

# **ANTISEMITISM AND PEDAGOGY**

Charles Asher Small, ed.

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*Antisemitism and Pedagogy*

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## Contents

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| <i>Foreword</i>   | <i>vii</i> |
| The Teaching of Holocaust History and the Reappearance<br>of the “Other” in Slovakia and Hungary<br><i>Slávka Otčenášová and Eszter Bartha</i>        | 1          |
| My Uninvited Guests: Teaching Historical Antisemitism<br>at a Catholic University<br><i>Patricia E. Behre</i>   | 21         |
| Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial, and Facebook<br><i>Raphael Cohen-Almagor</i>   | 35         |
| Hate Marches? Antisemitism in Online Comments on<br>Independence Day Marches in Poland (2017-2018)<br><i>Małgorzata Domagalska and Klaudia Kardaś</i> | 51         |
| In Countering Antisemitism: Notes on Mentoring<br><i>R. Amy Elman</i>   | 73         |
| Erasure and Demonization: Antisemitism and Anti-<br>Zionism in Contemporary Social Movements<br><i>Sylvia Barack Fishman</i>                          | 81         |
| Hate Crimes, Hate Speech: Sensitivity Training for<br>Police Officers in Hungary<br><i>Andrea Kozáry</i>  | 115        |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Modern Anti-Modernism: Antisemitic Hatred of the<br>West in the Ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran<br><i>Ulrike Marz</i>               | 131 |
| Antisemitism: The Big Picture in Small Pieces<br><i>David A. Meier</i>   | 155 |
| National Socialist Origins of Jihadist Antisemitism<br><i>David Patterson</i>  | 177 |
| Musical Interventions in Antisemitism Studies: On<br>the Example of Compositions Commemorating the<br>Holocaust<br><i>Anna G. Piotrowska</i> | 193 |

## Foreword

Antisemitism is one of the most complex and, at times, perplexing forms of hatred. It spans centuries of history, infecting different societies, religious, philosophical, and political movements, and even civilizations. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, some have even argued that it illustrates the limitations of the Enlightenment and modernity itself. Manifestations of antisemitism emerge in numerous ideologically-based narratives and constructed identities of belonging and otherness, such as race and ethnicity, as well as nationalist and anti-nationalist movements. In the contemporary context of globalization and postmodernism, antisemitism has taken on new forms that need to be decoded, mapped, and exposed. In fact, the emergence of populism and radical social movements on the extreme left and the far right, as well as the rise of political Islam, pose a significant threat to all societies. All these movements use antisemitism as a central element of their ideologies and political objectives. Moreover, this is happening in a context in which academia has been too slow to engage with this subject matter in an open, free, and honest manner.

Founded in 2004, the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) is the first interdisciplinary research center dedicated to the study of antisemitism to be established in North America. Its mission is to explore antisemitism from a wide range of approaches and perspectives within an academic framework. This mission encompasses the study of such topics as the changing historical phases of antisemitism, how antisemitism

relates to other forms of hatred, to what extent it is unique, how some societies are able to resist antisemitism, and how policies can be developed and implemented to combat it.

The academic study of antisemitism, like prejudice more generally, has a long and impressive intellectual and research history. It remains a subject of ongoing political importance and scholarly engagement. However, unlike prejudice and discrimination directed at other social groups, contemporary antisemitism is almost always studied outside an organized academic framework. A key aspect of ISGAP's mission is therefore to develop the discipline of critical contemporary antisemitism studies and ensure that it becomes an accepted component of university education and curriculum development.

While Holocaust studies and Jewish studies are taught at universities around the world, the rise of global threats against the Jewish people and the demonization of the State of Israel—including the rise of radical left-wing anti-Zionism and the BDS movement, the escalation of jihadist antisemitism and the Iranian nuclear threat, and the re-emergence of right-wing nationalism and racism—lend an urgency to the need for scholarship on contemporary antisemitism.

In 2015, ISGAP established a groundbreaking seminar and workshop-based curriculum development program in contemporary antisemitism studies that takes place every summer at the University of Oxford. The aim of the ISGAP-Oxford Summer Institute is to integrate the study of contemporary antisemitism into a wide range of academic fields where it has until recently received little attention, including history and historiography, sociology and anthropology, political science, psychology, pedagogy, media and communications, comparative literature, and so forth. Under the guidance of leading international academics, participants in the Summer Institute are encouraged to develop curricula and syllabi for courses on contemporary antisemitism that they will subsequently teach at their own institutions.

Since its establishment, the ISGAP-Oxford Summer Institute has produced 350+ graduates from more than 25 countries, who have gone on to teach over 150 new accredited courses on contemporary antisemitism at universities and colleges around the world. When measured against the objective of raising the profile of this previously overlooked topic, this is an immense achievement. In addition, by adding new scholars to the discussion each year and fine-tuning its expertise in the field of curriculum development, the Summer Institute has taken on a life of its own, enhancing scholarship and encouraging research on the study of contemporary antisemitism itself, as reflected in this volume.

In practice, the Summer Institute is also creating a grassroots movement of professors and scholars who are dedicated to promoting the study of contemporary antisemitism across a wide range of academic disciplines at universities in the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. One could say that they are developing contemporary antisemitism studies from the bottom up, while participants in ISGAP's Research Fellowship Program, which now encompasses more than 60 scholars, seek to do the same from the top down. In addition to advancing their own research on contemporary antisemitism, ISGAP Fellows are encouraged to participate in and/or teach at the Summer Institute, creating more opportunities to share ideas and best practices in this area.

The continuing reinforcement of a mutually supportive interdisciplinary network of scholars engaged in the study and teaching of contemporary antisemitism in academic institutions around the world reduces scientific isolation and intellectual stratification and stimulates dialogue, collaboration and cross-fertilization in the fields of research, teaching, and publishing on this important and oft-neglected topic. The present collection of papers by graduates and teachers of the ISGAP-Oxford Summer Institute is proof in point of the significant progress that has been achieved in this area in the five years since the establishment of the Summer Institute.

The papers in this collection were written by some of the Summer Institute's most creative participants. Hailing from a wide range of backgrounds, they provide fascinating insights into the study and teaching of antisemitism today. Several papers examine the pedagogical aspects of historical and/or contemporary antisemitism studies, ranging from the challenges of teaching antisemitism studies at a Catholic university, to mentoring students at a time of increased antisemitism in academia, to the potentially beneficial role of music in Holocaust education. Other papers in this area focus on teaching about the Holocaust and antisemitism in Eastern Europe, both in academia and at the level of sensitivity training for public servants. The remaining papers focus on three key manifestations of contemporary antisemitism that deserve greater academic scrutiny in the current climate, namely the rise of antisemitism and anti-Zionism in contemporary social movements, the origins and characteristics of jihadist and Iranian antisemitism, and the complex issue of antisemitism and hate speech in the age of social media.

It is the hope of all those connected with ISGAP and the Summer Institute that the papers in this collection will stimulate and inspire readers, help them understand the changing realities and guises of contemporary antisemitism, and encourage them to develop policies, strategies and teaching tools to combat and defeat this and other destructive hatreds. With the publication of this latest volume, as well as all its other academic efforts, ISGAP continues to fight antisemitism on the battlefield of ideas.

*Charles Asher Small*

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## **The Teaching of Holocaust History and the Reappearance of the “Other” in Slovakia and Hungary\***

Slávka Otčenášová and Eszter Bartha\*\*

The authoritative and formative nature of the messages presented to students in the framework of official school history education are fundamentally important from an academic, educational, and political point of view. As a medium through which information and values are supposed to be passed on to the next generation, educational materials for history are often the subject of social and political discussions. School history education, together with informal, family-based education, media, symbolic acts and representations in public spaces, and contacts with members of other social groups, is one of the main tools for the social production of stereotypes of the Other.<sup>1</sup> Fearing the Other is extensive in both Slovakia and Hungary. This has been manifested by the spread of right-wing political nationalism, and it is demonstrated in a Eurobarometer survey

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conducted by the European Commission.<sup>2</sup> Although the reason for this situation has been ascribed to the recent economic and current refugee crises, in which the original *telos* of European integration is often forgotten, this paper argues that negative responses to the Other are partially a by-product of the ethnocentric and statist character of history education. This approach to history education was established during the institutionalization of historical research in the 19th century, reflecting the rise of nationalism and nation-building movements that characterized the contemporary social and political context. At that time, the purpose of national historiographies was to defend the historical right of each nation to establish and maintain its own state. Historians emphasized the “golden age of the nation” to prove the historical excellence and exclusiveness of the nation and concurrently identified enemies (the Other) who were often described as an obstacle to the development of one’s own nation. Until this day—despite being constantly challenged by societal changes and attempts at modernization—history education still continues to be one of the main channels of the state-supported spread of stereotypes of the Other.

History education is one of the main tools for the institutionalized social production of the stereotypes of the self and the Other under the direct patronage of the state.<sup>3</sup> Scholars have widely recognized its social relevance, particularly during and after periods of global conflict. After the First World War, the League of Nations promoted international textbook revision as a response to the extreme nationalism that arose before and during the war, and after the Second World War UNESCO continued to support such efforts. A number of actions were taken in order to promote reconciliation among nations through history education, such as the establishment of different bilateral textbook-revision committees and the foundation of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (GEI) in 1975. Today the issue of history textbooks as resources in peace

education is being addressed by the Council of Europe and the European Union, the latter in the framework of a Horizon 2020-funded program, entitled “Improving mutual understanding among Europeans by working through troubled pasts,”<sup>4</sup> which targets critical engagement with negative heritage in order to enhance mutual understanding and reconciliation among Europeans.

The silencing of Holocaust victims relieved the national collective memories of Eastern European countries in terms of facing and coping with their fascist past. While it is true that the genocide would have been impossible without the Nazi program of annihilation of European Jewry and its associated infrastructure, it is also important to remember that Nazi troops received active support from certain segments of the local population and the authorities in Eastern Europe, including in Hungary and Slovakia. This could not be adequately studied and discussed under state socialism, since antisemitism was understood as a political question. All Eastern European countries held themselves to be the victims of fascism, and this collective memory failed to encompass the specific Jewish tragedy and the public acknowledgement that parts of the local elites actively participated in the Holocaust. Until the regime changes at the end of the 1980s, the topic of the Holocaust was considerably silenced in Slovakia and Hungary since the perspective of the Communist elites was that a confrontation with the fascist past could again stir up antisemitic sentiments and weaken the legitimacy of the Communist party.

After the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of 1989, the fate of the Jewish population during the Second World War has become a more important topic in national historiographies. This is also related to the general trend in European historiography. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, which divided the continent into two rival blocs, and the subsequent gradual expansion of the European Union, there

have been visible attempts to symbolically define a common European history and collective European values. The growing interest in the Holocaust—to some extent influenced by the war in Yugoslavia at the end of the 20th century and the subsequent focus on human rights issues—appears to be the result of the search for unifying moments in European history. The Holocaust is often seen as a universal experience on which Europe's collective memory and collective identity can be partially built.

## **Slovakia**

Between 1948 and 1989, historical research and historiography were under the control of the Communist party. In the 1950s, the interpretation of the past was strongly influenced by Stalinist propaganda, while the so-called normalization years that followed the Prague Spring of 1968 were marked by strong ideological pressure, party censorship, and self-censorship in each sphere of public life, including historical research and historiographical production. Even in the 1960s, a period characterized by less oppressive relations between the state authorities and the public, studies on the Holocaust could only be published if they included a robust antifascist message elaborated within a class struggle paradigm and excluded sensitive references to Slovak nationalism.<sup>5</sup>

The rise of political, methodological, and institutional pluralism in Slovak historiography after 1989 opened up space for systematic research into new, previously bypassed topics, one of them being the history of the Jewish population in Slovakia. There is a gradually increasing interest in the history of Jewish communities in general and a substantial increase in historiographical production on the Holocaust.

Part of the historiographical production in Slovakia after 1989 consists of monographs devoted to the history of Jews in selected towns, focusing on history of everyday life and cultural

history and using a combination of methods borrowed from history and anthropology. These works aim to present cultural traditions and cultural interpretations of the historical experience of the Jewish community in a given locality. The authors usually deal with social phenomena such as the observance of customs, rituals, and holidays, cultural identity, and attitudes of community members to various social aspects of the time; they focus on profiles of leaders of these communities and representatives of local elites. A significant part of these monographs is also devoted to the history of institutions. These narratives are richly supplied with facts about institutions and the organization of public life, but a more focused application of methods and approaches analyzing these institutions as products of social structures, which could form a basis for drawing conclusions about social and political changes (i.e. historical developments during the period under review), is often missing.

Another important stream of research after 1989 concerns the study of the Holocaust. First, focusing on political history and archival documents, historians have published a number of high quality monographs, collections of papers, volumes of documents, and articles.<sup>6</sup> Second, anthropologists in Slovakia took a very important step, which was soon followed by sociologists, historians, and other scholars—in exploring the so-called *small history* of the Holocaust, i.e. collecting, preserving, analyzing, interpreting, and making accessible the testimonies of its survivors and their contemporaries.<sup>7</sup>

Several institutions in Slovakia systematically utilize and develop an oral history approach in order to research the history of the Jews. The Holocaust Documentation Center,<sup>8</sup> an affiliate of the Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Slovakia, was established in 2005 and stuck to the overall concept of the project of the same name that has been jointly implemented by the Milan Šimečka Foundation and the Jewish Religious Community in Bratislava since 1999. In addition to collecting

archival documents about the Holocaust, the Holocaust Documentation Center also has in its possession a collection of valuable testimonies obtained through the so-called “The Fates of Those Who Survived the Holocaust” project.<sup>9</sup> The Edah civic association,<sup>10</sup> in cooperation with the Museum of Jewish Culture in Bratislava,<sup>11</sup> focuses, among other activities, on exploring the past using the oral history method and collecting the autobiographical narratives of Jews in Slovakia born before the Second World War. In the context of its Oral History Project, the National Memory Institute maps the fate of Slovak Jews in the years 1939-1945 and curates the recorded testimonies for the public. The collected interviews kept in these institutions provide valuable sources for further historical research and their interpretation by professional historians. In addition to these collections, historians can also rely on the testimonies of Jews from Slovakia recorded and archived in major international institutions such as the USC Shoah Foundation in Los Angeles, Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington.

Historians also do their own interviews with Holocaust witnesses, which they can draw on for broader or more focused research purposes. Oral history therefore seems to be an extremely beneficial tool in Holocaust history research. It allows historians to bridge the lack of archival material, helps them obtain the kind of information that does not exist in archival records (such as the personal perspectives and interpretations of individuals) and gives them the opportunity to formulate research questions that cannot be answered on the basis of traditional written sources. Oral history reveals the richness of the history of local communities, provides us with a unique insight into the personal opinions and thinking of individuals from different strata of society, and thus helps us bring to light such layers of history that classical archival research does not allow. The outcomes of solid interdisciplinary research have also

been communicated to a broad public through media and school education in the form of alternative study resources.

History textbooks, which are the basis for school history education, are an important part of historiography. They reflect opinions and values that in a specific time and space coincide with the normative ideals promoted by the state power. They present a simplified and schematic narrative about the past, owing to the limited time devoted to the teaching of history, the intellectual capacity of students, and the focus on learning facts about the past rather than on the critical engagement of students. On the other hand, history textbooks are one of the most widespread ways of mediating historical knowledge and one of the most important ways of establishing historical consciousness, collective memory, and collective identity. Since the formalization of school education in the 19th century, history textbooks have generally been characterized by nationally oriented and statist narratives. Thus, not much space has been devoted to the history of minority groups in school education in Slovakia. In fact, the history of the local Jewish population was almost completely absent from Czechoslovak and Slovak history textbooks published prior to 1989.

If they were mentioned at all, Jews were portrayed in such textbooks using negative stereotypes and as foreign elements in Slovak history. This image of Jews stemmed from the need to identify the Other in national history and was derived from their different ethnicity and religious/cultural dissimilarity. In some cases, textbooks even included interpretations of history that portrayed Jews as the perpetrators of economic oppression on the majority population. Interwar history textbooks usually did not mention them at all. An exception is a negative reference in the textbook published in 1922: "A Slovak in his own home was nothing; he was only good to work as a cheap labor and servant. Hungarianized Jews dominated trade and industry, the country belonged to counts, the authorities did not know Slovaks.

Whoever spoke out against the new order was imprisoned, fined, beaten. That is what Hungarian freedom looked like.”<sup>12</sup> Jews living in the Middle Ages were described in a Second World War history textbook by František Hrušovský as “merchants often living in a reserved part of the city, which was separated from other parts by walls.”<sup>13</sup> Such descriptions created a symbolic image of Jews’ physical separation from other groups and contributed to the segregation policies implemented against the Jewish population in Germany (starting in the interwar period) and Slovakia (during the Second World War). History textbooks contributed to the legitimization of this phenomenon by creating an image of Jews as traitors working against the majority population. A history textbook from 1975 states: “In eastern Slovakia, feudal administrators and new tenants of large estates and pubs (Jews who came from Galicia) enforced fees with harsh ruthlessness—execution.”<sup>14</sup>

The Holocaust was completely silenced in history education up to the 1990s. This gap was partially counterbalanced by artistic production related to the Holocaust, which was rather vivid even prior to 1990s and often served as a substitute for censored scholarly production.<sup>15</sup> Although the fall of the Communist regime in 1989 brought a certain opening up of Slovak society, the wave of nationalism and isolationism that characterized the country after the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1992 certainly influenced the production of historical narratives and images of the Other. Parts of the political elite demanded interpretations and reconstructions of Slovakia’s national history that would legitimize the newly established state and emphasize Slovakia’s tradition of independence. Focusing on what was unique and exclusive in Slovak history often went hand-in-hand with the creation or revival of historical myths and the negative stereotyping of others. This led, for example, to certain efforts to rehabilitate the Slovak state of the Second World War period. However, the interpretation of this period as

a solely positive era in Slovak history, as a source of traditional Slovakian statehood, and as a basis for the public commemoration of Slovakian heritage is directly connected to the relativization of the Holocaust and its consequences in Slovakia. Glorification of the Slovak state during the Second World War has not been uncommon among professional historians over the past 30 years (drawing from the tradition of Slovak émigré historiography), and as such it has often been accompanied by the deliberate forgetting of the traumatic events that had a fatal impact on a considerable part of the population.

One of the most vibrant discussions in Slovak historiography and history education after the establishment of the Slovak Republic in 1993 revolved around the reaction of the mainstream historical community—centered around the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, backed by the Slovak Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters and representatives of the Jewish community living in Slovakia—to a history textbook written by Milan Stanislav Ďurica. In their view, this book glorified the Slovak state of the Second World War period and spread a negative image of the Other, including Hungarians, Czechs, Jews, and non-Catholics in general.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, nationally-oriented sectors of the public and certain like-minded institutions, as well as the Ministry of Education, the Slovak National Party and some Catholic institutions, defended the book and its interpretation of the past. The Ministry of Education, which was in the hands of the Slovak National Party and introduced the controversial textbook into the school curriculum without prior consultations with scholars, maintained an authoritarian approach. It disregarded any objections from protesting historians and representatives of the Jewish community and did not take part in any constructive dialogue with representatives from the scientific or educational communities. It was only after the intervention of the European Union that the

Slovak government reluctantly withdrew support for the publication's use in schools.

Nowadays, the situation is much more favorable. State educational programs explicitly address the issue of the Holocaust and the tragedy of Slovak Jews in order to help students understand the Holocaust and its consequences.<sup>17</sup> Schools in Slovakia have access to a number of teaching materials that deal with the Holocaust in a modern pedagogical way. In addition to the narratives in official history textbooks, there are also many specialized alternative textbooks<sup>18</sup> and materials prepared in the framework of larger international projects.<sup>19</sup> The growing popularity and importance of this topic in the teaching process is also evidenced by the number of graduate theses of teachers on Jewish history and the Holocaust. Holocaust history has become an integral part of the history curriculum—from elementary schools up to universities.

Over the past 30 years, however, certain Slovakian historians have questioned whether the Holocaust really happened, and public representatives have repeatedly taken part in controversial events, such as the commemoration of controversial historical figures associated with the Slovak state during the Second World War.<sup>20</sup> For example, a campaign resulting in the adoption of a law affirming the importance of Andrej Hlinka to the Slovak nation met with disappointment, reservations, and open disagreement from members of the Jewish community, since Hlinka is perceived as a symbol of the Slovak fascist movement. An increasing number of court cases concerning people, even parliament members,<sup>21</sup> who have publicly spread extremist, anti-semitic, or anti-Roma messages reflects the general situation in the present-day Slovak society. Although the above-mentioned measures adopted at state level, including in the field of education, have the potential to contribute to the eradication of anti-semitism, the reality constantly proves to be different.

## Hungary

In the more liberal climate of the Kádár era in Hungary, dissident writers already published articles on antisemitism in the *samizdat* (self-published) journal *Medvetánc* in 1985. In 1988, Randolph L. Braham's monumental work on the Holocaust in Hungary<sup>22</sup> was published in a Hungarian translation. The political liberalization went hand-in-hand with an economic recession and the increasing discontent of the "masses" with the ruling Communist regime.<sup>23</sup> Disappointment was further fueled by palpable signs of economic decline within the Soviet Union and the satellite countries.

After the regime change, Holocaust studies became one of the most flourishing fields of post-1989 Hungarian historiography. However, this revival was accompanied by the rise of a new antisemitism. Economic restructuring after 1989 effectively impoverished many people. In addition, according to the calculations of Mark Pittaway, more than 20% of workplaces were lost.<sup>24</sup> In this climate, the reorganized far-right could win many new supporters.

While there has been an abundance of Holocaust literature since 1989, the far-right Jobbik became the country's second largest political party following Hungary's 2018 parliamentary elections. As Mark Pittaway concludes in *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, for which he wrote the section "Fascism in Hungary": "Its past may be complicated but, at the time of writing [2009], the radical right seems likely to have a future."<sup>25</sup>

The fact that the Holocaust was silenced in the official discourse received a special emphasis with the collapse of state socialism, after which antisemitism was no longer a political taboo. It was not just the political-ideological control of the state but the entire history of the 20th century that came to be seen in a different light. This also had an impact on the history of the Holocaust. Modern history became a contested terrain, and a

new ideological battle started for the appropriation of national collective memory and the development of a new, “authentic” narrative to replace the discredited Communist history. Unfortunately, even today political-ideological interests sometimes take precedence over academic considerations. This is how it was possible to hold Endre Ságvári (a Communist who died in 1944 while fighting the Gendarmerie) responsible for the atrocities committed under the Rákosi regime (the Stalinist regime in Hungary). The attempt to demonize Communism is often linked with finding an “excuse” for fascism, as if the latter was somehow less evil.<sup>26</sup>

Recent historical studies also shed light on another dark and largely forgotten chapter of Hungarian history.<sup>27</sup> The Hungarian army, which was sent to the territory of today’s Ukraine to exercise military control over the occupied territories, was effectively engaged in a genocide against the local population. Such studies triggered a fierce debate among historians who argued that the documentation in question was based on Soviet “falsification” and amounted to an attack against Hungarian national consciousness, on the one hand, and historians who claimed that the clarification of the past should be part of national historical consciousness, on the other.

Tamás Krausz’s argument that the Hungarian army committed atrocities that amounted to a “genocide” triggered fierce attacks against him. In this regard, he notes as follows: “This volume objectively proves that the Horthy-regime bears a direct political and historical responsibility for the death of several hundreds of thousands of people. The regime was responsible for a genocide. This explains the attacks against the book because it cannot be reconciled with the new legitimating narrative of the regime after 2010.” In terms of the politics of memory, Krausz represents the old-fashioned view that there is still such a thing as common knowledge and historical facts that cannot be debated. As Christian Hartmann, an expert on the history of the

Second World War, has argued: “I think that the documents are credible. The Hungarian soldiers took part in many operations, which ended in a genocide. ... I think that the main motive of the atrocities was the aggressive and widespread antisemitism among the Hungarian soldiers.”<sup>28</sup>

Krausz’s seminal book, *A magyar megszálló csapatok a Szovjetunióban* (The Hungarian occupying forces in the Soviet Union), extends the borders of Hungary and Hungarian historiography. Krausz was the first historian in Eastern Europe to document the crimes of non-German soldiers who assisted the Nazis in the genocide in the Soviet territories. Fortunately, there are some historians in Hungary who follow his lead. Examples include Ákos Fóris, who came to the same conclusion using German and Hungarian documents. He was also able to prove that the Hungarian elite was well informed about the crimes committed in the Soviet Union. One report even mentioned the tragic evidence of the mass murder of children (“hundreds of baby carriages left behind”).<sup>29</sup> It is therefore simply not true that Hungary “fell” victim to the Nazi Germany, as contemporary right-wing interpretations suggest. It is also worth stressing that not a single Hungarian soldier was punished by the Hungarian military courts for participating in the mass rape of local women or the murder of Jews or “simple” Soviet civilians, which further reinforces the shared responsibility of the power elite. However, this is strongly denied in the contemporary, right-wing, “official” narrative. The best proof of this is the monument erected at Szabadság tér (Liberty Square) in Budapest, which is also home to the monument to the Soviet victims. The so-called “monument to the victims of the German occupation” was widely criticized for its failure to acknowledge the complicity of the Hungarian authorities in the genocide. In fact, it suggests that the country lost its independence and that the Hungarian government therefore cannot be held accountable, while the truth is that Horthy was governor during the time that the Jews

from the countryside were deported to Auschwitz, where they faced certain death.

The criminalization of “Communism” goes hand-in-hand with attempts to whitewash the Horthy regime, which bears responsibility for Hungary’s entry in the Second World War and the deportation of the Jews from the countryside. To cite the renowned labor historian Mark Pittaway, however:

if paramilitarism was one element of the interwar Hungarian political scene relevant to the later emergence of fascism, then anti-liberalism and the hegemony of national Christian ideas within the political culture of interwar Hungary constituted another. ... Such attitudes generated forms of political discourse that stressed the unified and eternal nature of the Hungarian nation, its fundamentally “Christian” character and emphasized that political leaders had a duty to “defend” Magyars from their “alien” enemies. In turn, such opinions led to a growing interest in *völkisch* ideas of “race” and “racial defence” and their translation into a Hungarian context during the 1920s, inspiring political movements that stressed the apparent Turanian origins of Magyars which embedded themselves in radical right-wing rhetoric.<sup>30</sup>

While Pittaway was not a Holocaust researcher, his arguments are in line with those that highlight this essential continuity between the ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, it cannot be denied that the deportation of Hungarian Jewry from the countryside occurred during the time when Horthy was (still) the governor of Hungary.

It is possible to reconstruct much of 20th century Hungarian social history on the basis of Pittaway’s life work. A weak liberal bourgeoisie, widespread agrarian poverty, and an authoritarian regime that sought to revise the Trianon treaty and supported a strictly “national Christian” ideology—these are the main characteristics of the interwar era. Anti-fascism and socialism promised a panacea for the depressing poverty and political exclusion of many, the social and economic misery of the lower

classes, and the anomalies of the Hungarian caste system inherited from the feudal order. Indeed, an unprecedented social mobility can be documented in the region, which encompassed not only urbanization and extensive industrialization as peasants became workers but also “raised” many peasants and workers to the ranks of the intelligentsia and the *nomenklatura*. After the 1956 revolution, workers received a real chance to become incorporated in the “middle class.” Indeed, if not full *embourgeoisement* then at least “petty *embourgeoisement*” can be observed in many working class (and peasant) communities.

Many of these social and economic advances—however limited—were lost after the regime change. The resulting disappointment with the political left brought with it a rejection of all left-wing alternatives to state socialism, and the lack of a strong trade union movement rendered any working class resistance to privatization and neo-liberal policies illusory. The anger and frustration of the “little man” was channeled into support for right-wing populism. It remains to be seen whether there will be a (further) shift in this direction, but we can safely paraphrase the sad prognosis of Mark Pittaway: the radical right *does* seem likely to have a future in Hungary.

## Conclusion

As we have seen, the Hungarian and Slovakian histories and historiographies from 1939 show remarkable similarities. During the war, local elites and other segments of the population actively or passively participated in antisemitic measures, the persecution of the Jews, and ultimately their deportation, which would have been practically impossible without the cooperation of the Hungarian and Slovakian authorities. If we compare antisemitic propaganda, we also find remarkable similarities in that the dispossession of the Jews was “embedded” in the political programs of the right-wing political forces. This is partly explained

by the similarity of the relevant social structures: the bourgeoisie in both countries was weak, while bourgeois society and capitalist development were seen as “alien” or “Jewish” phenomena.

While the Communist regimes used the antifascist struggle as an integral part of their legitimizing ideologies, the Holocaust was effectively silenced in these countries, and all victims were regarded as victims of fascism. After the regime changes, there was a de-tabooization of the topic in both Hungary and Slovakia. A lot of quality research has since been published, utilizing newly discovered archival sources that have become accessible to researchers. Extensive oral history projects have been conducted, Holocaust museums were founded, and new diaries, memoirs, and other ego-documents have been published—alongside an impressive number of monographs, analytical works, and case studies. The products of this research have been made available to different audiences, including school pupils and students. For example, the history of the Holocaust is taught as an independent course at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest and Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice.

All these results count as positive outcomes for the politics of memory after 1989. Unfortunately, however, there are visible tendencies in both societies—currently fuelled by extreme-right parties and social media—that are contributing to a rise in anti-semitism in both Slovakia and Hungary as a way of coping with social and political frustration in society. This obviously calls for a more serious approach to the topic of Holocaust remembrance<sup>31</sup> and the portrayal of the Other at state level.

Although major historical debates are taking place in both countries, they still tend to focus on the relativization of the Holocaust. The suffering under fascism is measured against the suffering under “Communism,” as if the latter might counterbalance (or even outweigh) the tragedy of the victims of fascism. Such arguments are fundamentally wrong. What is at stake is not who suffered more but a proper historical understanding of the

many factors that led to the dispossession and—ultimately—deportation of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian and Slovakian Jews, with the assistance of the local authorities. The Western example of the formation of a national collective memory, which is conscious of its own history, should be followed more closely in Eastern Europe in order to move beyond national sensitivities and national traumas (i.e. “we also suffered a lot”) and understand our common history from a global perspective.

## Notes

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## **My Uninvited Guests: Teaching Historical Antisemitism at a Catholic University**

Patricia E. Behre\*

I am an historian, but I don't teach the history of the Holocaust. I am a Europeanist, but I don't teach the contemporary period. I explore the interplay between ideas and politics, but I don't teach the modern Middle East. And yet... I do teach all of these things. These topics and foci have all dwelt in, or even invaded, my classroom. I can no more ignore them than ignore a group of last-minute-registering students. There they are, arriving late, sitting in the back row, whispering among themselves. They make comments or demand attention at the most inopportune moments. And each time I teach, these topics at which I am no expert bring along more and more of their friends. How do I make them at least grudgingly welcome, acknowledge their presence, but still do right by the material—the students in this metaphor—who signed up on time: the areas to which I have devoted my scholarly life and in which I am more formally trained?

I teach the history of European antisemitism. In one course particularly I survey the topic over a wide sweep of centuries, from the beginning of Christianity through the Dreyfus Affair.

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The primary timeframe stops before World War I. This periodization was intentional, and chosen long ago—designed for the particular needs, context—and even controversies—of my small Jesuit liberal arts university in southern Connecticut. The frame also reflects my specialty in early modern French history—hence the prominence of Dreyfus. In the course of teaching this class I have learned several things: my course has a moral and ethical dimension that we cannot and should not ignore. In looking at current events my students and I go out into the world as equals. And contemporary Israel and debates about its security are part of the ongoing story of antisemitism. Finally, the Catholic heritage of my institution offers both challenges and benefits. That heritage also makes the course singularly important.

## **Some institutional history**

In the early 1990s a small group of Jewish faculty and supporters formed what we called “The Jewish Forum” to create space for Jewish voices and topics on our overwhelmingly Catholic campus. We began with discussion groups and brown bag lunches—the sort of casual but serious intellectual conversation and inquiry that universities have long tried to foster, and which were commonplace when I began my full-time academic career. There was no particular agenda.

Within a year however, sentiment coalesced around the desire to have a full-time, tenured or tenure-track, faculty member teaching Judaism on the campus. We had had a wonderful, local, academically-trained congregational rabbi teach a few courses in between his many other duties and humanitarian work, but no full-scale institutional commitment to the subject of Judaism. We imagined someone in our Religious Studies Department, but perhaps in History, or even Sociology or Politics. The Jewish Forum drafted a three-person delegation to make the case to the university’s president. The group consisted of a prominent art

historian, an English professor, and me. Two of us were practicing Jews. Only one of us had been born Jewish.

While sitting together in his faux gothic office, the President—a Jesuit priest—expressed theoretical support, but made no promises. He turned the conversation to his desire for more Jewish students on our suburban campus, which had long drawn mostly Catholic students from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. We offered that the best route to such an aspiration would be to create a first-rate academic institution, referencing Georgetown’s success at attracting a more diverse student body. Build it—to be intellectually stimulating and rigorous, as well as welcoming—and they will come. But we left the meeting with little prospect of a commitment to Judaism as an academic subject, or indeed to more Jewish students on our campus anytime soon.

Our art historian colleague reaching out to his contacts in the wider community, and the generosity of a family of local donors, changed the trajectory. Within a few years we were actively searching for a recipient of the university’s first endowed Chair, in Judaic Studies. We were lucky to hire a first-rate scholar, and the invention of Judaic Studies—not just one faculty member teaching Judaism—at our Jesuit institution began.<sup>1</sup> We now have a robust academic program leading to a minor, a faculty of five to seven affiliated professors across several departments, numerous annual lectures, public events and speakers, and an active adult learning community.

Consultants from other Judaic Studies programs, including nearby Yale, were invited to make suggestions for our program’s design. They recommended several measures, including specific additions to our curriculum. Particularly important, they believed, would be a course on the history of antisemitism in Europe, with attention and sensitivity to the nature of Christian antisemitism in that long and grim story. That’s where I came in. With training and an interest in Jewish-Christian relations, and a

published monograph on the topic in northeast France, I volunteered to design and teach the course that is still in our curriculum. Over the years, however, it has changed greatly.

The initial title reflected a tactical decision meant to draw in students who might be squeamish or defensive: *History 205 Jews and Christians: A Social History*. In retrospect, this choice seems more than a little timid. But in 1995 it seemed prudent, and was suggested by my dissertation director and his wife—herself a published scholar of Jewish history.<sup>2</sup> In consultation with others on my campus, I also ended the course with Dreyfus, both because we had a distinguished scholar of modern Germany who handled the Holocaust directly in his classes, and because it would remove me from tackling—head on at least—the thorny issues surrounding modern Israel and the Palestinian conflict, thus making it less likely that I would encounter opposition within my own department. While my professional life has been fairly comfortable at Fairfield, hallway conversations (i.e. about whether Jews dominated the slave trade (!) and about Israel, where I lived from 1984-1985) occasionally created friction. There were fights, waged in the seemingly polite terms of academics, about what constituted Holocaust denial. At one point I was questioned for wearing a Fairfield sweatshirt with the name of the university spelled out in Hebrew characters to a candidate job talk for our then-vacant position in modern Germany. It was speculated that I had meant to intimidate the candidate with my choice of clothing.

