective communications complement each other.

a-Elements:

To make the policy decisions to collect important and precise information.

To diffuse Islamic policy so that it is largely and efficiently covered by the media.

b-Procedures:

To create a modern surveillance system by means of advanced technology (possibly created at the research centers mentioned earlier).

To create an effective and serious media centre.

c- Suggested Missions:

To warn Muslims of the dangers that threaten them and the international conspiracies directed at them.

To give our views on current events and future issues.

THE ELEVENTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy plan and by means of *jihad*, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today.

a-Elements:

To provide an Islamic view on all areas, problems and solutions relative to the Palestinian question, based on the precepts of Islam.

To prepare the community of believers for jihad for the liberation of Palestine. [One can lead the *Ummah* to realize the plans of the Islamic movement above all if victory is ours], if God wills it.

To create a modest nucleus of *jihad* in Palestine, and to nourish it in order to maintain the flame that will light the road toward the liberation of Palestine, and in order that the Palestinian cause will endure until the moment of liberation.

b-Procedures:

To collect sufficient funds for the perpetuation of *jihad*.

To conduct a study of the situation of Muslims and the enemy in occupied Palestine.

c-Suggested Missions:

To conduct studies on the Jews, enemies of Muslims, and on the oppression inflicted by these enemies on our brothers in occupied Palestine, in addition to preaching and publications.

To fight against the sentiment of capitulation among the *Ummah*, to refuse defeatist solutions, and to show that conciliation with the Jews will undermine our Movement and its history.

To conduct comparative studies on the Crusades and Israel, and [the victory that will be that of Islam].

To create jihadi cells in Palestine, and support them in order that they cover all of occupied Palestine.

To create a link between the moujahadin in Palestine and those throughout the Islamic world.

To nourish a sentiment of rancor with respect to the Jews and refuse all coexistence.

THE TWELFTH POINT OF DEPARTURE

To know how to turn to self-criticism and permanent evaluation of worldwide Islamic policy and its objectives, of its content and its procedures in order to improve it. This is a duty and a necessity according to the precepts of shari'a.

a-Elements:

To conduct constructive self-criticism, in order to avoid pitfalls.

To proceed with constant evaluation, on a scientific basis, to permit the further construction of policies.

To improve Islamic policies and to take profit from past experiences must be a clear and essential objective.

b-Procedures:

To evaluate current practices and profit from past experience.

To ask officials in the various countries to give their views on direction, methods and results.

c-Suggested Missions:

To produce an official document on global Islamic policy.

To make the countries, the officials and the people aware of that policy.

To begin to apply the policy, to evaluate it annually and to improve it if need be.