Within the first ten years, however, as I and my colleagues became more secure (and perhaps my receipt of tenure in 1998 played a not inconsiderable role in this), the title of the course changed to more adequately reflect its content and focus, and History 205 became *Antisemitism: Medieval to Modern*. Under this name it has now become a regular part of our curriculum and my menu of course offerings. However, its contours, and not just its title, have changed greatly over the years—well beyond

my attempt to keep up with recent scholarship and introduce new texts. The effort to provide students with a more holistic experience and to meet the challenges of studying the topic in light of contemporary events has required constant reworking and revision. Glaring omissions or needs became apparent in the early years. The resurgence of antisemitic acts and violence and public expressions of classic tropes around the world have demanded attention. The modern Middle East as a theater for European-style antisemitism, despite its distinctive issues, can no longer be ignored by anyone with a background in this area. A summer at ISGAP's seminar in Oxford has broadened my view considerably.

### **Guest Number One: The Holocaust**

Of course the Holocaust has always been there in the course, even with the 19th century cutoff. It is a permanent presence, albeit under the surface: a deadly coda to the story my students and I explore each time we meet together for this journey through the dark heart of European history. Sometimes it is a foil to the medieval period that dominates the first half of our course—a way of showing a related but different non-exterminationist, pre-racial story of medieval Christian antisemitism. Sometimes it feels like a vortex that draws us inexorably toward it. One question we always consider is this: Can the Catholic Church elude responsibility for inventing the differentiation, demonization, and conspiracy theories that allowed Hitler and his collaborators such an easy transition to mass murder? To what extent is Christianity responsible for the hatred of Jews, even as some (not all) Church authorities or Christian monarchs interceded to protect some (not all) Jews from the malevolently logical consequences of such a thorough rejection of a whole people? Maybe the best (if tongue-in-cheek) articulation I have encountered on this came during a public lecture I

gave to a community audience. In response to my acknowledgment that Christianity was not *inherently* anti-Jewish, an audience member responded with appropriate Yiddishkeit “Do you need to be a Christian to be an antisemite? No. But it doesn’t hurt.”

So while we try to think in my class about the very long story of European antisemitism, its features, components, and historical context, against an array of political and intellectual developments—Crusades, Renaissance, Reformation, Modernity—we all know of course that the events and trauma of the Shoah are coming. It is impossible to erase that knowledge when assessing the foundational demonization or liberating movements that came before. Medieval stereotypes and the Jewish badge of 1215 look like the groundwork for genocide that in part they were. Hopeful developments connected to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and emancipation seem more poignant than triumphant when considered against twentieth-century events. Even *l’affaire Dreyfus* becomes, in part, an incubator for the Final Solution. Nonetheless, I still see my job as one of holding students back from their tendency to assess earlier Jewish history, and developing antisemitism, purely in light of the Holocaust. I still feel an obligation to complicate their tendency to see the rich and multi-dimensional story of pre-modern European Jewish and Christian life and thought as a linear narrative toward catastrophe or collective guilt.

Nonetheless, an experience of my own failure as a pedagogue, from one of the first years of teaching the course, altered my end date and even my overall conception of the course and its purpose. A student submitting her final exam one year ended a comprehensive essay question on the causes of antisemitism with the following words: “Thus we see that antisemitism has always existed, will probably always exist, and there’s nothing we can do about it.” Thud. After an entire semester, significant primary and secondary source reading, discussion, formal lectures,

and intense group work, was this the best we could come up with? I thought about this quandary for some time. Or, knowing of the Holocaust, could we perhaps use even that history to bring a very different dimension to our inquiry? Soon after this student's sobering exam answer I added Philip Halie's *Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed* on the Protestants of Le-Chambon-sur-Lignon and their decision to rescue rather than collaborate. They also serve, of course, as an example of Christians who drew *from their Christianity* to oppose Nazism. I also often screen the movie version of this story, by the filmmaker Pierre Sauvage—himself born to Jewish refugee parents in Le Chambon during the war—to show the students that all gentiles were not collaborators or silent; that a different choice was indeed possible, and by quite ordinary, regular people, acting in accordance with routinized societal values. There is, I believe, *a banality of good* that stands in counterpoint to Hannah Arendt's observation of Nazi evil. This idea, phrased this way, first occurred to me in conversation with a Jesuit priest colleague. By considering this against the direct backdrop of the Holocaust, I have come to embrace, unapologetically, a moral dimension to my material that seeks to move beyond a critical stare down of the past, toward a determined commitment to make a different future.

## **Guest Number Two: This Morning's News**

Despite my hope that students may take determination from my course to reject and combat antisemitism—its tropes, language, and potential for violence—the world we live in has risen up to meet the subject matter of my course. Usually historians long for obvious examples of why their courses are so relevant to understanding the modern world. In this case, I would rather the course had been able to remain, at least arguably, locked in the past. Bringing in the odd example from current events has always been a part of my course, but to an occasional and rather

limited degree. When I began teaching History 205, there had been no rampage at *Charlie Hebdo* and Hypercacher in Paris. There had been no chants of “Jews will not replace us” in Charlottesville, Virginia. There had been no murders at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. These and other recent incidents of hate speech, harassment, and murder fueled by antisemitism have required us to look regularly outside of our classroom, and outside of purely past events. This is never comfortable. Discussions are automatically raw when they leave the confines of a printed page. Like many academics I am most at home with books and would gladly be found some day expired and at peace in the stacks of Sterling Library.<sup>3</sup> The foray into current events requires me to constantly assess how to truly make the classroom intellectually open to debate. I spend as much time hanging back as professing, and even more time internally debating whether a particular moment calls for hanging back or professing.

It is a great equalizer too for me to discuss current events with my students, for in discussing them we are all just citizens of the world, better or lesser informed, but analyzing events in real time. And there are logistics to be juggled. It always seems exciting to chuck the day’s material from the age of feudalism to consider the latest headline or post. But when and how to do so, and how to maintain the appraisal of continuity and disjunction that is the historian’s task, is a skill I desire but cannot claim to have mastered. Because events related to antisemitism are in such a period of upsurge, there is also little time to prepare the perfect session that begins with something old, relates it to the present, and takes students into a deeper more nuanced view. I am forced to be more intellectually nimble, and more obviously imperfect. I hang around after class a lot more. I get more varied emails. I am forced regularly to admit uncertainty.

And I have had to embrace greater flexibility in my students’ assignments. For years I have screened the film *The Gentleman’s Agreement*, in part because it forces us to think of antisemitism

in the United States, and even more specifically in our state of Connecticut. The nearby town of Darien fares rather poorly in the film, serving as a nexus of the sort of unspoken antisemitism that informed the movie's title. One of the more creative student papers in the past looked at Darien today and its legacy stemming from the redlining of neighborhoods. But now my inclusion of current events is becoming more direct. This year students will give formal group presentations on the state of contemporary antisemitism in specific countries. I plan to have them do the research according to a fixed template: demography; historical antisemitism; current controversies; government or institutional intervention; and future prospects and predictions. Also this year I will include a panel discussion with the previously mentioned Chair of Judaic Studies, the rabbi who first taught Judaism at Fairfield, and myself considering antisemitism today in the United States. I am still compiling the questions with which we will begin. One of those, at least, will consider debates involving the modern Middle East.

### **Guest Number Three: A Visitor from the East**

I have lived in Israel, and I love Israel. I do not like some of the current Prime Minister's policies or his comportment in office. I could say the same of my own country's current executive. In the latter case I do so, often, in impassioned terms—outside of the classroom. But I am not a scholar of the modern Middle East, and it is here—in discussing Israel, the Palestinian conflict, and even American diplomacy in the region, that I feel least capable to guide my students. I know that they need reliable information, context, and discernment to consider these issues. They need much more than me. We do not have, I should add, an historian of modern Israel on the full-time faculty.

I am occasionally called upon to act as a spokesperson for the interests of Israel on my campus. I do this from time to time, but

I always feel unequal to the task. And I typically turn down requests to do so in formal settings because I know what I do not know. Where I do feel qualified to comment is on the *language* of anti-Zionism, and an assessment of when it moves into the realm of antisemitism. The European-style anti-Jewish rhetoric and images so readily at hand in the current Middle East (as in our own country) has made that task all too easy. And the generous sharing of images from an ISGAP presenter in Oxford in 2018 will enrich my class for the first time this year.

Recently a well-meaning student interested in having a campus dialogue between Christians, Muslims, and Jews on these issues wrote an editorial in our university newspaper defending Congresswoman Ilhan Omar's first round of tweets ("It's all about the Benjamins, baby") as not antisemitic. Just a comment on the evils of well-financed lobbying in American politics, he asserted. A colleague and I disagreed in print. The student reached out and wants further discussion; we have agreed, and this situation is ongoing as I write this essay. I suspect that this will bring Israel more directly into my classroom, as students note my participation. How will they enter this conversation?

I know that they will recognize the reference to money as resonant of longstanding anti-Jewish tropes. When we arrive, in class, at the 19th century and the publicity surrounding the Dreyfus trial, they may be prepared to discuss more directly Omar's reference to dual loyalty. The myth of world-wide Jewish conspiracy is already familiar to them, and probably will continue as a topic in this context. So I am forced to reconsider, refine, and reframe my own analysis. From the deicide charge or linkage to Satan in the age of Christian dominance in Europe, to Martin Luther's bitter resentment for resistance to conversion in the Age of Reformation, to hostility from the *philosophes* for inadequate Jewish embrace of the secular, to the more lethal racialized Nazi efforts to exterminate, Europe changed dramatically over the period I cover without, somehow, abandoning this

zeal to return reflexively to what has been called its oldest hatred.

Does anti-Zionism represent the newest manifestation of antisemitism? Not always, I believe. But it can. It has, within it, that potential. To my mind, the importation of European-inflected antisemitism into the Middle East and into the Islamic world is one of the particular tragedies of our era. But then I would feel this way, having studied medieval Muslim Spain, its vibrant diversity, and relatively secure environment for three monotheistic faiths.

So I am forced to wade into the deep water of modern Middle Eastern politics and of America's role in the region, despite my reluctance to do so. And I am forced to try to distill in the clearest terms what I observe. What will I say to the student newspaper writer when we meet? Something like the following: I reject the hypocrisy and partisan opportunism of Donald Trump's crude criticism of Omar—he being the same politician whose campaign superimposed a picture of his opponent next to a Jewish star on top of a sea of cash. I recognize that Islamophobia is alive and well in the United States, and I deplore equally crude images of Omar's face next to burning twin towers. But none of this prevents me from calling out Omar's words when warranted and identifying their potential connection to historical antisemitism.

## **Summary and Conclusion**

So this is where my attempt to discuss antisemitism with my students leaves me: with three, I suspect permanent, visitors. The first—the Holocaust—I have grown quite accustomed to. And I have some experience in admitting its contributions to discussion while still containing its outbursts when inappropriate. But the other two—contemporary events and the modern Middle East conflict—are changelings. And they are growing and transforming constantly, even in the interval between when I

began this written reflection and when it will go to press. By the time readers see this essay there may be new and urgent developments.

There have been particularities of grappling with this topic of antisemitism at a Jesuit university—some alarming, some arguably reassuring. I offer the following anecdotes from the alarming side of the ledger. Once when teaching a general survey of European history to beginning students, I pointed out that Renaissance humanists struggled to reconcile their heartfelt Christianity with their near-obsessive admiration for ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. This was a dilemma, I offered, because of the religious disconnect, since “what religion were the Romans?” Thirty faces looked back at me as I left a long awkward pause, and repeated the question, waiting for a reference to the pantheon of pagan gods. Finally, an earnest and diligent student in the first row raised her hand and answered: “Well, the Romans killed Jesus, so does that make them Jews?” In the same course, I should add, a story from Boccaccio’s *Decameron* used to be routinely misinterpreted as a tale of a Jewish man’s love of money, rather than the tale of the Roman Catholic Curia’s greed and corruption which Boccaccio meant it to be.<sup>4</sup>

More reassuring is the fact that it has now been many years since I have heard any reference to the deicide charge. And Boccaccio’s tale is generally understood rightly, at least in its broad outline. Perhaps the Church has done a better job of questioning its original sin. Perhaps the presence of an established Judaic Studies program at my institution, and a menu of courses exploring Judaism, has helped. I tend to think it has. We still have very few Jewish students, as far as we know. More profoundly, the challenge of teaching the history of antisemitism at a Jesuit university remains that of helping students craft their own appraisal of this material, and of Christianity’s role, in light of changing events in the world. The benefit is that the ethical and moral dimension of their struggle to do so is fully embraced.

All three of my uninvited visitors, then, need not be held to cameo appearances. They are free to remain and to become part of our efforts to outfit young adults to draw their own meaningful conclusions about their place in this time and space, whether examining social conflict, government policies, or tweets.

## Notes

1. The Carl and Dorothy Bennett Chair in Judaic Studies at Fairfield University has been held since its inception by Ellen Umansky, PhD, author of numerous publications, including *From Christian Science to Jewish Science: Spiritual Healing and American Jews* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), and editor with Dianne Ashton of *Four Centuries of Jewish Women's Spirituality: A Sourcebook* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2008).
2. My dissertation director was Peter Gay, whose works are far too numerous to mention here. His wife, Ruth Gay, published works on the Jews in Germany and America, including the 1997 National Jewish Book Award winner, *Unfinished People: Eastern European Jews Encounter America* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997).
3. The main library at my alma mater, Yale University.
4. See Giovanni Boccaccio, *The Decameron* (1353), the first day, the second story.



# Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial, and Facebook

Raphael Cohen-Almagor\*

## Introduction

Recently, Facebook decided to ban several groups associated with the far-right political group known as the Proud Boys, including one with more than 20,000 members, because they are considered to be hate groups. “Hate speech” and “organized hate” are not allowed on Facebook.<sup>1</sup>

However, Facebook stops short of changing its stance with respect to Holocaust denial groups on its website. Its directors believe that Holocaust denial is not hateful *per se* and, therefore, that it does not contravene the company’s terms of service. Facebook spokesperson, Barry Schnitt, has said: “We’re always discussing and evaluating our policies on reported content, but have no plans to change this policy at this time. In addition to discussing it internally, we continue to engage with third-party experts on the issue.”<sup>2</sup>

Facebook distinguishes between an “explicit statement of hate” and Holocaust denial. Its directors believe that Holocaust denial is not hateful *per se* and does not therefore contravene the

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company's terms of service. The terms of service state: "You will not post content that is hateful, threatening, pornographic, or that contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence."<sup>3</sup> However, Facebook still hosts the National Association for the Advancement of White People.<sup>4</sup> Facebook has stated: "We think it's important to maintain consistency in our policies, which don't generally prohibit people from making statements about historical events, no matter how ignorant the statement or how awful the event."<sup>5</sup> How this stance can be reconciled with Facebook's prohibition on posting content that is hateful or threatening is something for Facebook's managers to reckon with and answer.

In this paper, I wish to take issue with the assertion that Holocaust denial is not hateful *per se*. My aim is to show that it is and, therefore, that Facebook and other social networking sites that let their platforms become a ground for hate and bigotry should reconsider their position. All internet service providers and web-hosting companies whose terms of service disallow hateful messages on their servers should not host or provide forums for such hate mongering. This is of urgent need, as Holocaust denial is prevalent in Europe, the United States and across the Arab and Muslim world.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 explains the concept of hate speech. In Section 2, I discuss the connection between hate speech and hate crime. Section 3 explains the meaning of Holocaust denial and why it is a form of hate speech. Finally, Section 4 discusses the gatekeepers' responsibilities.

## Hate speech

By hate speech I refer to malicious speech that aims to victimize and dehumanize its target and is often, but not always, directed against vulnerable minorities. Hate speech aims to reduce the

target group members to speechlessness or shock them into silence. The notion of silencing and inequality suggests great injury, emotional upset, fear, and insecurity that members of the target group might experience. Hate might undermine the individual's self-esteem and standing in the community.<sup>6</sup>

Generally speaking, hate is derived from one form or another of racism, and modern racism has facilitated and caused untold suffering. It is an evil that has acquired catastrophic proportions throughout the world. Notorious examples include Europe under Nazism and, since then, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, South Africa, and Rwanda. Elsewhere, I have argued that, in hate messages, members of the targeted group are characterized as devoid of any redeeming qualities and innately evil. Banishment, segregation, and eradication of the targeted group are proposed to save others from the harm being done by this group. By using highly inflammatory and derogatory language, expressing extreme hatred and contempt, and through comparisons to, and associations with, animals, vermin, excrement, and other noxious substances, hate messages dehumanize the targeted groups.<sup>7</sup>

Hate messages undermine the dignity and self-worth of the targeted group members and erode the tolerance and open-mindedness that should flourish in democratic societies committed to the ideas of pluralism, justice, and equality. Hate messages undercut the targets' equal status in the community, their entitlement to basic justice and the fundamentals of their reputation. Hate speech might lead to mental and emotional distress, racial discrimination, and political disenfranchisement.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, a spiral of hatred can motivate and push bigots into action.

## **From hate speech to hate crime**

Hate speech might lead to physical harm. It is not argued that hate speech necessarily leads to hate crime. However, it is argued

that hate speech might lead to hate crimes. Benjamin Smith and Richard Baumhammers are two Aryan supremacists who in 1999 and 2000, respectively, went on racially motivated shooting sprees after being exposed to internet racial propaganda. Smith regularly visited the World Church of the Creator website, a notorious racist and hateful organization.<sup>9</sup> He said: "It wasn't really 'til I got on the internet, read some literature of these groups that ... it really all came together." He maintained: "It's a slow, gradual process to become racially conscious."<sup>10</sup> Rabbi Abraham Cooper of the Wiesenthal Center has also argued that the internet provided the theological justification for the torching of synagogues in Sacramento and a pseudo-intellectual basis for violent hate attacks in Illinois and Indiana.<sup>11</sup>

In 2014, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) published a two-year study detailing incidents in which active users of one website, Stormfront.org, had murdered nearly 100 people over the previous five years.<sup>12</sup> These incidents include the killing of three Pittsburgh police officers by Richard Poplawski in 2009. Two years later, in 2011, Anders Behring Breivik embarked on a murderous journey, in which he detonated a truck bomb in front of a government building in Oslo, killing eight, and then went on a shooting spree in Utoya Island, murdering 69 others. In May 2012, Jason Todd Ready killed four people before killing himself. That same month, Eric Clinton Kirk Newman, also known as Luca Rocco Magnotta, was accused of torturing and dismembering a Chinese immigrant. Three months later, Wade Michael Page shot and killed six people at a Sikh temple before killing himself during a shootout with police.

After explaining the harm caused by hate speech, and why it should be taken extremely seriously, let us now turn to Holocaust denial. I will start by explaining the substance of Holocaust denial and then elucidate why it is a form of hate speech.

## **What do we mean by “Holocaust denial”?**

What do we mean by “Holocaust denial”? Why does this form of speech constitute hate? If you ask a person on the street what they know about the Holocaust, and they answer that they have not heard of it, this is not Holocaust denial. Denying reality is not a form of hate. Even if they appear to know something, such a denial is not necessarily a form of hate. The component of hate depends on the content of the speech and the intention of the speaker.

Disputing certain historical facts is also not a form of hate, and I doubt whether it can be regarded as Holocaust denial. If one argues that five million—not six million—Jews were murdered during 1938-1945, based on a study of reports on Jewish demography in Europe, this is an issue that can, and should, be discussed in the open in order to discover a possible new facet of the truth. If one brings evidence showing that an alleged massacre did not happen, or happened on a different date, or more people were killed in it than we know, or that an alleged war criminal was not in an alleged place at the relevant time, these are all issues that should be probed and discussed. All this does not constitute Holocaust denial, nor a form of hate.

Moreover, generally speaking, people are entitled to hold and express vilifying and outrageous views, to voice their dislike of other people, to use derogatory words and discriminatory adjectives against others. We do not enjoy it: we feel it is wrong and we feel outraged confronting such statements. Still, liberals believe that such speech is protected by the principle of free speech and that it shelters in the shade of tolerance. The way to fight against such discriminating and damaging opinions is through more speech, not by silencing and censoring speech. This, indeed, is the essence of tolerance.

That being said, Holocaust denial constitutes a special category of speech that does not necessarily merit protection. It is far

from being innocent. Holocaust denial is a form of hate speech because it willfully promotes enmity against an identifiable group based on ethnicity and religion. It is designed to underestimate and justify murder, genocide, xenophobia, and evil. However, despite being a particularly evil manifestation of racism, Holocaust denial assumes a form of legitimacy under the guise of the pursuit of “truth.”

It speaks of an international Jewish conspiracy to blackmail Germany and other nations, exploit others, and create the State of Israel. It paints a picture in which the Jews conspired to create not just a hoax but the greatest fabrication of all time. Adolf Hitler did not plan a genocide against the Jews but wished instead to move them out of Europe. No gas chambers ever existed: this is an invention of the Jews to dramatize the mere “fact” that in every war there are casualties. People from many countries were killed. Many of them were Germans. And yes, Jews were killed too, but also people from other religions.<sup>13</sup>

Holocaust deniers attempt to disseminate their extremist ideas by offering unsupported arguments against the well-established historical facts of the Holocaust. Their beliefs include accusations that Jews have falsified and exaggerated the tragic events of the Holocaust in order to exploit non-Jewish guilt. Holocaust denial groups have posted thousands of web pages, filled with distortions and fabrications, that are designed to reinforce negative stereotypes. Among the most visited websites promoting Holocaust denial include those of the Institute for Historical Review, which was originally established for this purpose,<sup>14</sup> Bradley Smith and his Committee for Open Debate of the Holocaust (focusing largely on US college campuses),<sup>15</sup> and various sites sponsored by David Irving.<sup>16</sup> All portray themselves as hubs, even paragons, of unbiased, unorthodox, gutsy historical research.

Denying the Holocaust is to deny history, reality, and suffering. Holocaust denial might create a climate of xenophobia that

is detrimental to democracy. It generates hate through the rewriting of history in a vicious way that portrays Jews as the anti-Christ, a destructive force that works against civilization. Hateful messages desensitize members of the public on very important issues. They potentially develop a tolerance toward hate and resentment of the other—which might be more costly than the cost of curtailing speech. Hate speech, in its various forms, is harmful not only because it offends but because it potentially silences the members of target groups and interferes with their right to equal respect and treatment. Hateful remarks are so hurtful that they might reduce the target group member to speechlessness or shock them into silence. The notion of silencing and inequality suggests great injury, emotional upset, fear, and insecurity that target group members might experience. Hate undermines the individual's self-esteem and standing in the community.<sup>17</sup>

Nine European countries have made Holocaust denial illegal: Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland. Many of these countries also have broader laws against libel or inciting racial hatred. Germany prohibits Holocaust denial due to its sensitivity to the horrors of the Nazi era. In 1994, it passed a law making Holocaust revisionism, in and of itself, a criminal offence. The German Constitutional Court ruled that freedom of speech was not a defense available to groups propagating the "Auschwitz lie."<sup>18</sup>

In 1995, a Berlin state court convicted a leader of Germany's neo-Nazi movement for spreading racial hatred and denigrating the state by telling people visiting the Auschwitz concentration camp that the Holocaust was a fiction.<sup>19</sup>

France, another country that is highly sensitive to matters relating to the Second World War, passed the Gayssot law (named after French MP J.C. Gayssot) in 1990. The law punishes, through heavy fines or imprisonment, any "public expression

of denial of the genocide perpetrated on the Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War.” This law was used in 1999 to condemn the infamous denial academic, Robert Faurisson,<sup>20</sup> as well as some of his followers, notably the philosopher Roger Garaudy.<sup>21</sup> In February 2006, British historian David Irving was found guilty in Vienna of denying the Holocaust of European Jewry and sentenced to three years in prison pursuant to the Austrian Federal Law on the prohibition of National Socialist activities. Irving denied the existence of gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps in several lectures held in Austria in 1989. Under the State Treaty of 1955 for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, which Austria concluded with France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, Austria undertook to prevent all Nazi propaganda. The Prohibition Statute forms part of the Austrian Constitution.<sup>22</sup>

## **Gatekeepers’ responsibility**

January 27 has been designated by the United Nations as International Holocaust Remembrance Day. It is the day on which Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated. On this day, the world remembers the six million Jews who were murdered by the Nazi regime.

Despite clear historical evidence, some people deny the Holocaust. The internet has become a very handy platform for spreading those claims and for making a case for what the deniers term “revisionist history.” Among the major social networking sites that disseminate Holocaust denial is Facebook.

The internet plays an instrumental role in spreading hate and in translating speech into action. Cyberhate produces a “permanent disfigurement” of group members.<sup>23</sup> Responsible organizations should always weigh the consequences of their conduct. They should not say: “I did not know.” They should know.

Ignorance cannot absolve them of responsibility. Society cannot take lightly calls for the murder of people because of their race.<sup>24</sup>

The gatekeepers of some of the world's largest technology companies—Google, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter—are young Americans who were brought up on the values of the First Amendment. For them, freedom of expression is the most important principle that guides their actions. So much so that, at first, Facebook did not have rules on what speech violated its terms of service,<sup>25</sup> and Twitter's only exception to free speech merely stipulates: "You may not publish or post direct, specific threats of violence against others."<sup>26</sup> Consequently, hate speech is a legitimate, protected form of speech. However, the role of gatekeepers, which gives them great powers, also requires great responsibility. A balance needs to be struck between freedom of expression and social responsibility, between rowdiness and civility, between the desire to have an open, wide marketplace of ideas and ensuring that such a marketplace does not facilitate violence and lawlessness.

What internet service providers (ISPs) and web-hosting companies could certainly do is to provide a *uniform channel for user complaints*. Such a channel (which could be as simple as a link to the CyberTipline) could easily be provided on their complaints or customer service pages.<sup>27</sup> In France, where there is a legal requirement for ISPs to inform officials of violations, this method could work quite efficiently. In other countries, voluntary participation is to be encouraged.

From an ethical perspective, ISPs and web-hosting companies can and should have codes of conduct explicitly stating that they deny service to hate-mongers. This is not a free speech issue, as we are not free to inflict harm on others. It is about taking responsibility for stopping those who abuse the internet for their vile purposes. ISPs and web-hosting companies should strike a balance between freedom of expression, on the one hand, and principles of social responsibility, on the other. At the very least,

responsibility requires of them to adhere to their own terms of service. If their terms of service prohibit the posting of hateful and threatening content, then they should see that such content is not present on their servers.

This should be stressed, because Facebook, despite what is stated above, still hosts such organizations as the National Association for the Advancement of White People.<sup>28</sup> If you conduct a simple search on Facebook for “Holocaust denial,” you will get many results, including “Holocaust is a Myth,” a few “Holohoax” pages, two “Holocaust denial” groups, and one “Against Holocaust Denial Laws” group. In response to pleas to remove those pages, Facebook has said: “We think it’s important to maintain consistency in our policies, which don’t generally prohibit people from making statements about historical events, no matter how ignorant the statement or how awful the event.”<sup>29</sup> How can this stance be reconciled with Facebook’s prohibition on posting content that is hateful or threatening is something for Facebook’s managers to reckon with and answer.

Anti-hate speech advocates should explain to ISPs the nature of the contested hate, its potential harms, and why corporate responsibility means taking the content off their servers. This may lead ISPs to take proactive steps so as to avoid hosting hate sites on their servers.

In this context, it is worth mentioning that the US Congress passed the “Good Samaritan provision,” in the 1996 Communication Decency Act (Section 230-c-2), which protects ISPs that voluntarily take action to restrict access to problematic material. It states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to, or availability of, material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”<sup>30</sup>

ISPs and web-hosting companies should develop *standards*

*for responsible and acceptable practices for internet users.* Their terms of service usually grant ISPs a unilateral right and ability to block service to those who violate their terms. ISPs are reluctant to do this as they wish to maintain business. They operate for profit. However, there have been instances in which ISPs have denied service to users, generally on the grounds of copyright violations. In such cases, following complaints, the ISPs took the relevant material off their servers.

One example of cooperation between an internet monitoring organization and an ISP involves the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Brian Marcus, who at the time headed the ADL internet division, explained to private companies that they could decide not to host messages containing hate speech because doing so might be bad for their business. In particular, the ADL approached the CEO of a Texas web-hosting company, asking him where he would draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech. The CEO answered that hate was protected speech but that threats were not. Marcus then showed him that one of the sites that the CEO's company was hosting claimed that all members of minorities should be hanged from street lamps. The CEO was surprised. For him, this was a threat. Although it was not a threat according to US law,<sup>31</sup> for this CEO it was too much. Marcus then showed him some 150 similar sites. After deliberation, the company subsequently closed 110-120 of them.<sup>32</sup>

Lasting social change needs a combination of solid governmental support and committed corporate action. A comprehensive look at the movement for corporate social responsibility (CSR) shows that market forces often jump-start responsibility. Consumer demand for responsibility may push companies to produce certain products and abandon others. Actual (or threatened) consumer boycotts influence decision-making processes. "Naming and shaming" practices by non-governmental organizations, pressure from socially responsible investors, and values held by employees and management are all influential. Yet there

is no guarantee that a company will sustain its efforts past a marketing campaign if practices and standards are not enshrined in law. Corporations will only practice corporate social responsibility in the long-term if it is good for their bottom line. While profitability may not be the only reason corporations will, or should, behave virtuously, it has become the most influential one. In other words, corporate social responsibility is sustainable only if virtue pays off.<sup>33</sup>

## Conclusion

Holocaust denial may potentially lead to tolerance of hate and resentment of the other, which might be costlier than the cost of curtailing speech.<sup>34</sup> At best, ISPs and web-hosting companies show a strong form of ignorance. At worse, they intend to express bigotry and hate.<sup>35</sup> Those who allow such postings on their servers are culpable for their akratic conduct. Whether through ignorance, indifference, or insistence on clinging to freedom of speech without caring about its dangerous consequences, such behavior is unjustifiable. We expect such organizations to scrutinize their servers and to abide by a basic code of conduct that objects to rather than celebrates hateful bigotry and its promotion.

Facebook and other ISPs and web-hosting companies should reconsider their position on Holocaust denial, as such speech often does violate their general terms of service. They should not keep silent in the face of hate. We have learnt that silence is conducive to the spread of hatred and bigotry, and that harmful words might lead to harmful action. To recall the words of Martin Niemöller (1892-1984), the Protestant pastor who was an outspoken critic of Adolf Hitler and spent the last seven years of Nazi rule in concentration camps:

First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—  
because I was not a socialist.

Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a trade unionist.

Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—because I was not a Jew.

Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.

We should not stand idly by while the internet is being abused by hate mongers. Hate speech may result in hate crimes. Hate messages deserve our full attention. They should be condemned and delegitimized before they create ripe circumstances for murdering the targets of hate.

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34. R. Cohen-Almagor, "Holocaust Denial Is A Form of Hate Speech" and "Countering Hate on the Internet—A Rejoinder," *Amsterdam Law Forum* 2(2) (2010): 125-132. See also Chris Matyszczyk, "Facebook: Holocaust Denial Repulsive and Ignorant," *CNET News*, 6 May 2009, [http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852\\_3-10234760-71.html](http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10234760-71.html).
35. Examples are <http://www.adelaideinstitute.org>, <http://www.toben.biz>, and <http://holylwar.org>.

## **Hate Marches? Antisemitism in Online Comments on Independence Day Marches in Poland (2017-2018)\***

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Hate speech is a pertinent issue in the 21st century. Thanks to the ubiquity of the internet, anyone can have their say on practically everything, which breeds false judgment, disrespect, and arrogance among users. Anonymity and impunity boost intolerance and hatred in online comments, which are increasingly aggressive, offensive, and scornful.<sup>1</sup> In 2014 and 2016, the University of Warsaw's Centre for Research on Prejudice, in collaboration with the Batory Foundation, conducted research into hate speech in Poland, targeting adults and adolescents (16-18 years of age). The study involved demonstrating instances of hate speech to members of groups suffering from discrimination

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\* Translated from Polish by Łukasz Bogucki. The wording of the online comments cited in this paper has been slightly adjusted for the purpose of linguistic authenticity.

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in Poland (Jews, Muslims, Ukrainians, Roma, people of color, refugees, LGBT persons, and feminists). The examples were sourced from comments on popular internet portals, quotes from celebrities and politicians, as well as products of popular culture. The study aimed at establishing the extent of hate speech and the consequences of exposure to aggressive and prejudicial discourse.

Another issue under scrutiny was the relation between the escalating hate-driven behavior and political events, such as the emergence of the right-wing government of the Law and Justice party (PiS), as well as social changes related to the migration crisis and increasing nationalistic tendencies.<sup>2</sup> The study indicated that every third adult Pole and as many as 70% of adolescents were familiar with incidents of online hate speech. Surprisingly, derogatory remarks (in particular those addressed at Jews, Muslims, homosexuals, and Roma) met with general approval.<sup>3</sup> It appeared that acceptance of hate speech by adolescents was related to the prevalence of right-wing beliefs and the need for a stable social hierarchy, as well as antisemitic attitudes and hostility toward censorship. In the case of adult respondents, the connection between acceptance of hate speech and right-wing beliefs or hierarchical attitudes was less pronounced.

The 2016 report bears out the findings of previous studies, namely that youth have far more exposure to hate speech. Such incidents occur mostly online, while adults experience this kind of discourse chiefly on television. Since 2014, the exposure to hate speech in the media (including traditional ones that should apparently exercise more control over broadcast quality) has risen sharply. The recent trend appears to be increasingly disrespectful toward refugees, Muslims, and gays, but less so toward Jews.<sup>4</sup> However, as many as 75% of young respondents claim to have been exposed to online hate speech targeting Jewish people. According to researchers, acts of hate speech have more to do with contempt than actual hatred.<sup>5</sup> One worrying finding was

that fewer and fewer respondents consider this kind of language as hurtful and offensive, while those who are exposed to such discourse actually use it themselves increasingly frequently, as they no longer consider it a genuine concern.

Since 2010, Poland has celebrated its sovereignty (regained after 123 years) in the form of Independence Day marches in Warsaw. Very early on, these events were practically taken over by nationalistic groups, who identified themselves with the tradition of the National Democracy Party (*Narodowa Demokracja*), the Academic Union of All-Polish Youth (*Akademicki Związek Młodzieży Wszechpolskiej*) set up in 1922, as well as the National-Radical Camp (*Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*), which dates back to 1934. The political agenda of these associations was fraught with extreme antisemitism.<sup>6</sup> In 2011, the Independence Day March Association, *Stowarzyszenie Marsz Niepodległości*, was set up. This body posed as the official organizer of the rally and was made up of activists from re-established far-right associations.<sup>7</sup> They had a role model in Roman Dmowski, the pre-war leader of the National Democracy Party, who was always very adamant about resolving the Jewish issue and creating a Catholic “Poles-only” state.<sup>8</sup> At these Independent Day rallies, the nationalists and their supporters pledge allegiance to this infamous tradition by putting up banners with homophobic and antisemitic slogans. Recently, these rallies have also been backed by the leaders of the governing party, as well as by some pro-government media and journalists. During the second march in 2011, there were skirmishes between nationalists and opponents of racist and xenophobic beliefs. In 2012, the 25,000 protesters were united under the slogan “Let’s reclaim Poland,” while the motto of the 2013 march was “The new generation is coming.”<sup>9</sup> The cry of the 2014 event was “Patriot’s Army,” in remembrance of Dmowski’s 150th birthday. In 2015, the motto was “Poland for Poles, Poles for Poland,”<sup>10</sup> while in 2016 it was “Poland—the heartland of Europe.” The 2016 event was attended by almost 100,000 people,

who heard a letter from Poland's President Andrzej Duda read aloud. The slogan of 2017, "We want God," reverberated strongly in the mass media.<sup>11</sup> According to Robert Bąkiewicz, president of the Independence Day March Association, this cry was intended to attract public attention to the fact that atheism in the European Union was becoming increasingly prominent but that Poland was the European bastion of religiousness. This shibboleth failed to gain approval even among right-wing journalists. One of them, Rafał A. Ziemkiewicz, tweeted: "The Independence Day march slogan is a bad idea. The Nationalist Movement shouldn't follow in the footsteps of the Rosary Crusade; it's a completely different philosophy."<sup>12</sup> Internet users reacted, joking that, as some put it, "it must by now be too late for 'We want reason.'" The rally reverberated through local and foreign media, including *Wirtualna Polska* (WP), *Interia*, *Polska Times*, and *Wyborcza*. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "The Independence Day march was a memorable event for Poles; the isolated incidents cannot be interpreted as dominant."<sup>13</sup> The statement noted that Polish authorities "strongly condemn racist, antisemitic, and xenophobic views."<sup>14</sup>

Among the foreign media that took interest in the march were the Israeli information portal the *Times of Israel*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the BBC, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Politico*, the *Guardian*, CNN, the Russian TV station RT, the *New York Times*, and the Arabic TV station Al-Jazeera. Apart from the aforementioned motto, banners raised and slogans chanted during the rally raised controversies throughout the world media. The online information portal *Polska Times* was concerned by and critical of racist and fascist slogans such as "Pure blood," "Let's pray for Islamic Holocaust," or "Death to enemies of the state."<sup>15</sup> The *Times of Israel* mentioned the following slogans: "Pure Poland, Poland free from Jews" and "Jews, get out of Poland."<sup>16</sup> The portal made sure to remind its users that 90% of Polish Jews died in the Holocaust, resulting in today's Jewish

community in Poland averaging just 10,000 members. The post included a statement by the spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Emmanuel Nahshon, who said: “It is a dangerous rally, organized by extremists and racists. We do hope that the Polish government will seek to pursue its organizers. A lesson we learn from history is that hatred and racism must be fought with the full force and speed possible.”<sup>17</sup> Nahshon’s words were quoted worldwide, including by the Italian press agency Ansa. The news included the involvement in the rally of so-called far-right agitators, such as Tommy Robinson from the United Kingdom and Roberto Fiore from Italy.<sup>18</sup>

The 2018 Independence Day march was a special one, as Poland was celebrating 100 years of sovereignty that year. Despite the special occasion, controversies did occur. Four days before the celebrations on November 11, the Mayor of Warsaw, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, banned the rally for fear of possible outbursts of aggressive nationalism.<sup>19</sup> The Independence Day March Association appealed the decision and won; thus the ban was revoked.<sup>20</sup> The controversy led the government to issue a statement to the effect that one national march would be held.<sup>21</sup> The website run by the rally’s organizers had the following announcement:

As is by now a yearly tradition, the Independence Day march will be held in Warsaw. Despite numerous controversies and voices to the contrary, we can now say with full force and pride that the great initiative has won—for Poland, for Poles, for past and future generations. The government and the Independence Day March association have worked out a compromise so as to celebrate the anniversary of regaining independence in a suitable way.<sup>22</sup>

The Prime Minister’s website said: “Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki hopes that the march will unite everyone willing to express their love for our country on this very special day in a suitable manner.”<sup>23</sup> In spite of what both the government and the

organizers had announced, there were two rallies that day. The government one, headed by President Andrzej Duda, displayed the slogan “For you, Poland,” while the nationalist one treading behind it bore the motto “God, honor, homeland.”<sup>24</sup> Military police separated the two rallies.<sup>25</sup>

The events, described as peaceful and largely uneventful, attracted a record-breaking attendance of 250,000.<sup>26</sup> *Polska Times* commented that “there were no banners in sight that would be fascist or otherwise offensive.”<sup>27</sup> However, despite calls to forgo any pyrotechnics, flares were set off.<sup>28</sup> Opponents of the European Union burned the EU flag amid cries of “The rag is burning” and “Down with the EU.”<sup>29</sup> Although *Polska Times* assured its readers to the contrary, the rally was actually frequented by neo-fascists. The *Guardian*’s Christian Davies tweeted a picture of Polish soldiers with red and white flags, standing next to nationalists. The caption read: “I am lost for words.”<sup>30</sup> President Duda called for the use of only Polish flags, but to no avail.<sup>31</sup> The crowd waved various flags, including of the Italian neo-fascist movement *Forza Nuova* and the National Radical Camp, as well as symbols including the “black sun” and black Celtic crosses.<sup>32</sup> According to reporters, there were banners used at previous marches, including “Death to enemies of the state.”<sup>33</sup> Among the chanted slogans were “Honor, faith, nationalism,” “Pride, pride, national pride,” and “Roman Dmowski, Poland’s liberator.”<sup>34</sup>

Similarly to previous events, the 2018 march aroused media interest worldwide.<sup>35</sup> Foreign media were somewhat more skeptical about the peaceful nature of the march. The Spanish daily *El País* said: “The most extreme nationalist Europe showcases its strength in Poland,” and the *Guardian* made a note of the Polish president’s participation next to representatives of nationalist organizations.<sup>36</sup> The BBC noted that although the march went off without incident, it was notable for the controversial concession of allowing the nationalists’ participation.<sup>37</sup>

The *Bloomberg* portal commented: “As Poland is celebrating its 100th anniversary, nationalists converge in Warsaw.” The *Times of Israel* said that it was “the first time that Polish authorities have marched along with far-right movements.”<sup>38</sup>

Ever since its conception, the Independence Day march has generated heated controversy. Polish internet portals keep their readers updated on the organizers’ plans, as well as the events of the rally itself. These posts generate hundreds of comments from users. The feedback includes pro-march opinions, expressing pride in and support of the protesters’ involvement, as well comments by those against them, labeling the event as a threat to democracy and tolerance. Both sides are emotionally involved. The key question seems to be whether the march is patriotic or nationalistic in character. The proponents’ voices tend to be xenophobic, discriminatory, even racist, in particular against Muslims and Jews. On the other side of the proverbial fence are those who dread the preservation of pre-war nationalistic traditions and express concern regarding the slogans’ rhetoric. Their comments ridicule their opponents’ ignorance and obtuseness, involving hermetic Catholicism and expressions of faith excluding Christ’s Jewish background. Irony and sarcasm are among the more frequent rhetorical devices used against the rally’s dominant slogans:

We want God—the Father, the Son the Jew and the Holy Spirit?  
Well, maybe not the Son....<sup>39</sup>

Mary was actually not from Częstochowa, but from Nazareth.  
You know where that is? It’s in Jewish Israel.<sup>40</sup>

The opponents bring up the proponents’ backwardness and paranoia in hunting down aliens. The question “What happened to you Poles” is symptomatic of the fears.<sup>41</sup> Others are predominantly embarrassed.<sup>42</sup> Many internet users see political similarities between the rhetoric of the governing Law and Justice party (and its advocates) and the development of nationalism and anti-

semitism in the 1930s in Poland and Germany. Much of the feedback seems to be fuelled by aversion to the Law and Justice party, such as the comment: “To those who support Law and Justice—when will we have *Kristallnacht* and burn down some Jewish stores?”<sup>43</sup> The Poles’ war experience is brought up as well: “We Poles suffered the most from the Nazi ideology of the master race, and now we are in favor?! ”<sup>44</sup>

Both the negative and positive feedback thrives on dichotomy. Opponents of the march highlight the division between sensible, open-minded, and educated people who support democracy and EU values, and retarded antisemites and homophobes. The viewpoint of the proponents of prejudice is based on a division between genuine Poles, showcasing their patriotism and native values, and traitors who support foreign powers that deprive Poland of its sovereignty, whether overtly or surreptitiously. Critics of the march are seen as anti-Poland and of having “sick imagination.” Its proponents express the following opinions on the rally’s slogans:

I am proud of the slogans.<sup>45</sup>

They were good and honest slogans.<sup>46</sup>

It’s traitors who are offended by the slogans.<sup>47</sup>

Well done, Poland and Poles. We were on everybody’s lips 100 years ago and we are on everybody’s lips today. Let’s show everyone how we respect the blood of our ancestors and how we enjoy the celebrations. “Poland is not yet lost.... ”<sup>48</sup>

Interestingly, the march’s proponents do not reject accusations of fascism, racism, and antisemitism. On the contrary, they admit that the slogans represent their beliefs. The last commenter is proud of the “genuine patriots,” as evidenced by the use of the first line of the Polish anthem “Poland is not yet lost.”

Certain accusations, such as the promulgation of antisemitism and 1930s slogans, are rejected with the help of secondary anti-

semitism,<sup>49</sup> namely by undermining the import of antisemitic slogans by diverting attention and turning it toward the policy of Israel. This is a common defensive mechanism in the rhetoric of hate speech and antisemitic discourse, whereby the speaker is cleansed by pointing to the sins of the enemies, such as in the examples below:

Jews should see what they did in Palestine, not criticize what we do here!<sup>50</sup>

Let Jews worry about their own; where were they anyway when Hitler murdered them?<sup>51</sup>

The minister of the most chauvinist and racist country in the world has the balls to criticize us Poles?<sup>52</sup>

The comments abound in aggressive and vulgar language, apparent dehumanization, as well as the use of block capitals to make a stronger point, as these examples illustrate:

BARK ALL YOU WANT MONGRELS, BUT BARK AT HOME.<sup>53</sup>

TO THINK THAT GOD IS SO MERCIFUL AND HASN'T YET SENT A PLAGUE ON YOU ALL.<sup>54</sup>

The most frequent concomitant to antisemitic discourse seem to be elements of conspiracy theory, connected with the antisemitic specter of the Judeopolonia conspiracy theory that gave a vision of Jewish dominance in Poland.<sup>55</sup> Dating back to mid-19th century, this theory became more powerful in the interwar period, as Poland had the third largest Jewish community in the world at the time. The antisemitic myth continued into the post-war period, now as a form of “antisemitism *sans* Jews.”

Such discourse includes the belief that Jews are sneaky and insidious.<sup>56</sup> The comments contain elements of the so-called worldwide Jewish conspiracy, highlighted by quotes from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

... but they keep running it here, there are no Poles in politics, just Polish names.<sup>57</sup>

... so my objective opinion is that you Jews did more bad than good for Poland and you still do, like you push for power, media, economy, everywhere you can stir the pot. You lot are spiteful and aggressive to your neighbors.<sup>58</sup>

The commenters take recourse to post-war Polish history and the popular antisemitic theory of Judeo-Communism, whereby Jews are said to have played a major role in the Communist authorities, including those responsible for the post-war terror. According to researchers, approximately 37% of Jews and people of Jewish origin were involved in strengthening Communism and working for the security apparatus in Stalinist Poland—mostly among the high command.<sup>59</sup> The antisemitic illusion lays the blame for Stalinist crimes and the Communist government solely on named Jews. In addition, their contemporary relatives are also discredited, as evidenced in more online comments:

After 1945, Jews got Poland from Stalin as a gift. They were to run the place and keep Poles in check. They had nothing to fear. They had NKVD behind them, as well as their own terror apparatus. Changing names was just for the sake of EASIER work.<sup>60</sup>

Stalin had Jews in the most important government positions. They made up 70% of the staff in the Ministry of Public Security. They took over the army, courts, prosecutors' offices, law departments at Polish universities. They continued what Stalin did in Katyn to eliminate the rest of their enemies by bloody terror.<sup>61</sup>

A frequent antisemitic argument, whereby the victim of an attack is accused of starting it in the first place, is used to defend accusations of spreading racist beliefs:

Jews provoke antisemitism. In theory, they are not even here; in actual fact, they are all over the place.<sup>62</sup>

So if you want you can dig into this and see why they are so unpopular. You can like look at the world and it's like hard to see that Jews have always had issues with any and all nations they were with.<sup>63</sup>

The comments from internet users take the form of direct accusations, while the quotations and selective approach to history serve to bear out the obvious truth.<sup>64</sup> Jews are the object, not the partner in this discourse. Their alleged qualities are simply attributed to them by antisemites. This is not only an overgeneralization but also a compilation of irrational, mutually exclusive accusations. Thus, Jews aim at the “Islamization of Poland” but also “bring blacks to Europe,” although one is certainly hard put to think why they should do such a thing. Apparently Europe, and Poland in particular, is supposed to be the bastion of Catholicism and the area of white supremacy.

Stressing anti-polonism is another way of resisting accusations of antisemitism. This is meant to balance out the argumentation and insist that antisemitism is merely a consequence of or a reaction to Jewish anti-polonism. Thus, the blame falls on the side that is being attacked:

... when are you going to write about Jewish antipolonism?!?<sup>65</sup>

Bernard Lazare (a Jew) wrote a column on antisemitism in 1894 and he concluded “it’s the Jews themselves and their leaders who are responsible for antisemitism....”<sup>66</sup>

The comments quoted above indicate the strong negative stereotype of Jews. The internet users who lean toward antisemitism consider Jews as dishonest, aggressive, and mercenary; apparently they cheat and unite against others. The stereotype of the Jewish peddler is back, only the Jew is no longer involved just in his own business dealings but in an effort to control events at national and global level. Various highly generalized statements that fall into this category include:

... there are no good Jews, just Jews.<sup>67</sup>

... the Jew will always be ungrateful.<sup>68</sup>

Never trust anyone who is married to a Jew.<sup>69</sup>

Studies on the degree of antisemitism in contemporary Poland indicate a decreasing tendency to promote religious antisemitism, but online antisemitic comments abound.<sup>70</sup> Online feedback is a useful tool for identifying a new cultural code that is still clearly based on a firm Catholic background. Verbally-expressed disinclination toward Jews manifests itself by bringing up anti-Judaic accusations of Christ's death as irrefutable proof of the invariable Jewish nature. The comments abound with derogatory language, offensive lexis, and epithets, such as "Them Jews killed Jesus Christ"<sup>71</sup> or "Them Pharisees got even with Jesus."<sup>72</sup> Jews are seen as vindictive and cruel: "They say he was an honest man, that's why the brood of vipers got him murdered"<sup>73</sup> or "The reason why Jews hanged Jesus was because he wasn't one of them."<sup>74</sup> Opinions against Christ being Jewish are not infrequent. The commenters point to Jews not treating Jesus Christ as the Messiah, which is seen as despicable and unacceptable:

These Judases say Jesus was Jewish; that's disgusting.<sup>75</sup>

What? Jewish? That's bull.<sup>76</sup>

... as a man he actually WAS JEWISH.<sup>77</sup>

That's more Jewish crap though. Mary was just an incubator, that's why Jews crucified Jesus!<sup>78</sup>

All of the above being antisemitic in nature, the following comment, unbelievably shocking, can be regarded as the strongest manifestation of hate speech:

Why didn't they burn more of you Jews!! You are the reason we argue all the time!!<sup>79</sup>

This appalling comment makes all others pale in comparison, hateful as they all may be. What's even more horrifying is the fact that most of the feedback is provided by active internet users, who are young or at best middle-aged. The comments presented herein are mere examples, yet symptomatic enough to

support pessimistic assumptions concerning the permanent character of antisemitic prejudice and the instrumental application thereof. They are indicative of the rise of nationalistic tendencies and the relative freedom to express such views publicly. The opposite views do not balance out the hateful comments. Although 2018 saw a decline in the number of antisemitic comments connected to the Independence Day march, one could argue that the downward trend was due to the special character of that year's event and numerous pleas for a suitable celebration of the 100th anniversary.

Education on hate speech and its consequences—increased aggression and irresponsible verbal behavior—is valid even at the primary education level. This recommendation also applies to the media and to politically and socially influential people. Allowing BA, MA, and PhD candidates to study topics connected to hate speech enables them and their supervisors to study the linguistic mechanisms at work in such stereotypical behavior, the methods of its dissemination, as well as the impact of its escalation in the public space. Furthermore, it may help us to discover ways in which such undesirable conduct could be prevented. In the words of the director of the Auschwitz Museum, Piotr Cywiński, on the 74th anniversary of the liberation of the camp:

Hate speech breeds hatred. Words of dehumanization make us less human. Threats are dangerous. Why then is it all not taught at school? Why is it legally allowed? Why is it missing from homilies? Why do the media use the language of war to describe peace? There is already a price to pay; in Poland, in Europe, and worldwide.<sup>80</sup>

Let us then hope that the 21st century, with all its terrorist activity, refugee crises, escalation of negative emotions, frustration, and crime, can help us understand that language shapes reality and that our speech makes us live in a world that we created.

## Notes

1. See Małgorzata Wysocka-Pleczyk and Beata Świeży, eds., "Człowiek zalogowany," in *Od mowy nienawiści do integracji w sieci* (Kraków: Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 2013), 6; Hanna Dębska, "Mowa nienawiści a wolność słowa w Internecie—w poszukiwaniu uniwersalnego rozwiązania. Uwagi na marginesie rozważań Jamesa Banksa," in M. Wysocka-Pleczyk and B. Świeży, eds., *Od mowy nienawiści do integracji w sieci* (Kraków: Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 2013), 8.
2. Michał Bilewicz et al., *Mowa nienawiści. Raport z badań sondażowych* (Warsaw: Fundacja im. S. Batorego, 2014), 4-7.
3. Ibid., at 7.
4. See Ireneusz Krzemiński, *Żydzi-problem prawdziwego Polaka. Antysemityzm, ksenofobia i stereotypy narodowe po raz trzeci* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2015).
5. Bilewicz et al., *Mowa nienawiści*, 4-7.
6. For more on the National Democracy Party and National Radical Camp, see Szymon Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny. Geneza i działalność* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1985); Brian A. Porter, "Who Is a Pole and Where Is Poland? Territory and Nation in the Rhetoric of Polish National Democracy before 1905," *Slavic Review* 51(4) (1992): 639-553; Joanna Beata Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Małgorzata Domagalska, "Anti-Semitic Discourse in Polish Nationalistic Weeklies between 1918-1939," *East European Jewish Affairs* 36(2) (2006): 191-197.
7. See <https://marszniepodleglosci.pl/historia>, accessed March 15, 2018.
8. For more on Dmowski and his politics, see Grzegorz Krzywiec, *Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 1886-1905)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016); G. Krzywiec, "Between Realpolitik and Redemption: Roman Dmowski's Solution to the 'Jewish Question,'" in François Guesnet and Gwen Jones, eds., *Antisemitism in Era of Transition: Continuities and Impact in Post-Communist Poland and Hungary* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014), 69-90.
9. "Polsat" television estimated that in 2012 there were 50,000 people. See "Marsz Niepodległości. Policja oskarżona o prowokację," *Wprost*, November 11, 2012, <https://www.wprost.pl/356064/Swieto-Niepodleglosci-relacja-minuta-po-minucie>, accessed March 12, 2018.

10. "Ulicami Warszawy przejdzie Marsz Niepodległości," *TVP3*, November 11, 2015, <https://warszawa.tvp.pl/22591016/ulicami-warszawy-przejdzie-marsz-niepodleglosci>, accessed March 14, 2018.
11. "Marsz Niepodległości pod hasłem 'My chcemy Boga'. W sieci zawrzało," *WP*, October 10, 2017, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/marsz-niepodleglosci-pod-haslem-my-chcemy-boga-w-sieci-zawrzalo-6177468521040001a>, accessed March 15, 2018.
12. *Ibid.*
13. "Marsz Niepodległości był wielkim świętem Polaków," *Interia*, November 13, 2017, <http://fakty.interia.pl/polska/news-msz-marsz-niepodleglosci-byl-wielkim-swietem-polakow,nId,2464368>, accessed March 13, 2018.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Aleksandra Gersz, "Marsz Niepodległości 2017. Światowe media o marszu: pokaz nacjonalizmu, faszyzmu i rasizmu," *Polska Times*, November 13, 2017, <http://www.polskatimes.pl/fakty/swiat/a/marsz-niepodleglosci-2017-swiatowe-media-o-marszu-pokaznacjonalizmu-faszyzmu-i-rasizmu,12669490>, accessed March 15, 2018.
16. *Ibid.*
17. "MSZ Izraela skrytykowało Marsz Niepodległości w Warszawie," *WP*, November 12, 2017, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/msz-izraela-skrytykowalo-marsz-niepodleglosci-w-warszawie-6187099239532161a>, accessed March 14, 2018.
18. Adam Styczek, "BBC: marsz nacjonalistów. Kibole zawłaszczają patriotyzm," *WP*, November 12, 2017, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/bbc-marsz-nacjonalistow-kibole-zawlaszczaja-patriotyzm-6186827957094017a>, accessed March 15, 2018.
19. "Prezydent Warszawy Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz zakazała Marszu Niepodległości," *Rzeczpospolita*, November 7, 2018, <https://www.rp.pl/Warszawa/181109581-Prezydent-Warszawy-Hanna-Gronkiewicz-Waltz-zakazala-Marszu-Niepodleglosci.html>, accessed February 14, 2019.
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21. Andrzej Konieczny, "Marsz Niepodległości 2018. Warszawa: Wojsko na ulicach [ZDJĘCIA] Rosomaki jadą do centrum, zbiórka na rondzie Dmowskiego [WIDEO]," *Polska Times*, November 11, 2018, <https://>

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20, 2019. "We want God" is a popular Polish religious song.
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2019. Częstochowa is home to a famous Polish shrine dedicated to Virgin Mary, the Jasna Góra Monastery (lat. Clarus Mons), which is one of the country's places of pilgrimage. The image of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, to which miraculous powers are attributed, is one of Jasna Góra's most precious treasures.
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61. Ibid. Katyń is the site of a series of mass executions of Polish officers and intelligentsia carried out by the Soviet Union, specifically the

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  73. See <http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news-brytyjskie-media-o-marszu-niepodleglosci-pochod-antysemitow,nId,2464145>, accessed March 15, 2018.
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## **In Countering Antisemitism: Notes on Mentoring**

R. Amy Elman\*

Opposition to the study of contemporary antisemitism is often as powerful and pervasive as the prejudice that is its subject. As Charles Small reminds us, it has never been “acceptable to study or examine contemporary forms of antisemitism at the time in which they occurred.”<sup>1</sup> Thus, recent inquiries into the role of the Church and fascists in the last century may be welcome precisely because they are less likely to implicate the passions and prejudices of those in positions of power in this era.

Examples abound. Consider Yale University’s Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA). In 2006, YIISA became the first academic research center in a North American university dedicated to the interdisciplinary study of antisemitism. The expectation that the host institution’s august reputation might offer refuge to those determined to study its contemporary manifestations was proven wrong. Once YIISA focused on the Middle East, it was met with accusations of Islamophobia, a charge that brought about the Centre’s subsequent demise.

While YIISA’s closure is a compelling illustration of the vulnerability of even formidable institutions engaged in critical

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examination of antisemitism, renowned intellectuals—such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali—have also been publicly discredited by allegations of Islamophobia. As Adam Katz makes clear, if Islamophobia involves generating fear of Muslims, scholars of contemporary antisemitism risk being depicted as purveyors of hatred themselves should they extend “sustained, unvarnished, unapologetic attention to the virulent forms of antisemitism at large in Muslim communities today.”<sup>2</sup> When 30 years ago Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Iran’s Supreme Leader) issued a *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie, it was for his “blasphemous” novel. Muslim extremists have since transformed blasphemy into the racist offense of Islamophobia. In 2016, Rushdie conceded: “Today, I would be accused of Islamophobia and racism. People would say I had attacked a cultural minority.”<sup>3</sup>

By amalgamating two very different concepts: “the persecution of believers, which is a crime; and the critique of religion, which is a right,” the term Islamophobia has entered “the semantic field of antiracism,” rendering Islamic antisemitism immune from criticism.<sup>4</sup> This shift has had especially catastrophic consequences for Europe’s remaining Jews, many of whom have failed in their efforts to hold Islamists accountable for their lethal hatred. Consider Sarah Halimi, a 65-year-old French Jewish woman murdered in 2017 by a neighbor who declared he had killed the *shaitan* (an Arabic word for demon) by throwing her into the courtyard from her third floor apartment after brutally beating her. French courts ruled that the murderer, Kobili Traoré, was under the influence of marijuana and could therefore not be held responsible for his murderous antisemitism. Thus, the court set an especially concerning legal precedent, one Halimi’s family intends to appeal before the European Court of Justice.

Additionally, with antipathy toward Israel increasingly functioning as an alibi for antisemitism, the growing pressure that the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign places on academic institutions to boycott Israel has led to an increase in

faculty who refuse recommendations to students interested in studying there. Scholars who recognize the antisemitic character of the boycott and its advocates are, in turn, dismissed and/or ridiculed as Israel apologists whose research and courses deflect (legitimate) criticisms of Israel. Not least, those Jewish faculty and students who refuse to disavow their Zionist identities and/or working relationships with Israelis have been ostracized and forcibly removed from so-called progressive organizations and social movements.

Taken together, these conditions have helped legitimize a climate of self-censorship, segregation, and angst for Jewish faculty and students alike.<sup>5</sup> Swastikas, death-threats, and other acts of physical and psychological intimidation against Jewish faculty and students are far from unusual. According to historian Stephen Norwood, college and university campuses throughout the United States are once again becoming “a principal arena for the propagation of antisemitism, often now intertwined with a virulent anti-Zionism.”<sup>6</sup>

With this in mind, no consideration of pedagogy pertaining to antisemitism studies would be complete without directly confronting the vulnerability of those students (and faculty) affiliated with, or interested in, this emerging field. Understanding and opposing antisemitism on campus thus requires an explicit consideration of our role as mentors who might help to alleviate this problem. Faculty mentors are themselves important because our identities and political agenda inform our students’ views both within and outside of the classroom—in the lectures we give, the texts we assign, and the materials we publish.

Clarity about who we are, what we know, and what we are able to do is an essential ingredient to successful mentoring as its own pedagogical endeavor. This brief paper provides a set of reflections on mentoring and suggests some ways we might better identify and honor those whose contributions to our field have been invaluable while avoiding key assumptions about mentoring that can undermine faculty and students.

For Jewish mentors, in particular, one of the most important things we can do is to identify ourselves as Jews. When a student recently told me that he was grateful for my course because he had never had a Jewish woman professor I was slightly taken aback. As the only tenured Jewish faculty woman at my institution, I have often been alienated and occasionally discriminated against. However, given my own misgivings about identity politics, I had underestimated the ways in which my Jewish identity mattered to my students. That ambivalence about identity politics stems, in part, from many of its empty gestures of recognition that leave “those groups it professes to care about more vulnerable than they otherwise would be.”<sup>7</sup> Those seeking liberation through identity politics are apt to be disappointed, because the oppression that is central to it produces damaged people at least as often as it does successful activists. However, it is precisely because so many Jews have been sidelined through academic programs that promise diversity and inclusion (e.g., Ethnic Studies and Gender Studies) while undermining Jewish sovereignty, self-determination, and peoplehood that it may be especially important to come out.<sup>8</sup>

Jewish presence (whether in person or in the curriculum) can provide an intellectual antidote to parochialism by offering a kind of cognitive dissonance. That is, students long socialized to regard (other) Jews as usurpers (e.g., racists, colonialists, and oppressors) may come to view our teaching and scholarship as strenuously engaged in efforts to counter racism and embrace diversity—particularly viewpoint diversity. The common quip “Ask two Jews, get three opinions” can be particularly instructive to two-handed academics.

Recent critics of academia have attributed its lost stature to its apparent lack of relevance to people’s lives (i.e., elitism) and its emphasis on specialization (a.k.a. knowing more and more about less and less), a criticism that extends no less to interdisciplinary programs. Specialization is perhaps most clearly expressed within

dissertation committees. Because the success of many students depends on a willingness to embrace the jargon and references of such coteries, they are likely to dismiss dynamic work that transcends and/or challenges disciplinary conventions. Put differently, while those who question their disciplines are rarely acknowledged and routinely ignored (read: never assigned), others who offer the most articulate defense and adamant promotion of dominant professors are apt to receive stellar recommendations, academic prizes, grants, scholarships, and plum appointments.

Such factors can stunt progress and enhance academic insularity and, as privileges accrue to those whose positions are in step with the current antisemitic climate, we must acknowledge those students and junior colleagues who do not conform by offering them the assistance they need to succeed. It is also worth noting that while deference to powerful predecessors (collegiality) has its comforts, embracing the more autonomous role of outsider has its own rewards.<sup>9</sup> This includes, but is not limited to, substantive respect, a clear conscience, and access to opportunities that those within one's own specialized field may know little about.

Mentors may wish to inform their students that it is mistaken to assume one's advisors necessarily excel in promoting—or relish the chance to further—the interests of students. Advisors have their own (research and teaching) agenda, and these may not always coincide with those of their students. While mentors benefit from smart and engaged students, mentoring takes time even under the best of circumstances, and time is a resource that few researchers are willing to squander.

The best advisors are often overworked, with many students competing both for their attention and favor. Therefore, it is impossible (and unwise) to serve as every student's greatest advocate—whether for scholarships, grants, positions, or other opportunities. Advisors must be discerning. Successful mentoring requires that one is willing and unafraid to make important

choices about which students and/or junior colleagues to advance for specific positions and awards at different times and in various contexts. Moreover, it may help mentees to realize this and understand the ways in which our commitment to studying antisemitism, and/or Israel, may pose occasional constraints. Knowing the limitations of our reach might enable us to counsel mentees to cast their nets for (additional) references and assistance. That is, effective mentoring involves not only knowing one's field but the ways in which the broader world is connected to it.

Given the politics and entrepreneurial demands for institutional support, departments sometimes push their students into advanced degrees and onto the market well before they are ready to be there. This is especially clear when a job candidate's communication falls short in the absence of a carefully crafted thesis. Worse perhaps are those students, and (junior) faculty, who, having just secured a position, find themselves abandoned and needing to meet standards for which they were never prepared. For hiring institutions and departments that have endured several such debacles, enthusiastic letters of support begin to hold limited significance. Being mindful of this helps us guard against making similar mistakes that can wreak havoc on those we are trying to help.

While the conundrum of rank and grade inflation may be attributed to the compromised candor of one's mentors, one cannot overlook the institutional imperatives of academic production and promotion. Having attended as many prestigious, though intellectually vacuous, seminars as the next person, it is tempting to be forthright about their shortcomings. Yet, a senior colleague once cautioned against disparaging remarks. Although he agreed that such seminars could be tedious, he cautioned that our own stature is maintained or improved by boasting about our affiliations and avoiding unexpurgated assessments. For those confronting antisemitic climates my colleague's

position poses an ethical dilemma. Should one expose one's own institution, co-workers, students, professional organizations, and journals as antisemitic? If so, how? If not, why not?

To note that our colleagues and students may not always be well served by our candor is not to suggest that we deceive ourselves and others. Rather, I am suggesting that regardless of the choices we make about when and how we encounter the challenges of campus antisemitism, we may benefit most from external support systems that are balanced by the perspectives of others off campus (e.g., in non-profits, synagogues, and think tanks). This can reduce stress on us as advisors, boost the merit of our work with mentees, and prove rewarding for those colleagues and intellectuals with some distance from, yet interest in, the academy. In fact, this balance might move academics a step closer to overcoming those well-earned charges of insularity. Our research, teaching, and mentoring can become most rewarding when all of us set simultaneous anchors in different worlds, such as the one of engaged intellectuals and community elders who labor outside academia and the other relatively more secluded and staid settings of our academic affiliation(s).

In closing, one of the primary reasons so many of us might fail to witness the mentoring potential in one another within this new field is because we have failed to recognize this aspect of ourselves—a not inconceivable consequence of internalized antisemitism and its powerful resurgence throughout higher education. More important still, when we rarely extend the characterization of mentoring to the numerous relationships we have had with brilliant folks who nurtured us through the years, we also undermine the communities to which we belong. Our embattled field is in its infancy, and recognizing its diversity and the resilience of its scholars, and the mentors who nurtured them, inspires powerful and heartfelt connections from which we all can draw.

## Notes

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3. Michel Schneider, "Rushdie: 'Un peu partout, la religion s'infiltré dans la politique'," *Le Point*, August 25, 2016, [https://www.lepoint.fr/livres/rushdie-un-peu-partout-la-religion-s-infiltre-dans-la-politique-25-08-2016-2063631\\_37.php](https://www.lepoint.fr/livres/rushdie-un-peu-partout-la-religion-s-infiltre-dans-la-politique-25-08-2016-2063631_37.php).
4. Pascal Bruckner, "There's No Such Thing as Islamophobia: Critique of Religion Is a Fundamental Western Right, Not an Illness," *City Journal* (Summer 2017), <https://www.city-journal.org/html/theres-no-such-thing-islamophobia-15324.html>. Indeed, nearly three decades after Khomeini's *fatwa*, the European Court of Human Rights essentially codified blasphemy into European law, see *E.S. v. Austria* (Application no. 38450/12) [2018] ECHR 891, 25 October 2018, available at <http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2018/891.html>.
5. Andrew Pessin and Doron S. Ben-Atar, eds., *Anti-Zionism on Campus: The University, Free Speech, and BDS* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018).
6. Stephen H. Norwood, "Antisemitism in the Contemporary American University: Parallels with the Nazi Era," Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism (ACTA) no. 34 (Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2010).
7. Mark Lilla, *The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2017), 12.
8. Like Jews in general, lesbians and feminists have been especially invisibilized through these and other programs where post-modernism and queer studies reign. For an investigation of how this happened, with attention to the "pinkwashing" allegations against Israel, see my chapter "Pinkwashing Antisemitism," in Corinne Blackmer and Andrew Pessin, eds., *Poisoning the Wells: Contemporary Antisemitism in the United States* (New York: ISGAP, forthcoming).
9. Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (New York: Harvest/HJB Book, 1966).

## **Erasure and Demonization: Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in Contemporary Social Movements**

Sylvia Barack Fishman\*

### **Changing perceptions of Jews in America**

Waves of Jews emigrating to the United States from colonial to contemporary times were often fleeing active persecution, regarded as pariahs by surrounding Christians and Muslim majorities in their lands of origin. But in America, despite a range of difficult challenges, the status and image of Jews were both gradually transformed. Several excellent studies document how perceptions of Jews as a clearly defined “race” gradually eroded as the American twentieth century wore on.<sup>1</sup> Still, among children of the immigrant generation, and among Holocaust survivors and their descendants especially, many American Jews continued to believe that Jews were potentially vulnerable, and should remain vigilant to potential antisemitic flare-ups. Even Jews born in the United States often felt that White Anglo-Saxon

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Protestant America, while “exceptional” and much more benign than most countries of origin in its treatment of the Jews, still exhibited occasional signs of antisemitism. Even after American Jews had become “white folks,” many insisted that their Jewish “whiteness” was still different than that of the WASPs, whom novelist Philip Roth designated “the real owners of this place,”<sup>2</sup> and Jewish often seemed to be “whiteness of a different color.”<sup>3</sup>

This Jewish sense of vulnerability was part of the motivation for American Jewish political and social activity on behalf of other oppressed groups and new immigrants: As sociologist Marshall Sklare demonstrated in his groundbreaking studies, many suburbanizing liberal American Jews in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that one of the most “essential” activities in order to be a “good Jew” was to “work for civil rights” and to help “attain equality for Negroes.”<sup>4</sup> Many Jews took as their foundational religious motto the biblical principle “Be kind to the stranger because you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Deuteronomy 10:19), meaning that Jews are a people whose lives intersect with other oppressed peoples, and Jews are responsible for helping other oppressed peoples.

No longer stereotyped as foreign-looking, accented and struggling newcomers, successive generations of American Jews were increasingly (and sometimes negatively) portrayed as typifying the bourgeoisie or sometimes the nouveau riche. Satirical portrayals created by Jewish authors and filmmakers contributed: Herman Wouk, Philip Roth, and countless film and television screen-writers shone unflattering spotlights on aggressively upwardly mobile Jewish men and on Jewish women as the incarnation of spiritually bankrupt Judaism-as-consumerism. Ironically, among politically right-wing Americans, Jews were simultaneously stereotyped as communist “Reds” during and through the years leading up to the McCarthy/House Un-American Activities Committee hearings. Both sides of this negative stereotyping—the Jew as capitalist consumer and the

Jew as “Red Menace”—reveal the durability of Jews as a distinctive, “othered” minority American group.

These (sometimes Jewish-created) stereotypes of Jewishness as epitomes of crass, materialistic, middle-class America probably played some role in the evolution of a more contemporary Jewish stereotype: the Jew as a “privileged white” American who benefits in myriad ways by not being a person of color. One of the corollaries of this belated designation of Jews as “white” people is that Jewish peoplehood and distinctiveness is often denied. These stereotypes play into the current antisemitic tendency in progressive rhetoric to erase the peoplehood of Jews and thus their right to self-determination, by utilizing an unnuanced, binary political/economic scaffolding in which all persons or groups must be defined as either oppressors or the oppressed. Additionally, in some curricula, capitalism is identified “with white supremacy and racism” as “forms of power and oppression,” according to Williamson M. Evers.<sup>5</sup> This binary narrative and its accompanying stereotyped mischaracterizations are accepted by segments of the leftist and progressive world, including some faculty and students in academic institutions. They are seldom challenged as antisemitic. Indeed, within the academy antisemitism itself is often removed from discussions of racism.

Certainly, American Jewish involvement with the Civil Rights Movement was complicated, as Marc Dollinger explicates in a new book on the complicated interactions between the two groups, and the relationship between the two groups was always fraught.<sup>6</sup> Many Jews have been disturbed by the use of certain antisemitic language and tropes by individual Black Power activists and some clergy associated with the Black Power movement. Nevertheless, as scholar of religion Susannah Heschel accurately reminds us, “[t]he photograph of [Rabbi Abraham Joshua] Heschel marching out of Selma is still iconic.”<sup>7</sup> And through it all, overwhelmingly liberal American Jewish voting patterns, as

well as statements made in numerous studies, show that concern about minoritized peoples has been a central focus of the Jewish self-images of many American Jews.

Today, antisemitic tropes are repeatedly articulated by celebrity public figures, including some who are persons of color. Some sports and entertainment celebrities have claimed that “white Jews are imposters who falsify biblical history in order to demoralize Blacks,” who are the “real Jews.” As John-Paul Pagano writes, “rappers, actors, comedians, TV personalities, and professional athletes broadcast bigotry about Jews to tens of millions of people.”<sup>8</sup> And yet, in academic settings, despite the realities of the Holocaust in which Jews were massacred as an inferior “race,” antisemitism is not included in many definitions of “racial hatred,” because Jewish socio-economic success—according to these academic theories—obliterates the position of Jews as a minority; rather than an historical minority, they are portrayed as a mere subset of the privileged white majority.

American Jews continue to be measurably a largely politically liberal, left-leaning population, and many Jews perceive themselves as a group disproportionately involved in efforts on behalf of oppressed peoples. Many are deeply disturbed by one-sided mischaracterizations of American Jews, as well as polemical rhetoric defining Israel exclusively as a colonialist oppressor. Professor Laurie Zoloth describes typical anti-Israel canards and their potential impact on Jewish students: “To speak of Israel [on campus] is to speak of a ‘colonialist,’ ‘fascist,’ ‘ethnic cleansing machine’ ... the moral equivalent of defending apartheid in South Africa.”<sup>9</sup>

## **Describing Israel and the Jews as “colonialist oppressors”**

Even before, but especially after Israel’s 1967 preemptive strike against the surrounding Arab powers openly discussing her

annihilation, Israel began to be pictured as a colonialist aggressor rather than a vulnerable democracy. Liberal Jewish activist Daniel Burg, who is on the board of Jews Committed for Justice, protests: “To conflate the military-industrial complex with America’s support for Israel is to play on ... antisemitic tropes about Jewish power and the way that Jewish power is leveraged in the world.”<sup>10</sup>

Most troublingly, lies and distortions about Israel, and a rejection of Israel’s right to resist, now echo in the liberal mainstream, as columnist Bret Stephens points out:

Anti-Zionism—that is, rejection not just of this or that Israeli policy, but also the idea of a Jewish state itself—is becoming a respectable position among people who would never support the elimination of any other country in any other circumstance. And it is churning up a new wave of nakedly anti-Jewish bigotry in its wake... The progressive answer is straightforward: Israel and its supporters, they say, did this to themselves. More than a half-century of occupation of Palestinian territories is a massive injustice... And endless occupation makes Israel’s vaunted democracy less about Jewish self-determination than it is about ethnic subjugation.<sup>11</sup>

Israel struggles to make this narrative more accurate and fair because, as Yossi Klein Halevi insists in his book, *Letters to My Palestinian Neighbor*,<sup>12</sup> narratives shape the way Israel and the Jews are understood. In its early years the Jewish State was often described as a small but plucky David struggling against the Goliath of large, surrounding Arab countries that had attacked Israel the day after statehood was declared (May 15, 1948), openly intending to annihilate Israel and its inhabitants. Israel’s victory against what many saw as insurmountable odds seemed at the time almost miraculous. The secular Labor government and agrarian kibbutzim during Israel’s early years attracted the support of both Jewish and non-Jewish admirers, including various unions such as the AFL-CIO, and many socialists. Israel’s

entrepreneurship in rescuing oppressed Jews—including Jews of color—from Yemen, Ethiopia, Morocco, India, Russia, and elsewhere received positive press coverage. At this point, Israel's image fit in well with the American Jewish self-image (although manifestly support for Israel was far from universal among American Jews, due to concerns about dual loyalty and other issues).

However, early positive images of “tiny,” courageous Israel were later replaced by negative images in many settings, especially liberal-leftist academic environments. Israel's armed forces appeared manifestly stronger than many had imagined when her anticipatory strike against lethal force in 1967 not only quickly defeated and pushed back the armies of large enemies massed around her borders but also put into her hands the Sinai peninsula, the Western Wall, the West Bank, and Gaza, along with nearly 1,000,000 Palestinian inhabitants. Israel's leaders initially offered to return much of the territory conquered in exchange for a peace settlement. However, after Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab countries were rearmed by the Soviet Union (in order to maintain a Middle Eastern foothold), Arab League Summit members issued the Khartoum [Sudan] Declaration (1967), which is famous for containing what came to be called the “Three Nos”: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.

After 1967, Israel was no longer pictured in the media as a vulnerable underdog; subsequent descriptions seldom mentioned Israel's small size and the fury of her enemies. Television news coverage, as well as print journalists and photographers, made the plight of the Palestinian refugees, crowded into refugee camps with extraordinarily high birth rates and palpably miserable living conditions, better known to the American public than many other international crisis situations. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed at a Cairo summit in 1964 for the purpose of creating “liberated Palestine in Israel.” Fatah

leader Yasser Arafat assumed the PLO leadership in 1969, providing the Palestinian cause with a vivid, charismatic, and undeniably ethnic and non-Western face. Partially due to Arafat's lobbying, the United Nations adopted its notorious "Zionism is Racism" resolution in 1975; the resolution spread the idea that the concept of a Jewish state was morally problematic (without mentioning the existence of dozens of official Muslim and Christian states around the world). While US Ambassador to the United Nations Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned that the resolution made "antisemitism international law," it was not revoked until 1991.<sup>13</sup> Left-wing Israeli historians,<sup>14</sup> as well as non-Jewish opponents of the Jewish state, publicized what they often portrayed as episodes of Israel's putatively immoral behavior during and after the 1948 War.

Not least, egged on by the malicious intervention of the USSR, leftist intellectuals in European countries like France and England, which had been forced by waves of uprisings to retreat from their own lucrative, far-flung, and bitterly resented colonial empires, now turned disapprovingly toward Israel, labeling the West Bank and Gaza as "colonial occupations." Their rhetoric ignored Arab aggression and repeated rejection of peace overtures, as well as Israel's immediate proximity to the territories and their acquisition in a defensive war, and instead conveyed the misinformation that the relationship of Israel to the "occupied territories" was identical to the relationship of England to India, France to Algeria and Indochina (where hundreds of thousands were massacred by the French), or, most recently, white minority rule in South Africa.

## **Anti-Zionism as a form of antisemitism**

In contemporary liberal journalistic accounts, historical events and contexts are routinely omitted, distorting Israel's image, and Israel is judged by a different calculus than other nations. For

example, the overt role of hostile Arab neighbors in the genesis of Israel's 1948 War of Independence is typically ignored in many news stories and op-ed pieces dealing with the state's formation, and some journalistic accounts assign motivations of "ethnic cleansing" to Israel's military and political leaders. Currently it has become routine in liberal American journalism and scholarly writing to refer to the 1948 War by its Palestinian name, the *Nakba* or "catastrophe."<sup>15</sup> Such historical facts as the Khartoum rejection of land for peace in 1967 are virtually never mentioned. Similarly, Arafat's rejection of what historian Benny Morris considered "generous" offers and his reversion to terrorism after Oslo I and Oslo II (1993 and 1995) are seldom recalled.<sup>16</sup> David Hirsch writes that, in the common anti-Israel narrative, the Palestinians are viewed as "symbolic of all the victims of 'the west' or 'imperialism,' [while] Israel is thrust into the center of the world as being symbolic of oppression everywhere." In this scenario, as Jarrod Tanny notes, "the Palestinian is the universal victim, the 21st century incarnation of the Marxist proletariat whose liberation would lead to the liberation of us all."<sup>17</sup>

Journalist Bret Stephens warns about the false narrative in which Israel's choices are indicative of "boundless greed for Palestinian land and wicked indifference to their plight":

Israel's enemies were committed to its destruction long before it occupied a single inch of Gaza or the West Bank. In proportion to its size, Israel has voluntarily relinquished more territory taken in war than any state in the world. Israeli prime ministers offered a Palestinian state in 2000 and 2008; they were refused both times. The government of Ariel Sharon removed every Israeli settlement and soldier from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The result of Israel's withdrawal allowed Hamas to seize power two years later and spark three wars... Nearly 1,300 Israeli civilians have been killed in Palestinian terrorist attacks in this century: That's the proportional equivalent of about 16 Sept. 11's in the United States.<sup>18</sup>

The charge that Israel is colonialist is antisemitic—not only anti-Zionist—because it erases Jewish history. It is based on the false premise that the Palestinians are indigenous to Israel and the Jews are not—“the lie that there is no ancestral or historic Jewish tie to the land,”<sup>19</sup> Stephens insists. Examining the anti-Zionist assertions promulgated by some contemporary social movements and organizations illustrates the triumph of alternative narratives over historical fact. “Temple denial,” the claim that the Jewish Temple never existed in Jerusalem—and thus that the Jews have no historical connection to Jerusalem—is symptomatic and symbolic of the prevalence of such fake news. “There is nothing there,” declared Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat at the end of Camp David (July 2000), an astonishing claim repeated frequently by Mahmoud Abbas and reasserted frequently on Palestinian television, as well as in newspapers and sermons. According to the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs’ Dore Gold, Abbas charges that Israelis indulge in “never-ending digging [and] threaten to make al-Aqsa look less significant and vindicate the Israeli narrative.” Temple denial contradicts classic Islamic sources referring to “the area where the Romans buried the Temple [*bayt al-maqdis*] at the time of the sons of Israel.” Repeating ahistorical claims, such as “there is no archaeological evidence that the Temple ever existed on the Temple Mount,” in the words of Yasser Abd Rabbo in *Le Monde* (September 2000), is an effective strategy. Repeated often enough, lies may become accepted as fact.<sup>20</sup>

## Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions

One of the most recognized names among non-sectarian organizations that promulgate anti-Israel narratives as they demonstrate for Palestinian causes is the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The international conferences culminating in the United Nations World Conference Against

Racism in 2001 set the stage for equating Israel with South Africa and launching movements to boycott Israel and Israelis, divest financially from Israeli ventures, and isolate and shun Israel internationally in every possible way. While the United States and Israel ultimately removed their delegations and left Durban over the openly antisemitic and anti-Israel rhetoric expressed there, the ideas launched in Durban took root and have become more accepted over time in many circles.<sup>21</sup>

A 2019 *New York Times* feature article clarified the BDS mission as still “loudly and proudly anti-Zionist,” noting that its “founding documents explicitly reject Zionism—the belief in self-determination for the Jewish people in the biblical land of Israel—calling it the “ideological pillar of Israel’s regime of occupation, settler colonialism, and apartheid.” Quoting co-founder Omar Barghouti, “A Jewish state in Palestine in any shape or form cannot but contravene the basic rights of the indigenous Palestinian population and perpetuate a system of racial discrimination.” Moreover, although its original 2005 doctrine espoused “nonviolent punitive measures,” the BDS movement regards “armed struggle as a legitimate right” and has welcomed “terrorists and their supporters” under their umbrella. Not surprisingly, the authors agree that there is “overlap between support for BDS and antisemitism.” Perhaps most disturbingly, the end-goal of BDS is not to “solve” the conflict but rather to eliminate the existence of Israel as a sovereign Jewish state.<sup>22</sup>

According to its own website, “The BDS movement works to end international support for Israel’s oppression of Palestinians and to pressure Israel to comply with international law.”

BDS language makes it clear that the original sin was the creation of the State of Israel in the first place: “For nearly seventy years Israel has denied Palestinians their fundamental rights.” BDS has three basic principles, listed below with some of their explanatory rationales:

1. “Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall.” This demand accuses Israel of forcing Palestinians into ghettos in order to steal Palestinian land. In Gaza—“the world’s largest open-air prison”—Israel is accused of committing “war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
2. “Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality.” In this and the following demand, only Arab Palestinians are referred to as “indigenous” dwellers—Jews living in Palestine from ancient to modern times are non-existent. Israel is accused of subjugating Palestinians, who comprise “one-fifth of Israeli citizens,” to a “system of racial discrimination ... forcibly displacing Palestinian communities in Israel from their land ... [and] routinely and openly inciting racial violence against them.”
3. “Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194.” “Since its violent establishment in 1948 through the ethnic cleansing of more than half of the indigenous people of Palestine, Israel has set out to control as much land and uproot as many Palestinians as it can. As a result of this systematic displacement, there are now more than 7.25 million Palestinian refugees. They are denied the right to return to their homes simply because they are not Jewish.”

Nathan Thrall describes the moral condemnation inherent in left-wing critiques as follows: “The B.D.S. movement casts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a struggle against apartheid, as defined by the International Criminal Court.” Moreover, American struggles on behalf of persons of color, such as Black Lives Matter, and a variety of groups promoting justice for women, both causes that many Jews support, are widely viewed as being “intersectional” with the plight of the Palestinians.<sup>23</sup> In a response to Thrall, Israeli Brigadier General Yosef Kuperwasser argues that the BDS movement’s overt goal—beyond the three stated in its written literature—is, as articulated by As’ad Abu Khalil, a University of California professor and BDS activist, “to

bring down the State of Israel.”<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Barghouti stated in a 2014 UCLA address that Jews in Israel are “not a people” and that the UN principle of the right to self-determination therefore does not apply to the Jewish state.<sup>25</sup>

## Intersectionality

Berkeley professor Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the term “intersectionality” in a paper for the University of Chicago Legal Forum in 1989 and later expanded and clarified it in a paper for the *Stanford Law Review*.<sup>26</sup> Crenshaw argued that women of color have more in common with other oppressed persons of any gender orientation than they may with either privileged white feminists or powerful male persons of color, because their lives, interests, and problems “intersect,” declaring, “the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism.” The idea that the lives of oppressed persons intersect, even when their circumstances seem quite different, quickly caught on, and it has been used by a broad spectrum of persons and causes.

The broadening of the concept of intersectionality has gained power today partially because of what the Reut Group calls “the Trump Factor,” which exacerbates the “ideological polarization” between Israelis, Americans, and American Jewish communities. They write:

Israel and Netanyahu’s close ties to the Trump administration, as well as to populist governments in Eastern Europe, have driven liberals and young millennials to question whether traditional ties to Israel are deserved or beneficial. The result is that it is easier today to depict Israel as a brutal oppressor in intersectional circles. These sentiments validate increasingly mainstream liberal opposition to Israeli government policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians.<sup>27</sup>

One corollary of the use of the term “intersectionality” today, commonly in use among American communities of color, is the

idea that African Americans have much in common with Palestinians—and that Jews were responsible for African American oppression. Segments of the leadership of the American women’s movement have embraced this conviction and declared themselves allies of oppressed Palestinians. In several episodes, women’s movement activists who are Jewish and also support Israel have been silenced, snubbed, or even banned from participating in women’s movement activities. At the same time, Muslim patriarchal power systems are steadfastly ignored by “intersectional” feminists, while Israel is singled out and condemned. This has created painful conflicts for American Jewish feminists who also are committed to Israel.<sup>28</sup> Those who speak out against this blatant unfairness in academic and professional feminist settings often encounter overt hostility, as professor Janet Freeman and others have testified. This is particularly painful for women who, like Freedman, identify strongly as lifelong active feminists and feel caught between their feminist and their Jewish Zionist passions and commitments.<sup>29</sup> Charging that intersectionality is dangerous to Israel, journalist Sharon Goldman explains that it is based on a concept of “shared victimhood” in which “there is no place for an ideology or an identity that is premised on the idea that Jews will no longer be victims.”<sup>30</sup>

“Does feminism have room for Zionists?” asked Emily Shire in a *New York Times* op-ed (March 7, 2017). A lifelong participant in feminist causes, Shire wrote she is “troubled by the portion of the International Women’s Strike platform that calls for a ‘decolonization of Palestine’ as part of the ‘beating heart of this new feminist movement.’” Shire noted this was hardly the first time opposition to Israel was highlighted as “feminist.” In “Columbia University’s anti-sexual assault advocacy group, No Red Tape,” for example, sexual assault survivors were compared to Palestinians (2015); “that same year the National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) voted to endorse the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel as an expression of feminism.” Shire concluded defiantly: “My identity

as a Zionist places me in conflict with the feminist movement of 2017. I will remain a proud feminist but I see no reason I should have to sacrifice my Zionism for the sake of my feminism.”<sup>31</sup>

In these episodes, the charge is sometimes articulated that Jewish women belong to a particularly well-educated, high-status, affluent segment of the American population, and thus are particularly “privileged.” But as columnist Bret Stephens argues, even wealthy, powerful, and privileged people can be—and frequently are—violently victimized by racists, and persons who represent oppressed peoples can themselves practice and promote violent racist persecution:

Jews in Germany were economically and even politically powerful in the 1920s. And then they were in Buchenwald. Israel appears powerful vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but considerably less so in the context of a broader Middle East saturated with genocidal antisemitism. American Jews are comparatively wealthy. But wealth without political power ... is a recipe for hatred ... privilege didn’t save the congregants of the Tree of Life synagogue last year.<sup>32</sup>

Not least, it has occurred to historian Jonathan Sarna and other observers that the American Jewish attraction to the Civil Rights Movement was motivated at least in part by concepts somewhat similar to Crenshaw’s original notion of intersectionality; that is, that prejudice is a kind of slippery slope, in which prejudicial attitudes and/or behavior against one minority group leads to similar offenses against others.<sup>33</sup> This of course makes the exclusion of the pro-Israel Jewish community from the current Intersectionality movement—and even from the classification of being a minority—deeply ironic.

## **Black Lives Matter/The Movement for Black Lives**

Black Lives Matter (BLM) was created in 2014 as a response to the shootings of unarmed Black men by police officers. In the

past, this was exactly the kind of organization that American Jews supported,<sup>34</sup> but the rhetoric produced by the movement quickly alienated some Black leaders as well as wide swathes of American Jewry. African American public intellectual Jason D. Hill explained: “The leaders of Black Lives Matter have written a profoundly anti-Israel (and anti-American) manifesto in which they accuse Israel of ‘genocide’ and ‘apartheid,’ in addition to endorsing the ‘Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions’ movement.”<sup>35</sup>

Journalist Emma Green discussed exactly why the term “genocide” crosses a red line for Jews: “The word ‘genocide’ was coined to describe the Holocaust. Six million Jews were systematically eliminated from the earth on the basis of blood and faith. Subsequently, a nation was formed where those who survived could go—including those fleeing the homes they tried to return to, only to be met with rejection and renewed violence.” Clearly, the accusation of “genocide,” has been trivialized in contemporary social movements: “Genocide means the deliberate wiping out of a group of people based on their ethnic or racial background.... But in the past 20 years the word Genocide has come to mean any kind of massive, racialized oppression,” notes history professor Cheryl Greenberg. By trivializing the scope of the Holocaust, painting the Jewish state in distorted colors, and lacing their statements with florid leftist anti-American language, Black Lives Matter has turned away many American Jews who actually support racial equality.<sup>36</sup> Those Jewish activists who do urge cooperation and support for BLM typically do not excuse the rhetoric, but rather urge American Jews not to take the language seriously, to look past it; in effect, to treat it as innocuous, as “just words.”

## **Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP)**

One of the most virulently antisemitic and destructive groups today, according to data on campus antisemitism from the

Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies (CMJS) at Brandeis University, is Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). Formed in 1993 in Berkeley, it is affiliated with the Palestine Solidarity Movement and Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights. In Canada, some SJP chapters call themselves Students Against Israeli Apartheid. Jewish Stanford senior, Elliot Kaufman, writing in *Commentary*, confirms that SJP are an “extremely well-organized national group” with a gift for persuasive, even intimidating methods and language.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to being extremely well-organized, SJP utilizes propaganda techniques that emphasize shock and emotion, rather than factual coherent dialogue. Some of SJP’s dramatic methods are described by a Jewish student at Rutgers University, who recalled: “During apartheid week the SJP club stood in front of the dining hall wearing white shirts with red ‘blood’ spatter ... [with] signs saying this is what the Jews did to us.’ I felt extremely harassed ... I saw complete hatred.” Jared Samilow, writing about SJP tactics at Brown University, concludes, “We’re fighting an asymmetric war because the Zionist Jew is in fact *not* privileged. We can be attacked, and we are attacked, but we can’t effectively respond without being accused of supporting injustice and inflicting psychological distress on other students.”<sup>38</sup>

## Israeli Apartheid Week

Picking up from the assertion in Durban that Israel should be painted as the “new South Africa,” Israeli Apartheid Week is run on many campuses with student funds for campus programming. Recently the Jewish News Service reported: “It’s no secret that college campuses are often some of the most hostile environments these days for pro-Israel and Jewish students. From BDS resolutions to anti-Israel speakers, young adults are often on the defensive for openly supporting Israel ... for one week each year, many campuses across North America and around the

world are transformed into hotbeds of anti-Israel programming and events known as Israeli Apartheid Week.” Personal accounts of these weeks assert that dramatizations characterize Israeli soldiers beating Palestinian women and children. Nevertheless, typically, student groups running such programs declare themselves to be resolutely against antisemitism, claiming that their programs are only for the purpose of education and turning public opinion against “Israeli occupation.”

Perhaps few students running Israeli Apartheid Week realize that the “racial politics” of South Africa or the United States cannot “be projected onto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” because “nearly half of all Jewish Israelis have Middle Eastern roots” and a significant portion of them are persons of color, an omission that Stephens reads as progressive antisemitism.<sup>39</sup> Not paying attention to Jewish status as one of the indigenous people of Israel, along with not paying attention to the large segments of Israeli Jews who are people of color and who are of Mediterranean and North African origin is a manifestation of the erasure and demonization tactic. The foundational image of Israel—as a white colonialist power oppressing Palestinians who—unlike Jews—are persons of color—is racial (and racist) “fake news.”

## **Antisemites on the Left and the Right agree: Jews are the problem**

Although this paper focuses on rising manifestations of antisemitism in the rhetoric of left-wing social justice organizations, it is important to note that right-wing antisemitism has flared up during the same time period and for some of the same reasons.<sup>40</sup> As Hannah Elka Myers puts it in the title of her summary of antisemitism in 2020: “The flames of anti-Semitism are growing higher, fueled by both the Left and Right.”<sup>41</sup>

Yair Rosenberg suggests it is perhaps not surprising that “conspiracy theorists seeking scapegoats to blame for the

nation's problems" are antisemites, because antisemitism itself "is the world's biggest and most durable conspiracy theory. It ... blames powerful shadowy Jewish figures for all problems."<sup>42</sup> Slogans and memes popularized by the Proud Boys and QAnon tell many of the same stories prevalent in anti-Zionist and anti-Israel narratives in contemporary progressive social movements. Both present ideas and versions of the recent and ancient past that are, at their worst, ahistorical and informed by canards like *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and at their best deeply distorted.

## Echoes of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion

Even while popular leftist American perceptions of Israel are intertwined with a tangled mass of negative ideas and images, antisemitism from the right, such as American white nationalists and neo-Nazi sentiments around the world, are demonstrably and disturbingly on the rise. George Soros is demonized and burnt in effigy, and tropes drawn directly from the infamous antisemitic forgery known as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* are common. Just a few years ago, American Jews read about and watched reports on flare-ups of antisemitic incidents in Hungary and France and elsewhere—but in the major metropolitan areas where most of them lived, the accepted wisdom was that antisemitism did not have a significant impact on the daily lives of most Jewish Americans. The general consensus among many observers of the American Jewish community was that antisemitism was relatively quiescent in the United States.

However, by the early months of 2019, hybrid forms of antisemitism, related in complex and not-so-complex ways to anti-Zionism, increasingly alarmed American Jews. Jews in the broader American Jewish community have become aware of manifestations of similar antisemitism merged with anti-Zionism in the world of political rhetoric. Increasingly, revivals

of tropes common in antisemitic screeds like *The Protocols*—ideas such as Jews controlling world affairs, despite their small numbers, by working with worldwide networks of Jewish conspirators or by using their money to buy legislation—have been articulated by politicians and public figures on both the political left and the political right.<sup>43</sup> Some of the accusations are worse. In a 2016 talk given at Vassar College, for example, the Israeli government was accused of engaging in a “secretive, systematic plot to stunt the growth of, maim, and harvest the organs of Palestinians, thus colonizing not only their land but their bodies.”<sup>44</sup>

Upsurges in antisemitic and anti-Zionist rhetoric and incidents have already created palpable, historic changes for Europe’s Jews, as Joel Kotkin observes: “For millennia, following the destruction of the Second Temple and the beginning of the diaspora, Europe was home to the majority of the world’s Jews. That chapter of history is over. The continent is fast becoming of Jewish ghost towns and graveyards.” But unlike the antisemitism of Nazi and other totalitarian regimes, today right-wing antisemitism is “not nearly as powerful a threat to Jews as the alliance of Islamists and left-wing activists” who blame Jews “for being too linked to continental values.” One study, for example, shows that European antisemitism has penetrated deep into Europe’s mainstream. Kotkin notes: “Today, barely half of Europeans think Israel has a right to exist.”<sup>45</sup> Paul Berman, and others, observe similar antisemitic and anti-Zionist trends among liberal United States leaders with dismay and apprehension, wondering if these “zealots of anti-Zionism” are catalysts and whether “the same miserable battle that has torn apart large portions of the European left [will] spread to America.”<sup>46</sup>

Conservative columnist Ross Douthat warns that liberal America has already internalized these anti-Israel messages and extended them to its attitudes toward American Jews. Douthat sees a decline of the American philosemitism that made America

exceptional for decades after World War II, marking the end of a time when both “American Jews and the American-Israel relationship were considered special cases.” In his view, arguments whirling around freshman Congresswoman Ilhan Omar’s repetition of toxic antisemitic tropes in her critique of Israel and her defenders are no accident. Douthat asserts that philo-Semitism is transitioning out, and being replaced by, a “left-of-center politics that remembers the Holocaust as one great historical tragedy among many, that judges Israel primarily on its conservative and nationalist political orientation, rather than on its status as a Jewish sanctuary, and that regards the success of American Jews as a reason for them to join white Gentiles in check-your-privilege self-criticism, ceding moral authority to minority groups who are more immediately oppressed.”<sup>47</sup>

## **Jewish critics expand their voices**

Antisemitic and anti-Zionist concepts have been internalized by highly educated, younger Americans, including some younger American Jews, especially those whose upbringings and chosen lifestyles are less “traditional.” Some Jews participate and some take leadership roles in general Israel-critical or anti-Zionist organizations. In addition, a range of specifically Jewish organizations expressing opposition to Israeli policies have emerged. These newer organizations occupy a broad spectrum, running from J Street, which defines itself as being both pro-Israel and critical of Israeli policies, to virulently anti-Israel organizations with little Jewish content, such as Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), which promulgate patently inaccurate calumnies such as the claim that Israel participates in police crimes against Black Americans. These and others build on the foundations of well-established organizations like the New Israel Fund (NIF) and Americans for Peace Now. The New Israel Fund in particular has supported and funded a broad range of entities working in Israel

and the territories on behalf of civil and human rights, women's rights, religious status, minority rights, and freedom of speech since its founding in 1979. The particular groups funded by NIF have been diverse over the decades, all the way from liberal Orthodox groups like *Ne'emanai Torah ve-Avodah* to left-leaning—and well-publicized—critics of Israeli policies like Breaking the Silence, B'Tselem, and Yesh Din.<sup>48</sup>

## J Street

Today, progressive critics of Israel are most recognizably represented by Jeremy Ben-Ami and the J Street organization he founded in 2008, during the Obama presidential campaign.<sup>49</sup> Ben-Ami, who emphasizes that J Street is “pro-Israel” and that criticisms do not conflict with dedication to Israel, spells out his views in *A New Voice for Israel*. Perhaps J Street's most familiar message is its “powerful indictment of mainstream Jewish advocacy groups that demand unquestioning support for Israel's actions.”<sup>50</sup> In a recent fundraising letter Ben-Ami explains, “We started J Street to provide a political voice and home for Americans who believe in democracy, justice, tolerance and peace—and who want to see those values brought to bear on American policy in the Middle East.” Dismissing as non-threatening “a few tweets by progressive elected officials criticizing Israel using some ill-advised language,” Ben-Ami also clarifies, “While we oppose the global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, we have been fighting legislation that seeks to penalize and criminalize those using constitutionally-protected tools to express their opposition to occupation.”<sup>51</sup>

Responses to J Street by the organized Jewish Zionist community have ranged from wary inclusiveness to condemnation. However, many younger American Jews have embraced the movement and enthusiastically expressed their gratitude that J Street gives them an address where they can express their

ambivalence without feeling like “bad Jews” and lightning rods for establishment approbation.

## **IfNotNow**

IfNotNow, founded in 2014, is a newer and younger Jewish progressive group opposing the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As Daniel Gordis points out, IfNotNow presents a one-sided picture in its description of its own founding and in ongoing literature articulating its goals: “Nowhere did it mention Palestinian violence against Israel, the continued pledge of many Palestinians (including the Hamas government of Gaza) to destroy Israel, any mention of the Jewish right to sovereignty, or even the word ‘Zionism.’”<sup>52</sup> In addition to demonstrating against the occupation, IfNotNow is perhaps best known for press-covered pickets and protests of Birthright Israel. Their signs and rhetoric on these occasions criticize what they claim is Birthright Israel’s disproportionate emphasis on the Jewish peoplehood side of Israel’s story and its hiding or downplaying of Palestinian suffering.<sup>53</sup>

## **Jewish Voice for Peace**

One of the more radical and aggressively anti-Israel Jewish-associated organizations is Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), which was founded in 1996. JVP describes Israel’s situation as “a conflict ... between a nation-state, Israel, with one of the world’s most powerful and well-funded militaries, and an indigenous population of Palestinians that has been occupied, displaced, and exiled for decades.” Most recently, since 2017, JVP’s *Deadly Exchange* campaign has been spreading the vicious lie “that Israelis are training U.S. police officers to commit unnecessary shootings and other abuses, especially against racial minorities.”<sup>54</sup> According to Miriam Elman, “the allegations that form

the crux of *Deadly Exchange* were first introduced as a supplement to JVP's 2017 Passover Haggadah." In its present articulation, *Deadly Exchange*

positions JVP at the forefront of the effort to stoke hatred of Israel and Zionist Jews through intersectionality, which BDS has morphed into a theory of generalized victimhood. According to the theory, Israel is a global oppressor of American minority communities and the source of the problems that these groups face. ... *Deadly Exchange* accuses five organizations in mainstream Jewish American life—the ADL, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the American Jewish Committee (AJC), and Taglit-Birthright Israel—of deliberately conspiring to harm the innocent. According to JVP, these organizations are complicit in fostering “deadly exchanges” where American and Israeli security officials and experts “trade tips” that “extend discriminatory and repressive policing in both countries” including fatal police shootings of African Americans and the “extrajudicial killings” by Israeli police of Palestinians in the West Bank.<sup>55</sup>

It should be noted that nowhere in JVP's literature is there any acknowledgement that Jews have comprised an indigenous population in the area at any time, or that they may legitimately feel vulnerable to Arab aggression or violence. Regarding its organizational goals, JVP's own statements note: “We support any solution that is consistent with the full rights of both Palestinians and Israeli Jews, whether one binational state, two states, or some other solution.” The same online organizational documents brag about lobbying the American government against military aid to Israel, and their association with the BDS movement. Thus: “JVP was the first major Jewish peace group to demand that American military aid be withheld until Israel ends its occupation. We are also the only major Jewish group to support the Palestinian civil society call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions.”<sup>56</sup>

Both IfNotNow and JVP often take part in college campus demonstrations. JVP's "Deadly Exchange" platform utilizes an anti-Israel propaganda video charging that ADL and Birthright Israel "recruit American police forces to undergo 'racial profile' training by the IDF in Israel, in order to better control, detain, deport, and extra-judicially execute people of color in overpopulated American cities."<sup>57</sup>

In addition to joining organizations that articulate Israel critiques, Jewish activists have devised additional ways to demonstrate their disapproval of Israeli policies. Some have disrupted Birthright Israel activities, as Farah Stockman recounts: "Activists have circulated petitions, staged sit-ins at Hillels on college campuses and blocked Birthright's headquarters in New York." Still others have staged "walkoffs from a handful of Birthright trips."<sup>58</sup> However, in a new Brandeis CMJS study of 2017 Birthright Israel participants, Leonard Saxe et al. find that participants who are present for the entire trip find the Birthright Israel experience to be educationally even-handed. Their evaluation revealed: "Among participants, 76% reported that the trips 'somewhat' or 'very much' included thoughtful discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," although that figure was somewhat lower among "participants who identified as political liberals." Significantly, "a majority of participants reported that they heard authentic accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that the trip allowed for diversity of opinion about the conflict." Only 27% of liberal participants expressed the view that some parts of the trip "favored Israel's perspective."<sup>59</sup>

Still other critical American Jews distance themselves from the sins of white privilege not only by declaring themselves to be an "ally" of "minoritized" non-white populations but also by condemning other, less "woke" Jews. In its most extreme guises, it is as if Jews who wish to distance themselves are saying to anti-semites: "Don't hate me—I'm not that kind of a Jew." A recent example of that strategy is a short op-ed by S.I. Rosenbaum, who

asserted: “Even as white nationalists wish us dead, a shocking number of Jews have become willing collaborators in white supremacy ... kapos in the openly ethno-nationalist Trump regime, such as Stephen Miller or Jared Kushner. Thus we are capable of being both the target of racism and a part of its apparatus.”<sup>60</sup> That assertion and its hot-trigger language garnered many outraged and/or defensive responses. Some responses reflected a rupture that has been experienced by “numerous Jewish people ... [who] have chosen to devote all or part of their careers to racial justice, on matters ranging from the Black Lives Matter movement to criminal law reform to the Trump administration’s assault on immigrants ... they are standing with people of color to bring more justice to America.”<sup>61</sup>

Some analysts link problematic Israel-Diaspora relations to the putative decline of the status of American Jews themselves. The “golden age” of American Jewish liberal political and intellectual elite status may itself be threatened, according to a few extremely pessimistic political analysts such as Adam Garfinkle, founding editor of *The American Interest*. “Left of center Jews will become ever more alienated from Israel,” Garfinkle predicts, adding that “[s]upport for Israel will become a liability even for mainstream politicians within the Democratic Party.” Non-Orthodox American Jewish populations will shrink, and many among the growing proportion of the Orthodox may choose to move to Israel, according to Garfinkle, while Israel “will be fine,” offering thriving Jewish life to “many forms of Orthodoxy” and “many forms of secular Jewish civilization.”<sup>62</sup>

## **Impact of antisemitism and anti-Zionism on younger Americans**

A majority of younger Americans have no memory of Jews as a disadvantaged and persecuted minority. They have broad lacunae in their knowledge of world history in general and the

evolution of modern Zionism in particular. They have no memory of a world without a strong Israel, and little sense of how tiny the worldwide population of Jews is compared to other ethnic and religious groups. Young adult Americans in academic settings—including America’s youngest Jews—inhabit environments in which politically liberal, occasionally leftist, and sometimes anti-Israel views are freely expressed.

In interviews with young people active in anti-Israel organizations, Sina Arnold found that respondents singled Israel out by saying they could not support Israel because Israel’s establishment was artificial and violent. Arnold reported that the (highly ahistorical) impression of the respondents was that other countries may be presumed to have been created through peaceful and “organic” methods. Additionally, Arnold discovered that antisemitism is not perceived as a relevant issue in the same category as “racism,” “sexism,” and “capitalism”; she calls this phenomenon “antisemitism trivialization.”<sup>63</sup> Similarly, Karin Stogner interviewed participants in Intersectionality activism organizations and found that Jews are regarded as white supremacists in intersectional circles and that Zionism is not perceived as a national liberation movement with significant historical context but rather that Zionists are by definition perceived as a colonialist group.<sup>64</sup> Such anti-Israel rhetoric in contemporary social movements can be decentering, as attested to by a participant in an American Jewish focus group conversation conducted by Abby Dauber Sterne. Pro-Israel American Jews sometimes feel like being pro-Israel is countercultural:

There is often intersectionality here. Israelis have no idea of it and have no idea of how the left perceives them. Israelis don’t understand how it feels for US Jews from all ends of the political spectrum who stick up for Israel. US Jews feel very complex, especially on campus, about what it means to be Jewish or Zionist in America. Israelis don’t think about this. Israelis take it for granted. American Jews have to swim against the current. Israeli Jews don’t.

A Brandeis University study of campus antisemitism and anti-Israel activity found that colleges differ substantially in terms of how aggressively anti-Israel organizations are on college campuses: “Some campuses, such as CUNY-Brooklyn, Northwestern, and many of the schools in the University of California system are ‘hotspots’ where the majority of Jewish students perceive a hostile environment toward Israel.” On other campuses, such as Wisconsin, Rutgers, and Illinois, “hostility toward Jews and antisemitic harassment are relatively high, but do not seem to be highly connected to criticism of Israel.” One of the biggest precipitating factors for an anti-Zionist and antisemitic climate on campus “is the presence of an active Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) group on campus.” On some campuses, Jewish students say they are often “blamed for the actions of the Israeli government” because of their Jewish identity. Some of the worst campuses in that regard are Northwestern, UCLA and other University of California schools, NYU, and Texas. While a minority of students report harassment regarding either their Jewishness or anti-Zionism, those who have experienced either or both report vivid and disturbing incidents.<sup>65</sup>

Jewish students and other students who are pro-Israel are more likely to retreat from than to feel threatened by or react to unpleasant comments about Israel or Jews, argues a Stanford study, *Safe and on the Sidelines*, concluding that reports of campus antisemitism and anti-Zionism are exaggerated. “What emerges is not a picture of campuses ablaze with antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment,” the authors report, but rather “Jewish students feel excluded from both Jewish communal spaces and activist groups” because the activist groups are “strident, divisive, and rigid” and leave “little room for more nuanced debate,” while the Jewish communal spaces “stifle” or “exclude” or “pressure” them to support Israel vocally. Students in this study described rerouting their walking paths to class in order to avoid passing near anti-Israel demonstrations, and training themselves not to

react emotionally to seeing swastikas (“maybe three or four ... maybe five ... maybe more than that....”) on campus. At the same time, some of the students interviewed also avoid Jewish communal settings, such as Shabbat dinner, because they feel unable to voice their concerns about Israeli policies regarding the Palestinian population.

Although the Stanford study found “many of our interviewees claim that they ‘don’t know enough about the Israel-Palestine conflict’ to render an opinion,” similar to subjects in the Brandeis studies, the *Safe and on the Sidelines* researchers charged that their respondents were “hardly the targets of hate” but were rather “avowing ignorance” simply as “a strategy for disengaging from discussions they found uncomfortable or irreconcilable.”<sup>66</sup> The anti-Zionist organizations utilize detailed historical arguments against the establishment of the State of Israel as well as against many of her past actions and her current policies, and students who disagree often feel that they are lacking the specifics to challenge the narratives presented.

## **Dishonest scales: delegitimizing Israel is genuine antisemitism**

This paper has demonstrated how statements by contemporary left-wing or “progressive” social justice organizations often incorporate four manifestations of antisemitism: (1) erasing the concept of an historical, defined Jewish people inside and outside of Israel; (2) erasing the much-documented experiences of the Jewish people as a persecuted and displaced minority who have sought self-determination; (3) erasing Jewish historical connections to the land as well as Israel’s foundational and internationally ratified *raison d’être* as a haven and homeland for the Jews; and (4) demonizing the Jewish State of Israel exclusively as an illegitimate displacer of persecuted minorities, and judging Israel by standards not applied to other nations and their policies.

Why is it central to contemporary antisemitic progressive narratives to remove Jews from the category of a minority people that has endured repeated and sustained violent persecutions for racial as well as religious reasons? If Jews are neither an historical people nor a genuine “minoritized” oppressed minority, according to current progressive ideologies, Jews cannot be the targets of racist hatred, and Jews have no particular right to national self-determination. Indeed, the very insistence that Jews comprise a nation or peoplehood, with an historical culture worth transmitting, as well as ties to an historical homeland, are ideas that are often vilified as Zionist “racism.”

Anti-Zionism brings to the table additional anti-Jewish calumnies, including most foundationally the false premise that the Palestinians are a people indigenous to Israel while the Jews are not. Equating Israel with the white ruling government of South Africa has not only been an axiomatic concept for organizations like the BDS movement and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), unfortunately it also informs the anti-Zionist rhetoric of important American social justice movements like Intersectionality and Black Lives Matter.

Two examples from the working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IRHA) are particularly relevant to the erasure and demonization practiced by the social justice movements discussed in this paper: (1) “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor,” and (2) “Applying double standards [to Israel] by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”

As we have seen, several organizations whose declared *raison d'être* is related to social justice and advocacy on behalf of specific minoritized groups nevertheless issue written and verbal statements denying the existence of Jews as a people and as a minority; these statements are foundational to their attempts to

delegitimize the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. In official and unofficial statements, members of the BDS, Intersectionality and Black Lives Matter movements, as well as activists from Jewish groups like JVP and IfNotNow, disseminate one-sided narratives about what is often called “the conflict.” Omitting important contextual details and using inaccurate terms like “genocide” to describe Israel’s policies, they painfully distort the historical record.

Sometimes these distortions reflect genuine ignorance. However, it is urgent to recognize that organizations and movements purporting to criticize particular Israeli government policies often also reject Jewish peoplehood and the concept of Jewish self-determination. Both inside and outside Israel, individuals and groups have a genuine right to speak freely and to criticize specific Israeli governmental policies, as well as to discuss the suffering that occurs on both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, rhetoric that judges Jews and Israel by different standards than any other nation is judged is not mere “critique.” These are dishonest scales of “justice” and manifestations of antisemitism that should be recognized and called out.

## Notes

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10. Emma Green, "Why Do Black Activists Care about Palestine?," *Atlantic Monthly*, August 18, 2016.
11. Bret Stephens, "The Progressive Assault on Israel," *New York Times*, February 10, 2019.
12. Yossi Klein Halevi, *Letters to My Palestinian Neighbor* (New York: HarperCollins, 2018).
13. Gil Troy, *Moynihan's Moment: America's Fight Against Zionism Racism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 134.
14. Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, and other Israeli "new historians" researched and publicized episodes of Israeli brutality during the 1948 War, especially egregious episodes in Deir Yassin, Lydda, Abu Shusha, and Saliha. Pappé used the language of ethnic cleansing, "killing and butchering." Benny Morris later revised much of his earlier thinking on the motivations and severity of Israeli actions.
15. For one example, a *New York Times* book review by Isabella Hammad, which concluded: "No words can purge the Nakba, because the Nakba is still being lived." Isabella Hammad, "Cracked Mirror," review of *Children of the Ghetto: My Name is Adam*, by Elias Khoury, *New York Times*, Sunday June 23, 2019. But this language is also used routinely in *Ha'aretz* and elsewhere in the liberal journalistic and scholarly community.
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- Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). Morris was appalled by Palestinian responses to Oslo I (1993, Washington, DC) and Oslo II (1995, Taba, Egypt) and partially as a result reassessed his understanding of the meaning of Israel's wartime behavior.
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  18. Stephens, "Progressive Assault on Israel."
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66. Ari Y. Kelman et al., *Safe and on the Sidelines: Jewish Students and the Israel-Palestine Conflict on Campus* (report, Research Group of the Concentration in Education and Jewish Studies, Stanford University, September 2017).

# **Hate Crimes, Hate Speech: Sensitivity Training for Police Officers in Hungary\***

Andrea Kozáry\*\*

## **Introduction**

Hate crime is, unfortunately, a daily reality throughout the world. It has special and particular motives, as well as identifiable underlying causes that are both social and psychological. Hate crime occurs in all European countries, and since the 1970s it has been identified as a specific form of delinquency. Hate crime requires specific investigation methods and cooperation between police forces. Although European law and criminology accept the concept of hate crime—and all relevant EU documents express the necessity to fight prejudices and discrimina-

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\* This paper is based on research conducted in the framework of a European Commission-funded project entitled “Facing all the Facts: Building Capacity to Monitor Hate Crime and Hate Speech Online (2016-2018),” JUST/2015/RRAC/AG/TRAI/8997. See also Andrea Kozáry, *Facing Facts! Make Hate Crime Visible: Hate Crime—Meaning, Development, Critique, Handbook for Law Enforcement* (Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019).

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tion—hate crime occupies a different place in the national legislative procedures, which makes police cooperation in this area more difficult.

The Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has called upon the Council of Europe's member states to ensure that national laws, including criminal laws,

specifically counter racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance, inter alia by providing ... that racist and xenophobic acts are stringently punished through methods such as defining common offences but with a racist or xenophobic nature as specific offences [and] enabling the racist or xenophobic motives of the offender to be specifically taken into account.<sup>1</sup>

Hate crime is a crime against certain groups and communities and constitutes a human rights issue, a threat to community cohesion, and a rejection of common and shared values. Society is strong when its communities are strong, and communities thrive when they are united by positive, shared values: values such as fairness, respect, tolerance, democracy, and the rule of law.

There is a spectrum of hate crime, which runs from abuse and harassment through to violent extremism. Hate incidents and hate crimes are everyday features of the lives of some people and occur in ordinary, everyday circumstances. For some, persistent harassment and abuse may be an ongoing aspect of day-to-day existence. Other victims of hate crime may experience a process of escalation in which insults, vandalism, and minor crimes increase in severity and intensity into more serious crimes of violence.

Hate crime is an offence that targets individuals, groups, and communities on the basis of certain personal characteristics, known as "protected characteristics," such as race, national or ethnic origin, language, color, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, and other similar characteristics that usually reach to the core of their identities. Put concisely,

hate crimes are criminal offences committed on the basis of a discriminatory motive or bias (prejudice).

Hate crimes are message crimes. Perpetrators do not only want the victims to hear their message of bias and hate but often want to share that message with the community at large because they assume that it shares their views. For example, some perpetrators believe that police officers share their biases and will even approve of their violent acts.

Hate crime is actually not charged as an independent crime in Hungary (or in most other EU countries). Nevertheless, we often see cases brought to court in European countries where the crime concerned was motivated by hate. Preventing and tackling hate crime is a task for the police and for society as a whole. That is why future police officers and all law enforcement employees should be equipped to tackle hate crime in a proper manner. Law enforcement officials throughout the world should know how to deal with hate crime issues.

According to Paul Goldenberg, Programme Manager of the Law Enforcement Officer Programme on Combating Hate Crime:

Law enforcement agencies, particularly front-line officers, have an important role to play in leading the fight against hate crimes. Police are often at the forefront of social change. They are in a unique and vital position in maintaining civil society and protecting the safety and security of a nation's citizenry.<sup>2</sup>

For law enforcement officers to tackle any type of crime, they must first be aware of its existence, and then they need to be armed with the right tools to make an effective response. Hate crime is a prime example of a law enforcement issue where both awareness and the means to respond are often lacking.<sup>3</sup>

## **Teaching about hate crime in Hungary**

The mission of the Faculty of Law Enforcement at the National University of Public Service in Budapest is to focus on a current

and sensitive problem that exists throughout Europe and also affects Hungarian society. Experiences and statistics show that the number of hate crimes has been rising across Europe over the last couple of years. In the case of Hungary, those most severely affected by this rise have been the Roma, LGBTQI persons, Jews, immigrants, and refugees.

When teaching about hate crime, one must always keep in mind the specific profile of the university and the expectations and future professional status of the students. At the National University of Public Service, we wish to approach the basic facts and questions of the public's everyday problems from a pragmatic point of view. The teaching material devotes detailed attention to hate crime and negative views of vulnerable people within society and the aforementioned communities. Criminal law should serve to provide justice for those involved in the conflict—both victims and offenders—so that the legal norm itself and its moral contents are strengthened. Furthermore, the law should contribute to preventing the emergence of similar conflicts and thus the possibility of the offence being repeated. It aims to repair the relationship between the offender, the victim, and the community involved. Today, as we experience an exceptional period of criminal law reform in Hungary, it is especially important to consider new opportunities.

At the university, students are assessed on knowledge and skill-based competencies. Assessments of their progress are carried out regularly, both during and following the end of the training program. Pre-training and post-training testing has been introduced and indicators have been established to allow progress to be measured in order to further tailor the program in the future. Assessments are designed to support learning by providing feedback on areas for improvement, and results are shared and discussed with trainees, helping them acquire the ability to reflect, admit shortcomings, and thus improve their professional performance. Assessment methods for individual

students or groups of trainees are fair and reliable and are carried out transparently, ensuring that the achievements of all students are recognized and valued.

Common features of police abuse include the use of ethnic or racial profiling, which undermine the democratic accountability and image of the police. Only when citizens trust the police and have confidence that they are professional and fair does law enforcement receive the necessary information and support from those they serve.

## **Sensitivity training**

Hate crimes have received more serious attention in the past decade than ever before. According to international and national research carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the Hungarian Otherness Foundation, along with other NGOs, professionals in different fields agree that the key to improving the response to hate crimes lies in reforming basic education and introducing targeted in-service training to professionals working in the field.

The aim of sensitivity training is to raise awareness and the sense of urgency on the issue of hate crime and to help users to better understand and identify issues in police attitudes and responses to these crimes.

Training is a fundamental element in such endeavors as it enhances awareness and the type of police response. It strengthens the capacity of law enforcement officials to contribute to the successful investigation and prosecution of hate crimes. Moreover, cooperation between law enforcement and victim assistance professionals could benefit from enhanced training. Therefore, learning materials, training activities, and specialized trainers should be available to enable this type of targeted capacity building. Sensitivity training should include raising awareness, encouraging empathy, and showing professionals what to do.

Hate crime cannot be properly addressed until there is an understanding of its causes.

The program participants are deliberately selected from specific areas and are expected to engage in common thinking by exploiting their collective wisdom through open and efficient communication with their partners. The purpose of the training sessions is to identify, define, name, and explore the problems in a specific area and analyze their causes. The program participants subsequently start to look for solutions, while making a serious personal and common commitment to take on the problem and take responsibility for fighting it. The aim here is to encourage cooperation through dialogue between the police and the community. The police need to understand the cultures and lifestyles within a given community and how to address the challenges those cultures and lifestyles may present to the police. The best way to understand the community and to deliver accessible services is to meet local people to discuss their needs and concerns.

The training offered by the university lasts a day and is most effective when 15-25 people are involved. The training focuses on experience-based learning, so participants can learn the method while practicing.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, we seek to raise awareness within institutions. Rather than producing immediate effects, the training is a long-term investment.

It may be said that the response to the training has been positive on both sides, meaning the police and citizens. It can be demonstrated that there were clear results in terms of shaping the dialogue, not only within law enforcement but also within the community. We are convinced that, with additional support, the police will be able to carry out their serious corporate social responsibility to establish and maintain security as a professional service in a modern democratic state.<sup>5</sup> If this is done in partnership and through dialogue with members of the local community, it is a clear indication that law enforcement is taking this respon-

sibility seriously. The police have to build confidence and encourage reporting by showing that they care and that victims will receive a high level of service when they report hate crimes. Law enforcement officials need to take steps toward increasing the confidence of hate-crime victims, so that they feel safe enough to report such crimes to the police. To bridge this trust gap, it is crucial that the police receive adequate training on community policing that can help them to handle conflict resolution at the local level.

In these training sessions we utilize the experiences and results we have obtained from our daily work and from activities in various projects,<sup>6</sup> courses, workshops, conferences, working group meetings,<sup>7</sup> and seminars.

## **Hate crimes and the Jewish community**

The Jewish community has long been one of the most targeted communities for hate crimes. These crimes, which include systematic offences and attacks against Jewish people as well as vandalism against synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, have a profound psychological impact on the entire Jewish community.

It is not easy to define who is Jewish and what constitutes a Jewish community. We believe that the first step toward getting to know such groups is to accept that they are very diverse, which actually reflects the complexity of wider society.

Reporting by victims of antisemitic hate crimes can be encouraged in various ways. One way is through the establishment of contact points within their communities. Another important aspect is to provide the victims with all the relevant information. For example, they need to understand the process after they report an antisemitic hate crime. What happens next? What are the procedures? It is also important that they are provided with feedback, either by the police or by their community, so that they know that something will happen if they report the crime.

Finally, an important point to consider is the need to reach out to all community members. This is not an easy task because not all Jewish people are involved in community life. The vast majority are actually distanced from Jewish institutions. It is very important to set up out-reach strategies to connect with these people and encourage reporting. In this context, online reporting can be a very useful tool.

It is important to highlight the great trauma experienced by the Jewish community throughout European history, which is characterized by violent and repugnant acts against the Jewish community and attacks on Jewish culture, religion and traditions. The renowned historian Robert S. Wistrich has used the term “the longest hatred” to emphasize the Jews’ plight from pre-Christian times up to the Holocaust.

Antisemitism can be defined as a discriminatory attitude toward or discrimination against Jews and the Jewish community that is based on stereotypes and preconceived myths and targets Jews and Judaism as a people, a religion, and a way of life. Some of these discriminatory attitudes (biases), stereotypes, and conspiracy theories derive from the unfounded belief that Jews control the media, the economy, and the government and that they are responsible for phenomena such as capitalism. Suggesting that Jewish people are dangerous, harmful, and evil reverses the victim-abuser dynamic and provides justification for verbal and physical aggression against Jews.<sup>8</sup>

Antisemitism can manifest itself in a variety of ways. For example, although recent evidence indicates that physical attacks against Jews and vandalism against Jewish targets is in decline, online hate speech against Jews has grown exponentially and forms a key concern of major Jewish organizations.<sup>9</sup>

In 2013, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) published the results of its first survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU member states,<sup>10</sup> in which Jewish respondents reported that the highest increase in anti-

semitism had occurred on the internet, followed by hostility in public places and in the media. The highest percentage of Jews who worried that they would be harassed or assaulted were found in France, Belgium, Hungary, Denmark, Latvia, and Italy, while the highest percentage of Jews who had personally experienced harassment or assault were found in Hungary, Belgium, Sweden, and France. Some 76% of cases of harassment and 64% of cases of physical violence were not reported, whereas “only” 53% of vandalism was not reported. Many EU member states have no data on antisemitic incidents, and civil society therefore plays an important role in this area.

In December 2018, the FRA published the results of its second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews.<sup>11</sup> The survey brought together comparable data on the experiences, perceptions, and views of discrimination and hate crime victimization of those who self-identify as Jewish on the basis of their religion, ethnicity, or any other reason. The survey was conducted in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The survey sought respondents’ opinions on trends in antisemitism, antisemitism as a problem in everyday life, and their personal experiences of antisemitic incidents, including discrimination against Jews on various grounds and across several areas of everyday life, for example at work, school, or when using other services. The survey also explored the respondents’ level of awareness of rights deriving from anti-discrimination and hate crime legislation and of the activities of victim support organizations.

The second survey shows that almost 90% of respondents feel that antisemitism is getting worse in their country, especially online. Almost 30% of respondents have been harassed and over one third of all respondents have considered emigrating from the EU. The results of the reports show the frightening reality of what it is like to be Jewish in the EU today.

Data collected by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on trends in recorded anti-semitic incidents also suggests that Jewish people continue to face repeated incidents of violence and hate speech motivated by anti-Jewish prejudice in many European countries. Moreover, the data shows that most incidents are never reported to the authorities and are not reflected in official incident statistics.

The main beneficiaries of the results of these surveys include EU institutions, EU national governments, and national and European Jewish organizations concerned with security and anti-semitism. All these stakeholders use the above-mentioned data to tackle discrimination and hate crime against Jews, increase rights awareness, and monitor the under-reporting of incidents.

An antisemitic hate crime occurs where a recordable crime is committed and the victim perceives it to be motivated (wholly or partially) by antisemitic hostility. Jewish people may report such crimes as racially or religiously motivated, even when the victim is secular or does not have any links to Israel. This perception should be recognized. Antisemitism is a historic and deeply rooted prejudice that continues to affect Jewish communities across Europe.

## **Antisemitism in Hungary**

The impact of the Holocaust still significantly affects Jewish and other communities in Hungary. The number of survivors is decreasing but there are still many Hungarian citizens who lost relatives.

In Eastern Europe, and also in Hungary, the major issue today is not just the physical security of Jews but the coexistence and cohabitation of mainstream society and the Jewish community. The public discourse on these issues is informed by a grievous history and dynamic that goes back centuries. Accord-

ing to Daniel Bandar, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Action and Protection Foundation (TEV) and a board member of the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIL), hate speech, denial of the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes, and anonymous threats are all phenomena whose spread challenges the reasons behind unrestricted freedom of speech, especially through some sad lessons learnt from certain cases. Moreover, antisemitic and racist hatred is increasingly degenerating into physical atrocities.

The TEV is a civil-society organization that was established in November 2012. Its trustees represent the most important Jewish religious and cultural movements in Hungary, a symbolic expression of the fact that action on antisemitism is a cause shared by all. The Brussels Institute, which was founded by the TEV, monitors antisemitic hate incidents in accordance with methods developed by the OSCE. The TEV publishes the results of this monitoring on a monthly basis

Since 2013, at the behest of the TEV, the Median Opinion and Market Research Institute has conducted a comprehensive survey on Hungarian society's relations with the country's Jewish population, including an examination of issues such as: opinions and ideas related to the Jewish people; a look at how widespread and intense antisemitic prejudice is; public perceptions of antisemitism; attitudes toward the social engagement of Jewish organizations; and society's awareness of conflicts between the government and the Jewish community in the recent past. One of the main findings of the survey is that an increase—albeit slight—can be seen in the levels of antisemitism over the last few years. The proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents grew from 20% in 2013 to 23% in 2015. Some 26% of the population agreed with the statement “I don't like Jews.” A TEV-commissioned public opinion poll conducted at the end of 2016 found that 20% of Hungarian society could be regarded as strongly antisemitic, 13% as moderately antisemitic, and 67% as not antisemitic.

In 2017, the Tom Lantos Institute published a report on the current state of modern antisemitism, including new antisemitism, in the Visegrád countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.<sup>12</sup> Previous research suggests that the most important characteristics of contemporary antisemitism are its political and ideological aspects and its relation to nationalism, while a personal aversion to Jews is less typical. Unlike in the West, from Germany to the United States, where new antisemitism is generally associated with left-wing, pro-Palestinian activists, the identity of those engaging in modern antisemitism in the Visegrád countries is much more diffuse. Although the intensity of new antisemitism is undeniably much weaker in this region, it is also not entirely absent.

The history of the Jewish population has broadly followed the same route in all four countries. For centuries, a large Jewish population contributed to the country's social, economic, and cultural development. However, even periods of peaceful coexistence between Jews and non-Jews were accompanied by growing anti-Jewish sentiment. Antisemitism later seeped into national politics, culminating in the Shoah and the annihilation of most of the Jewish population of all four countries. Although the post-war regimes appeared to offer the surviving communities the possibility of assimilation, in practice antisemitism was revived by the Communist parties of the region. It is well known that there is no direct correlation between the size of the Jewish population and the level of antisemitism. It is present in all the Visegrád countries, regardless of the size of the local Jewish community.

New conspiracy theories have recently emerged in the region, such as the alleged Jewish contribution to the European refugee crisis. The spread of conspiracy theories concerning George Soros, the multimillionaire businessman of Hungarian-Jewish origin, on social media platforms such as Twitter are a common element in three of the four countries (except the Czech Repub-

lic).<sup>13</sup> The most popular claim is that Soros encourages refugees to “invade” Europe and that he and his supporters are to blame for the current migration crisis. In all four countries, manifestations of new antisemitism were mostly linked to far-right actors that also engaged in other forms of antisemitism. Despite this, attacks against Jews are much less prevalent in these countries than in certain Western European countries.

Sensitivity training for police officers dealing with antisemitic hate crimes in Hungary is producing promising results, but Hungarian society still has a steep hill to climb in the fight against antisemitism. As noted by Keno Verseck in an article concerning Hungary’s politics of memory, the country’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has proclaimed a zero-tolerance policy toward antisemitism, yet he and his party continue to honor antisemitic national heroes such as Miklós Horthy.<sup>14</sup>

## Notes

1. ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 1: Combating Racism, Xenophobia, Antisemitism and Intolerance, adopted on 4 October 1996.
2. The Law Enforcement Officer Programme on Combating Hate Crime was developed by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/20699?download=true>.
3. Ibid.
4. The training methodology is based on the World Café methodology. See Erna Uricska and Katalin Molnár, “The Police Café: An Efficient Method for Improving the Dialogues between the Police and the Community,” *European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin*, Special Conference Edition (SCE) 4 (2019), <https://bulletin.cepol.europa.eu/index.php/bulletin/article/view/338>.

5. Joachim Kersten et al., eds., *Police Profession as a Human Rights Service: How to Improve the Relationship between European Ethnic Minorities and Police* (Münster: Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei, 2014), <https://www.corepol.eu/findings/documents/Police-Profession-as-a-Human-Rights-Service.pdf>.
6. In the framework of various EU-funded projects, including: Commonality in Police Higher Education in Europe (2011-2014); Facing all the Facts: Building Capacity to Monitor Hate Crime and Hate Speech Online (2016-2018); and Support and Advice through Health System for Hate Crimes Victims (2018-2020).
7. I would like to express my thanks for the support and cooperation of colleagues Albin Dearing, Gerhard Haberler, Karl Göran Stanton, Paulo Vaz, and Hugh McCormack during the expert meetings preparing the content of the online hate crime module at the headquarters of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) in Budapest in 2016.
8. Anna Szilagyi, *Linguistic Self-Defence Guide Against Antisemitism* (2015). This publication was produced in the framework of the “Get the Trolls Out!” project, which was designed to engage European youth in countering religious hate speech and ran from September 2015 to July 2016. Through a media and social media campaign, the project exposed the antisemitic attitudes, misrepresentations, and manipulations of the public discourse through creative education, humor, and drama. The project provided methods to actively reject antisemitic discourse in the media (both traditional and new) as well as in everyday life. See <https://getthetrollsout.org/resources/antisemitism>.
9. For more information, see the website of CEJI (A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe) at <https://ceji.org> and the FRA’s antisemitism surveys cited in the next two notes.
10. In 2012, the FRA conducted the first ever transnational survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews, which was published in 2013. See *Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism*, <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/discrimination-and-hate-crime-against-jews-eu-member-states-experiences-and>. It covered eight EU Member States and until 2018 remained the largest ever survey about European Jews on any topic. It provided evidence on how Jews in the EU perceive and experience antisemitism.
11. See *Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism—Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU*, <https://fra>.

europa.eu/en/publication/2018/2nd-survey-discrimination-hate-crime-against-jews.

12. Ildiko Barna and Anikó Félix, eds., *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2017).
13. Péter Krekó et al., "'Migrant Invasion' as a Trojan Horseshoe," *Trust within Europe* (Budapest: Political Capital, 2015), 63-72, [http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC\\_OSIFE\\_Trust\\_Within\\_Europe\\_web.pdf](http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_OSIFE_Trust_Within_Europe_web.pdf).
14. Keno Verseck, "Orbán's Antisemitismus-Politik: Juden-Hass verfolgen, Juden-Verfolger ehren," *Der Spiegel*, 11 October 2018, <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/antisemitismus-in-ungarn-juden-hass-verfolgen-juden-verfolger-ehren-a-1232388.html>.



## **Modern Anti-Modernism: Antisemitic Hatred of the West in the Ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran\***

Ulrike Marz\*\*

Jews are regarded by Iranian antisemites as world conspirators and as initiators and beneficiaries of modernity and capitalist exploitation. Political decision-makers and clerics from Iran, whether moderate or hard-line, regularly call for the annihilation of Israel. It was not until the end of 2016 that one of Iran's revolutionary leaders, Ali Khamenei, now the country's spiritual leader, at a meeting with the leader of the Palestinian organization Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Ramadan Abdullah, reiterated: "If we fight together and the Palestinians and the Muslims agree, Israel will no longer exist in the next 25 years."<sup>1</sup> Antisemitic propaganda is spreading through various areas of society in Iran.

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The term propaganda is used here because this paper focuses on the published words of politicians, clerics, and other persons at the center of Iranian public life. It is worth noting that these antisemitic statements are not necessarily shared by all exponents of the Iranian regime. On this basis, no reliable statements can be made about the effects of antisemitic propaganda on the Iranian population.<sup>2</sup> In this paper, we will explain who this Iranian antisemitism is directed against, how the relationship between antisemitism and modernization is to be characterized and how the West, which in the ideology of the Iranian regime is usually equated with the United States, and more rarely with Great Britain,<sup>3</sup> is constructed, antisemitically, as a universal enemy.

## **The Iranian form of Islamic antisemitism**

Modernity expands with capitalism. However, the expansion of capitalist modernity by the forces acting within society does not take place as a uniform process. Instead, different variations of capitalist modernity emerge. These lead to varying manifestations of family structures, politics, or the economy. Modernity as social change also produces an aversion directed against itself, namely anti-Modernism. A central element of this anti-Modernism is a pronounced antisemitism. Modern antisemitism is an attempt to explain the world in a specific way by interpreting social reality. It personalizes abstract social conditions. These abstract social relations, which are characterized by the division of labor, the differentiation of social sub-areas, wage labor as alienated labor, or impersonal power relations, emerge with the development of capitalist modernity. In order to make this abstraction tangible, antisemitism personalizes certain aspects of modernity and associates them with Jews.

Antisemitic ideas in Iranian antisemitism are directed against three objects. First, Iranian antisemitism is directed against the

Jews as a religious minority. In the Islamic Republic of Iran itself, Jews are suspected of treason and espionage for Israel as well as ritual murder for the purpose of taking the blood of (mostly male) children to make matzos for the Passover festival.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Iranian antisemitism also agitates against Jews worldwide on the basis of a Jewish world conspiracy and domination. Above all, however, it is directed against the Jewish state. For Iranian antisemites, the Holocaust is a myth and the State of Israel an agent of Western imperialism. Corresponding to these three antisemitic objects, the Iranian variant of antisemitism draws on various references.

The assertion of a long historical hostility between Jews and Muslims is an important argument in Islamist discourse for underpinning antisemitism. From Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's first Supreme Leader, to other spiritual authorities, from the Guardians of the Revolution to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there are statements that Jews have planned conspiracies against Islam since the days of early Islam and continue to do so today.<sup>5</sup> This assertion fits in with the allegation that Jews, especially after the Six-Day War, falsified the Koran by distributing copies in which all anti-Jewish passages were removed. Thus Khomeini writes in *Islamic Government*: "We see today that the Jews—may God humiliate them!—have falsified the Koran. In the occupied territories the Koran was published in a modified version. We are obliged to prevent these treacherous manipulations."<sup>6</sup>

Above all, the notion of rulership as personalized, which revolves around the constant question of suitable leadership in the absence of Islam's 12th Imam, is significant here. The belief in the so-called Mahdi (the Hidden One) plays a decisive role in the Twelver Shia Islam, the state religion of Iran. According to Shi'ite opinion, the Mahdi, the 12th Imam, went into hiding in the year 874<sup>7</sup> or 941.<sup>8</sup> Central to this is the idea of a Messiah and end-time ruler, who on his return will destroy tyrants and

oppressors, end the division of Muslims, and establish an empire of justice.<sup>9</sup> Since the Mahdi went into the great occultation, it has left not only the Shia but the “whole Islamic Umma without a legitimate head” according to the Shiite conception.<sup>10</sup> As a rule, it is true for the Shia that until the return of the 12th Imam any secular rule is illegitimate. Before the Islamic revolution, this led to a far-reaching abstention of the clergy from political affairs. Khomeini justified the necessity of political activity by the clergy based on the threat to Islam and the Islamic community from the imperialist influence of the West to which the Islamic countries were exposed. The constitution of the Islamic Republic refers to the 12th Imam as the actual head of state. The Islamist interpretation of the Shiite variant of Islam, with its belief in the Redeemer in the form of the Mahdi and its fixation on suitable leadership, therefore tends increasingly toward authoritarian answers to social and political questions. In a 2002 study, 65% of Iranians surveyed (students, religious students, government employees, and other educated people) agreed with the statement: “In order to solve the affairs of society, the powerful hands of a dictator are needed.”<sup>11</sup>

Another important ideological source of Iranian antisemitism are images borrowed from Western antisemitism, which are overwritten by Islamist concepts. Jews and Zionists are regarded as world conspirators, especially as conspirators against the Islamic world, who would exploit and enslave others using colonialist methods.<sup>12</sup> The following quotations support these widespread ideas and also stand for the antisemitic phantasm according to which Jews supposedly control the media, the economy, and politics and invented the Holocaust in order to have moral legitimation for the founding of the State of Israel.<sup>13</sup>

The Jews were the first to begin anti-Islamic propaganda and spiritual conspiracies and, as you can see, this continues to the present day.<sup>14</sup>

[A]s you can see, the Jews have seized the world by the hair of their teeth and devoured it with an insatiable appetite, they have devoured America and have now turned their attention to Iran and are still not satisfied....<sup>15</sup>

We must raise our voices; we must make people aware that the Jews and their foreign accomplices are fundamentally opposed to Islam. They want to establish a Jewish world state;<sup>16</sup> and since they are deceivers and act decisively, I fear that they—keep God’s word!—will one day reach their goal.<sup>17</sup>

When we deal with the Zionists in Palestine, we are actually dealing with imperialism in Palestine. Zionism is not similar to the other forms of Western imperialism. Zionism is an entity that has even been expelled from the Western world. The way the Zionists used their money and their media forced the local leaders to use violent and inhuman means against them, as Hitler had once done.<sup>18</sup>

These examples show that Iranian Islamists speak of Jews, Zionists, and Israel to serve the idea of the world domination of Judaism. Although the terms vary, the antisemitic content remains the same. To reinforce the construction of enemy images, equating Jews and Zionists is not just a rhetorical tool. As a rule, antisemitic accusations and attributions are applied to both designations and are constantly emphasized to the point of an equality of essence. The negative attributions of Jews are sometimes attributed to Jews and sometimes to Zionists. It is precisely this interchangeability of terms with the same content that points to the manifestation of antisemitism in the anti-Zionism of the Iranian regime. After the Islamic Revolution, however, the Islamic leadership around Khomeini tried to adopt a slightly more nuanced distinction. In a speech to the Jewish community in Iran, Khomeini stressed: “We consider the Jewish community to be completely separate from the issue of Zionism and Zionists.”<sup>19</sup>

The Jews in Iran had nothing in common with the Zionists, but the latter had served the “arrogant” and “powerful”—which mostly refers to the United States and Great Britain—and acted

as their spies. In addition, they acted against the weak and oppressed and unlike Moses did not come from the common people.<sup>20</sup> Khomeini very openly articulated his fantasies of violence against the Israelis:

If the Israelis come to Iran in order to extract the oil, it will be the duty of all Muslims to throw them out or kill them all. They are at war with Islam, they are at war with the Muslims, they are in a state of war and if we are able, we will cut them all down. If they set foot in Iran, if even one Israeli sets foot in Iran, it will be the duty of the people to destroy them. The Israelis will come! The hell they will!<sup>21</sup>

These claims of the war of the Zionists against Islam and Muslims are a central element of antisemitic fantasies. It activates the feeling of being in a self-defense situation, which then justifies the destruction of the enemy. In the tradition of modern European antisemitism, Israel, Jews worldwide, and aspects of Western modernity are also imagined as absolute evil in modern Islamic antisemitism. These three objects are based on the notion of a Jewish principle that prevails in various areas of society. A comparison of anti-Zionist and antisemitic statements quickly shows that anti-Zionism is usually only a “foreign policy” phenomenon<sup>22</sup> or a “geopolitical reproduction”<sup>23</sup> of antisemitism.

## **Community and society**

The starting point for the spread of modern antisemitism is a specific form of social irrationality that has been reinforced by social upheavals and crises.<sup>24</sup> These experiences and feelings of crisis are inherent in capitalism. However, misjudged as such, they are interpreted as a crisis of cultural understanding or as an identity crisis by the Islamists. Alienation, crisis of meaning, loss or change of values, and de-traditionalization are the permanently recurring themes in Islamist discourse. Subjects such as misery, hunger, poverty, and the exploitation of labor are rarely

mentioned. The concretization of the crisis transforms the logic of capitalist society into one produced by Westernization. The reference to Westernization as the origin of the crisis indicates the core of crisis perception as a transition from the traditional to the somewhat inconsistent new. With the global implementation of capitalism, ideologies have also grown in Islamic societies that want to explain capitalism and its crisis phenomena through personalizing determinations, often resorting to antisemitic explanations.

A meta-ideological constant of antisemitism is the idea of the infiltration or decomposition of the community by the infiltrating Jews, which is related to the construction of the Jews as absolute enemies. Much like the antisemites of so-called Western societies, the community ideology of the Islamists, whether Sunni or Shiite, is based on the idea of a healthy community that must defend itself against external enemies. For many Islamists, Jews stand behind the destruction of the family and the fragmentation of faith and sacred social relationships, as Said Qutb of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has called it.<sup>25</sup> Iranian Islamists also adhere to the image of the power of the Jews penetrating all areas of society. Before the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini repeatedly stressed that the Shah allowed Israel to penetrate Iran in all economic, military, and political affairs.<sup>26</sup> He also argued that the “destructive expansionist program of Zionism [had reached] the stage of implementation in the Islamic countries”<sup>27</sup> because Islamic governments were “the executors of the enemies’ fatal and treacherous plans.”<sup>28</sup> In *Islamic Government*, Khomeini emphasizes the great influence Israel had in monarchist Iran under the Shah:

Israel’s influence in our country has reached a point where its military comes to train in our country! Our country has become their base; our country is ruled by them. If it remains so, if the Muslims continue to be so inactive, the economy of the Muslims will be ruined.<sup>29</sup>

The alleged equivalence of modernity and Jews can be demonstrated by juxtaposing community and society.<sup>30</sup> In anti-semitism, the society that appears abstract is the social formation of modernity. This is opposed to the natural community based on proximity and solidarity. While the community is experienced as a place of security, society is perceived as being destructive toward this overarching shelter. In Islamic antisemitism, society is associated with the Western-modern way of life, while community is the Islamic-traditional one. The erosion of social networks under the influence of modernization appears in the antisemitic imagination as a targeted act of individuals. In anti-semitism, the strict image of community and society is associated with concrete attributions. Society is abstract and represents the new and the disintegrating, while the community stands for tradition and the unifying. These views about society coincide with antisemitic imaginations about Jews. For example, Jews stand for the temporary, the flowing, the abstract and ambivalent, conflict, isolation, plurality, decomposition, alienation, uprooting, materialism, and exploitation.

According to Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, the idea that Jews are “the negative principle as such,”<sup>31</sup> on whose extermination the happiness of the world depends, expresses the antisemitic personalization of the socially abstract nature of the Jews. For Zygmunt Bauman, they embody ambivalence, and the antisemite wants to extinguish this ambivalence.<sup>32</sup> Abstractness, ambivalence, and ambiguity are also made concrete by the Islamists and projected onto Israel in the commodity-mediated Iran. As an explanation of the world, antisemitism is so attractive because, as an ideological component of Islamism, it enables a form of regressive processing of contradictions and a return to community and religion. The synthesis of community and religion finds its expression in Islamism in the hypostasis of the Umma, which is constantly presented as threatened and worthy of protection. According to Islamists, the Umma is threatened by

the access of unchecked capitalism, individualism, Western nationalism, secularism, and a fundamentally Western way of thinking, which is characterized by the absence of religious meaning and thus systematically replaces the spiritual-religious experience of Islam.

Interpreting modernization processes as decomposition and destruction makes antisemitism plausible as an explanation for a planned and targeted destruction of Islam and its Umma. In this frame of interpretation of the Iranian Islamists, Jews adopt various positions from which they act in a disintegrating way—inside Iran under the Shah as collaborators with the ruling elites and inside the Islamic Republic as potential spies for Israel and the West. As non-national Jews, their actions worldwide and the control of other governments, the economy, the media, and politics are hallucinated. And as Israel's national project, the Jews, according to the Islamists, seek to destroy and disintegrate Islam in the heart of the Islamic world.<sup>33</sup>

## **The West as a universal enemy**

Since the 1960s, Iranian Islamists have worked to bring Islam back into the social and political arena and contrast it with the West. The West is not understood geographically but as a cipher for a worldview. According to Khomeini, the West is a school of thought with a unified way of thinking, observing, and acting.<sup>34</sup> As early as 1942, he wrote as follows in *Keys to Secrets (Kashf al-Asrar)*:

Have Europeans discovered the ideal society? Can we regard Europe as so civilized that we take it as an example, as some madmen do? The ideology of Europe consists of nothing but bloodsucking, man-eating and burning down other countries. The sole aim is to lead a vicious life in anarchy, in which lust rules. What do [Europe] and Islam—the religion of grace and justice—have in common?<sup>35</sup>

Large parts of Iranian society experienced the modernization processes under the Pahlavi dynasty as an artificial import of social changes. Specific examples include new laws that led to an improved status for women and non-Muslims, a circumcision of the powerful position of the clergy, and the reforms of the White Revolution<sup>36</sup> in the 1960s. The Iranian intelligentsia has created various terms for these changes, including “Westoxication”<sup>37</sup> and “alienation,”<sup>38</sup> which describe the underlying feeling of contamination by the West and alienation from Islamic existence. Here, anti-modern attitudes are primarily anti-Western. The West became an enemy when it began to act militarily, politically, and economically in Islamic societies. However, it is only from the argument that the West also gained influence ideologically, culturally, and theoretically that this anti-Western attitude draws its strength. According to the Islamists, this way of thinking consistently leads to injustice, exploitation, oppression, and colonialism. Schariati’s argument is interesting here because it paints European thinkers as the executors of capitalism, which is characterized by its worldwide expansion. They have developed a special plan that is supposed to create and secure the longing of non-European societies for the Western way of life. In *Civilization and Modernization*, he writes:

Tastes, worries, suffering, desires, ideals, aesthetic feelings, traditions, social conditions, the need to relax had to be changed in such a way that man was forced to become the consumer of European industrial goods. Thus the great producers and capitalists of 18th and 19th century Europe transferred the plan to the thinkers. The plan is to unify all people on earth.<sup>39</sup>

This period also includes a quotation from Khomeini, which asserts the interaction of exploitative Western, that is to say American, interests under the leadership of Zionism:

America is the number one enemy in the world of the deprived and oppressed people of the world. There is no crime America will not commit in order to maintain its political, economic,

cultural and military domination of those parts of the world where it predominates. It exploits the oppressed people of the world by means of the large-scale propaganda campaigns that are coordinated for it by international Zionism. By means of its hidden and treacherous agents, it sucks the blood of the defenseless peoples as if it alone, together with its satellites, had the right to live in this world.<sup>40</sup>

What exists as a conflict of interest is reinterpreted by Iranian Islamism as a conflict of identity. For the idea of cultural infiltration, for example via the internet, the concept of the velvet war or the velvet revolution has prevailed, which is currently being increasingly used by President Hassan Rouhani and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Leadership.

The characterization of Western modernity in Iranian Islamism coincides with numerous accusations that antisemitism levels against Jews. Islamic antisemitism permanently blurs the boundaries between Western modernity and Jews/Israel and treats them as one and the same thing. Both the West and the Jews/Israel are said to have the same ambitions and methods of gaining power. The juxtaposition of two writings reveals the same attributions to Jews/Israel and Western modernity. The first, *The West and Its Basic Ideological Principles according to Imam Khomeini's Thinking* (1980), is a summary of Khomeini's attitude to the West published by the Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works. The second, *Palestine from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini* (2006), which was published by the same institute, is an anthology of Khomeini's views on the Israeli state and Jews in Iran. Islamic antisemitism permanently blurs the boundaries between Western modernity and Jews/Israel. Both the West and the Jews/Israel are said to have the same ambitions and methods of attaining domination: the intention to destroy Islam and Muslims; the falsification of the Koran and Islam; the foundation of discord and strife between Muslims to weaken their unity; the change of

faith and values of Islam; the economic, cultural, and military transformation of Islamic societies; the spread of capitalism in Islamic countries to destroy the natural structures of these societies; and finally the enforcement of practices such as colonialism, imperialism, and oppression.<sup>41</sup> The list of overlapping attributions may also be said to include the spreading of a materialist and secular perspective on the future and the spreading of Western nationalism and universalism in order to eliminate any peculiarity and unify everything under the banner of the West and Zionism.

The structural crises of modern societies are rewritten by the Islamists as identity crises and contradicted by Islamic counter-concepts: Islamic morality, Islamic community, Islamic economy, Islamic reason, and Islamic government (*Velayat e-faqih*). The perceived disintegration—both of traditional ties and of political and social systems in short historical periods—generates feelings of dissolution and powerlessness. In order to achieve a form of self-empowerment, aspects of cultural identity are emphasized using a religious ticket tailored to an imaginary world of decomposition and decay. The construction of collective identities serves not only to emphasize authenticity but also to ward off the external enemy. As a projective defense mechanism, Islamic antisemitism comes into play when it seeks to identify the consequences of the commodity-producing system as the planned action of mostly external interests. Islamism claims to be able to fight these alleged corrupt and conspiratorial efforts. The assignment of conspiratorial activity is attached to the United States, mostly in cooperation with Israel, and under the Shah to the former elites. Islamism has its very own demonic descriptions for the United States and Israel: the Great Satan and the Little Satan.<sup>42</sup>

Islamism postulates a division of modernity into abstract private interests and generality.<sup>43</sup> Jews/Israel embody the particular (the abstract private interests), while the Umma, the

Islamic community, is ideally elevated to the principle of generality. The schematic perception of an absolute alienation of every social development is always close to antisemitism, because it always wants to personalize the responsibility for crises and other developments perceived as threatening to an exterior factor. Personalization seems to capture the abstract contradictions of modern societies.

How does a view come about that makes the Jewish state a representative of the changes that are perceived as threatening in the course of the implementation of capitalist modernity? The State of Israel was founded in 1948 and offered a home not only to the survivors of the Shoah but also to the Jews who lived as *dhimmis* in Islamic societies until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. European and Islamic antisemitism combine in their territorial dimension. With their emigration and the Zionist project, the European survivors of genocidal Nazi antisemitism reacted to the permanent threat posed by antisemitism. This national way out was forced upon the Jews by Auschwitz and led to the founding of the State of Israel. For Islamic antisemitism, the immigrant Jews are not only messengers of modernity but its direct embodiment. The fact that the Jews founded a modern state in the 1940s makes them real actors in this change within the territory of that state. However, antisemitism universalizes and extraterritorializes this modern import to the entire Islamic world. Thus, changes in money, press and media, education, (sexual) morality, art, the circulation of Communist and Marxist ideas, the spread of capitalism, and the emergence of sociology and psychoanalysis are painted as Jewish initiatives.<sup>44</sup> These changes are interpreted negatively because they are perceived as destroying Islam's traditional way of life.

The territorialization of Jews in Israel, especially in this region, leads to a territorialization of antisemitism, which as anti-Zionism adorns itself with the attitudes of anti-colonial rhetoric. In his later writings, Jalal Al-e Ahmad speaks about Israel with

complete contempt. While in his earlier writings he did not regard Israel as a threat to the unity of the Muslims but as an “agent of imperialism” everywhere, his rhetoric radically intensified after the Six-Day War of 1967:

Because Nazism, the flowering achievement of Western bourgeoisie, dragged six million wretched Jews into man-baking furnaces, today two to three million Arabs of Palestine, Gaza, and Western Jordan ought to be massacred and scattered around under the auspices of Wall Street capitalists and Rothschild Bank. And because the European intellectuals, so called, were partially responsible for Hitler’s atrocities, and yet did not utter a word at the time, now they are giving the same Jews the green light in the Middle East so that the people of Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq are whipped enough to forget about fighting against the Western colonialism, and would never again close the Suez Canal to the civilized nations!<sup>45</sup>

In this quotation, Al-e Ahmad draws a connection between two antisemitic metaphors for Jews—Wall Street and the Rothschilds—and Nazism, while in his further remarks Israel is devalued to the “puppet supreme of capitalism and Western colonialism in the Middle East.”<sup>46</sup> In the phantasm of a world conspiracy, however, it can be seen that the work of the Jews is also assumed to be global. Islamists of all colors repeatedly claim that Israel is only one step on the way to its goal of world domination.<sup>47</sup> Sometimes these alleged world domination ambitions are described as originally Jewish, sometimes as American. The following is a quote from Ahmadinejad, in which the United States is pointed out as the driving force of this striving for world domination.

The creation of the occupying regime is a strong action by the ruling arrogant world order against the world of Islam. There continues a historic war between the World Arrogance and the Islamic world, the roots of which go back hundreds of years ago. ... The World Arrogance turned the Zionist regime occupying Jerusalem into a staging ground to dominate the Islamic

World. ... They have created a base, from where they can expand their rule over the entire Islamic world; it has no other purpose other than this.<sup>48</sup>

Khomeini provides an example of the idea of the Jews striving for world domination in *Islamic Government*.

We must raise our voices; we must make people aware that the Jews and their foreign accomplices are fundamentally opposed to Islam. They want to establish a Jewish rule; and since they are deceivers and act decisively, I fear that they—keep God!—will one day reach their goal.<sup>49</sup>

Jews are portrayed here as threatening, as people who would resolutely take action against Islam and, since they do not fight by honest means but by fraudulent means, as an unequal enemy of the Islamic world. What is interesting here is the juxtaposition of the allegation of the Jews' striving for world domination and the intention actually expressed by Khomeini to establish a "worldwide Islamic state," as he did in the conservative Iranian newspaper *Resalat*.<sup>50</sup> However, this projection still contains an attempt at rationalization in that Khomeini describes Islam's ambitions as good and other imperialist ambitions as bad:

World public opinion should understand that Islamic conquest is not the same as the conquest sought by other world rulers. The latter want to conquer the world for their own profit, while the Islamic conquest aims to serve the interests of the inhabitants of the entire globe. [Non-Islamic] conquerors want to rule the world so that they can spread any injustice and sexual misconduct there, while Islam wants to conquer the world to spread spiritual values and to prepare humanity for justice and divine law.<sup>51</sup>

The juxtaposition of good and bad world domination ambitions corresponds to the dichotomy of generality and private interest that has already been mentioned. Accordingly, the non-Islamic conquerors acted out of private, profit-oriented interest, while the Islamic urge to conquer represented the general public.

The focus on sexual decay is especially important here, as it paradigmatically stands for the fear of a transformation of social relations through Western influence. The speeches that Khomeini frequently made to the faithful are a way of sowing the “rumor about the Jews”<sup>52</sup> and consolidating it through constant repetition: “as you can see, the Jews have seized the world by the hand and devoured it with an insatiable appetite, they have devoured America and have now turned their attention to Iran and are still not satisfied.”<sup>53</sup> There are numerous statements in this style by Khomeini. The kinds of conspiracies of which Khomeini accuses Jews are known from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. In fact, the *Protocols*, which have been spread by Iranian state authorities since 1985, offer al Iranian antisemites numerous points of contact for the interpretation of any change in all areas of life,<sup>54</sup> such as politics, media, economy, religion, science, art, culture, and even environment, under the conditions of modernization. Antisemitism thus follows the pattern of an anti-modern construction of identity. When Ahmadinejad dates the emergence of Zionism to 400 years ago and discovers a continuity of Zionist influence in the United States, as he explained to representatives of the Islamic world in August 2012, he serves precisely this idea of the power of the Jews, even if he calls them Zionists:

For about 400 years a fearsome Zionist movement has been leading the fate of this world and behind the scenes are the main centers of power, politics, media, money and banking, so that the presidential candidate of a large country with a huge economy and over 300 million inhabitants to win the elections must kiss the feet of the Zionists.<sup>55</sup>

Another way in which Islamists seek to delegitimize Israel is denial and relativization of the Shoah, which ties into the idea of the Jewish infiltration of the Islamic world. According to this argument, the main reason for the founding of the State of Israel was not the extermination of millions of Jews but the creation of

an imperialist outpost in the Islamic world. In the opinion of Iranian antisemites, the Holocaust is thus an invention of Jews and Zionists that enabled them to found the State of Israel, blackmail the Germans for compensation payments, and obtain worldwide moral support.<sup>56</sup> Iranian political scientist Seyyed Mojtaba Asisi of Imam Sadeq University challenges the scientifically proven and well-documented facts of the industrial extermination of Jews under Nazism by accusing Jews of “cultural terrorism.”<sup>57</sup> The aim of this cultural terrorism is to make it impossible to question the Holocaust. Islamic antisemitism not only propagates a complete denial of the Holocaust but also oscillates between understating the number of victims, asserting the complicity of the Jewish victims, denying the technical feasibility of mass extermination—in the tradition of European Holocaust deniers—and equating Nazi extermination policy with Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.<sup>58</sup>

The following quote from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini reveals three important aspects of the language and logic of antisemitism in Iran:

There is evidence to show that Zionists had close ties with Nazis and falsified statistics on the killing of Jews. There is even evidence that a large number of non-Jewish hooligans and gangsters from Eastern Europe were forced to emigrate as Jews to Palestine ... to found an anti-Islamic state in the heart of the Islamic world, disguised as a project in support of the victims of racism.<sup>59</sup>

What is significant here is the characterization of European antisemitism as racism. According to this approach, antisemitism is not a distinct social phenomenon in Western or Islamic history. Jews are either persecuted on the basis of racist motives, which is largely but not consistently rejected in the Islamic discourse, or they are justifiably persecuted—or “called to account” in the language of the Islamists—as Zionists with imperialist ambitions. The claim of bringing gentile gangsters to Israel supports the

idea that Jews behave in an insidious and morally corrupt manner. Ultimately, this quote also reveals the notion that any state project that is not Islamic must therefore be anti-Islamic and have as its sole purpose the destruction of the Islamic world.

The establishment of an (illusory) relationship between Western modernity and Jews/Israel has led to the emergence of anti-imperialist antisemitism in Iran. In addition, as a product of modern socialization, antisemitism in Islamic societies such as Iran emerges from inner forces and resistance to modernity itself. It should therefore not be interpreted as something that developed purely externally to these societies, as the import thesis suggests. While it is true that certain antisemitic images have been imported into Iran, antisemitism itself finds its impetus in the country's own social structures.

## Notes

1. Bahman Nirumand, *Iran-Report* 1 (2017): 21, published by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, [https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/iran\\_report\\_01\\_17.pdf](https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/iran_report_01_17.pdf).
2. For a reflection on the forms of Iranian antisemitism, see Ulrike Marz, *Kritik des islamischen Antisemitismus. Zur gesellschaftlichen Genese und Semantik des Antisemitismus in der Islamischen Republik Iran* (Berlin: Lit, 2014), 301-371.
3. See Henner Fürtig, "Iranischer Antisemitismus und Ahmadinejad. Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen?," in Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzels, eds., *Antisemitismus und radikaler Islamismus* (Essen: Klartext, 2007), 103-127 at 118.
4. Imported from the Ottoman Empire by Christians in the 15th century, the ritual murder charge found its way to Safawid Iran. In Iran this

- accusation has increasingly been made against the Jews since the Islamic Revolution. See Soli Shahvar, "The Islamic Regime in Iran and Its Attitude towards the Jews: The Religious and Political Dimensions," *Immigrants and Minorities* 27(1) (2009): 82-117 at 98ff.
5. Ruhollah Khomeini [1977], Speech at Shaykh Ansari Mosque, Najaf, Iraq, on 28 September 1977, in *Kauthar: Volume 1: An Anthology of the Speeches of Imam Khomeini (s.a.) including an Account of the Events of the Revolution 1962-1978* (Teheran: Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, International Affairs Division, 1995), 349-373, at 368; Ruhollah Khomeini [1970-71], *Der islamische Staat*, translated and edited by Nader Hassan and Ilse Itschernska (Berlin: Schwarz, 1983), 15. See also quotes by Pasdaran [1980] and Rafsanjani [2002], in Shahvar, *supra* note 4, at 98, 92.
  6. Khomeini [1970/71], *supra* note 5, at 146.
  7. Minor occultation: assumption that the Mahdi remained in contact with his followers through ambassadors.
  8. Major occultation: assumption that the Mahdi completely disappeared after the death of the fourth ambassador.
  9. Wilfried Buchta, *Die iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit 1979-1996* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1997), 27.
  10. *Ibid.*, at 23.
  11. Dal Seung Yu, *The Role of Political Culture in Iranian Political Development* (Aldershot: Routledge, 2002), 126ff.
  12. See, e.g., Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, "The West and its Basic Ideological Principles according to Imam Khomeini's Thinking," *Spektrum Iran. Zeitschrift für islamisch-iranische Kultur der Botschaft der Islamischen Republik Iran* 22(2) (2009): 50-77, at 71.
  13. See, e.g., Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani [2002], Speech at a meeting of media representatives from Islamic countries in support of Palestine on 30 January 2002, published as "Tiraden in Teheran: Hetzrede von Rafsanjani," *haGalil.com*, 26 July 2013, <http://www.nahost-politik.de/iran/rafsanjani.htm>; Khamenei [2001], quoted in Fürtig, *supra* note 3, at 118.
  14. Khomeini [1970-71], *supra* note 5, at 15.
  15. Khomeini [1977], *supra* note 5, at 368.
  16. In the English translation of Khomeini's *Islamic Government*, the term "Jewish domination" is used instead of "Jewish world state," which should rather be translated as Jewish rule.

17. Khomeini [1970/71], *supra* note 5, at 146.
18. Rafsanjani [2002], *supra* note 13.
19. Ruhollah Khomeini [1979], Speech to the Jewish Communities in Iran on 14 May 1979, *Sahifa-yi Nur*, vol. 6, 164, in *Palestine from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini* (Teheran: Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, 2006), 12.
20. Ibid.
21. Ruhollah Khomeini [1978], Speech of 16 December 1978, *Sahifa-yi Nur*, vol. 4, 79, in *Palestine from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini* (Teheran: Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, 2006), 11.
22. Herbert A. Strauss, "Einleitung—Vom modernen zum neuen Antisemitismus," in Herbert A. Strauss, ed., *Der Antisemitismus der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus 1990), 7-28 at 15.
23. Stephan Grigat, *Fetisch und Freiheit. Über die Rezeption der Marxschen Fetischkritik, die Emanzipation von Staat und Kapital und die Kritik des Antisemitismus* (Freiburg: ça ira, 2007), 329.
24. See Karl-Heinz Lewed, "Erweckungserlebnis als letzter Schrei. Der Islamismus und die irrational-rationale Subjektivität der Warengesellschaft," *Krisis* 33. *Beiträge zur Kritik der Warengesellschaft* (Münster, 2010), 16-57, at 41f.
25. See excerpts from Said Qutb, *Unser Kampf mit den Juden*, translated by Matthias Küntzel, 27 November 2002, <http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2002/48/22785.html>.
26. See Ruhollah Khomeini [1971], Speech of 8 February 1971, *Sahifa-yi Nur*, vol. 1, 157, in *Palestine from the Viewpoint of Imam Khomeini* (Teheran: Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, 2006), 30.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Khomeini [1970/71], *supra* note 5, at 138.
30. For an explanation of this fundamental connection between community and society as a dichotomous pair of opposites, See Klaus Holz, *Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus. Islamistische, demokratische und antizionistische Judenfeindschaft* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005), 23-27.
31. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno [1944], "Dialektik der Aufklärung," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, published by Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1997), 192.

32. See Zygmunt Bauman, *Dialektik der Ordnung. Die Moderne und der Holocaust* (Hamburg: EVA, 1992).
33. In his reflections, Holz draws attention to the paradoxical simultaneity of national and transnational motifs in antisemitism, see Holz, *supra* note 30, at 35ff.
34. Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, *supra* note 12, at 54, 56, 62.
35. Khomeini [1980], quoted in Amir Taheri, *Chomeini und die islamische Revolution* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1985), 278.
36. The White Revolution is the name given to the comprehensive 1963 reform project under Reza Shah Pahlavi to modernize and improve the social situation in Iran. This included land distribution, forest nationalization, electoral reform, active and passive suffrage for women, denationalization of state property to finance land reform, profit sharing for workers, and literacy efforts. See Wahied Wahdat-Hagh, *Die islamischer Republik Iran* (Münster: Lit, 2003), 116.
37. Jalal Al Ahmad [1962], *Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi)* (Delmar, NY: Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, 1982).
38. Ali Schariati [1973], *Zivilisation und Modernismus* (Speech to the Association of Sociology Teachers in Khorassan Province on 31 December 1973) (Bonn, 1980).
39. *Ibid.*, at 24.
40. Ruhollah Khomeini [1980], Message to the Pilgrims on 13 September 1980, *Jumhuri-yi Islami*, in Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941-1980)*, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1981), 300-306, at 305.
41. See Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, *supra* note 12, at 51, 60, 69, 71, and Khomeini [1979], *supra* note 19, at 1-7, 13, 16, 25ff.
42. See Nirumand, *supra* note 1, at 21.
43. On the concepts of abstract private interests and generality, see Lewed, *supra* note 24.
44. Riesebrodt writes aptly about this without referring directly to antisemitism but to fundamentalism: "Sociology stems from the same processes of urbanization and industrialization that engendered fundamentalist protest, but makes its appearance as an adversary to the traditionalist camp. Representative of the new secular academic elites, sociologists consider themselves agents of enlightenment, committed to a rational implementation of progress that they often equate with

- secularization.” Martin Riesebrodt, *Pious Passion: The Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3; see also Holz, *supra* note 30, at 25.
45. Al-e Ahmad [1984], *The Israeli Republic*, 90, quoted in Hamid Debashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York, 1993), 70.
  46. Al-e Ahmad [1984], 92, quoted in Debashi, *supra* note 45, 70.
  47. See Hamas Charter, Art. 32, translated by Matthias Küntzel and R.R.C., available at <http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2002/48/22787.html>.
  48. Ahmadinejad, quoted in Andrew G. Bostom, *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History* (New York: Prometheus 2008), 683.
  49. Khomeini [1970/71], *supra* note 5, 146.
  50. Khomeini [1988], *Resalat*, 25 March 1988, quoted in Henner Fürtig, “Die Bedeutung der iranischen Revolution von 1979 als Ausgangspunkt für eine antijüdisch orientierte Islamisierung,” in *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung*, vol. 12 (Berlin: Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung der Technischen Universität Berlin/Metropol, 2003), 73-98, at 94.
  51. Khomeini, quoted in Victor und Victoria Trimondi: *Krieg der Religionen. Politik, Glaube und Terror im Zeichen der Apokalypse* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2006), 359.
  52. Theodor W. Adorno [1951], “Minima Moralia,” in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, published by von Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1980), 123.
  53. Khomeini [1977], *supra* note 5, at 368.
  54. See Götz Nordbruch, “Antisemitismus als Gegenstand islamwissenschaftlicher und Nahost-bezogener Sozialforschung,” in Werner Bergmann and Mona Körte, eds., *Antisemitismusforschung in den Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), 241-270, at 205.
  55. Ahmadinejad [2012], quoted in Wahied Wahdat-Hagh, “Die iranische Führung droht Israel mit Vernichtung,” *Achgut.com*, 16 August 2012, [http://www.achgut.com/artikel/die\\_iranische\\_fuehrung\\_droht\\_israel\\_mit\\_vernichtung](http://www.achgut.com/artikel/die_iranische_fuehrung_droht_israel_mit_vernichtung).
  56. See Meir Litvak, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism,” *Journal of Israeli History* 25(1) (2006): 267-284, at 275.
  57. Asisi [2006], quoted in Wahied Wahdat-Hagh, *Der islamistische Totalitarismus. Über Antisemitismus, Anti-Bahaismus, Christenverfolgung*

*und geschlechtsspezifische Apartheid in der "Islamischen Republik Iran"* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 96, 106.

58. Meir Litvak and Esther Webman, *From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
59. Khamenei [2001], quoted in Robert S. Wistrich, *Muslimischer Antisemitismus. Eine aktuelle Gefahr* (Berlin: Edition Critic, 2011), 76ff.



## **Antisemitism: The Big Picture in Small Pieces**

David A. Meier\*

Antisemitism traces its origins in attitudes toward the Jews dating from ancient times to the present. As early Christianity evolved out of Jewish messianic tradition, Christianity interpreted Judaism as its heretical counterpart, reminiscent of Augustine's early Manichaeism. Beginning with the accusation of Jews as "Christ-killers," Christians demonized Jews and embraced the myth of ritual murder and Luther's condemnation of the Jews. Religious condemnation added a conspiratorial specter of Jews as murderers and thieves. As Europe's wars of religion wound to a close in the 17th century, a new secular assault on Jews and Judaism took shape in the writings of Johannes Andreas Eisenmenger. As the Enlightenment inspired a more intellectualized Judaism among European Jewry, contemporary thinkers retained reservations about accepting Jews as their equals. Slowly, rational thought coupled with religious antisemitism and pseudo-scientific ideas about race and nationalism, which survive into the 21st century. Paralleling the specter of the common cold, antisemitism spreads through direct and indirect

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human activity. Consequently, antisemitism requires regular educational inoculations to prevent its spread and lethal potential.

Modern antisemitism emerged from the growing belief that Jews comprised an inferior race. While Jews had previously suffered a more religious-based persecution, Enlightenment thinkers transformed antisemitism into a pseudo-science with clear racial overtones. Three assumptions prevailed, namely: (1) rational thought replaced supernatural forces; (2) the “scientific method” had the best chance to answer all fundamental questions; and (3) the human race could be guided by education as opposed to bloodlines or class status. Concurrently, early nationalistic feelings embraced an equally rational assessment of culture, language, history, race, and value systems, bonded together into political, economic, and social entities with distinct continuous geographical boundaries. Falling into the definition of foreigners, Jews shared a common language, culture, religion, and history. To the so-called untrained eye, Jews became the unseen enemy within.

In this paper, three possible approaches are suggested for addressing the history and on-the-ground implications of antisemitism in a classroom setting. As with any historical phenomenon, under the first approach, students require a basic overview of the subject. Antisemitism, however, requires a more engaging interactive environment. Students harbor many embedded stereotypes as they attempt to grasp the reality of their complex world. Too often, they lack the historical and contemporary insight to understand the extent to which they may inadvertently project their own cultural, religious, and political biases. The second and third approaches investigate real-world, on-the-ground manifestations of cultural bias and antisemitism. Inevitably, these examples suggest a fragile world driven more by emotion and fear than tolerance and understanding.

## Historical approach

The following proposed topics for short papers represent a fraction of possible topics. Those listed here are intended only as tools to open the discussion about the various manifestations of antisemitism throughout history. Controversy confronts the teacher and student at every turn. However, defining antisemitism as the manifestation of social tension opens doors and raises questions about the contexts in which antisemitism often emerges. Possible topics for discussion or short papers could include the following:

- Ancient attitudes before Christianity
- Apathy to enmity: Jews as “Christ-killers”
- The Church and the Jews
- The myth of ritual murder
- Martin Luther and the Jews
- The Spanish Inquisition
- Johann Andreas Eisenmenger
- An enlightened rejection of antisemitism in 17th-18th century Europe
- A conspiracy takes root: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
- The advent of racial antisemitism in the 19th century: Wilhelm Marr
- America’s tolerance of antisemitism: from Henry Ford to Alfred P. Sloan
- Antisemitism and genocide: Hitler, the Nazis, and ordinary Germans
- Arab responses to the Holocaust
- Contemporary Islam and antisemitism

## General overviews

William F. Buckley’s *Anti-Semitism* (1992) is somewhat out of date (and out of print) but didn’t aspire to be a history of anti-

semitism. The wide array of Continuum publications are very focused, for example Susan Sorek's *Jews Against Rome* (2008). The exceptionally well-researched and edited work created by Michael Berenbaum, *Not Your Father's Antisemitism* (2008), has a clear focus on the 20th century and apparent inclinations for the 21st century. Many of these publications cover important facets of this history. Antisemitism, however, can also be integral to Jewish-Christian Messianism, Jewish philosophy, and early Jewish history without being the focal point of the work. Of works currently in print, Norman Finkelstein's *Beyond Chutzpah* (2005) places its emphasis on contemporary manifestations of antisemitism. Marvin Perry and Frederick Schweitzer's *Antisemitism, Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present* (2002) covers the subject with a more theological trend. Excellently researched and well-written, it is practically beyond the reading level of the public and most students. Leon Poliakov's *History of Anti-Semitism* (1965) (translated from the French) is a classic but also four volumes in length. Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin's *Why The Jews?* (1983) is structured more as an open discussion, but a delicately sophisticated one. It has few details about the history itself.

It is a rather curious feature of works-in-print that there are more than 40,000 works on this subject—according to one count at least. Beyond existing classics, students should be encouraged to explore more recent works and research projects. For example, the Inquisition's files, which have been available only since 1998, the Vatican's files relating to the Holocaust, British radio intercepts of Nazi executions, Nazi radio broadcasts to the Middle East, and the 16 miles of files that the International Tracing Service of the Red Cross released to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), as well as our knowledge of Jewish history through various archeological discoveries.

Antisemitism appears to have a strong resonance with parties interested in Holocaust and genocide studies, as well as those

interested in Jewish, European, and Middle Eastern history—in print, on the internet, and in all visual media. However, the field is heavy-ended with very demanding, high-power works that the public cannot read and, frankly, won't take the time to read—many are looking for something more digestible. Similarly, academic works on antisemitism confront student audiences, who have limited vocabularies and even more limited knowledge of the big picture than history buffs of all shades.

## **On the ground in Dagestan**

It can be readily said that antisemitism proved an institutionalized component of Soviet and now Russian culture, society, and politics. Within the Republic of Dagestan, where 88 percent of the population identified with Islam, Islamic fundamentalists gained strength through contacts with Chechnya. An inherent component of Islamic fundamentalism is antisemitism. Furthermore, residents of Dagestan are prohibited from moving to other parts of the Russian Federation as a means of escaping regional discrimination and persecution. Additionally, Dagestan is a region plagued by crime, poverty, kidnappings, assassinations, mafia activities, arms merchants, bombings, and easy access to arms. Numbering less than 10,000, Jews have little to no political influence. Where race and ethnicity (customs, language, and religion) determines socio-political grouping, Jews are necessarily marginalized and particularly susceptible to outbreaks of popular violence. Given prevailing socio-economic conditions in Dagestan, Russian Federation authorities anticipate further violence.<sup>1</sup>

Dagestan's historical legacy is characterized by outside interference and political fragmentation. The native peoples resisted the Russian encroachment in the 19th century with guerrilla warfare and major conflagrations, culminating in the Caucasian War (1816-1856) and Imam Shamil's holy war (1834-1859). In

the early 20th century, the North Caucasus resisted by force the imposition of Soviet rule between 1917 and 1921, with isolated clashes continuing into the 1930s. During the Russian Revolution, the Caucasian peoples of Dagestan actively supported the Bolsheviks, expecting political autonomy in return. Later, in 1920-1921, an anti-Bolshevik uprising, mainly supported by Avars, was brutally crushed. In 1921, the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed (DASSR). According to Nora Levin's *The Jews of the Soviet Union since 1917* (1988), ritual murder charges ("that Jews had allegedly murdered children for ritual purposes") against Jews circulated in Buinaksk in the 1960s. According to Levin, "Jews were assaulted, and their homes looted, with police standing by or participating. The perpetrators remained immune from prosecution."

After the demise of the Soviet Union, a movement for national independence emerged in Dagestan. This movement reached its peak in April 1991, when 39 out of 54 regional soviets supported a resolution to create a sovereign Republic of Dagestan. Domestic unrest gripped the region again when, in December 1994, Russian Federation troops moved through Dagestan en route to Chechnya and provoked popular anxiety that the war in Chechnya would be the start of an all-Caucasian war including Dagestan.<sup>2</sup>

In the 1994 election, the Communist Party received 54 percent of the vote. By the mid-1990s, the nationalist movements that emerged in the late 1980s had lost much of their political relevance. Election results in 1990, were manipulated, and most likely in 1995 too, but this did not arouse much popular indignation. On the other hand, fear of Islamic radicalism has found expression in several recent developments. Deputy Prime Minister Said Amirov, elected mayor of Makhachkala, the capital, in February 1998 with more than 70 percent of the vote, publicly opposed the so-called Islamic path of development for Dagestan proposed by his election rival Shirukhan Gadzhimuratov, who

polled 29 percent of the vote. More disturbing, when the head of the Dagestan Intelligence Service was seriously wounded in an attack, Dagestan officials held Muslim militants responsible. In response, the Dagestan Intelligence Service worked in close collaboration with Russian troops in finding and arresting militant Muslims. In short, contemporary identification with Islamic fundamentalism is an expression of frustration and a means of social protest.

The large number of refugees from Chechnya that poured into Dagestan from December 1994 put a severe strain on the western regions of the country. According to the Federal Migration Service, refugees reached a peak of roughly 150,000 in May 1995, although by September 1995 more than half had returned to Chechnya. The remaining refugees are expected to stay. The Minister for Nationalities of Dagestan, Magomedsadykh Gysaev, expressed his concern over events in Chechnya that threaten to destabilize the political situation in Dagestan. The Chechen conflict caused many Dagestanis to return home from other parts of Russia. Russian Federation troops that were withdrawn from Chechen territory and redeployed in Dagestan have generated occasional clashes between civilians and military personnel. This ethnic influx inevitably amplified tensions in what were already disputed territories and initially inspired Dagestani loyalty to Moscow. Since late 1996, the situation in Dagestan has been a focus of Kremlin concern. Political assassinations continue to be carried out in Dagestan. In August 1996, a gathering of parties and movements in Grozny, the bombed-out capital of Chechnya, resulted in the creation of an organization dedicated to the resurrection of the Imamate, a state that had once comprised Chechnya and much of Dagestan. In August, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin participated in a high-level Russian government discussion on the situation there.<sup>3</sup>

***Militant Muslim factions***

Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus has been preserved mainly by the Sufi brotherhoods, which can be Sunni or Shia. Ten years ago, there were only 27 mosques in Dagestan, today there are 1,800. According to Garun Kurbanov, head of the cultural faculty at Makhachkala University, "Islam certainly played the biggest role in the formation of Dagestan's national identity ever since the 8th century." Quarrels between Muslim leaders apart, the bigger issue of resurgent Islam in the south makes Moscow nervous. The south's history is one of violent religious-political wars between Muslim guerrillas and Russian armies. The Russian Federation feared that a newly Islamicized Dagestan might again join forces with separatist Chechnya to escape Russian hegemony. Movladi Udugov, Chechnya's Deputy Prime Minister and Information Minister, added mischievously to those fears by bringing together 35 Dagestani and Chechen Islamic groups in Chechnya in August 1996. They established an Islamic Nation movement whose aim, according to Udugov, was to reunite Chechnya and Dagestan.

According to Yossef Bodansky, who served as Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the US House of Representatives between 1988 and 2000, the Wahhabi movement originated in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century. Advocating an orthodox view of Islam, the aggressiveness of Wahhabism in proselytizing is matched by its strict interpretations of Islam, and hence has often been labeled fundamentalist. The Wahhabi receive military training in Chechnya, are sympathetic to the fundamentalist Taliban movement in Afghanistan, and have links with Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Hizbi-Islami, Iranian intelligence, and Hizballah in Sudan (allegedly funded in part by heroin smuggling). The Wahhabi also reject secular forms of government, and this group is among the first mentioned in the press as potentially disruptive, though no state

has yet gone so far as to ban Wahhabi activities. Since the early 1990s, the Wahhabi have been viewed as fundamentalists, fanatics, and mujahedin, and appear to be the cause of numerous acts of violence. Conflict between Wahhabi and traditional Sufi believers hit the headlines in Dagestan in May 1996, when 1,000 rivals clashed in the central village of Karamakhi.

While this drama was unfolding, the violence spread into Dagestan from Chechnya. Chechen raiding parties planted mines and ambushed government vehicles. In early July 1997, seven Russian policemen were killed and 13 were injured near the town of Khasavyurt in Dagestan, near the Chechen border, when the truck they were traveling in was blown up. On December 22, 1997, a large Chechen-Dagestani terrorist force led by senior Arab mujahedin figures attacked the Russian army based in Buinaksk, Dagestan, as well as such spots as Khasavyurt, Pervomayskoye, and the Kizlyar bridge over the River Terek, which is considered a key piece of infrastructure for the building of the oil pipeline in the Caucasus. According to the Islamists, the strike force was made of three platoons of Mujahedin fighters, with a total of 115 fighters of Chechen, Ingush, Dagestani, Central Asian or Arab nationalities. Many of the Chechens were Akintsy Chechens from Dagestan.

The Jihad Army of Dagestan, the organization that Salman Raduyev, one of the Chechen field commanders, would claim carried out the attack on Buinaksk, is an Islamist force made up predominantly of Akintsy Chechens originally trained by Raduyev himself in camps in central Chechnya. In the so-called Jihad Army of Dagestan, Mujahedin troops likely united with the Dagestani jihad movement and staged the attack, since they are opposed to the presence of Russian occupational forces on their territory. The next phase is turning Dagestan into an eastern bridgehead for exacerbating tension and crisis with Russia. Russian officials believe that the escalatory potential in Dagestan alone represents the biggest threat to the integrity of the Russian

State since the Second World War. On January 6, 1998, Pyotr Marchenko, a plenipotentiary representative of the Russian president in Dagestan, noted that the Russian security services had accumulated evidence that foreign secret services and various terrorist organizations aimed to destabilize the situation in Dagestan by fuelling internecine strife. Determined to consolidate their control over the strategically and economically crucial Caucasus, the Islamists and their sponsoring states have resolved to escalate their terroristic jihad to achieve what no negotiations can deliver. Herein lies the quintessence of the grim prospects for the Caucasus. Significantly, the official Tehran media has urged Moscow to grant independence to the entire "independence-seeking North Caucasus region."<sup>4</sup>

### ***Manifestations of public violence***

There have been many cases of bombings and attacks in Dagestan. In January 1995, there was an attack on the cemetery in Makhachkala, and on February 12, 1995, a bomb was placed in the city of Buinaksk. Members of the Jewish community in Dagestan, located on the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus region of southern Russia, have been leaving the area in droves, mainly due to constant crimes committed against Jews. "There is virtually no Jewish family in town that has not been robbed during the last four years," says Ovadis Yakubov, a high-ranking Dagestani government official from Makhachkala. Crime rose dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union, and criminals often target Jews because of the popular belief that they are richer than the general population. Finally, according to the *Antisemitism World Report 1997*, on November 14 an inter-departmental conference at the procurator-general's office in Moscow noted: "The growing number of cases of incitement to racial, national and religious strife and spreading ideas of fascism in Russia very often do not meet with effective counteraction."

Yuri Zakharov, senior assistant to the Russian prosecutor-general, noted that as far back as 1991 there were 90 fascist-type organizations in Russia and 150 “printed editions” propagating similar ideas. However, he claims that these figures have since increased considerably. Prosecutors’ checks in 20 regions in 1996 revealed numerous neo-fascist organizations in Dagestan.<sup>5</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, remains plagued by a shortage of housing and glutted by relocations to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The renaissance of rabid antisemitism in the Russia, furthermore, has been an extensively documented phenomenon in recent Russian history, for example in the articles of the *Slavic Review*. In February 1990, the US House of Representatives and Senate both urged then President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union to: (1) publicly condemn the emergence of popular antisemitism in the Soviet Union; and (2) take whatever measures are necessary to protect Soviet Jews from acts of harassment and violence.<sup>6</sup>

### **On the ground in Ukraine**

Ukraine’s historical legacy demonstrates a continued propensity for periods of antisemitism. Under the impact of 19th-century Russification, Ukrainian culture remained largely a peasant, folk culture. Ukrainian history is spotted with massacres of Jews. The perpetrators of these massacres were regarded by Ukrainians as national heroes, and this gave rise to a popular tradition of antisemitism in which the Jews were identified with aliens and the hated Muscovite government. Jews, Russians, and later Communists were closely linked in public consciousness as integral components of the Russian oppression of Ukraine. Within this context, institutionalized antisemitism became a common element in expressions of Ukrainian nationalism. Suppressed in

the former Soviet Union, Ukrainian antisemitism emerged again as a feature of socio-political life in the independent but unstable Ukrainian republic.

According to the Library of Congress's *Area Handbook* for the (former) Soviet Union, the Orthodox peasantry joined the Ukrainian Cossacks in the mid-17th century in killing thousands of Jews. In 1648, Bogdan Khmel'nitski massacred thousands more in his popular uprising against the Polish-Russian nobility. In 1654, Russian armies and Ukrainian Cossacks eliminated an estimated half a million Jews and some 700 Jewish communities, and thousands more fled. Although Jews had been expelled from Russia proper in 1742, the subsequent incorporation of Polish territory by the 1790s vastly increased the size of Russia's Jewish community. Prohibited from living anywhere except in the Pale of Settlement, a western area of Imperial Russia, including most of Ukraine, where permanent Jewish residency was allowed, about 1.5 million Jews lived in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Nicholas I (1825-1855) conscripted Jews into the army for an enlistment period of 25 years (which was even extended briefly to 50 years) and demanded their compulsory instruction in the Christian religion. In 1843, expelled Kievan Jews migrated into a territorially reduced Pale of Settlement and witnessed further restrictions on their economic activities, including operating taverns. During the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881), Russia's intelligentsia largely condoned antisemitism in popular newspapers, such as *Novoye Vremya* (New Times), including the revival of the so-called Blood Libel in Kutais. After the 1881 assassination of Alexander II, Alexander III (1881-1894), reinvigorated the persecution of Jews. Government-sanctioned pogroms against Jewish communities, led by the ultranationalist Black Hundreds, numbered in the hundreds. Beginning in May 1882, Jews faced another series of antisemitic laws that reduced the territory of the Pale by a further 10 percent and further curtailed

Jewish activities outside the Pale, including expulsion from the civil service. After 1887, even within the Pale of Settlement, Jewish students were largely excluded from entering secondary schools. In 1891, roughly 20,000 Jews were expelled from Moscow into the Pale of Settlement. Nicholas II (1894-1917) hoped to deflect revolutionary movements by initiating a war with Japan abroad and pogroms at home. After months of violent antisemitic campaigns, a pogrom broke out in Kishinev in 1903. These campaigns culminated in a new wave of pogroms after the disastrous defeat of Russia by Japan. The Black Hundreds made no secret of their intention to rid Russia of its Jewish population.

Despite the revolutions of 1917 and the emergence of a successful Bolshevik regime, the residual presence of German troops and civil war reduced the former Pale of Settlement into a war zone. Several armies, armed gangs, and units, each with a different objective, entered the conflict. By early 1918, a Ukrainian army demanded an independent Ukraine, while the so-called White Armies (royalists) fought the Bolshevik government. Apart from these more organized armies, armed gangs of bandits under their own leaders (*atamans*) joined the fighting. Violence against Jews proved ubiquitous. Only the Red Army Command prohibited antisemitic violence and punished attackers. As the Red Army gained the upper hand over Ukraine, Ukrainian anti-Jewish violence escalated. The White Army also tolerated violence against Jews and Jewish property, brandishing the slogan "Strike at the Jews and Save Russia." When they retreated southward at the end of 1919, they vented their rage on Jewish communities along the way. Over the course of Russia's civil war, several thousand pogroms left an estimated half a million Jews homeless and as many as 100,000 dead.

The purges in the mid to late 1930s reduced the Jewish intelligentsia's participation in political life, particularly in the party's top echelons. The *Yevsektarii*, the Jewish sections of the Com-

munist Party, worked to discredit Zionist organizations, forced assimilation into Soviet society, closed synagogues, confiscated religious materials, closed Hebrew schools and confiscated Jewish printing presses.

The 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union signaled the beginning of the annihilation of Soviet Jewry, often assisted by collaborators among the native populations in the occupied territories who aided the Germans in killing Jews. Paradoxically, in Soviet territories that escaped German occupation, anti-semitism also re-emerged in the local population's resentment against the often better educated, wealthier Jews, who were evacuated there before the advancing German armies. Some Ukrainian nationalist forces welcomed the Nazi invaders as liberators and joined them in auxiliary units of the SS. Ukrainians also participated in the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto in April 1943, while Ukrainian auxiliary forces, militias, and Ukrainians in the SS participated directly in the killing units and in the operation of the extermination camps.

Appearing in Kiev in 1963, Trofim Kichko's *Iudaizm bez prikras* (Judaism without embellishment) attacked Zionism with images reminiscent of Nazi antisemitism, provoking sufficient international condemnation for its prohibition by the Soviet authorities in Moscow. Nevertheless, Ukrainian journalists and propagandists contributed to the officially sponsored anti-Zionist campaign, with its antisemitic excesses, from the late 1960s onwards.

According to the US Department of State's 1995 *Human Rights Report*, there is evidence of "serious ethnic tension ... in some parts of western Ukraine [against] the small Russian minority and Jewish groups ... [by] local Ukrainian ultranationalists." President Leonid Kuchma, meeting with leaders of the Ukrainian Jewish organizations in 1997, acknowledged the need to combat xenophobia and antisemitism. Reports on the meeting were published in numerous Ukrainian newspapers. Before the

Israeli Knesset (Parliament) that November, President Kuchma acknowledged the problem of antisemitism in Ukraine.

### ***Ultra-nationalists***

According to *Antisemitism Worldwide 1994* (1995), *Antisemitism Worldwide 1995/6* (1997), and *Antisemitism World Report* (1997), several ultra-nationalist organizations exist on the fringes of Ukrainian politics. The most prominent of these, the *Ukrainska natsionalna asambleya* (UNA, Ukrainian National Assembly), created a working alliance with other Russian ultra-nationalist parties, namely the *Narodnaya natsionalnaya partiya* (NNP, People's National Party), the *Natsionalno-respublikanskaya partiya* (NRP, National Republican Party), the *Natsionalno-bolshevistskaya partiya* (NBP, National Bolshevik Party), and the *Partiya slavyanskogo edinstva* (PSE, Party of Slavonic Unity). Together, these parties identified their principal enemy as "the cosmopolitan new world order with its imperialist dictatorship of the golden calf."

Ultra-nationalists took aggressive antisemitic positions. *Derzhavna samostiynist Ukraini* (DSU, State Independence of Ukraine), active since April 1990, held numerous demonstrations and organized pickets displaying slogans such as "Long live national dictatorship" and "Free passage to Tel Aviv for the Yids." The *Organizatsiya ukrainskikh natsionalistiv v Ukraine* (OUN, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine) openly regarded Freemasonry, Zionism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and Communism as enemies of Ukraine. In its January 1996 "Appeal to the Ukrainian nation," OUN xenophobia targeted Jews, Poles, and Russians. According to one OUN leader, political power in Ukraine was still in the hands of "Russians, Jews and their Ukrainian servants." In addition, the OUN regularly singled out the alleged influence of Jews in governing bodies, the military, business, the civil service, and

educational institutions. The OUN took special note of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which it alleged served a pro-Jewish agenda. The Sotsial-natsionalna partiya Ukrainy (SNPU, Social-National Party of Ukraine) proposed a Nazi-like doctrine of biological racism in accepting only those potential members who could be defined as “pure” Ukrainians. The Ukrainska konservativna respublikanska partiya (UKRP, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party), a mixture of left and right-wing radicalism, claimed that Russian and western “pro-Zionist imperialism” threatened Ukrainian national security. After being practically invisible in 1995, the Organizatsiya ukrainskikh idealistiv (OUI, Organization of Ukrainian Idealists) re-emerged in 1996 and held rallies and demonstrations mainly in western Ukraine, focusing on Lvov. Their slogans marked them out as Russophobes and antisemites.

### ***Manifestations of public violence***

According to *Antisemitism Worldwide 1995/6* (1997), antisemitic occurrences accompanied celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Vandals desecrated memorials to Jewish victims of Nazi oppression in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk and Jewish cemeteries and synagogues in Chernigov, Sevastopol, Droghobych, Lvov, and Kharkov. Bomb threats and harassment became common features of life for Jewish organizations and Jewish religious festivals. According to newspaper reports from Kiev *Nezavisimost* (April 19, 1997) and Zhytomyr *Panorama* (May 16, 1997), numerous gravestones were vandalized in the Jewish cemetery of Berdichev, one of Ukraine’s most important Jewish religious shrines. According to *Krymskiye izvestiya* (September 20, 1997), the building of the United Jewish Community of Crimea suffered damage from vandalism. In a report from November 1996, Joseph Zissels, Chairman of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine

(VAAD), added examples of other antisemitic displays. Vandals broke windows in the Jewish community in Simferopol in September 1996. Antisemitic slogans were heard during a labor demonstration in Odessa on October 17, 1996.

### ***Publications and media***

Articles with antisemitic content appear regularly in publications distributed by the extremist parties. The most virulently antisemitic material appears in *Neskorena natsiya* (Unconquered nation), a monthly newsletter published by the OUN in Lvov, and *Nezborima natsiya* (Invincible nation), the organ of the DSU in Kiev. Hundreds of antisemitic articles appeared in the pages of these two publications alleging a world Jewish conspiracy directed against Ukraine, Jewish theft of Ukrainian national assets and their removal to Israel and the United States, and Jewish sympathy and support for Ukraine's historical enemies, Russia and Poland. According to Alexandre Naiman, Director of the Kiev Branch of the Association for Jewish Studies and Culture, and Alina Polyak, the Poltava *Khleborab* has consistently printed "inflammatory antisemitic articles." In particular, the *Khleborab* explained Ukrainian poverty "according to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*." In another case, the *Khleborab* published an editorial claiming that "World Jewry, the leaders of Judo-Zionism, have made it their goal to exterminate the Ukrainians." Alongside seven newspapers in Lvov and one in Sumy, Kiev's *Vecherny Kiev* (Evening Kiev) and *Vseukrainskie Vedomosti* (All-Ukrainian News) regularly published antisemitic material.

### ***Conclusion***

Within a total population of 51.8 million, Ukraine's Jewish population stands at roughly 450,000 individuals residing primarily in Kiev, Lvov, and Kharkov. An institutionalized component

of Ukrainian history and socio-culture traditions, antisemitism manifests itself in several ways. First, Ukrainian culture and society shows a continued propensity to blend notions of race, religion, and ethnicity, while blurring distinctions between various Jewish groups, for example, non-religious ethnic groups versus orthodox groups. Second, economic and political instability evoked the emergence of ultra-nationalistic political groups as well as outbreaks of a more spontaneous nature, all clearly espousing antisemitic positions, for example in local and regional newspapers, and spontaneous outbreaks of public violence. Economic and political instability have fuelled Ukrainian nationalism and the search for scapegoats. Two minority groups in Ukraine have borne the brunt of this tension: Russians and Jews. Throughout the 1990s, examples of religious and ethnic persecution of Jews in Ukraine can be found in regional newspapers, positions espoused by political organizations and their spokespeople, and in random acts of violence against Jewish persons on account of their race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. President Kuchma publicly stated his awareness of the problem of antisemitism in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup>

## Notes

1. The endnotes for the various sections of this paper have been merged. Marshall Ingwerson, "Guns and Posses on the Road to Makhachkala," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 21, 1997. Judith Ingram, "Yeltsin

- Meets with Caucasus Leaders," *Associated Press*, March 10, 1998. See also the Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest (Prague), where the following articles can be found: "Mafia vs. Nomenclatura in Daghestan," *Bechernyaia Kazan*, May 30, 1995; "Duma Member Attacked in Dagestan," *Sovetskaia Rossia* (Moscow), August 24, 1995 and *Radio Mayak* (Moscow), August 15, 1995; and "Dagestan Wants to Return Chechen Refugees," *Izvestia* (Moscow), September 26, 1995.
2. Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnya and Dagestan* (1993). See also the *Neue Kaukasische Post. Nachrichtenblatt der Studiengruppe für gegenwartsbezogene Kaukasien-Forschung*, double issue no. 2-3 (May-December 1996); Nikolaus von Twickel's *Reportagen*. Thomas M. Barrett, "Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the North Caucasus," *Slavic Review* (Fall 1995). See also Marshall Ingwerson, "To Reach Caspian's Crude, the West Must Walk across Shards of Empires," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 22, 1997; Marie Benningsen-Broxup, ed., *The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World* (1992); M.A. Daniyalov, *Soviet Daghestan in Foreign Historiography* (1982); David Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR*, 2nd ed. (1982); Nora Levin, *The Jews of the Soviet Union Since 1917* (1988), 625.
  3. Darrell Slider, Vladimir Gimpel'son, and Sergei Chugrov, "Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections," *Slavic Review* (Fall 1994). See also Robert Chenciner, "The 1990 Elections in Daghestan," *Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle* 9(4) (1990): 4-7. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *News Online*, February 17, 1998. *Dharb-i-M'umin*, January 3, 1998, <http://www.taliban.com/war22.htm>. R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (1986). See also Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment* (1998); US Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook* (1997); US Department of State, *Human Rights Report: Russia* (1996). US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Weekend Passport* 4(33), October 31, 1997. *Newsletter*, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Graduate Training and Research Program on the Contemporary Caucasus (Fall 1996). Robert Bruce (Oxford University) and Enver Kisriev (Dagestan Research Center and advisor to the Chairman of the Dagestan Parliament) worked with Tatiana Chubrikova (Dagestan Pedagogical University and Senior Translator for the UN High Commissioner on Refugees) in composing this report.

4. See also Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, 2nd ed. (1986); R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (1986); and Alexandre Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (1985). Bruce Pannier, "Russia: Dagestan's Religious Tensions—Analysis," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 19, 1997. Vanora Bennett, "Islamic Fervor Unnerves Russia's South," *Los Angeles Times*, October 1997. Yossef Bodansky is the Director of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the US Congress, as well as World Terrorism Analyst with the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies (Houston, TX). In the 1980s, he acted as a senior consultant for the Department of Defense and the Department of State.
5. Roman Isaaevich Isaev's May 1995 report for the Russian-American Bureau on Human Rights (Union of Councils for Soviet Jews) and the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 3, 1997. *Antisemitism World Report* (1997).
6. US Congress, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, H. CON. RES. 264, February 7, 1990. See also Arkady Vaksberg, *Stalin against the Jews* (1994); Alfred D. Low, *Soviet Jewry and Soviet Policy* (1990); Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Jewry in the 1980s: The Politics of Anti-Semitism and Emigration and the Dynamics of Resettlement* (1989); and Nora Levin, *The Jews of the Soviet Union Since 1917* (1988).
7. Sources used for Ukraine include Amnesty International (<http://www.amnesty.org>); Anti-Defamation League (Washington, DC); Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine); Institute of Statehood and Democracy (Kiev, Ukraine); United Nations (New York); Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (Washington, DC); US Department of State (Washington, DC); *Jewish Press* (Brooklyn, NY), namely Alexander Naiman and Alina Polyak, "Anti-Semitism and the Ukrainian Press," January 12, 1996; *Kiev Post* (Kiev, Ukraine); *The Rukh Insider* (Kiev, Ukraine); *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Parsippany, NJ); *Die Welt* (Hamburg, Germany); as well as various published works, including *Antisemitism World Report* (1997); *Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1994* (1995); *Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1995/6* (1997); Elias Heifetz, *The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919* (1921); Hellmuth G. Bütow, ed., *Länderbericht Sowjetunion* (1988); Olexiy Kartunov, *Yellow-Blue Anti-Semitism: A Documental Story about the Anti-Semitic Activity of the Ukrainian Nationalists (1900-1980)* (1981); Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia* (New York: Macmillan, 1953); Trofim Kichko, *Iudaizm bez prikras* (Judaism without embellishment) (1963); Nora

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## **National Socialist Origins of Jihadist Antisemitism**

David Patterson\*

### **Nazi exterminationist antisemitism**

National Socialism emerged not only from the social, political, and other vicissitudes of modern Germany but also from the convergence of religious, philosophical, and cultural expressions of a millennial Jew-hatred. In 1922, Adolf Hitler told German journalist Josef Hell: “Once I am in power, my first and foremost task will be the annihilation of the Jews.”<sup>1</sup> He also declared to Hermann Rausching that, as Führer, his mission in life was to destroy the “tyrannical God of the Jews” and His “life-denying Ten Commandments.”<sup>2</sup> The object of extermination, then, was not only the Jews but also the teaching and testimony of Judaism—the Holy One Himself—that the Jews represent through their very presence in the world.

Central to the Jewish tradition that the Nazis set out to eradicate is a certain understanding of the human being. According to Judaism, all of humanity is interrelated, physically through Adam and metaphysically through the Creator, in whose image

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and likeness we are created. Each human being has infinite value, so that each of us has an infinite responsibility to and for the other. Nothing could be more antithetical to Nazi teaching. From the Nazi standpoint, two things determine the value of a human being: an accident of nature, whereby one is born an Aryan, and a will to power, whereby one determines the meaning and value of everything else. The Nazis, therefore, were not antisemites because they were racists; rather, they were racists because they were antisemites.

For the Nazis, “race” is not merely a biological or anthropological category—it is a *metaphysical* category: it is *Rassenseele*, or “race-soul,” as Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg explains: “Blood and character, race and soul are merely different designations for the same entity.”<sup>3</sup> According to Rosenberg, the Aryan *Geist*, the Aryan “mind” or “spirit,” “has been poisoned by Judaism,” and not merely by Jewish blood, for the -ism is in the blood.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, every Jew is a carrier of the contagion of Judaism, so that the extermination of the Jews must be total. Because the contagion is Judaism, the Nazis’ exterminationist antisemitism is about the obliteration of the Holy One who is at the center of Judaism. Because the God of Abraham is omnipresent, the assault on the God of Abraham has to be omnipresent. Nothing else can explain why in 1942 the Nazis trekked to Tromsø, Norway, 217 miles north of the Arctic Circle, to murder the seventeen Jews residing there; one does not venture into the Arctic out of economic envy, xenophobia, racial animosity, ethnic prejudice, or to find a scapegoat. Nazi antisemitism was about the usurpation of the divine throne of judgment, and that required the elimination of the millennial witnesses to the Divine Judge: the Jewish people.

In their assault on the God of Abraham the Nazis systematically murdered the ones closest to God, the holiest ones among the Jewish people: the children. It is well known that the Nazis slaughtered at least 67% of European Jewry; designated first targets, *more than 80% of the Jewish children of Europe were*

*murdered*. According to Jewish tradition, only the prayers of our children reach the ears of God, “for the outcry of children,” says Jacob ben Wolf Kranz, the Maggid of Dubno, “is formed by the breath of mouths unblemished by sin.”<sup>5</sup> The Talmud, moreover, teaches that all of Creation endures thanks to the breath of little children (*Shabbat* 119b). If the child sustains creation, the murder of the child is central to the war against the Creator.

Just as the *Shekhinah* or the Divine Presence, moreover, is associated with the community of Israel, so is she associated with prayers of Israel. Therefore the annihilation of the Divine Presence required the annihilation of prayer. On the eve of Tisha b’Av 5700 (1940), Chaim Kaplan writes in his diary: “Public prayer in these dangerous times is a forbidden act.... If you will, it is even sabotage, and anyone engaging in sabotage is subject to execution.”<sup>6</sup> Why sabotage? Because prayer affirms the divine authority behind the commandments of the Torah, beginning with the prohibition against murder. And wherever we encounter exterminationist antisemitism, we encounter the systematic elimination of the divine prohibition against murder.

Because the Nazis undertook an assault on the soul created in the image and likeness of the Holy One, they undertook an assault on the human relation from which the soul draws its breath. The head of a block in Buchenwald, in one of the most chilling lines in all of Holocaust literature, informed the young Eliezer in Wiesel’s *Night* that in the camp “there is no such thing as father, brother, friend. Each of us lives and dies alone.”<sup>7</sup> Says Primo Levi: “The struggle to survive is without respite, because everyone is desperately and ferociously alone.”<sup>8</sup> Yes: *ferociously* alone! And no one was more ferociously alone than the Muselmann, the undead skeletal denizen of Auschwitz, what Levi describes as “the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living; one hesitates to call their death.”<sup>9</sup>

If Auschwitz epitomizes the assault on God, the Muselmann embodies the essence of that assault.

The singularity of the Holocaust lies in its assault on the *singular sanctity* of every human being created in the image and likeness of the Holy One. This is what the exterminationist anti-semitic is anti-. This is what the Nazis set out to exterminate in the extermination of the Jews. And this is what the Nazis transmitted to the Islamic Jihadists who followed them. As the Führer hid in his bunker and prepared for his suicide, he penned his last political will and testament. He ended his last written words with a plea to the world to continue to “resist mercilessly the poisoner of all nations, international Jewry,”<sup>10</sup> a plea most profoundly heeded by the Islamic Jihadists.

## **The Muslim Brotherhood: Origins of Jihad**

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in March 1928, when Hasan al-Banna and five other brothers gathered to draft their creed: “Allah is our goal. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Death in the service of Allah is our highest desire.” With this affirmation of the essence of the Brotherhood, al-Banna turned to Hitler and found inspiration.<sup>11</sup> Hitler confirmed for him that Zionism is about establishing a base of operations for world domination.<sup>12</sup> Al-Banna said that he learned from Hitler the power of propaganda against the Jews,<sup>13</sup> as a means not of persuasion but of inciting hatred.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, for the Jihadists, the Jews *must* be hated and ultimately exterminated, as evil must be hated and exterminated; for the Jihadist it is a *holy act pleasing to God* and therefore a *religious duty*. Why? Because, for the Jihadist as for the Nazi, it is not just that all Jews are evil, but that all evil is Jewish.

From 1935 onward the Brotherhood sent delegations to the Nazis’ rallies in Nuremberg. In 1938 they held the Parliamentary Conference for Arab and Muslim Countries in Cairo, where they

distributed Arabic translations of *Mein Kampf* and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. With the outbreak of the war, the Nazis enjoyed their full support. When King Farouk granted asylum to Nazi war criminal Haj Amin al-Husseini on 20 June 1946, al-Banna hailed the former Mufti of Jerusalem as a hero and a great Jihadist. Indeed, al-Banna declared that “in Berlin he [al-Husseini] had been carrying out jihad [just as the Nazis had done].”<sup>15</sup> In al-Husseini, then, we have an important key.

### **Haj Amin al-Husseini: The Jihadist Nazi**

Haj Amin al-Husseini came to power after he had been tried in absentia and found guilty of inciting riots in Palestine in 1920; attempting to calm the Arab population, British mandate governor Herbert Samuel appointed him Mufti of Jerusalem on 8 May 1921. From 1933 onward he established such tight relations with the Nazis that they provided financial support for him to wage the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. On 13 October, once again wanted by the British for inciting riots, al-Husseini fled Palestine. Two years later, now on the Nazis' payroll, al-Husseini set up a base of operations in Baghdad, where on 3 April 1941 he led a coup against the British-backed government of Iraq. By the end of May, however, the British had suppressed the coup. Al-Husseini fled to Tehran but not before he managed to incite the slaughter of 600 Jews in Baghdad on 1 June 1941 in an action known as the Farhud.<sup>16</sup> Then on 28 November 1941 he had his first meeting with the Führer. Later he wrote: “Our fundamental condition for cooperating with Germany was a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world. I asked Hitler for an explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem.... The answer I got was: ‘The Jews are yours.’”<sup>17</sup> Once again we discover the bond between National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism: it is exterminationist antisemitism.

Soon after his conference with Hitler, al-Husseini met with

Eichmann, whereupon he “was informed of the plan concerning the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe,’”<sup>18</sup> a plan that suited his aim as Mufti to bring salvation to all the true believers of Islam, since he had always preached that murdering Jews pleases Allah and is essential to salvation. If it pleases Allah, then for Jihadist murderers killing Jews is not about “freeing Palestine” or driving out an “oppressor.” It is about serving God. And that makes it an absolute duty. Just as a Nazi cannot be a true Nazi without murdering Jews, so an Islamic Jihadist cannot be a true Muslim and therefore cannot enter Paradise without murdering Jews.

As early as January 1941, the Grossmufti, as the Germans called him, had gone to Bosnia to convince Muslim leaders that a Muslim SS division would bring honor and glory to the followers of Islam. Each battalion had its Imam and each regiment its Mullah. The Mufti set up a school for the Mullahs to indoctrinate them in the essential ties between the Nazis and the Jihadists. The largest of the Muslim killing units was the 13th Handschar Division of 21,065 men. Recruitment for the division began in February 1943. The commander, Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig, “reported that the Muslim recruits gladly adopted Nazi doctrine and even that ‘the Muslims, SS men in the Division, and the civilians are beginning to see in our Führer the mission of a second prophet,’ that is, one following Mohammed.”<sup>19</sup> The Division went into action in February 1944.

Soon after the Muslim Brotherhood gave al-Husseini a hero’s welcome in 1946, the Mufti took Yasser Arafat under his wing and brought in a former Nazi commando officer to teach Arafat “the fine points of guerilla warfare.”<sup>20</sup> Near the end of his life, in 2002, Arafat affirmed the decisive impact that al-Husseini had had on him throughout his life.<sup>21</sup> And so we see how the intricate web linking the Nazis to the Muslim Brotherhood, the PLO, and to other Jihadist movements too numerous to mention here finds its nexus in Haj Amin al-Husseini.

## **The PLO: Stepchild of the Nazis and the Muslim Brotherhood**

In October 1959, acting on the inspiration of al-Husseini, Yasser Arafat founded the Jihadist organization Fatah. On 29 May 1964, the Palestinian National Council drafted the Palestinian National Covenant to become the Palestinian Liberation Organization. On 2 February 1969, Arafat became the PLO's chairman. With the stated aim of destroying the Jew "in order to take his place,"<sup>22</sup> the PLO's Jihadist ideology, like Nazi ideology, allowed no room for negotiation; also like the Nazis, they were willing to give the appearance of negotiating in order to achieve the higher aim of annihilation, adopting what they called a "phased strategy."<sup>23</sup> The Palestinian Authority continues to cling to this strategy.

In July 1968, the PLO produced the final draft of its Charter.<sup>24</sup> Its ultimate aim, as stated in the Charter, is "the annihilation of the Zionist entity in all of its economic, political, military, and cultural manifestations."<sup>25</sup> Reminiscent of the Nazis, Article 4 of the Charter sets a racist tone, stating that "the Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children." Because "the destiny of the Arab nation and, indeed, Arab existence itself depend upon the destiny of the Palestine cause" (Article 14), the elimination of the Jews is not merely a political issue but an existential issue: just as the Jews threatened the existence and the essence of the Aryan nation, so they threaten the existence and the essence of the Arab nation.

Anything that might legitimize Jewish existence, then, must be debunked, which is the point of Article 20: "Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history." The Jews simply have *no place* in Palestine. Or better: they have no place, period. Such is the implication of Article 22, which states: "Israel is a constant source of threat vis-à-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole

world.” Yes, *the whole world*. Just as the Nazis would deliver humanity from the Jewish evil, so would the PLO save humankind. Therefore, said Arafat in 1972, *every Jew is a target*.<sup>26</sup> On 22 November 1974, the UN gave Arafat its blessing by welcoming the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians (by means of UN General Assembly Resolution 3236), whereupon PLO chief Salah Khalaf asserted: “An independent state on the West Bank and Gaza is the beginning of the final solution.”<sup>27</sup>

When Hamas was established in 1987, Arafat gave its leaders his blessing: “My brother Sheik Yassin, my holy brother Hadi Hunam, I cherish your participation in the struggle for the liberation of Palestine.”<sup>28</sup> One difference between the tactics employed by Hamas and the PLO, however, lies in the latter’s phased strategy, exemplified most dramatically with the signing of the Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993. In order to instill Palestinian children with rabid Jew hatred, Arafat saw to it that the agreement would allow the Palestinians to retain control over the curricula in their schools. Indeed, Efraim Karsh argues that “Arafat’s indoctrination of hatred among Palestinian children was unparalleled since Nazi Germany.”<sup>29</sup> Continuing to incorporate the Nazi discourse into the discourse of the PLO, Fatah leader Sakhr Habash commented on the Oslo agreement by saying that, once the Palestinians had control of Gaza and the West Bank, they would proceed to the “final solution,”<sup>30</sup> a statement that makes clear the ideological foundation of the PLO’s Jihadism that stems from the Nazis through Haj Amin al-Husseini.

## **Hamas: The Nazis’ heirs to the legacy of the *Protocols***

The Islamic Resistance Movement (*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya*), more widely known by its acronym Hamas, emerged as a militant Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood on

9 December 1987. The Movement was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his comrades Dr. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi and Mahmoud al-Zahar.<sup>31</sup> Born in Ashkelon in 1938, Yassin grew up in awe of Haj Amin al-Husseini.<sup>32</sup> He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1957 and in 1973 established the Islamic Congress in Gaza to expand the influence of the Brotherhood. Yassin embraced the Nazis' fundamental view that the Jews are "the dirtiest and meanest of all races, defiling the most sanctified and honored spot on earth," making "no distinctions between Jews, Zionists, and Israelis."<sup>33</sup> As in all ideology driven by Jew-hatred, from Hitler to Hamas, where the Jew is the enemy, Judaism is the enemy.

Noting quite correctly that Hamas represents a distinctively modern form of animosity toward Jews and Judaism, Beverly Milton-Edwards writes:

The Hamas view of the Jewish people is not drawn solely from the pages of the Qur'an and *hadith*. Its myopia is also the product of Western anti-Semitic [primarily Nazi] influences. While Hamas, like other modern-day Islamic Jihadists, has developed its argument on the Jewish question by relying on Qur'anic and other Islamic sources, it also ... [borrows] from such classical Western anti-Semitic sources as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, like other Islamic Jihadist movements, Hamas represents not a throwback to a "medieval mindset" but a distinctively modern, *exterminationist* mutation of Jew-hatred, fomented largely by Nazi ideology. As with Hitler and the Nazis, with Hamas exterminationist Jew-hatred forms a *definitive, foundational* basis for its entire worldview.

Ahmed Yassin was the head of Hamas until 22 March 2004, when the Israelis took him out. Rantisi succeeded him, only to meet the same fate on 18 April 2004. After Rantisi came Khalid Mashal. Mashal met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran on 27 May 2008 to shore up the alliance between

Hamas and Hezbollah. In 2006 Ismail Haniyeh was voted the leader of Hamas in Gaza. Like his predecessors, Haniyeh applies lessons learned from the Nazis on the use of propaganda to incite what Hitler called a “wrathful hatred” of the Jews. Nowhere is the linkage between National Socialist and Jihadist antisemitism more evident than in the Hamas charter. Drafted on 18 August 1988, it is deemed “The Charter of Allah”: the word of Hamas is the word of Allah.<sup>35</sup>

Article 1 states that Hamas is “based on the common coordinated and interdependent conceptions of the laws of the universe” and that it flows “in the stream of destiny.” Thus, according to *the laws of the universe* and the order of *destiny*, which is the will of Allah, the Jews must be exterminated. Indeed, a key to the universal rule of Islam is the universal extermination of the Jews, a position justified by Article 7’s invocation of a teaching of the Prophet himself found in the al-Bukhari hadith no. 3593:

The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, has said: “The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say, ‘O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.’”

Nature itself rebels against the existence of the Jews: nature itself, therefore, requires the eradication of the Jews.

Article 11 demonstrates that Hamas can allow no compromise on the status of Palestine, for the presence of the Jews is not only unnatural—it is unholy. The issue of Palestine, then, is not about politics or economics—it is about holiness and truth, something that no government or ruler can negotiate. To ask a Muslim to negotiate peace with the Jews is to ask him to renounce Islam. Therefore, according to Article 13, “initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion.” Because the extermination of the Jews is a

divine directive, Article 15 ends with the refrain from the al-Bukhari hadith: “I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill”<sup>36</sup>—assault and kill the Jews.

Just as the Nazis carefully shaped the minds of the young, so Article 16 underscores the importance of “forming the thoughts and faith of the Moslem student”; just as the Nazis used a thorough knowledge of the Jews in their assault on the soul of Israel, so Article 16 calls for “a comprehensive study of the enemy [the Jew].” Because Jihad is not just a tactical war but a holy war, this call to know the Jew is for the purpose not only of winning battles against the body of Israel but, above all, of destroying the teaching, tradition, and testimony that the Jews represent by their very presence in the world. Thus one sees that the Jihadists have taken Hitler’s assertion in *Mein Kampf* to heart: “Only the greatness of the sacrifices,” said the Führer, “will win new fighters for the cause.”<sup>37</sup> To be sure, understanding their struggle as a holy war, they take this idea to a level that even the Nazis failed to attain. What sacrifice is greater than child sacrifice? If the Nazis captured the souls of their children, the Jihadists destroy them by training them not just for sacrifice but for murder. For the duty of a good Muslim mother toward her children is “to teach them to perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of fighting awaiting them” (Article 18). Like the ancient idolaters against whom God warned the Israelites (Deuteronomy 18:10), they pass their children through fire by making them into sacrificial offerings consumed by the flames of their bombs.

Elaborating on Hitler’s insistence that the Jew is an “invisible wirepuller” who by stealth conspires to rule the world,<sup>38</sup> Article 22 states:

[The Jews] took control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others.... They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions.... With their money they

formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there.... They were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate.... They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II.... It was they who instigated the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it.

In a word, the Jew is the hidden source of every evil, and Hamas is the salvation of humanity from the Zionist invasion not of Palestine but of the world.

Here, Article 28 of the Charter of Allah is worth quoting:

The Zionist invasion [of the world] is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using *all evil* and contemptible ways to achieve its end.... They aim at undermining societies, *destroying values*, corrupting consciences, *deteriorating character* and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion.... *Israel, Judaism and Jews* challenge Islam and the Moslem people. [emphasis added]

Here too we see the metaphysical dimensions of the Jihadist assault on the *Jews and Judaism*, both of which they associate with evil *as such*. Hence, in keeping with National Socialist ideology, the Jews, unlike the rest of humanity, *can be neither redeemed nor rehabilitated*.

In Article 32 of the Charter of Allah we have yet another borrowing from National Socialism: "After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to

further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.” To leave off this struggle against the Jewish evil would be to betray Allah. Continuing this theme of the betrayal of Allah, Article 34 invokes the words of Allah: “Say unto those who believe not, Ye shall be overcome, and thrown together into hell” (Qur’an 3:12), adding, “This is the only way to liberate Palestine.” Indeed, according to Hamas, casting the Jews into hell is the only way to liberate humanity.

## Ramifications and summation

One of the primary threads tying National Socialist antisemitism to Jihadist antisemitism is the metaphysical thread that comes to bear with the description of the Jew as the “invisible wirepuller.” Casting the Jew in the metaphysical category of an invisible evil, both Hitler and the Jihadists render the Jew as invisible as Satan. Rendering the Jew invisible, they transform the Jew into a ubiquitous threat, and the effort to eradicate the evil must be equally ubiquitous. Finally, given the invisibility of the evil, one cannot be certain of its defeat until Hitler or Hamas has become the ruler of all humanity, which is, indeed, the stated aim of the Islamic Jihadists.<sup>39</sup> Like the Nazi war against the Jews, then, the Jihadist war against the Jews is far more than a war against the “Zionist entity.” Transcending political contingencies or issues of racism, scapegoating, or xenophobia, it is a metaphysical war, as evidenced by a speech given on 17 January 2009 on Egypt’s Al-Rahma television by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub: “If the Jews left Palestine to us, would we start loving them? ... The Jews are infidels—not because I say so ... but because ... Allah ... said that they are infidels.... They are enemies not because they occupied Palestine. They would have been enemies even if they did not occupy a thing.... Our fighting with the Jews is eternal ... until not a single Jew remains on the face of the Earth”<sup>40</sup>—this in the name of God.

If the Jihadist bible is the Qur'an, and not *Mein Kampf*, then the Jihadist evil transcends (if possible!) the Nazi evil, inasmuch as the Qur'an is *scripture*, a revelation from God, and not just the pronouncements of the Führer, no matter how godlike he may be. By *usurping* God, the Nazis usurped the absolute obligation imposed from beyond, so that the will and imagination from *within* posed the only limits to their actions. Hence the Nazis did not do what was unimaginable—they did everything imaginable. By contrast, by *appropriating* God, the Jihadists appropriate the authority to impose from beyond what they have determined to be the will of Allah, which is not a matter of human will but an absolute obligation. There we have the nuanced difference between how this evil defined the Holocaust then and how it seeks to bring about another Holocaust now.

## Notes

1. Quoted in Stephen E. Atkins, *Holocaust Denial as an International Movement* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), 29.
2. Quoted in Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin, *Why the Jews? The Reason for Antisemitism* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 16.
3. Quoted in Max Weinreich, *Hitler's Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany's Crimes against the Jewish People* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 26 (*italics in the original*).
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## **Musical Interventions in Antisemitism Studies: On the Example of Compositions Commemorating the Holocaust**

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Antisemitism adopts many faces and takes on many masks. It also has many antecedents and entails many consequences as, for example, those irreversibly connected with the ultimate experience of the Holocaust.<sup>1</sup> Teaching about the Holocaust—regardless of whether to primary school students, undergraduates, or adults—serves as a reminder of the atrocious effects of the radicalization of antisemitic attitudes. While the universal character of the Holocaust has been widely recognized, several authors still stress its close relationship with antisemitism, underlining that the Jews not only tend to be most vocal about their Holocaust experience<sup>2</sup> but also claiming that the “Jews were the unique population targeted to the last man, woman and child for complete extermination.”<sup>3</sup> Pointing at these Jewish contexts of commemorating the Holocaust, some scholars even talk about “Jewish exclusivism”<sup>4</sup> as a model of remembering the Holocaust by commemorating the deaths of Jewish people whose cruel persecution followed the solidification of antisemitic tendencies.

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The growing distance—predominantly temporal but also mental—from the atrocities of the Holocaust allows for more space for reflection and provokes an increase in their artistically elaborated representations, even the “proliferation of imaginative acts.”<sup>5</sup> Harnessing these artistic acts for the needs of the educational process during which the meanders of antisemitism are discussed and approximated can be treated as a highly stimulating alternative teaching formula in antisemitism education, which is usually dominated by (historical) narratives. Thus it can prove exceptionally useful while also appealing to the emotions and imagination of students. That sonic method should be particularly seriously considered for classes that address sensitive topics. For example, studying the Holocaust invariably touches upon moral implications and ethical realities.<sup>6</sup> By responding to the prevailing social climate and answering the needs and expectations of contemporary society, Holocaust education “raises issues that are critically important”<sup>7</sup> by fostering fundamental awareness of antisemitism and its consequences. On the methodological level, it is still very complicated, among others issues, to bridge the aforementioned temporal—but also geographical and mental—distance, which “only increases the problem of conceptualization and communicability.”<sup>8</sup> Instructors need to identify *a priori* which “aspects of the story are told, what questions persist, what layers remain unemployed”<sup>9</sup> to be able to cast more light on the phenomenon—in both the historical and contemporary contexts. Finally, given the “radical generational shifts in transmission,”<sup>10</sup> it remains to be determined how these issues are to be conceptualized, conveyed, and presented in the educational process.

## **Music as an educational medium**

Many educators and scholars point out that one of the problems they often encounter is, broadly speaking, the insufficiency of

linguistic means to describe the experience of the Holocaust. At the same time, it can be noted that the language of the arts, and especially of music, which remains semantically ambiguous, offers quite a unique chance of expressing the inexpressible. Unsurprisingly, then, the ultimate experience of the Holocaust impacted the sensibility of many artists, such as composers for whom the dramatic events of the Holocaust functioned as the catalyst of their artistic expression. The compositions dedicated to Holocaust victims can, or even should, be incorporated into *Holocaust education*.<sup>11</sup> This has been recognized by various instructors, including Ludmilla Leibman, the author of *Teaching the Holocaust Through Music* (1999),<sup>12</sup> who maintain that teaching cultural respect and racial tolerance can be facilitated by means of music. Yet, it seems that the problematics of the musical aids to be harnessed during classes dedicated to anti-semitism are still under-researched. Hence this paper offers a few practical suggestions on how to tackle this difficult subject by referring to musical compositions.

## **Musical intervention**

Appropriately employed, musical examples can prove to be an efficient didactic tool that awakens the curiosity and interest of students. For educational purposes, short fragments (e.g. up to three minutes long) of carefully selected compositions can be prepared and accompanied by a set of pre-designed activities of various kinds. This format—labeled as musical intervention—is thought to counterbalance the abundance of factual information whose assimilation demands a high level of attention from students. Musical interventions can be introduced as a response to the realization of the need for new spaces of creativity, adeptly and efficiently enriching the educational process on the perceptual level. Their power lies then not only in their purely musical—aesthetic—values, but also in their ability to foster the

communication of knowledge. Musical interventions provide the possibility of free expression and promote independent observation of ideas, while carefully steering the curiosity of students toward those issues that the teacher actually intends to discuss. Hence musical interventions work as incentives, encouraging the circulation of knowledge and facilitating communication routines while following the dynamics unfolding during a particular class.

As a source of productive stimulation, musical interventions nurture intertextual relations since they exist in the proximity—vis-à-vis—of other didactic forms. Their specific trademark, aside sonicity, is their capability to encompass a multitude of ideas within a considerably short format. Musical intervention can be designed as abbreviations of the topics discussed but may also be treated as supplements to a given education module. Consequently, their role may sometimes be perceived as secondary, which carries the stigma of minor or inferior, or even marginalized if the normative weight is shifted toward the narrative defined as the main text. Often, musical interventions remain subordinate to the main narrative and are thus considered as ancillary on a par with other small forms which are based on the densification of the material, its condensation, perhaps ellipsis.<sup>13</sup> The advantage of musical interventions is connected rather to their compressed and emphatic format, as well as their quick application. They can be easily interwoven into other activities, as their figurations can be easily recombined in order to smoothly coexist with other elements of the didactic process.

Sketchy and impressionistic, even ephemeral and provisional, but lyrically dense and conceptually concentrated, and thus profoundly allegorical, musical interventions amplify the idea of each lesson, especially if the musical examples they feature are appropriately chosen (i.e. taking into account the students' age, anticipations, and so forth). The selection of musical interventions is conditioned by aesthetic and pragmatic factors, which are both independent and interdependent. Despite several

constraints narrowing the number of compositions suitable for musical interventions, such as the implied message or purely musical aspects (i.e. genre, instrumental arrangement, etc.), there still exists a wide and diversified spectrum of choices. The genre of the composition from which the sonic examples are extracted may presuppose, or even impose, the didactic convention—for example, parts of operas or oratorios can be easily adapted to role-playing exercises. Similar if not identical didactic tools can be used with different musical genres, attesting to the flexibility and versatility of musical interventions in this area. Their handiness and attractiveness as educational instruments is also connected to their ability to form alliances with other media, such as films. Musical interventions can be introduced via portable devices (e.g. mobile phones or CD players) or through larger sound systems.

The special status of musical interventions as didactic tools comes mostly from their ability to ease constraints of time and space and evoke emotional reactions that may greatly enhance the educational process.

## **Original accounts set to music**

Musical compositions commemorating the Holocaust do not only transmit cultural memory but also capture emotions associated with that trauma. Although encapsulated, these emotions may be triggered and re-enacted thus making the history even more meaningful.<sup>14</sup> Musical interventions can be treated as invitations to further investigate complicated issues, usually validated by evidence and research. However, while the actual information, such as facts and dates, delivered during the class may be interpreted differently depending on the students,<sup>15</sup> the emotions evoked during musical interventions can help to personalize the accumulated knowledge and facilitate the internalization of certain concepts by students.

In the long run, musical interventions are thought to ease the constraints of time, space, and different attitudes by referring to authentic emotions. Experiencing these emotions while listening to music is an act that transcends national or geographical borders. From a practical perspective, the selection of appropriate compositions (e.g. those suiting the needs of a given class) should be based on several factors, including musical language, level of symbolism, and so forth, as attested by Steve Reich's composition *Different Trains* (1988). This composition commemorates the Holocaust in general, on the one hand, while referring to Reich's personal memories from his childhood, on the other. From a broader perspective, it also discusses antisemitism as an ideological danger threatening both millions of people and every single person. The title of the composition refers to real trains, and yet they are treated highly metaphorically as allegories for human life. Accordingly, the students need to understand that as an adolescent boy in the years 1939-1942, the composer often commuted between the homes of his divorced parents on American trains. However, that seemingly banal activity, as remembered in the composition, is contrasted with Reich's discovery that—as a Jewish boy he would have probably found himself on a different train had he been born in Europe, namely a prison train transporting Jews to concentration camps. Reich's message is magnified by the authenticity of the lyrics he used, which were based on the testimonies of Holocaust survivors. Additionally, he introduced several disturbing noises such as air raid sirens, train whistles, and so forth. If chosen as a musical intervention, *Different Trains* (or fragments of it) should be listened to with guidance, in that the story behind the origin of the piece ought to be explained. The activities accompanying the act of listening can include answering questions connected to the countries depicted or identifying sonic signals and their meanings. Students can be asked to name these additional sounds and encouraged to reflect on the feelings they elicit as interwoven

into the musical piece. Since *Different Trains* is “quite an achievement as an example of imageconjuring music,”<sup>16</sup> the musical interventions based on that composition can be accompanied by various pictures.

*Different Trains* tells a universal story through the prism of a particular person, and the personalization of the experience of antisemitism as an individual tragedy thus appeals to the emotions of listeners. In that respect, a similar piece is the oratorio *A Child of Our Time* (1944) by Michael Tippett (1905–1998)—arguably his best known work—which was conceived as a “response to ... outrage at the world’s apathy to the plight of Jewish refugees”<sup>17</sup> and presents the effects of German antisemitism and the Nazi belief that “Jews were responsible for all the evil.”<sup>18</sup> The composition features a story based on the life of Herschel Grynszpan (1921–1942), a Polish Jew born in Germany who escaped to France as a teenager. There, in the act of despair, unable to fight prejudices and bureaucratic obstacles, he killed a German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath. In a veiled, even allusive way, Tippett’s composition follows the biography of Grynszpan. While listening to the piece students may be asked to decipher the ambiguous descriptions appearing in the oratorio and match them with actual events from Grynszpan’s life. For example, in the composition, Paris is referred to as “a great city,” and Grynszpan himself is introduced as “the boy,” while vom Rath is presented as “the official.” The question can be posed as to why all these details were camouflaged, and the discussion can focus on the universality and singularity of the antisemitic experience.

The emotional response is often amplified during musical interventions when they are based on original testimonies of Holocaust survivors. In such instances, students may possibly identify with the suffering of those persecuted as the result of the radicalization of antisemitic discourses. Original words featured in musical compositions become a very powerful tool that triggers various emotions, such as feelings of empathy. Accordingly,

several compositions commemorating the Holocaust make use of human voices to present such original accounts. For example, Arnold Schoenberg's *A Survivor from Warsaw* (1947) can be chosen as both an artistic interpretation of the events and the original musical testimony of the composer-witness.<sup>19</sup> Also, the dodecaphonic *Requiem* (1945-1948) by Roman Palester (1907-1989) sets to music the story of a survivor from the Warsaw Ghetto while interweaving sonic illustrations such as cries and commands. Krzysztof Penderecki's *Brygada Śmierci* (Brigade of Death) (1963) is the musical realization of the wartime diary of a young Jew, Leon Weliczker (1925-2009), that was published immediately after the war. The sonoristic oratorium *Dies irae* (1967) also makes use of several sonic interventions, including cries and whistles. The large-scale composition *Holocaust Memorial Cantata* (1992) by Marta Ptaszyńska (b. 1943), which was written to the poem *Chant for All the People on Earth* by American poet and WWII-veteran Leslie Woolf Hedley (1921-2013), abounds with genuinely affecting moments. One of these is the lyrical a cappella chorus, "May I become less than nothing," which is contrasted by the dissonant orchestral opening. The piece conveys a dark, even somber, mood built up on clusters and counterpoint passages highlighted by the slow tempos. Students may be asked to find as many terms as possible to describe the atmosphere evoked by the piece (e.g. nightmarish, gnawing, or troubling). Ptaszyńska originally dedicated her work to the victims of the Holocaust, but on the suggestion of Yehudi Menuhin (1916-1999) she decided in 1993 to commemorate all victims of the murderous ideologies of the 20th century.

## Music as a tool for raising historical awareness

Finally, the emotional charge of original compositions by Holocaust victims and survivors—often in the form of songs—makes them ideal for musical interventions. Many educators believe

that when leaving aside the propagandistic purposes of music such compositions can be treated as pedagogical tools.<sup>20</sup> While working with these compositions, students are shown musical traditions cultivated by Jews and are made aware that in the anti-semitic discourse Jews were often accused of lacking their own music. There exist a number of (printed) musical manuscripts with songs by Jewish Holocaust survivors from ghettos and concentration camps that provide reliable and historically valid materials that can be used in the classroom. These collections include lullabies, folk songs, partisan songs, death marches, and much more. Hence, activities designed for musical interventions can encompass listening, analyzing, or re-creating songs (e.g. reading out the lyrics individually or in groups). Other exercises may include matching particular songs with pictures provided by the teacher, thinking of the possible circumstances in which the pieces originated and were performed, and so forth.

The importance of featuring compositions by Jewish composers in musical interventions also derives from various attempts to deny the musical talents of the Jewish people. For example, the forerunner of antisemitic philology, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), insisted on “the absence of creativity as a key component of the Jews’ mental physiognomy.”<sup>21</sup> The same applies to Richard Wagner (1813-1883), who in an infamous tract on Judaism in music claimed that Jews were incapable of producing any original music. In *Das Judenthum in der Musik* (1850), which was strongly influenced by the thinking of Ludwig Feuerbach, Wagner explicitly accused the Jews of being unable to produce any genuine art and thus of being unable to contribute to the development of high culture.<sup>22</sup> According to Wagner, Jewish music manifested only in “the ceremonial music of their Jehova rite”<sup>23</sup> and the only site of Jewish music was the synagogue. Since medieval times, Jews were blamed for producing noise instead of harmonious music<sup>24</sup> and for being predominantly, if not solely, interested in the financial aspects of producing art.<sup>25</sup> As “descendants—or

predecessors—of Hermes (Mercury),”<sup>26</sup> they were supposedly only interested in mercuriality and impermanence.<sup>27</sup>

In an increasingly antisemitic discourse, Jews were accused of a complete lack of a creative imagination<sup>28</sup> “primarily associated with central Europe, above all nineteenth-century Germany.”<sup>29</sup> In German speaking circles, Jews were perceived as shallow and completely devoid of profundity, while genuinely gifted Jewish artists—especially musicians—fell prey to the racial stereotype that Jews were unable to soar to the higher levels of artistic expression. It was believed that they could be skillful as artisans but that they would never achieve the status of real artists. Jews were described as capable of acquiring the musical language of the country in which they lived,<sup>30</sup> but they were still believed to be too incompetent to create authentic music and participate in the production of valuable art.

Musical antisemitism dwelt on the concept of Jews as an artless nation, despite the fact that among Jews

music ... has become the essential form of art, a real folk art. This seems to be the reason why Jews became active in the field of music when they entered the European art development at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It produced many significant composers. And it is once again interesting to see that composers, again and again, conspicuously and unconsciously, reach back to Jewish themes, to chords and melodies of their people. They know instinctively that here are the roots of their strength and that they can only blossom if they nurture and develop this ancestral gift.<sup>31</sup>

Unfavorable musical stereotypes were sharpened by the antisemitic atmosphere in turn-of-the-century Vienna. Several Jewish musicians fell prey to its effect, including Gustav Mahler (1860-1911),<sup>32</sup> Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951), Alban Berg (1885-1935), and Anton Webern (1883-1945). Their music, hailed as modern, was strongly opposed,<sup>33</sup> and Schoenberg was portrayed as a clown and swindler<sup>34</sup> whose ideas of emancipating the dissonance

provided the ultimate proof of Jewish predilections for noise. Following Adolf Hitler's seizure of power, the Nazis willingly accused Jews of corrupting music. Jews, who "thrived in the liberal, secular, commercial, urban context ... came to be seen as ... a corrupting, conspiring outsider, an insidious agent of dissolution."<sup>35</sup> While atonal music was still associated with Jews, it was now tagged as devilish,<sup>36</sup> while jazz was seen as Jewish entertainment<sup>37</sup> and was officially condemned "as a modern form of St Vitus's dance, which originally arose as a hybrid cultural product of two races singing for a lost homeland, the Jews and America's negroid population."<sup>38</sup> Such antisemitic antipathies were also apparent in concentration camps where orchestras composed of Jewish musicians were described as "Semitic orchestras."<sup>39</sup>

In the contemporary world, finally, antisemitic tendencies still emerge in the realm of popular music. Examples include the so-called white power music genre, which follows the aesthetics of "hate music"<sup>40</sup> and upholds Aryan values.<sup>41</sup> Anti-Jewish hatred is displayed in the lyrics, pictures, and images used in this music, as well as in its gestures and camouflaged messages.<sup>42</sup> Hence teaching about antisemitism in the contemporary world should also refer to musical culture and include examples from this genre as musical interventions.<sup>43</sup>

Suggestions on how to conceptualize and prepare the kinds of musical interventions discussed in this paper are to be treated as an invitation to design a wide variety of similar small forms that can be further elaborated and/or redesigned. Appropriately planned and designed musical interventions can be strategically valuable as didactic instruments offering a platform for free discussion. In a manner that is both meaningful and emotionally charged, musical interventions can facilitate the process of education about various forms of antisemitism and the many faces and masks it adopts.

## Notes

1. Claude R. Foster, "Historical Antecedents: Why the Holocaust?," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 450 (1980): 1.
2. In the opinion of many scholars, memory wars between various victim groups should be left behind in favor of a new paradigm in which the narratives of one group ought to facilitate the public recognition of the victimhood of other groups. See Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 118.
3. Janina Bauman, "Demons of Other People's Fear: The Plight of the Gypsies," in Sandro Fridlizius and Abby Peterson, eds., *Stranger or Guest? Racism and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1996), 85.
4. Yosefa Loshitzky, "Quintessential Strangers: The Representation of Romanies and Jews in Some Holocaust Films," *Framework* 44(2) (2003): 58.
5. R. Clifton Spargo, "On the Cultural Continuities of Literary Representation," in Robert Ehrenreich and R. Clifton Spargo, eds., *After Representation? The Holocaust, Literature, and Culture* (New Brunswick and Washington, DC: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 7.
6. David H. Lindquist, "Meeting a Moral Imperative: A Rationale for Teaching the Holocaust," *The Clearing House* 84(1) (2011): 26.
7. *Ibid.*, at 26.
8. Marianne Hirsch and Irene Kacandes, *Teaching the Representation of the Holocaust* (New York: Modern Language Association, 2004), 4.
9. *Ibid.*, at 2.
10. *Ibid.*
11. See Roselle Chartock, "Including Music in a Study of the Holocaust," in Samuel Totten and Stephen Feinberg, eds., *Teaching and Studying the Holocaust* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 280-303.
12. She also taught the academic course "Music of the Holocaust" at Boston University from 2001 to 2009.
13. The term "small forms" can be compared to "simple forms" as suggested in André Jolles, *Einfache Formen. Legende, Sage, Mythe, Rätsel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabile, Märchen, Witz* (Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1930).
14. Elizabeth Jelin and Susan G. Kaufman, "Layers of Memories: Twenty Years after in Argentina," in T.G. Ashplat, Graham Dawson, and

- Michael Roper, eds., *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 89-110.
15. Omer Bartob, *The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath* (Hove: Psychology Press, 2000), vii.
16. See Stefan Beyst, "Steve Reich's Different Trains: Narrative Music," June 2012, <http://dsites.net/english/reichtrains.htm#boven>.
17. See Dave Kopplin, "A Child of Our Time," March 23, 2017, <https://www.hollywoodbowl.com/musicdb/pieces/875/a-child-of-our-time>.
18. David A. McConnell, "'I Would Know My Shadow and My Light': An Examination of Sir Michael Tippett's 'A Child of Our Time,'" *The Choral Journal* 51(4) (2010): 13.
19. Amy Lynn Wlodarski, *Musical Witness and Holocaust Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
20. Samuel Totten and Stephen Feinberg, *Teaching and Studying the Holocaust* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 286.
21. Jay Geller, "Of Mice and Mensa: Anti-Semitism and the Jewish Genius," *The Centennial Review* 38(2) (1994): 364.
22. Albert Goldman and Evert Sprinchorn, eds., *Wagner on Music and Drama* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1964), 55.
23. Ibid.
24. For more on this subject, see Ruth HaCohen, *The Music Libel Against the Jews* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).
25. Kalman P. Bland, *The Artless Jew: Medieval and Modern Affirmations and Denials of the Visual* (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 26.
26. Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7.
27. Ibid., at 8.
28. Ernest Renan, *Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques* (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1863).
29. James Loeffler, "Richard Wagner's 'Jewish Music': Antisemitism and Aesthetics in Modern Jewish Culture," *Jewish Social Studies* 15(2) (2009): 4.
30. Albert Goldman and Evert Sprinchorn, eds., *Wagner on Music and Drama* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1964), 55: "The Jew has never had an art of his own."
31. Martin Buber, "Address on Jewish Art," quoted in translation in Gilya G. Schmidt, ed., *The First Buber: Youthful Zionist Writings of Martin Buber* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 53-54.

32. Leon Botstein, *Judentum und Modernität* (Vienna/Cologne: Böhlau, 1991), 136.
33. Ben Winters, *Erich Wolfgang Korngold's The Adventure of Robin Hood: A Film Score Guide* (Lanham, MA: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 19.
34. Leon Botstein, *Judentum und Modernität* (Vienna/Cologne: Böhlau, 1991), 132.
35. Alex Kurtagic, "Black Metal: Conservative Revolution in Modern Popular Culture," *The Occidental Quarterly* 10(1) (2010): 30.
36. Alfred Rosenberg, *Gestaltung der Idee* (Munich: NSDAP-Verlag, 1940), 337.
37. See Joseph Wulf, *Musik im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1963), 406-408.
38. Roger Griffin, "This Fortress Built Against Infection: The BUF Vision of Britain's Theatrical and Musical Renaissance," in Julie V. Gottlieb and Thomas P. Linehan, eds., *The Culture of Fascism Visions of the Far Right in Britain* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 54.
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40. Keith Kahn-Harris, "The Aesthetics of Hate Music," Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2004, <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-eur76>.
41. Robert Futrell, Pete Simi, and Simon Gottschalk, "Understanding Music in Movements: The White Power Music Scene," *Sociological Quarterly* 47(2) (2006): 281.
42. Wolfgang Benz, *Was ist Antisemitismus?* (Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2004), 235: "Die Vorurteile der Judenfeindschaft werden durch Sprache, Bilder, Gesten und Einverständnis transportiert."
43. See Lorry Stillman, *The Spirit That Moves Us: Using Literature, Art, and Music to Teach about the Holocaust at the Secondary and College Level*, vol. 3 (Gardiner, ME: Tilbury House Publishers, 2001).